THE REDUCTION OF A DIGRESSOR OR *Rich. Baxter's* REPLY TO Mr *George Kendall's* DIGRESSION

in his Book against

Mr *GOODWIN.*

Job 42.3. *Who is he that hideth Counsel without Knowledge? Therefore have I uttered that I understood not, things too wonderfull for me, which I knew not.*

Rom. 11.33. *O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgements, and his waies past finding out!*

Nam quomodo intellectu Deum capit homo, qui ipsum intellectum suum, quo Eum vult capere, nondum capit? *Augustin. de Trinitate*, l. 5. c. 1.

LONDON,

Printed by *A. M.* for *Thomas Underhill*, at the Anchor and Bible in *Pauls* Church-yard near the little North-door, and *Francis Tyton*, at the three Daggers in Fleetstreet near *Dunstans* Church. 1654.

Nazianzen. *Orat.* 29. *pag.* 493. Edit. Morelli.

Εἰ δὲ πολυπραγμονεῖς τὸν γέννησιν καὶ πνεύματος πρόοδον, &c.

QUod ſi in filii generatione & Spiritus proceſſione perveſtigandâ curioſum te præbes, ego quoq; pari curioſitate tuam animæ corporiſq; conjunctionem & temperamentum inquiram: Quomodo pulvis es, & Dei Imago? Quid eſt quod te moveat? aut quid quod moveatur? Quomodo idem movet & movetur? Quomodo ſenſus in eodem manet, & externa attrahit? Quomodo mens in te manet, & in alia mente ſermonem gignit? Quo modo cogitatio per ſermonem impertitur? Nondum majora profero; Quæ cæli converſio? quis ſyderum motus, & ordo? aut modus? quæ conjunctio aut diſtantia? qui maris termini? unde venti profluant? unde partim anni revolutiones, aut pluviarum effuſiones? Si nihil horum intellectu percepiſti, ô homo, (percipies autem fortaſſe aliquando cum perfectionem conſecutus fueris & ut conjicere poſſimus ea quæ nunc cernimus, non veritatem ipſam eſſe, ſed quædam duntaxat veritatis ſimulachra) ſi teipſum non noſti, quiſquis es qui de his rebus diſputas, ſi hæc nondum intellectu comprehendiſti, quorum ſenſus ipſe teſtis eſt, quo tandem modo Quid, & Quantus ſit Deus, te certò tenere ac ſcire arbitraris? Magnæ profectò id ſtultitiæ eſt. Quocirca ſiquid mihi obtemperas, hoc eſt Theologo minimè audaci, ut nonnulla jam percepiſti, ita ea quæ ſuperſunt ut percipias, roga, precibuſq; contende. Ea parte quæ in te manet contentus eſto: reliqua in ſupernis theſauris recondita maneat. Per vitæ probitatem aſcende: per purgationem, eum qui purus eſt adipiſcere. Vis Theologus aliquando fieri, ac divinitate dignus? Mandata ſerva: per Dei præcepta incede (actio enim gradus eſt ad contemplationem) ex corpore operam animæ nava. An quiſquam eſt mortalium qui ad eam ſublimitatem efferri poſſit, ut ad Pauli menſuram perveniat? At ille tamen videre ſe per ſpeculum & ænigma dicit, tempuſque affore, quo facie ad faciem viſurus ſit; ſis tu licet aliis in Diſputando ſublimior: at Deo haud dubie inferior es. Sis licet aliis fortaſſe acutior & perſpicacior: at certe veritate tanto poſterior es, quanto eſſentia Dei eſſentiam tuam antecellit] See the reſt to the end.

Idem Naz. *Orat.* 34. *pag.* 538, 539.

Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπὸν φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον, &c. *Deum intellectu percipere difficile est, eloqui autem impossibile, ut prophanorum Theologorum* * *quidam docuit, meo quidem judicio non incallidè; nempe ut ex eo quod intellectu difficilem affirmat, opinionem hominibus afferat, se eum cognitione percepisse. Ex eo autem quod nullis verbis eum explicari posse ait, hoc agat ne insciitia sua prodi atque convinci queat. Ego verò ita potius dicendum censeo* [*Dei naturam nullis quidem verbis explicari posse; animo autem atque intellectu comprehendi multo minus posse, Nam quod quis animo atque ratione complexus fuerit, id quoque fortasse sermone declarare queat, si non satis dilucide atque perspicue, at saltem obscure, modò auditorem nactus sit non omninò surdum, tardiq; & stupidi ingenij. At rem tantam animo comprehendere omnino impossibile est, non modo ignavis & languidis, deorsumque vergentibus, sed magnis etiam & excelsis viris, Deique amore præditis, ac mortalibus peræque omnibus, quibus ad veri cognitionem, caligo hæc & carnis crassities tenebras offundit. Atque haud scio an hoc quoque sublimioribus illis & intelligentibus naturis negatum sit, quæ quia Deo propius junctæ sunt, ac toto suo splendore collucent, cernere utiq; certasse queant, si non prorsus, at certe plenius quam nos & solidius, atq; aliæ aliis, pro cujusq; ordine, vel uberius, vel parcius.*

* *Plato* is the man he means. Note that proud Heathens confess a difficulty, but humble Christians an impossibility.

Nec vero hæc verba ita accipi velim, quasi percipi non posse dicam, Quod sit Deus: sed Quid & Quale *sit. Neq; enim inanis est prædicatio nostra, nec vana fides nostra; nec id est quod astruimus (ne rursus id quod probe candideque diximus, in impietatis & calumniæ argumentum trahas, ac nobis ut ignorantiam confitentibus, arroganter insultes.) Plurimum namq; interest, certò tibi persuadeas, aliquid esse, an Quid tandem illud sit compertum habeas. Etenim Quod Deus sit, ac Princeps quædam causa, quæ res omnes procreavit, atq; conservet, tum oculi ipsi, tum Lex naturalis docet, &c. Ac nimis profecto hebes ac stolidus est, quisquis non hucusq; sponte sua progreditur, naturalium q; demonstrationum vestigiis insistit, atq; adeo hoc sibi persuadet,* Ne id quidem Deum esse, quod vel imagine quadam animi concepimus, vel informavimus, vel orationis penicillo utcunq; descripsimus. *Quod si quis unquam cogitatione Deum quoquo modo comprehendit, quonam obsecro argumento id probabit? &c.*

Pag.

Pag. 548. *Quid tandem Deus natura ſua & eſſentia ſit, nec hominum quiſquam unquam invenit, nec invenire poteſt: An verò aliquando ſit inventurus, quærat hoc, qui volet, ac perſcrutetur.*

Pag. 556. Having heaped up many intricacies and inſuperable difficulties about the creatures, he addes [*Poſſuntne hoc expedire Phyſici, atq; inanis eruditionis laude celebres, ac vere cyatho mare, hoc eſt, res tantas ingenio ſuo metientes?*]

I intreat the capable Reader to peruſe the reſt of that excellent Oration in the Author.

I cite theſe paſſages 1. If it were poſſible to perſwade poor mortals that we are no Gods, nor ſhould aſpire as did the father of ſinners; and therefore that we have leſs knowledge of Gods Eſſence and nature, then the vain Diſputers called Schoolmen have long pretended to. 2. That hereby the matter of the Churches contentions being removed, our wounds may cloſe again. For who knoweth not, how many curious and vain, though much applauded Volumes, are all built upon the ſands of ſome preſumptuous ſuppoſition of the Nature of God? If they did not take it for granted that God doth properly *Underſtand* and *Will*, and properly *Intendere finem*, with many the like, what matter could they have for their Voluminous contentions? If but only thoſe two ſuppoſitions were known to be (at leaſt) uncertain, what ſhould we do with all thoſe Learned Writings that ſo ſubtilly Diſpute of the order and number of Gods Decrees? and how ſhould we eſteem them? He that will reade the *Auguſtane* Confeſſion, may ſee what thoughts the firſt Proteſtants had of the Controverſies about Predeſtination, and how little of that doctrine did enter their Religion.

Vide Euſebium *Præparat. Evangelic. lib. undecimo, cap.* 12.

Where he affirms that *Moſes* and all the Prophets teach that Gods Nature cannot be explicated by words, and that his Name is ineffable, and how *Plato* agreeth with them.

As alſo *cap.* 9. where he makes the very Name *Ens* proper to God, and alledgeth *Plato*'s conſent, and *cap.* 10. the conſent of *Numenius*, and *cap.* 11. the conſent of *Plutarch*.

Alſo *lib.* 8. *cap.* 8. *pag.* (*mihi*) 365. out of *Joſephus* he citeth this, [That God is the *Beginning*, the *Middle*, the *End* of all things, and

as he is in Works and Benefits conſpicuous, yea of all things by far the moſt notable (or known) ſo is he both in Nature and Greatneſs moſt obſcure: Nothing that is like him (or no likeneſs of him) can be ſeen of us, or imagined by us; nay it is not lawfull ſo much as lightly to frame it (ſuch a reſemblance) in our mindes.]

Novatianus (*nondum lapſus*) *lib.* 1. *de Trinitate inter opera* Tertulliani, *cap.* 7.

Sed tamen & ipſe (Chriſtus) ſic adhuc de Deo loquitur hominibus quomodo poſſunt adhuc audire, vel capere: licet in agnitionem Dei religioſam jam facere incrementa nitatur: Invenimus enim ſcriptum eſſe quod Deus charitas dictus ſit; nec ex hoc tamen Dei ſubſtantia charitas expreſſa eſt. Et quod Lux dictus eſt, nec tamen in hoc ſubſtantia Dei eſt; Sed totum hoc de Deo dictum eſt quantum dici poteſt; ut merito & quando ſpiritus dictus eſt, non omne id quod eſt dictus eſt, ſed ut dum mens hominum intelligendo uſq; ad ipſum proficit ſpiritum, converſa jam ipſa in ſpiritu aliud quid ampliùs per ſpiritum conjicere, Deum eſſe poſſit. Id enim quod eſt, ſecundum id quod eſt, nec humano ſermone edici, nec humanis auribus percipi, nec humanis ſenſibus colligi poteſt. *Nam ſi quæ præparavit Deus his qui diligunt illum, nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec cor hominis, aut mens ipſa percepit, qualis & quantus eſt ille ipſe, qui hæc repromittit, ad quæ intelligenda & mens hominis & natura defecit.*

This is one note by which it is known not to be *Tertullian*'s writing, becauſe *Tertullian* groſly erred in making God too like the creature, as is well known.

The like paſſages you may reade, *in* Ruffini *Expoſit. in Symbolum Apoſtolor, Sect.* 4, 5, 6, 8. with ſeveral difficulties propoſed in things about our ſelves, to convince us of our ignorance.

Author de Cardinalibus operibus Chriſti inter opera Cypriani *Prolog.* §. 3. p. 482.

Nec patitur ad liquidum ſe videri Divinitas, quam utiq; inveſtigatio, fidelis aliquo modo adorat vel ſentit: ſed puram ejus eſſentiam nec conſpicit, nec comprehendit: Affirmatio quippe de Dei eſſentia in promptu haberi non poteſt; neq; enim definibilis eſt Divinitas; ſed

verius

verius ſinceriuſq; remotio indicat, negando quid non ſit, quam Aſſerendo quid ſit. Quoniam quicquid ſenſui ſubjacet, illud eſſe non poteſt quod omnem ſuperat intellectum. Quicquid audiri, vel videri vel ſciri *poteſt, non convenit majeſtati; hebes eſt in hac conſideratione omnis acies ſenſuum & caligat aſpectus.*—— p.483. §.8. *Et utinam me ipſum cognoſcam & ſciam! Quod ſi animæ meæ quæ corporis mei obtinet principatum, nec originem ſcio, nec metior quantitatem, nec qualis ſit intueri ſufficio, ſi ignota eſt mihi ratio quare ipſa delectetur in corpore perſecutore ſuo,* &c. *patienter me ferre oportet ſi operatorem univerſitatis non intelligo, qui in minimis operationum ſuarum particulis meam profiteor cæcitatem.*

Reade the reſt of that Prologue excellently ſhewing how far God is known, and how far not.

Syneſius *de Regno*, pag.8,9. *Edit.* Petavianæ.

Nullum unquam nomen inventum eſt quod Dei naturam aſſequeretur, ſed cum ab ea exprimenda homines aberrarent, per ea quæ ab illo fiebant, ipſum attingere conati ſunt; ſive ergo Patrem, conditorem, ſive aliud quidpiam dixeris, ſive Principium, ſive cauſam, hæc omnia reſpectus quidam ſunt, & ad ea quæ ab illo oriuntur comparationes. Eodem modo Regem ſi appellis ab iis quorum Rex eſt, non a propria perſona naturam illius apprehendere conaberis. Venio jam ad reliqua ejus nomina, &c. *Bonum utiq; Deum omnes, tam ſapientes quam imperiti homines ubiq; celebrant,* &c. *Nondum tamen hoc ipſum* Bonum *quantumvis extra contentionem poſitum, Dei in natura ſua ſtabilitatem declarat: ex iis vero quæ poſteriora ſunt corrogatur. Nec enim Boni nomen, abſolutum quid auribus ſonat, ſed illis Bonum quorum efficax eſt, quiq; eo frui poſſunt,* &c. *Vide reliq. ib.*

Cyrillus, *Hieroſol. Catecheſ.*6. pag. 46,47,48. is large on this.

Dicimus non quæ oportet de Deo; nam ei ſoli hæc nota ſunt: Sed quæ pro ſuo modulo capere natura humana poteſt, & quæ imbecillitas noſtra ferre valet. Non enim Quid ſit Deus exponimus: Nam candide nos accuratam de eo cognitionem non habere confitemur. Quam ignorantiam agnoſcentes, magnam de Deo cognitionem profitemur.—— *At dicet quiſpiam, Si comprehendi nequit eſſentia Divina, quid eſt quod tu de his enarras?* &c. *Laude Dominum decorare, non exprimere verbis aggredior,* &c. *Quid igitur, dicet aliquis, nonne ſcriptum eſt quod*

Angeli

Angeli cælorum vident ſemper faciem patris mei qui in cælis eſt? At vident Angeli non ſicut Deus eſt, ſed quatenus ipſi capere poſſunt, &c. *Cum igitur Angeli neſciant, nullus homo ſuam erubeſcat inſcitiam, & ignorantiam confiteri, tum ego qui nunc loquor, tum omnes omnium temporum homines. Quin etiam quomodo enunciare non poſſumus: Nam quomodo poſſem eum verbis exprimere, qui ipſe dedit ut verba promam? Ego qui Animam habeo nec ejus formam lineamentave poſſum exprimere, quomodo conſervatorem animæ enunciare potero?*

Cyrillus Alexandr. *To.*1.*Theſaur.li.*11.*c.*1.Eſpecially near the end, is full for the ſame as the former cited Authors, as he doth in divers other places. And in Commentary on *John* among *Cyrill*'s Works, but indeed *Clictoveus*,it is frequent. As *li.*1.*c.*13. *Nam quemadmodum quamvis nullus novit quidnam ſecundum naturam Deus ſit, Juſtificatur tamen per fidem quum credat præmia illum redditurum quærentibus eum: ſic etſi operum ejus rationem ignorat, quum tamen fide omnia illum poſſe non dubitet, non contemnenda tamen probitatis hujus præmia conſequetur.*

And *li.* 9. *c.* 34. *Sed nullus naturæ Deitatis capax intellectus eſt. Ac ideo furioſus eſt qui audet temeraria ſcrutatione rimari quidnam Deus ſecundum naturam eſt. Umbris tamen & ænigmatibus ut in ſpeculo,* &c.

Auguſtin. *de Trinitat.* reproves three ſorts of Errours about God, in the entrance, *lib.*1. *cap.*1. 1. Thoſe that judge of ſpiritual things by corporeal. The ſecond is thoſe *Qui ſecundum humani animi* naturam *vel affectum de Deo ſentiunt, ſiquid ſentiunt.* 3, Thoſe that do indeed endeavour to tranſcend the mutable creature that they may raiſe their intention to God, *ſed mortalitatis onere prægravati, cum & videri volunt ſcire quod neſciunt, & quod volunt ſcire non poſſunt, præſumptiones opinionum ſuarum audacius affirmando, intercludunt ſibimet intelligentiæ vias, magis eligentes ſententiam ſuam non corrigere perverſam, quam mutare defenſam,* &c.---- *Quæ vero* proprie *de Deo dicuntur, quanquam in* nulla creatura inveniuntur, *raro ponit Scriptura Divina,* &c.

Clemens

Clemens Alexandr. *Stromat. li.* 5. commends *Plato* for saying that God cannot be expreſſed by words, as agreeing with Scripture; and himſelf addeth that he is neither *Genus, Species, differentia, individuum, numerus, accidens, nec cui aliquid accidit, totum, pars*, &c. *Et ideo eſt figuræ expers, & quod nominari non poteſt. Et ſi aliquando eum nominemus*, non proprie *vocantes aut Unum, aut Bonum, aut* Mentem, *aut ipſum id quod eſt, aut Patrem, aut Deum, aut Creatorem, aut Dominum: non id dicimus tanquam nomen ejus proferentes, ſed propter ejus poteſtatem pulchris utimur nominibus, ut in aliis non aberrans, his inniti poſſit cogitatio*, &c. I uſe *Hervetus* tranſlation.

Irenæus *li.* 2. *cap.* 16.

Eſt autem & ſuper hæc & propter hæc inenarrabilis: ſenſus enim capax omnium bene & recte dicetur, ſed non ſimilis hominum ſenſui: Et lumen rectiſſime dicetur; ſed nihil ſimile ei, quod eſt ſecundum nos lumini. Si autem eſt in reliquis hominibus, nulli ſimilis erit omnium pater hominum puſillitati: & dicitur quidem ſecundum hæc propter dilectionem, ſentitur autem ſuper hæc ſecundum magnitudinem.

Juſtin Martyr *Serm. ad Gent. exhort.*

Intellexit (Plato) *Deum non indicaſſe illi* (Moſi) *nomen ſuum proprium. Nullum enim poteſt Deo convenire propriè.*

Idem *Apolog.* 1. *Pro Chriſtian. Univerſorum Pater nullum nomen habet inditum: Pater enim, Deus, Creator, Dominus, Herus, non nomina ſunt, ſed a beneficentia deſumpta vocabula*, &c. *Sicut &* Dei *vocabulum non tam nomen eſt, quam inenarrabilis rei hominibus innata opinio.*

Idem *Apol.* 2. *Quis enim poteſt dicere quodnam ſit nomen ineffabile? quod nemo niſi deplorate inſanus proferre tentaret.*

I conclude from all this, that either it is certain that *Intelligere, Velle, Amare, Intendere*, &c. are not ſpoken of God Properly, or by Analogy of Attribution (as they ſpeak) or at leaſt, that it is utterly uncertain to us, whether it be ſo or not: But that we muſt

uſe both theſe and lower notions of God, from the glaſs of mans nature and actions, ſtill confeſſing the Impropriety in all, and that we have no poſitive formall certain apprehenſion of the thing expreſſed (*viz.* God and his acts) but only a general apprehenſion that it is ſomewhat which is beſt repreſented to us in the glaſs of theſe metaphorical Notions, which contain as great a likeneſs to the thing it ſelf as we are now capable of reaching; and upon theſe conſiderations we muſt ſtick cloſe to the Scripture phraſe which condeſcendeth ſo low in ſpeaking of God; and not hearken to the unproved fancies of Schoolmen, that tell us *This act* is properly in God, as implying no imperfection, and *That is* not ſeeing all humane acts do contain imperfection in their very formall nature.

As *Salvian de Provid. li.3. p.62,63.* ſaith, ſo, *à fortiore*, do I: *Neſcio ſecretum, & conſilium Divinitatis ignoro. Sufficit mihi ad cauſæ hujus probationem dicti cæleſtis oraculum. Si ſcire vis quid tenendum ſit, habes literas ſacras: perfecta ratio eſt hoc tenere quod legeris. Qua cauſa autem Deus hæc de quibus loquimur, ita faciat, nolo a me requiras. Homo ſum, non intelligo ſecreta Dei; inveſtigare non audeo, & ideo etiam attentare formido: quia & hoc ipſum genus quaſi ſacrilegæ temeritatis eſt, ſi plus ſcire cupias, quam ſinaris*, &c. *Sicut enim plus eſt Deus quam omnis ratio humana, ſic plus mihi debet eſſe quam ratio, quod a Deo agi cuncta cognoſco.*

Οὐδὲ γὰρ φύσεως τῆς θεότητός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ &c. ſaith *Macarius* Homil. 1. *Neq; enim Naturæ Divinæ eſt Anima* (therefore Intellection and Volition are not the Divine Nature) *neq; Naturæ tenebrarum malitiæ; ſed eſt quid creatum ſenſibile, viſibile, inſigne & admirandum, atque elegans ſimilitudo & Imago Dei.*] Intellection and Volition are in their natures comprehenſible, but that which in God we call Intellection and Volition is incomprehenſible, and not to be formally underſtood. *Quis enim poteſt capere quantus ſit Deus?* (ſaith *Theophylact* in *Luc.* 12.) *& manifeſtum eſt ex Seraphin, qui ſe obtegunt propter excellentiam Divini luminis.* Which is as true of Gods Eſſence as his Greatneſs: and as true is it of formall proper intellection, as *Minutius Felix* ſaith of Viſion, *Deum oculis carnalibus vis videre, cum ipſam animam tuam quà viviſicaris & loqueris, nec aſpicere poſſis, nec tueri?*

Epipha-

Epiphanius disputing against those honest Hereticks, called the *Audians* (cast out of the Church by the Bishops for their honesty, and at last banished.) *Hæres.* 70. *pag.* 815,816. speaking against those that placed the Image of God in the Soul only (as the *Audians* did place it in the Body) because, say they, the soul is Invisible, and hath the Power of Acting, Moving, Understanding, Reasoning, and therefore contains the Image of God, he Answereth, That [If therefore the soul be said to be made to (Gods) Image, it cannot be said to be made after his Image at all: ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐπέκεινα μυριονταπλάσιον, &c. *Deus enim Infinitis præ animâ partibus eoq; amplius, comprehensionem omnem ac cogitationem effugit,* &c. *Ipse enim cum omnia comprehendit, tum a nullo comprehenditur.*] And after [*Spiritus enim Deus est qui omnem spiritum exuperat, & lux luce omni præstantior. Quicquid enim ab ipso conditum est, infra illius decus & gloriam est. Sola vero Trinitas comprehendi non potest, & infinitam quandam gloriam obtinet, quæ nec conjecturâ capitur, nec Intelligentia percipitur.*

I conclude with the words of *Colvius in Beverovic. de Termino Vitæ*, pag. 160, 163, 164. [*Non Intelligitis quomodo Intelligatis, centum Syllogismos facitis & nescitis quomodo: & vultis Intelligere quomodo ille Intelligit qui est supra omnem intellectum?* &c.] [*Quod si exigua hæc & contemptibilia naturæ penetrare non potest humani ingenii acies, annon est extremæ impudentiæ nos velle pertingere ad ipsam Divinam essentiam? Quæ est* ἀπέραντος, ἄορισος, ἀτέλειος *in seipsa, nobis verò* ἀκατάληπτος, ἄγνωστος, καὶ ὑπεράγνωστος, &c. *Non terminatur visu, non tenetur tectu, non sentitur incessu, non comprehenditur Intellectu; Major omni corde, major omni laude.——Novi homines, bullæ nascentes & evanescentes,* &c. *exhaurire vultis mare vasculo? terram metiri palmo?* &c. *Furor est cogitare homuncionem videre Dei fines, qui suos non videt, Deum velle metiri qui suam mensuram ignorat, ut capiat Divinitatis terminos quos non capit ipse mundus; cujus vix Imago est spiritus, cujus umbra mundus, judicia abyssus.——Deum laudare omnes possumus & debemus, definire nemo potest: Non potest Deus quæri nimis; inveniri nunquam potest, digne ipsum æstimamus cum inæstimabilem confitemur: digne laudamus cum præ stupore animi in silentio ipsum adoramus; apprehendi potest voluntate, comprehendi non potest*

 intel-

intellectu. Major est ipsius Incomprehensibilitas quam comprehendere possumus: Non ita capit eum arguta scientia, quam illum sentit & gustat munda conscientia: Melius nos docet eum Unctio quam eruditio. Hoc est illud manna absconditum, quod ipse dat timentibus ipsum, non autem iis qui in arcana illius temere involant. Et idcirco veniunt indocti & qui Deum summa cum reverentia colunt, & rapiunt regnum cælorum; interim acutissima & superbissima ingenia evanescunt, in propriis subtilitatibus, & merguntur in infernum: loqui volentes de profundis mersi sunt in profundis.-----Quocirca optime bonas horas collocant, qui veritatem summo studio quærunt: Sed pessime judicant qui se illam invenisse putant.-----Desino, & dico cum Hilario, quod non per difficiles quæstiones ad vitam beatam nos ducat Deus.

The Lord repair by Love, Humility and Holy Obedience, the ruines that have long been made in his Church, by Contention, Pride, and unsanctified-presumptuous-ignorant-Learning, and reduce men to the Scripture simplicity of Doctrine, and convince them that their *overmuch* Wisdom is but Folly, and all their *over-doing* but *undoing*.

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The

The Prologue to Mr K.

§. 1.

Sir,

THough I would not have you reſtrained from revealing Truth, yet if I had been worthy to have been of your counſell, I ſhould have adviſed you to have avoided this quarrelſom way. Our world hath *Contention* enough already; and it comes not from ſo good a root (*Prov.*13.10.) nor is it ſo good a ſymptom, nor doth it produce ſuch lovely effects (*Prov.*22.10. & 17.19. & 29.21.) nor doth it bring ſo good a name (*Prov.* 21.24.) as may make it ſeem deſirable in my eyes. Had you conſulted *Solomon* himſelf, he would have bid you [*Strive not with a man without a cauſe, if he have done thee no harm*, Prov.3.30.] and [*Go not forth haſtily to ſtrive, leſt thou know not what to do in the end thereof, when thy neighbour hath put thee to ſhame*, 25.8.] for [*The beginning of ſtrife is as when one letteth out water: therefore leave off contention before it be medled with*, 17.14.] It ſeems a ſtrange thing to me, that you could finde no man to deal with in the main Controverſie here choſen out, that was indeed againſt you, but that you muſt make to your ſelf, an adverſary of one that you confeſs doth not once deny your Concluſion. Unleſs it be becauſe you are likely with ſuch a one to have the eaſieſt conflict. But then you ſhould have remembred, that the Victory will be as ſmall. I pretend not to ſuch a piercing knowledge, nor to ſuch acquaintance in the inviſible regions, as to determine infallibly of what Province or Degree, of what quality, *albus an ater*, that ſpirit was that raiſed the ſtorm of your Paſſions, or to know exactly his name and ſirname that animated theſe your lines: But ſeeing you are pleaſed to chooſe me for your adverſary, I muſt deſire you to bear with me if I ſpeak ſometime leſs pleaſingly; and to uſe what patience you have left, as knowing you have drawn this trouble upon your ſelf. And whereas you put me on a double imployment: one to defend the Truth; and the other to defend my ſelf; ſo I perform the firſt ſucceſsfully, I hope I may be excuſed if I be more negligent in the later; yea if I give you the day, and freely confeſs as much ignorance as you charge me with. Its true that I have not the Titles or Robes of Honour, and as little deſerve them, as you here expreſs. But might I be ſure that I have right

to that farre better Title (of piety) which you are pleased to bestow on me, I could easily allow you the other. I remember the description of the old Christians by *Minutius Fælix*, [*Nos qui non habitu sapientiam, sed mente præferimus; non eloquimur magna, sed vivimus: gloriamur nos consecutos quod illi summa contentione quæsiverunt, nec invenire potuerunt.*] And that of *Mirandula* [*Fælicitatem philosophia quærit, Theologia invenit, Religio possidet.*] And to contend for the reputation of being Learned, I shall scarce think is worth my labour, till I have higher thoughts of the prize. Mens thoughts and words are a poor felicity. Applause is such an aery nourishment, that I see few thrive by: (though I must confess that in me, as well as in others, the unreasonable sin of pride is daily stirring, and convincing me by experience that it is mortified but in part.) O that I may have the honour of being a member of Christ, and then I can spare the vain glory of the world! *Vera ibi gloria erit, ubi laudantis nec errore quisquam, nec adulatione laudabitur: Verus honor qui nulli negabitur digno; nulli deferetur indigno: sed nec ad eum ambiget ullus indignus, ubi nullus permittetur esse nisi dignus:* saith *Austin, de Civit. Dei, li. ult. cap. ult.* Only I must crave this of the Reader, that my confessed weakness be no prejudice to Gods truth: and that he will not judge of the cause by the person, nor take the name or person for a fault; which is the thing that the ancient Christians did so deprecate of the Pagans, and therefore I hope every Christian will grant. And I must also desire that want of smooth and pleasing words may not be judged the want of truth. *Enimvero dissoluti est pectoris in rebus seriis quærere voluptatem, & cum tibi sit ratio cum male se habentibus atque ægris, sonos auribus infundere dulciores, non medicinam vulneribus admovere: inquit* Arnobius *li. 1. adv. Gent. p. 49.* I confess I do deeply compassionate ordinary Christians, when I think what a hard thing it is for them to discern the truth, among all the smooth words and plausible arguments of Learned contenders. Usually they think every mans tale good, till they hear the other; and then they think it bad: and at last when they see what fair glosses a Learned man can put on the worst cause, they are ready to run into the other extream, and to believe or regard nothing that they say. As *Minutius Fælix* saith, [*Altius moveor de toto genere disputandi: quod plerumq; pro disserentium viribus & eloquentiæ potestate, etiam perspicuæ veritatis conditio mutetur, Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur, sine delectu assentiuntur dictis omnibus, nec a rectis falsa secernunt, nescientes inesse & in incredibili verum, & in verisimili mendacium. Itaque quo sæpius asseverationibus credunt, eo frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur: sic assidue temeritate decepti, culpam judicii transferunt ad incerti querelam, ut damnatis omnibus malint universa suspendere, quam de fallacibus judicare.*] But let such at least hold fast the Foundation, and remember that we are all agreed in that.

The Reader that I expect should profit by these Writings, must neither be utterly unlearned, nor so learned as your self. For the former are not yet capable of it; and the later are beyond it, and will hardly learn from any but the more learned. It is the younger sort of Students whose edification I intend: who are neither quite above, nor below my instructions; nor so engaged to a Party or Opinion, but that their mindes lye open to any evidence of Truth. *Præventus enim falsæ opinionis errore humanus auditus, ad veri rationem percipiendam, durus & perdifficilis invenitur, quantiscunque testibus urgeatur. Mavult enim pravi dogmatis sententiam, qua semel infectus est, perversus vindicare, quam hanc eandem tantis divinarum humanarumq; legum authoritatibus refutatam salubrius immutare: inquit* Vigilius *contra Eutich.* li. 1. *initio.*

Lastly,

Lastly, If you should be in the right and I in the wrong in any one Philosophical Controversie, I must expect that the Reader do not thence conclude, that you are right in your Theology. And I could wish that you had so mean thoughts of your Philosophy, as that you might not build your Theology on it too much; nor think much the better of your Writings, or of your self. For doubtless when the Canon of a Council forbad the reading of Heathens Books, these things were not so highly valued as now. I approve not of that extream neither: but shall conclude with that serious exclamation of *Ahenagoras* (*Legat. per Christian.* p. 13, 14.) Τίνες ἢ τῶν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλυόντων καὶ τὰς ἀμφιβολίας διαλυόντων, καὶ τὰς ἐτυμολογίας σαφηνιζόντων, ἢ τῶν τὰ ὁμώνυμα καὶ συνώνυμα καὶ κατειγορήματα καὶ ἀξιώματα, καὶ τί τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τί τὸ κατηγορούμενον, εὐδαίμονας ἀποτελεῖν, διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ὑπισχνοῦνται τοὺς συνόντας οὕτως ἐκκεκαθαρμένοι εἰσὶ τὰς ψυχὰς, ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦ μισεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀγαπᾶν, &c.

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§. 2.

Pag. 133. Mr K.

For the fuller opening of this particular, I will be content to make some Digression from your Book, and to shew 1. That there can be no new immanent act in God, against Mr Baxter. *2. That there is somewhat like Justification in that immanent act of God, whereby he decrees from eternity to justifie and condemn men. And 3. that yet that immanent act cannot be stiled Justification; nor is it meant so by Dr.* Twisse *or Mr.* Pemble *that I know; and so that Justification is not from eternity: and then I shall return to you,* &c.

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§. 2.

R. B. YOur Digression, methinks, is very sudden, and the occasion to a stranger hardly discernable: Its like it was the uncouth apparition of some ruling wight of another Orb, which made upon your intellect that strange impression, which caused you to reel thus out of your way, and lead you unhappily into this private path, or rather bewildred you in this Maze where we now finde you. But whoever led you in, charity commands me to do my part to help you out, or at least to warn others that they do not follow you.

1. As to your first undertaking, I confess it was very ingenuously done, to say, You will do it [against Mr. *Baxter*] and not [against his doctrine or opinion,] acknowledging afterwards that I deny not your Conclusion. But I am used to Dispute against Doctrines, and not Persons: and therefore will give you the better in this.

2. Your second undertaking is more admirable then the first. For I have met with some besides you that dare adventure on the former, but never man that durst attempt the later. Is it not enough for you to prove Gods Decree of justifying to have somewhat like Justification? but you must also prove, that the Decree both to justifie and *condemn*, hath somewhat like Justification? If the Decree to condemn a man have somewhat like justifying him, then the Decree to torment him in hell hath somewhat like glorifying him: and the Decree to kill, hath something in it like quickening him. You must fly to some general point of similitude, or to the Lord *Brookes* doctrine, that all things are One, to make this good. But if it were but your oversight, then I hope hereafter you will be more

 com-

compaſſionate to your Brethren, and no more ſo ſolemnly call men to [ſee the hand of heaven, in the pompous diſplay of their folly, to appear moſt ridiculous; and to adore the hand of God in infatuating their parts, &c.] as you do by Mr. *Goodwin* for a ſmaller miſtake then yours. Alas what man ſo Learned and accurate, as to be free from all overſights.

3. But indeed Sir I cannot ſo eaſily excuſe your next errour, annexed to the third part of your undertaken-task; where you ſay [Nor is it ſo meant by Dr. *Twiſs* or Mr. *Pemble* that I know.] What is it that is not ſo meant by them? Why that this Immanent act can be ſtiled Juſtification. You have boldly ventured to write thus: and I will be bold to try how well. Either its true, or not true that they ſo meant: If true, and undeniably apparent in the Writings of one of them, if not both, and oft repeated by him, and yet Mr. K. knoweth it not, why then he doth not only write before he knows, and Vindicate men before he underſtand whether they are guilty or innocent, but makes it the great motive of his undertaking, as [not having the patience to ſee ſo worthy Divines ſo unworthily handled.] If in the midſt of his impatience he knew not this, then it ſeems I am not alone ignorant of the buſineſs that I meddle with. But I will lay it open to the Judgement of the Reader, whether the thing be true or falſe? and whether you might not with leſs learning have known this if you would? and ought not to have known the cauſe before ſo zealous a Vindication.

Dr *Twiſs Vind. Grat.* li. 1. part 2. §. 25. p. *(vol. min)* 272, 273. *Sic ſcribit* [*Omnis actualis juſtificatio eſt juſtificatio, & omnis juſtificatio ſimpliciter dicta congruenter exponenda eſt de juſtificatione actuali. Nam Analogum per ſe poſitum ſtat pro famoſiori ſignificato.*] [*Sed libet his pauliſper immorari. Quænam erit illa peccatorum Remiſſio quæ fidem conſequetur; & quam oporteat Spiritus ſancto acceptam referre? Remiſſio enim peccatorum, ſi quidditatem inſpicias, nihil aliud eſt quam aut Punitionis Negatio, aut Volitionis puniendi negatio. Sit ergo peccata Remittere, nihil aliud quam nolle punire. At hoc nolle punire, ut actus immanens in Deo, fuit ab æterno, nec fidem conſequitur, &c. Quod vero operatione Spiritus ſancti nobis ex hac parte, per fidem contingit, aliud eſſe non poteſt quam ſenſus gratiæ Dei, &c. Quare ſiquid morte ſua nobis impetrat Chriſtus, quod ad peccatorum noſtrorum Remiſſionem attineat, ſenſum * iſtum amoris Divini peccata noſtra remittentis, nobis impetret neceſſe eſt. Et* pag. 279. c. 1. [*Nam juſtitia Chriſti dicitur nobis imputari, & merita ipſius nobis applicari per fidem, non coram Deo, ſed apud conſcientias noſtras: quatenus per fidem generatur in cordibus noſtris ſenſus & agnitio hujus ſalutaris applicationis ex amore Dei quem ex fide guſtamus; & ſpiritualiter ſentimus nos juſtificantem, & in filios ſuos adoptantem, ex quo naſcitur pax conſcientiæ. Quare ante fidem hæc Chriſti juſtitia noſtra fuit, quatenus ex intentione Dei patris & Chriſti mediatoris pro nobis præſtita, &c. Sed advenicute fide quam in cordibus noſtris Sp. ſanctus accendit, tum demum agnoſcitur & percipitur hic amor Dei erga nos in Chriſto Jeſu. Unde dicitur juſtitia Chriſti imputari nobis per fidem, quia non niſi per fidem dignoſcitur a Deo nobis imputari: & tum demum juſtificari dicimur ejus generis juſtificatione, atq; abſolutione a peccatis noſtris, quæ pacem ingenerat conſcientiis noſtris. Hoc autem duobus argumentis confirmo. 1. Quia per juſtitiam Chriſti non modò aſſequimur remiſſionem peccatorum, ſed & fidem ipſam, atq; reſipiſcentiam, hoc eſt, cordis circumciſionem,* Eph. 1. 3. *ergo etiam ante fidem & reſipiſcentiam applicatur nobis juſtitia Chriſti, utpote propter quam gratiam aſſequimur efficacem ad credendum in Chriſtum & agendum pœnitentiam. Alterum eſt, quia juſtificatio & abſolutio, prout ſignificant actum divinæ voluntatis immanentem, ſunt ab æterno.*

* Are not Chriſts Merits and the Spirits gifts here highly honoured?

Unius

Unius autem voluntatis notificatio externa, per modum abſolutionis cujuſdam judicialis & forenſis, quæ fit per verbum & ſpiritum, pro tribunali conſcientiæ uniuſcujuſq;, hæc eſt illa juſtitiæ Chriſti imputatio, itemq; juſtificatio & remiſſio atque abſolutio quæ fidem conſequitur.] *Et cont. præfat.* p. 18. b. *Extra controverſiam eſt remiſſionem peccatorum prout eſt actus in Deo immanens antecedere noſtram fidem & reſipiſcentiam: Nobis vero non niſi per fidem innoteſcit, cujus etiam fiducia multo adhuc confirmatior evadit per reſipiſcentiam.*]

Lib. 1. *Part.* 2. p. 272. [*Juſtificationem verò & Reconciliationem pro eodem haberi ab Arminio (quod & verum eſt) &c.* And he oft maintaineth the eternity of Reconciliation.

Lib. 2. *P.* 2. pag. 434. [*Ergo etiam ante fidem Deus nobis reconciliatus eſt: neque enim niſi jam reconciliatus & propitius gratificatur nobis fidem. Quid quod* remiſſio peccatorum *&* acceptatio *noſtri,* Non niſi actus internos & immanentes *in Deo notant: cujus generis actiones non ſuboriuntur Deo de novo.*] *Lege ult. & poſtea* [*Juxta iſta diſtinguere poterimus de reconciliatione dupliciter dicta: Nam & Deus reconciliavit nos ſibi in Chriſto quoad rei veritatem: & in miniſtris ſuis poſuit verbum reconciliationis, quoad ejuſdem prætioſæ veritatis evidentiam & manifeſtationem. Sic cum inimici eſſemus dicimur reconciliati fuiſſe Deo quoad rei veritatem: quod tamen non niſi per Evangelij prædicationem fit quoad ejuſdem veritatis patefactionem & ſalutarem communicationem.*] *Et* p. 433. [*At Arminius applicationem remiſſionis peccatorum, ita interpretari videtur, ut per applicationem fiat, & jam quaſi de novo eſſe incipiat: quaſi vero non requiratur, ut jam antea exiſtat quod applicandum eſt. Nobis vero ſic inſtituendum videtur. Chriſtus morte ſua nobis procuravit redemtionem a peccatis, cum Deo reconciliationem, & peccatorum omnium remiſſionem; quæ quidem per prædicationem Evangelij & per fidem, nobis applicantur, non ut ſint, ſed ut nobis innoteſcant. Nam rationem omnem ſuperat quomodo applicari poſſit illud quod nondum eſt,* &c.] Pag. 434. *Noſtra vero interpretatio ſic procedit: Chriſtus nobis acquiſivit morte ſua redemptionem efficacem & actualem, id eſt, actualem peccatorum remiſſionem, & reconciliationem cum Deo. Applicantur autem iſta per prædicationem Evangelij, non ut de novo fiant, ſed ut nobis innoteſcant,* &c. *At inquies, actualis Remiſſio peccatorum eſt ipſa Juſtificatio: Juſtificatio ſequitur fidem: nam fide juſtificamur: ergo nemine peccata remittuntur antequam credat. Reſpondeo, Cum docet Apoſtolus nos fide juſtificari, nihil aliud ex inſtituto docet, quam nos juſtificari per ſanguinem Chriſti, ſive propter Chriſtum crucifixum.*] And in the Index he owns it, that *Remiſſio actualis eſt Juſtificatio:* and therefore we may take what he ſaith of remiſſion as meant of Juſtification.

The like *Lib.* 3. *pag.* 18. *& lib.* 1. *p.* 2. *pag.* 272. which we before cited part of [*Nec ſane occurrit ſpecies aliqua rationis, cur reconciliatio cogatur in ordinem cum impetratione remiſſionis, Juſtificationis & redemptionis, potius quam cum actuali Remiſſione, Juſtificatione & Redemptione.*] So that he puts actual Juſtification with Remiſſion and Reconciliation.

So *contra* Cervinum *pag.* 48. *Et quid quaſo Adoptio eſt quam conſequimur per fidem? Dicis eſſe Acceptationem Dei. Quid autem eſt Acceptatio? An non actus in Deo immanens? An vero actus Deo immanens ſupervenit de novo?*]

Its undeniable in this that *Twiſſe* doth not only affirm Remiſſion and Reconciliation and Adoption to be before we are born, immedialy on Chriſts death; but alſo to be immanent Acts, and from Eternity: and though he be more ſeldom in thus uſing the word [Juſtification] yet he affirms Reconciliation and Remiſſion (which he ſaith are from Eternity) to be the ſame thing with Juſtification: yea he expreſly entitleth that eternal immanent act [Juſtification.]

And did he only affirm Remiſſion and Adoption and Reconciliation and Acceptation to be immanent acts and from eternity, I beleeve few ſober men will think it any better, then to affirm the ſame of Juſtification. Yea he plainly intimates a diſtinction of Juſtification: one from eternity or from Chriſts death, and the other upon our believing: And therefore when he ſpeaks of Juſtification by faith, he cals it [that ſort of Juſtification] intimating the other ſort.

Now for Mr. *Pemble*, as he expreſly maintains Juſtification *in foro Dei* to be long before we are born, even on Chriſts dying, ſo that is all one to our purpoſe, as if he maintained it to be from eternity. And it were meet that ſome of you ſhould have ſhewed before now, what Tranſient act it is by which particular ſinners not yet born (and therefore not yet ſinners) are juſtified at Chriſts death * ? If it were (as Mr. *Pemble* intimates, I think) Gods accepting the Price, its worth the while to ſhew that to be Temporal and Tranſient, when Dr. *Twiſs* will have his accepting of man in Adoption to be immanent and eternal: But if you maintain Gods juſtifying act at Chriſts death (whether undertaken or ſuffered) to be an immanent act, then it muſt be before Chriſts death, even eternal too. Mr. *Pembles* words are, *Vind. Grat.* p. 21. [But with a diſtinction of Juſtification. 1. *In foro Divino*, in Gods ſight; and this goeth before all our ſanctification. For even whilſt the Elect are unconverted, they are then actually juſtified and freed from all ſinne by the death of Chriſt: and God ſo eſteems of them as free, and having accepted of that ſatisfaction, is actually reconciled to them. By this Juſtification we are freed from the guilt of our ſinnes: and becauſe that is done away, God in due time proceeds to give us the grace of ſanctification to free us from ſinnes corruption, ſtill inherent in our perſons. 2. *In foro conſcientiæ*, in our own ſenſe: which is but the Revelation and certain Declaration of Gods former ſecret act of accepting Chriſts Righteouſneſs to our Juſtification.] So *pag.* 23. he ſpeaks again of the ſame Juſtification *in foro Dei*, and ſaith, that all the ſinnes of the Elect are actually pardoned, the Debt-Book croſſed, the hand-writing cancelled, *&c.* and that this grand tranſaction between God and the Mediator Jeſus Chriſt was concluded on and diſpatcht in heaven long before we had any being either in nature or grace.] This phraſe of [diſpatching it in heaven] makes me conjecture that it will prove ſome immanent act which they call Juſtification at Chriſts death. Lay all this together, and judge whether it be true that neither Dr. *Twiſs* nor Mr. *Pemble*, do mean that the immanent act can be ſtiled Juſtification. Or if it were true, whether Juſtification before we are born, is not an errour fit to be reſiſted. Indeed it is true that Mr. K. ſaith, that neither Dr. *Twiſs* nor Mr. *Pemble* did ever mean, that [the Decree of God from eternity to juſtifie and condemn men, is to be called Juſtification:] For the Decree to condemn men cannot well be called Juſtification: But I believe this being but Mr. K. overſight, he will not make uſe of it to juſtifie his third Propoſition.

* *I pray you Sir remember to do this in your next.*

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§. 3.

Mr. K. Digreſſion. *P.* 1.

WHether there may be a new immanent Act in God?] *To the firſt, By an immanent act, we mean ſuch as is terminated in the Agent; and not in any thing without it. Now that there can be any new immanent act in God,* M. Baxter *doth not adven-*

adventure to affirm. Only he is pleased to say this; [That all immanent acts in God are eternall, he thinks is quite beyond our understanding to know. Aphor. *pag.* 174.] *and he casteth out somewhat to render it suspected,* p. 173. *which I shall examine by and by.*

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§. 3.

R. B. THey say of those that are bred souldiers and used to bloodshed and Victory, that the state must make them fresh work and finde them constant imployment; or else they will make work and finde imployment for themselves. A Polemical Divine much used to Disputations, and thereby to the glory and Triumph of Victory, is, as it seems by this Learned man, in the same case. Mr. *Goodwin* found him not work enough, and rather then he would want more, he makes to himself an adversary (for he saith, it is against Mr. *Baxter*) which here in the beginning he confesseth, makes not himself one, so much as by a denial of his Proposition, or an affirming the contrary. Could you finde never a man in the world to deal with, that affirmed that there may be new immanent acts in God? If you could, they had been fitter for you to take in hand: For its like, they would purposely have maintained that assertion with some shew of reason: If you could not; then your doctrine is so universally received, that I should think it should not need your Arguments now to support it: And then you may well conclude, as you do, that you have done little by this Dispute; if you have but laboriously maintained that which no man denies. But it seems to me it was some reasons *ab homine*, from the person of your chosen-feigned adversary, rather then from the cause that allured or impelled you to this encounter.

As you well begin with some explication of your sense, so will I also: and the rather seeing I have little else to do. I desire the Reader therefore to understand this much of my thoughts about the subject in hand, before I proceed further.

1. *In generall,* I am very strongly perswaded that it is one of the greatest sins that a great part of Pious Learned Divines are guilty of, that they audaciously adventure to dispute and determine unrevealed things; and above all others, about the Nature and Actions of the Incomprehensible God. And that this is *The* very thing that hath divided, weakned and ruined the Church, more then any one thing, except plain contempt of God: And that it is under the wounds of these overwise mens Learning, that the poor Church hath lain bleeding many hundred years. Our Contentions, Envyings, Heart-burnings, by perverse zeal, and much of all our warres and calamities, are long of this sinne in these men: That as the Romish Clergy are justly esteemed the greatest Schismaticks on earth, for their audacious and unmercifull additions to the Creed, making such a number of new Keys which heaven must be opened and shut by, which God never made: So are those zealous Learned men, the cruel dividers of the Church, by occasioning our contentions, that will with boldness pry into things unrevealed, and with confidence and peremptorines determine them, and then with long and subtil and fervent arguings maintain them, and make them seem necessary to the peace of the Church, or the soundness of our faith. Scarce any one thing hath more fully discovered to me the frailty and fearfull pravity of man, then this: To think, that so silly a worm should be no more acquainted with his own weakness, and the infinite distance between God and man; and should so confidently think that he knows

what

what he doth not know! yea and what he cannot know? yea and be angry with all the world that will not say, It's true; and will not believe that he knows what he pretends to know! If a man should perswade me that I know how many Angels are in heaven, or how many daies it will be till Christs coming to Judgement, one would think it were no hard matter for me to know that I do not know any such thing. But if I should perswade my self that I know it, and should expect that all others should believe that I know it, and would write Volumes to prove it, and count all those ignotant or erroneous that will not believe me, or that will not say they know it when they do not, as well as I, whether this were the part of a man awake and in his wits, let others judge. How much more beyond our reach is the unsearchable nature of God, further then he hath revealed himself in his Works and Word, which, alas, affordeth us but a glimpse of his backparts. Yea the wonder is yet greater that these same Learned Divines, when they are at a *non-plus* in their arguing, will plead mans ignorance and incapacity to put off their adversary and blame others for too bold enquiries and intrusions into Gods secrets: and most of our Reformers do speak hardly of the Schoolmen for it (and very deservedly) and yet will not see the guilt in themselves. No man speaks more against his own natural inclination in this then I do. I feel as great a desire to Know, and to pry into any thing that others have disputed, and as much naturall delight in the reading of the most audacious subtil Disputers, as others do. I was wont to say, I could get more out of *Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus*, and such like in a day, then out of many Ancient Fathers, and later Treatisers, in a moneth. But I finde that as desire to know was the beginning of our misery, so is it the continuance. Why do men fear themselves no more, in that which innocent *Adam* was undone by? I finde that this bait of knowing things unrevealed, doth but entice men into vain hopes, and labours, and self-deluding promises, and flatter men into a pleasant loss of time (and worse:) and in the end faileth all their expectations: and the Learned Disputers come off as *Adam* did, with Gods acknowledgement that he was like God in knowing good and evil (Ironically, as some Divines think; or expressing his unhappiness plainly, as others.) Those leaves of *Bradwardine* and *Twiss Vind.* and *de scient. Med.* &c. which I was wont to reade with longing and delight, I confess I look on now with fear; and many Learned Schoolmen (specially on the first Book of the *Sentences*) I read, as I hear men swear or take Gods name lightly in their common talk; even seldom, unwillingly (looking for other matter) and with horrour. Yet how oft doth Dr. *Twisse* tell *Arminius* and Dr. *Jackson* of the sinfulness, unsafeness and uncertainty of departing from the Scriptures in these high things, about the Nature and Decrees of God? And what *Bradwardine* excellently saith, I desire the Reader to see in him, *de Causa Dei, l.1.c.1. corol.32.* But especially I desire the Reader to peruse that excellent Epistle of *Colonius* in *Bovovicius de Termino Vitæ*; which contains what I have a minde further to have said of this: with *Gibieuf*'s first Chapt. *de Libertate Dei (lib.2. de lib.)* which shews how far God is above all our highest names and notions: and that *Deus ab illis Liber est:* with much more against the Doctrine that I oppose. See also *Card. Contarenus de officio Episcopi, operum* p.410, 411. and what he citeth out of *Dionysius*. And I intreat you to reade seriously that notable passage, 1 *Tim.6.* 3,4,5. where pride is shewed to be the root, and supposed knowledge said to be but Doting, and they are said to know nothing, that thought they knew most, and the sad effects of all are manifested.

a. I do

2. I do think that moſt of our profound Diſputes, wherewith the Dominicans and Jeſuites, the Arminians and Antiarminians have Learnedly troubled the world, are guilty in part, of this hainous ſinne before mentioned: and that theſe great Doctors do diſpute for the moſt part of they know not what. I confeſs its uſual with men that know little themſelves, to think that others know as little, and to meaſure the knowledge of other men by their own: and ſo its poſſible I may undervalue the Learning of theſe men, becauſe having none my ſelf, I cannot underſtand the largeneſs of their capacities, and ſublimity of their ſpeculations. However I am ſure I am wiſer and righter in one point then I was: For when I ſteeped my thoughts in their ſpeculations, and was my ſelf of the ſame expreſs opinion with one of the parties, I thought that I begun to grow ſomewhat wiſe my ſelf; but now I know I was deceived, and it was my folly, and that I knew not what I thought I knew. And though I will be bolder to befool ſuch a one as my ſelf, then men of ſuch ſublime incomprehenſible knowledge; yet its my opinion that they are but men; and what a man is though I do not yet fully know, yet I am daily both ſtudying and trying: and experience which is the teacher of fools, hath taught me this much of him; that he is no Deity; nor one of the Intelligences that moveth or comprehendeth the orbs; that the wiſeſt are not ſo wiſe as they would ſeem, or as they imagine themſelves; that all their conceptions which they judge ſo comprehenſive are comprehended in the compaſs of a narrow skull, and there lodged in a puddle of ſuch brains, and humours, that a little knock if it hit right may make the wiſeſt man an Ideot, and drive out all that profound Learning which Mr K. thinks is ſo near kin to the knowledge of God. I confeſs of late I have accuſtomed my ſelf to ſuch mean thoughts of man and his imaginations, and ſuch high thoughts of God, that I reade many of the profoundeſt School Divines (whom yet in ſome reſpects I honour) as I hear children diſcourſing of State matters, or Theology; or as if I heard two diſputing in their ſleep. The Serpent hath beguiled us as he did *Eve*, by drawing us from the ſimplicity that is in Chriſt. Vain Philoſophy hath been the bait to deceive the Church: And ſo we are judiciouſly broken in pieces and ruined; and have learned to our coſt to know good and evil. I think there is no hope of the Churches recovery but by returning to the primitive Chriſtian ſimplicity; and uſing *Ariſtotle* as a help in Naturals, but not preferring him before Chriſt in the teaching of the higheſt ſpeculations of Theology, as if we muſt go learn Gods nature of *Ariſtotle*, where Chriſt leaveth us at a loſs. When thoſe Learned men, who profeſſing themſelves wiſe became—— ſhall become fools that they may be wiſe, and come quite back again to their *cognoſce teipſum*, then they may know more of God then they yet do, and yet perceive that they know leſs then they thought they had known: and then their knowledge will edifie which now puffeth up.

3. I think that man can have no poſitive proper conception of God, at leaſt beſides *ens* (which the Scotiſts think proper) and that there is no word in humane language that can expreſs Gods nature in ſtrict propriety, but all our notions of him are ſo exceeding imperfect, that they expreſs more of our ignorance then of our knowledge. *White* is bold to ſay (*Inſtitut. Peripatet. l. 4. lect. 9, 10.*) that none of the Names that we attribute to God, hath a notion which hath in God a formall object: and that that ſcience is of all other the moſt ſublime and proper, which inquireth into the impropriety of the names that are ſpoken of God, and denieth them all as to him.

4. I think that there is no ſuch thing in God as Underſtanding, Knowledge, Will, Intention, Decree, Election, Love, *&c.* as theſe are by men conceived of, and expreſſed: And that man knows not what it is in God formally which theſe terms are uſed by him to expreſs. And that it is a farre leſs improper ſpeech to ſay, that the Firmament is a nutſhell, or the ſun is a glow-worm, or to denominate the reaſon of men from the apprehenſions of a fly or a worm, then to attribute Underſtanding, Will, *&c.* to God. What the impropriety is, we ſhall ſpeak to more anon.

5. Therefore all thoſe reaſonings concerning Gods Nature or Acts, which are drawn meerly from the nature and acts of man, as concluding from a ſuppoſed Analogy of attribution (much more a formal Identity) is a vain deceitfull reaſoning.

6. Yet as Scripture ſpeaks of God in terms improper, according to mans capacity, and fetcht from mans nature and acts, ſo muſt we both conceive and ſpeak: that is, not believing that theſe are proper expreſſions or conceptions of God, but that there is that in God which we cannot now more fitly conceive of then under theſe notions, or fitlier expreſs then in theſe terms. God hath nothing properly called Knowledge or Will: but he hath or is that which man cannot fitlier expreſs or conceive of then under the notion of Knowledge and Will: But what it is, God knows. We muſt ſay, God knows, and God willeth; and God muſt ſay ſo to us: For elſe man could not hear or ſpeak of God, if God condeſcended not to the language and capacity of man. *Camero* ſaith, even of our moſt perfect ſtate of glory, that *Frui Deo nil aliud eſt quam potentiæ, ſapientiæ, bonitatis divinæ fructum percipere, quem creaturæ modus & ratio ferre poteſt, &c. Et videtur Deus experiundo quis ſit* (1. Jo 3.) *Et qualem ſe erga nos præſtet, cæterum* (*quicquid dictitent ſcholaſtici, homines acuti quidem, ſed in hoc argumento nimis acuti, inviſibilis eſt vel Angelis, quibus ad Dei conſpectum nulla peccati labes, ſola naturæ imbecillitas*, (*creaturæ enim ſunt*) *aditum interclusit. Prælect. de Verb. Dei. Glaſc.* c. 7. p. 455. I am more certain that even the eye of our underſtanding hath no direct and proper ſight of God, while we are in the fleſh.

7. Yet theſe attributions of Knowledge and Will, to God, are not falſehoods, for there is really ſomewhat in God which theſe are made the improper expreſſions of. Equivocals and Analogies are not *eo nomine* falſe expreſſions.

8. I am ſo farre from thinking that it is by Analogy of Attribution (as the Schoolmen call it) that Knowledge, Will, *&c.* are attributed to God and the creature; that I think theſe aſcribed to God by an exceeding farre fetcht metaphor, further then (as I ſaid) if I ſhould call Heaven a nutſhell; there being a thouſand fold more likeneſs between theſe, then between Gods Knowledge and Will, and mans: For between finite and Infinite there is no proportion. Yea I will not undertake to prove that the *Ratio homonymiæ* is not in Us, only, and not at all in the Things.

9. Yet no doubt, the thing meant by Knowledge and Will when attributed to God, is not only, as many ſay, moſt eminently in God, but is ſolely in God; that which is called knowledge and will in man being not the ſame thing, but *toto genere diverſum*. But yet the conception that we have of Gods Knowledge and Will is but improper derived from the ſuppoſed *ſimile*, *viz.* our own underſtanding and will, which repreſenteth it with exceeding imperfection. So that the terms of Knowledge, Will, Decree, *&c.* are ſpoken firſt and properly

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of the creature, and thence improperly of God.

10. Yet I acknowledge that though all these terms of Attribution, as to God, are exceeding improper, yet there are degrees of impropriety; some being more improper then others are: And so I doubt not but that the terms that are taken from humane passions and imperfections are more improperly applied to God, then these forementioned of Understanding and Will, &c.

And thus I have told you some of my thoughts, that Mr. K. may know on what terms to deal with me, and not contend with one whose minde he understandeth not.

And as to his description of Immanent Acts, I deny that there is any such thing as an Act in God terminated in himself, supposing that you speak not of a meer objective termination (as I know you do not; For else you would call many of these transient acts, as having an extrinsick object.) As I acknowledge no certainty of a proper Act in God, so I acknowledge no positive termination of that which in him we call an Act; and we call it immanent but in that negative sense which the later clause of your description doth express. We are like to make a good dispute of it, when I am forced to deny the subject, as being a *Chymæra*.

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§. 4.

Mr. K. *IN the mean time, out of the respect I bear to the memory of Dr.* Twisse, *I cannot forbear to say, that Mr.* Baxter *had better consulted his own honour if he had said nothing to the disparagement of that Reverend and Renowned Doctor; of whom he speaks very sleightingly more then once in his otherwise excellent Treatise of* Infant-Baptism, *and in all his other Books: In which I could wish there were not somewhat of the Doctrinal part not answering that of the Devotional What Dr.* Twisse *hath said of Justification from eternity, upon this ground, that there can be no new immanent act in God, and how much some in the Synod said against him, and how little he replied for himself matters not: he was now grown old,*

Et videas sessos Rhadamanthon & Æacon annis,
Et Minoa queri———

Like enough, Multum mutatus ab illo
Hectore qui redit exuvias indutus Achillis.

When he beat Arminius, Corvinus, Tilenus, Penottus, Bellarmine, *Dr.* Jackson, *and I know not how many more out of the field;* & solus vacua dominatus arena *left them all bleeding, as Mr.* Goodwin *would have said, at the feet of his Writings. It may be he was now at last, but* magni nominis umbra, *but whose very name really did most of the service, and I am sure was that formidable thing to the learned Adversary: But as old as he was, I question not but he could have easily made this good, There is no new Immanent act in God*] *against all that opposed him in the Synod, and Mr.* Baxter *to boot: and I would fain hear any of them all that opposed him, to give a satisfactory answer but to this one Argument.*

§. 4.

R. B. 1. YOu need not argue me to a higher reſpect to Dr. *Twiſſe* then I have ever manifeſted, except you would have me ſay, He was a God, or an Angel, or an Infallible man.

2. If you cannot forbear, as you ſay, its pity you ſhould be hindered: Men and women muſt ſpeak when their lift is ſo great. Who can hold that which will away?

3. I confeſs that I did not much conſult mine Honour in that writing. Elſe you had not found your ſelf work as you have done in theſe leaves. If you mean the Honour of my Honeſty, your proof muſt do more to the determination then your aſſertion: If you mean the Honour of my Learning, do not you know well enough, how little I have to conſult? He that hath nothing, hath nothing to loſe.

4. [Sleightingly] is a word that will ſtretch, and therefore I will not charge you with untruth. In one mans ſenſe, he ſleights a man that cals him [that famous excellent Divine:] but in another mans, ſleighting ſignifieth the eſteeming of a man below his worth, and expreſſing ſo much, or ſetting light by a man. I am miſerably troubled with thoſe kinde of people that cannot endure [ſleighting] as they call it, above all folks in the world. (I uſe to call them plainly, Proud people, here in the Countrey; but if I were to talk to Learned men I would uſe more manners.) They think I ſleight them, if I do not applaud them, or complement with them, or if I commend them not with ſo loud a voice as they expect (and they are a people that are never low in their expectations:) or if I do but praiſe another above them, or ſpeak to another before them, or be ſhort with them (when I am buſie) when they look for a longer more reſpectfull diſcourſe; yea if my Hat ſhould be over mine eyes that I ſee them not, or my memory ſo fail me as that I forget them; theſe and abundance more I am guilty of ſleighting every day, that I am now grown accuſtomed to the vice, and ſhameleſs in hearing it charged upon me. But I ſuſpect that my ſleighting Dr. *Twiſſe* conſiſteth in my ſuppoſing him to erre, and telling the world ſo: that is, in taking him to be a man: for *humanum eſt errare:* and for ſaying he knew but in part, that is, that he was not glorified on earth by perfection. If you could have charged me with any more then this, would you not have done it? I ſay, would you not? when the Vindication of this Reverend man was the end of your encountring me? and it boyled ſo hot on your ſtomack, that [you could not forbear: you had not the patience to ſee ſo Worthy men ſo unworthily handled.] Yea your ſelf affirm that which is his doctrine to be untrue, and yet I ſleight him for ſaying ſo! Lay this with the commanded Adoration of the footſteps, and it ſeems, it is high matters indeed that you expect. I doubt, by this, that you will ſay, I ſlight *you* before I have done, either becauſe I praiſe you not enough, or becauſe I take you not for infallible and indefectible, or becauſe I value Dr. *Twiſſe* or Mr. *Pemble* ſo very, very, very farre before you; when yet I am accuſed of ſlighting them. Sir, theſe Reverend men, I doubt not, are perfected Saints in heaven, and have pride ſo much, that if they know it, they will give little thanks to him that will contend for the honour of their Infallibility, yea or for the guilding over any of their errours; much leſs, if their honour ſhould be made a ſnare to the entangling of the godly, and a means to the promoting the

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Kingdom of darkneſs, and oppoſing that Truth which they love better then their Honours, and the diſhonouring of that God whoſe glory is their felicity.

Yea let me tell you that I take my ſelf bound in conſcience to ſay more then ever I have yet ſaid, and that is this: [All young Students that will deigne to take advice from ſo mean a man as I, as ever you would preſerve your graces and converſations, preſerve your Judgements; and as ever you would maintain the Doctrine of Chriſt, take heed of the Errors of the Antinomians: and as ever you would eſcape the ſnare of Antinomianiſm, take heed of theſe principal Articles of it following: [That Chriſts ſatisfaction is ours *quà præſtita*, before the Application; and that ſo far, as that we are actually Pardoned, Juſtified, Reconciled and Adopted by it before we were born, much more before we believe: yea that Adoption and Remiſſion of ſin are immanent acts in God, and ſo are from eternity, even before any death of Chriſt, or efficacy of it: That pardon of ſin is nothing but *Velle non Punire*: That Juſtification by faith is nothing but Juſtification *in foro conſcientiæ*, or the ſenſe of that in our hearts, which was really ours from eternity, or from Chriſts death, or both: That juſtifying faith is the feeling or apprehenſion of Gods eternal Love, Remiſſion and Adoption.] I ſay, take heed of theſe maſter-Points of Antinomianiſm: And as ever you would avoid theſe, take heed how you receive them on the reputation and plauſible words of any Writer: and eſpecially of Dr *Twiſs*, who is full of ſuch paſſages, and being of greater learning and eſteem then others is liker to miſlead you. For you know, if you receive theſe then you muſt receive the reſt, if you diſcern the concatenation. For if all your ſins were pardoned as ſoon as Chriſt died, then what need you pray for pardon, or Repent or Believe or be Baptized for pardon? then God loved you as well when you were his enemies, as ſince; and then how can you be reſtrained from ſin by fear? *&c.* And that you may know I ſpeak not this in ſlighting of the Doctor, as Mr. K. chargeth me. 1. I profeſs to do it mainly for Gods glory and Truth, and for the love of ſouls. 2. I take my ſelf the rather bound to it, becauſe I was once drawn my ſelf to ſome of theſe opinions by the meer high eſtimation of Mr. *Pemble* and Dr. *Twiſſe*. 3. I profeſs ſtill moſt highly to love and reverence the names of theſe two bleſſed excellent men, as formerly I never honoured any two men more. For Dr. *Twiſs*, I am more beholden to his Writings for that little knowledge I have then almoſt any one mans, beſides: and for Mr. *Pemble*, for ought I can ſee in his Book of Juſtification, he revoked this ſame errour which in his *Vindic. Grat.* he hath delivered: ſure I am, no two mens Writings have been more in my hands, and few mens names are yet ſo highly honoured in my heart.

This much I take my ſelf bound to publiſh for a common warning. And I would further adviſe all to take heed how they entertain Dr. *Twiſs* doctrine about the cauſe of ſin; of which I ſhall be ready to give my reaſon when I have a call; but will not now digreſs ſo far.

5. For your good wiſh [that my Books had not ſomething in the Doctrinal part not anſwering the devotional] I thank you. But, alas, ignorance and errour will not be healed with a wiſh: Many a year have I ſtudied and praied againſt them, and yet they ſtick by me ſtill. But had I erred in the Foundation, it would have ſpoiled my Devotion: for *non recte vivitur, ubi de Deo non bene creditur*: And I had rather be defective in leſſer doctrinals, then in Devotion. And though I am as confident that you erre in ſome of your Doctrinals (as I ſhall anon manifeſt);

feſt) as you are of my erring, yet I heartily wiſh your Devotion be as good as your Judgement in Doctrine; and I think I wiſh you a greater bleſſing then you wiſhed me.

6. I do not well reliſh your exceeding coldneſs in Gods cauſe, who are ſo hot for mine: When it is for the honour of your Learned Brethren, [you have not patience, you cannot forbear.] But what Dr. *Twiſſe* hath ſaid for Juſtification from Eternity, on the ground that there is no new immanent act in God, this you ſay, *Matters not*: Is it a phraſe beſeeming a Preacher of Chriſts Truth to ſay, [*It matters not?*] When that Truth is contradicted in ſo high a Point? and the ſouls of men, and the peace of the Church ſo much endangered? A *Gallio* might better have ſpoke thus. *England* hath not ſped ſo well by the Antinomians of late, as that any knowing friend of it, ſhould ſay, It matters not, when ſuch great Divines promote their cauſe.

7. And where you alſo ſay, that [it matters not what ſome in the Synod ſaid againſt him, and how little he ſaid for himſelf.] I am not of your minde. 1. Is it only the *veſtigia Doctoris Twiſſi & M. K.* that are to be adored? You ſhall give me leave to honour you much, and the Doctor more, but the Aſſembly more then either of you. 2. I do not think the Doctor was ſo weak, or at leaſt a good cauſe ſo friendleſs in the Aſſembly, but that himſelf or ſome other would have done ſomething conſiderable to the juſtification of his cauſe, if it had been juſtifiable. 3. I will be bold to ask you, the next time I ſee you, whether all your heat and impatience for unworthy handling or ſlighting the Doctor be not meant againſt the Aſſembly as well as me? or if not, Whether it be not reſpect of perſons that made the difference? or rather the ſecuring of your reputation, which you might think would be elevated by a Victory over others, or at leaſt loſe nothing, though the perſon were ſo contemptible, as not to adde to your glory; but by an oppoſition to the Aſſembly it might have been daſht in pieces? Or if the Antinomians being queſtioned by the Aſſembly ſhall alleadge Dr. *Twiſſ*'s words (frequently and plainly uttered) for their Defence; and the Doctors cauſe being hereupon queſtioned ſhall fall without any juſtification; I pray you tell me, Whether there may not be the ſame neceſſity for *us* to take notice of his Errours as the Aſſembly? and whether after them we may not do it (while we honour his worth as much as I ſtill do) without ſlighting or wronging him. It is more diſhonour to be Queſtioned by an Aſſembly and come off unjuſtified, then to be judged to miſtake by ſo contemptible a perſon as I.

8. Where you ſpeak of [his very Name doing moſt of the ſervice.] I do not underſtand what ſervice you mean. I know you mean not the ſervice done in his Writings: And ſure you dare not mean [the ſervice done by the Aſſembly:] for that were to make them a contemptible Aſſembly indeed, if a mans Name, yea *magni nominis umbra*, did moſt of their ſervice: And it were to think as baſely of their ſervice as the worſt Sectary doth, that I have met with. It were not worth ſo much coſt, and ſo many years pains, nor worthy the Acceptation of Parliament or People, if it were but the offspring of Dr. *Twiſſe*'s Name. But Sir we have received fruits that ſhew they came from another cauſe then a name or the ſhadow of a name. I confeſs I value their leaſt Catechiſm for children above all Mr. *Kendall*'s learned Labours, were they twenty times more of the ſame quality. I never heard but one Learned man ſpeak contemptuouſly of the Aſſembly, and his friends ſay it was becauſe he was not thought Worthy to be one of them. (I except thoſe that were againſt them in the Warre; where heat of oppoſition might occaſion

~~occasion diseteem: But if this were Mr. K's case, yet methinks when he changed~~ his Cause and Party, he should withall have changed his esteem of the Assembly.) But its likely that Mr. K. means that it was the Doctors Name that did most of the service of a Moderator; most of his own part in the Assembly: It may be so: But if he had nothing to work by but his Name, yet had his cause been good, it would in that Assembly have found some friends. But what you mean then by the following words, I do not well know, that his Name you are sure [was that formidable thing to the Learned adversary.] Perhaps you mean your self, by the Learned adversary, of whose fears I confess you might be sure, and so might know the Name or Word that did affright you: else I cannot imagine who you mean, except it were the Kings party or the Episcopal Divines together: But for Episcopacy, I know of no Disputes that ever the Assembly had upon it, and so had no adversaries in a disputing way; at least during Dr. *Twiss*'s time. And for disputing the Kings Cause, I think they did as little in it. Some chosen men in the Treaties indeed disputed against Episcopacy, but with other weapons then Dr. *Twisse*'s Name. If you should mean that it was Dr. *Twisse*'s Name that made the Learned Episcopal Divines have Reverend thoughts of the Assembly, I must tell you that there were in that Assembly no small number of Divines of that excellency for Learning, Piety and Ministerial Ability, which might command Reverence from the Learnedest adversaries of you all.

9. But though his Name did all the service; yet you [question not but he could have easily made it good, That there is no new immanent act in God, against, *&c.*] It seems by this that you think this the easier to prove of the two: And indeed I am acquainted with none that are minded to oppose it.

10. Nor is it reasonable for you to say, that you [would fain have any of them all that opposed him, to give a satisfactory answer to your Argument,] when you know it was not in that Point that they opposed him. Would you make more your adversaaies against their will as well as me? or do you long for more honourable Antagonists to cope with? And whats your Argument?

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§. 5.

Mr. K. *IF there be any new immanent Act in God, it must be either of his Understanding or his Will: Of his Understanding there can be none: else must he know somewhat a new, which inferres he was not Omniscient, knew not all before this new act of Knowledge: If of his Will, then either this new act is for the better or worse or indifferent: If for the better, he was not absolutely perfect before, as being capable of bettering: If for the worse, he is not so perfect since this act as he was before; which is to make him less perfect by his new act: If neither, then is this act such as might as well have been out as in: and then it is an imperfection to act so impertinently. This same Argument as I take it made use of by Mr.* Goodwin *himself in a like case, and therefore he will not be offended how highly soever I value it as an irrefragable Demonstration.*

§. 5.

§. 5.

R. B. REmember that I say not that your Doctrine is *Untrue*, but *Uncertain*. It may be possibly as you say; but whether you can tell that it is so, or prove it to be so, I doubt. To your great Argument, I expect better proof of your *major* Proposition, which indeed hath none at all. Two things I expected you should have proved: 1. That God hath an Understanding and Will which act; properly so called: or that you know what it is that is improperly called Gods Understanding and Will? 2. That God hath no immanent Act but of his Understanding or Will. To begin with the last: I will not say, *datur tertium*. For I dare not say properly *dantur duo:* But I will desire you to prove your *major:* and I think that in the same sense as God is said to have an Understanding and Will, for ought you know he may have other acts, which those two notions will not express. For 1. You are uncertain whether Angels may not have other faculties or acts-immanent, besides Understanding and Will: (If you say, you are sure they have not, prove it:) and so others may be ascribed to God by Analogy from them, as these be by Analogy from man. You know perhaps how many senses you have your self: but how can you prove that no other creature hath a sixth sense, which you are uncapable of knowing the name or nature of? So how know you but Angels may have powers or immanent acts beside Understanding and Willing, which you know nothing of for name or nature? Must all Gods superiour creatures be needs measured by poor man? How much more noble creatures hath God, then these below that dwell in dust! 2. But if you were acquainted with all the Angels in heaven, and were at a certainty about the number or nature of their powers or acts, how prove you that God hath no other act then what Understanding and Willing doth express? That one unconceivable perfect act in God, which *Eminenter* (by an unconceivable transcendent eminence) is *Understanding and Willing*, (yet but Analogically so called) but properly and formally is neither, but somewhat more excellent; is in all likelihood very restrainedly or defectively expressed by these two words; even as to the objective extent. How know we but that in some of Gods creatures, or at least in God himself there may be something found besides Entity, Verity, Goodness; or any thing that is the object of Intellection or Volition, whereof no man had ever any conception. However, is it not unlikely, yea a dangerous imagination, That the powers or acts of such wretched worms as we, should be so farre commensurable with the Infinite Majesty, that as we have no immanent act but of Understanding or Will (or subordinate to these) so God hath no other? or none but what are expressed in these two notions! Alas, that silly worms should so unreverently presume! and pretend to that knowledge of God which they have not! and might so easily know that they have not!

And for the former, How farre God hath an Understanding or Will, I will peruse your words to Master *Goodwin* when I have done with this Section.

This were enough to your Argument and Challenge: but I proceed to the confirmation of your implied *minor*. And 1. I easily grant you, that it is certain there is no Addition to, or mutation of Gods Essence. 2. I think all the Acts ascribed to God are his Essence, and are one in themselves considered. Pardon that I do but say [I think:] For though principles of reason and Metaphysical Axioms seem

ſeem to lead plainly to this Concluſion; yet I am afraid of pretending to any greater Certainty then I have; or of building too much on the doubtfull concluſions of mans ſlippery Reaſonings, about the nature of the Inviſible Incomprehenſible God. I think it moſt ſutable to Gods Unity and Simplicity, that all his immanent acts (ſo called by us) are Himſelf and are One. But I dare not ſay I am certain that God cannot be Simple and Perfect, except this be true: both becauſe He is beyond my knowledge, and becauſe the doctrine of the Trinity aſſureth us that there is in God a true diverſity conſiſting with Unity, Simplicity and Perfection of Eſſence. 3. You know not what the ſubject of your Propoſition is, (Gods acts of Underſtanding and Will:) and therefore you are uncapable of ſuch peremptory concluding *de Modis*, knowingly and certainly, as here you pretend to. 4. You cannot prove that there's any ſuch thing in God as an Immanent Act, or an Underſtanding or a Will in proper ſenſe: but ſomething there is which we cannot fitlier or more profitably conceive or expreſs then under ſuch notions, drawn Analogically from mans acts of Underſtanding and Willing. Now if we will ſpeak of Gods Incomprehenſible nature by ſuch Analogy, and put the names of Underſtanding and Willing on God, as borrowed from mans underſtanding and willing, then muſt we accordingly conceive of Gods underſtanding and willing, as like to mans in the form of theſe acts (for we can reach to no higher conceptions, though theſe be utterly improper.) Now mans actual intellection doth connote and ſuppoſe an intelligible object, and his Will doth connote and ſuppoſe an appetible object: and conſequently it cannot be expected according to the utmoſt imaginable natural perfection of them, that either ſhould go beyond the extent of their objects, or be ſuch acts without their proper objects: * Theſe things thus premiſed, ſome will perhaps think you ſufficiently anſwered (when you ſay, it inferres that God was not Omniſcient, knew not all, *&c.*) by telling you 1. That as Omniſciency ſignifies a Power of Knowing all things, Analogically aſcribed to God *ad captum humanum* as diſtinct from the act of knowing; ſo God was yet Omniſcient. 2. As Omniſciency ſignifieth the actual Knowledge of all intelligible objects, ſo God was Omniſcient And no more is requiſite to the perfection of his Knowledge. 3. But an Object may have not only its real but its * intelligible Being *de Novo* which it had not before; and therefore as Omniſciency ſignifieth the Knowledge of all things that *will* be intelligible, as well as thoſe that now *are* intelligible, ſo (ſay they) it belongs not to Gods perfection to be Omniſcient; for it is unnaturally and improperly called Science (and ſo Omniſcience) which hath not an Object. Their foundation (which may ſeem abſurd to you) *viz.* That ſome things may *de novo* become the objects of Knowledge, they declare thus: 1. They ſuppoſe, that though God be Indiviſible, and ſo his Eternity be Indiviſible, and have neither in it, *Præteritum* nor *Futurum*, not *Nunc* neither, as we underſtand it, as expreſſing a preſent inſtant of time; yet as God knoweth not Himſelf only, but the creature alſo, ſo he knoweth not Eternity only but Time: He knows how things are ordered and take place in mans Diviſible meaſure of motions: and therefore he knows things as Paſt, Preſent and Future, *quoad hominem & tempus*, which are ſo paſt, preſent and future. And he doth not know a thing Paſt to be Preſent (*quoad tempus & hominem*) nor a thing Future to

* *Even as Gods Omnipotency is but* dicta ad poſſibilia, *Vid.* Aquin. 1. *q.* 25. *a.* 3. *c.*

* *See* Buridane *of that queſtion in his Ethicks ſo far as to ſhew the great difficulty.*

be Past: but knows things truly as they be. 2. This being premised, they will then assume, that *Peter* and *Paul* did not actually exist from eternity: Christ did not actually suffer from eternity: and so the actual existence of *Peter* in *nunc temporis*, was not an intelligible object from Eternity: and therefore they think they may conclude, that it could not be known from Eternity. They will urge their reason thus: 1. There was no Time from Eternity (that is, before time:) therefore it could not be intelligible, that *Peter* did actually then exist in Time. 2. Else you will confound Futurition and Present existence: God did know from Eternity, that *Peter* would exist in Time, *i. e. futuritionem Petri*: therefore it was not *Peter*'s present actual existence that he knew. 3. The nature of *foreknowledge* is to know things as future, and therefore must not be confounded with knowledge of things as existent. 4. This proposition before the creation was not true [*Peter* doth actually exist:] therefore God could not know it to be then true. But after *Peter*'s birth it did *de novo* become a true proposition: and therefore must be *de novo* known to be then true. Before that, it was only true that [*Hæc Propositio vera futura est*] but not [*vera est:*] therefore no more but the futurition of the Truth could be known, and not the actual present existence (as referring to time:) It is not all one to say [*Petrus erit*] and [*Petrus est*] nor all one to know it. 5. The contradictory Proposition was then true [*Peter* doth not exist:] But both contradictory Propositions could not be known to be true together, that is from Eternity. Therefore God did then know the Negative Proposition as then true [*Petrus non existit:*] and the Affirmative *de futuro* to be true [*Petrus futurus est, vel existet:*] but he did not know the Affirmative *de existentia præsenti* to be true from Eternity [*Petrus in nunc temporis existit*] no nor [*Petrus in nunc æternitatis existit:*] for they were then false Propositions: nor yet was it then true that [*Tempus actu existit.*] If you say, That there were no Propositions from Eternity, and therefore they could not be true or false: this alters not the case: for 1. We speak on supposition that there had been creatures to have framed these Propositions. 2. If we conceive not of God's Understanding as knowing the truth of Propositions, concerning things, we shall scarce have any conception of it as an Understanding at all. 3. The Schools commonly speak of the Eternal truth of Propositions, *e. g. de futuris contingentibus*. 4. There are Propositions in Time, and these God knows: and thats all one to the present case. At *Noahs* flood God knew not this Proposition to be then true [*Petrus existit:*] for it was not then true. Nor did he know then that [it is true *in nunc temporis quo existit Petrus*] but only, that it *will* be true: For *Futura* and not things presently existent are the objects of Foreknowledge: and that [*Nunc temporis*] it self did not then exist. 6. Otherwise it would be true that All things do coexist with God from Eternity: (which is disclaimed by those that are now opposed:) and so that they do exist from Eternity. For if this Proposition were known to be true from Eternity [*Petrus existit, vel Deo coexistit,*] then the thing expressed is true, *Peter* did so exist and coexist. For that which is false cannot be known to be at the same time true. If it be granted therefore that *Peter* did not exist from Eternity, and consequently that that Proposition was not then true, nor intelligible as then true, but only as of future Verity, then when God in time knows it to be of present existent Verity, he knows more then when he knows it to be only of future Verity and of present falshood: And so about the creatures, When he knows that they do exist and knows them as existing, he knows more then when he knew them only to be future and as future. For if it be

not more to know a thing as existent then as future, and so knowledge be not diversified from the object, then it is no more to know something then nothing: For the reason is the same: and future is a term of diminution as to existent. And then it will be all one to know [*Judas* is damned] and [*Peter* is saved:] [*Jacob* is loved] and [*Esau* is hated.] Yea then it would be all one if (*per possibile vel impossibile*) it were known [*Peter* is damned] and [*Judas* is saved] or [*Peter* is saved and damned:] and so it would be all one to know falshood and truth.

Many such reasonings as these will be used against you. Of which if you would know my own opinion, I think they are *de ignotis*, dreams, fightings in the dark, yet much like your own. And though I know severall things that you may say against this reasoning, so do I know much that may be said against yours: and, I think, both sides would do better to profess that ignorance which they can neither overcome nor hide. How constantly do the Schools distinguish between Gods Abstractive and Intuitive Knowledge? *Scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ & puræ Visionis?* and tell us that the former in order of nature goes before the other? If this be so, then God hath a *Prius* and *Posterius* in the acts of his knowledge. The like we may say between Gods Knowledge of Himself and the creature. If they think it not absurd that *etiam in mente Divina* there should be a transition of things *è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum*, and this *sine mutatione*, why may they not admit a knowledge of things as existent only when they are existent, and of things as future when they are future? and this *sine mutatione* too? For the distinction *quoad momenta temporis*, will make but a gradual difference, in point of mutation, from that *quoad ordinem naturæ, vel momenta Rationis*. All distinction, that hath real ground, denotes imperfection, according to our highest speculators, and so must all be denied of God. I refuse not to say (if I must say any thing) of both as Mr. *Barlow* doth *Exercit.* 5. (I think him not pedantick, because he is bound with *Schibler:*) *Mutatio illa est solum in objecto cognito, non in cognoscente, seu cognitione; cum cognitio divina ab objecto non dependet, nec ad mutationem objecti mutationem ullam patitur, &c. Cum ideo admittit Alvarez res primo esse possibiles solum in ordine ad potentiam & futuras in ordine ad voluntatem, necesse est ut prius cognoscat cognitione abstractiva (quia ut possibiles ea solum cognitione cognosci possunt) & postea cum per voluntatem fiunt futuræ, & etiam actu existentes, illas cognitione intuitivâ cognoscet Deus. At hinc nulla in Deo mutatio sequetur, sed solum in objecto (ut fateatur necesse est) Et per consequens hoc dato, quod scientia Dei ab abstractiva in intuitivam mutaretur, tamen non sequetur Deum esse mutabilem, vel cognitionem suam ex parte rei: sed solum quod objecto variato, intellectus noster, varias ei denominationes attribuit: ut quod sit intuitiva, quod abstractiva, quæ solum sunt denominationes variæ cognitioni divinæ ab intellectu nostro impositæ, pro diverso respectu ad creaturam, cum in se sit omnino simplex & invariata.*]

But then I would fain know whether there be not the same necessity that the difference between objects [only future] and [presently existent] should cause our understandings to put the forementioned various denominations on Gods Knowledge, as the difference *inter Possibilia & Futura*, doth so cause us to put on it? And also whether in the same impropriety and imperfection, the very notions of [Understanding, Willing, Acting, Immanently, *&c.*] be not *Denominationes ab intellectu nostro impositæ*, or assumed by God in condescension to humane weakness, expressing but some little, very little, of that Divine ——I know not what. For that same thing which man hath a true formall conception of under the notion of [Knowing, Willing] is varied according to the variety of

objects: But if it be not ſo with God (as I muſt think and ſay, It is not, if I preſume to think and ſay any thing of it,) that is becauſe Knowledge and Willing in Him are not the things that we by thoſe terms uſe to expreſs; nor yet any thing that we can have formall proper conceptions of: And by the ſame neceſſity and warrant as we do bring down the Divine nature ſo low, as to apply to it the notions of Acting, Underſtanding, Willing; may we alſo apply to it the notions of Acting, Knowing and Willing *de novo*; confeſſing a further addition to the impropriety of ſpeech. And therefore as God himſelf doth in Scripture accomodate himſelf to our capacity, by aſſuming the terms and notions of Underſtanding and Willing, ſo doth he alſo of loving where he before hated, with divers the like, which in man would imply an innocent mutation.

I have here given you ſome reaſon of ſeveral paſſages of mine, which your following Pages carp at, before you diſcerned my meaning, as I ſhall ſhew you further anon.

So much to your proof that there is no new immanent act in Gods Underſtanding. One word to what follows about his Will.

Where you argue thus: [*If of his Will, then this new act is either for the Better, or Worſe, or Indifferent*, &c.] *Anſ.* In ſtrict propriety, it is taken as unproved, that he hath Will, or Immanent acts. But *ad captum humanum* as we are neceſſitated to aſcribe Willing and Acting to him, ſo they that think they may on the ſame grounds aſcribe New acts of Will to him (as the Scripture undoubtedly doth,) will think that your Argument is ſufficiently anſwered thus:

1. This arguing ſuppoſeth mans ſilly intellect capable of comprehending the Reaſons of the Acts of the Almighty; as if it cannot be, except we can apprehend the reaſon of it, and whether it be for the better or worſe or indifferent; or what it produceth, or to what end it is: which is a moſt bold arrogant preſumption in ſuch moles as we are. As I ſaid before, you know not whether there may not be more Affections or *Modi entium* open to the Divine Intellect and Will, or Nature, then we have any name for or conception of: And though mans will look only at the goodneſs or appetibility or conveniency of objects, yet you know not what Gods will is; and therefore know not what is its adequate object. Many other reaſons alſo of the obſcurity of this might be given.

2. It will be anſwered you, that the ſaid New act of Gods will, is for the Better: But then they will diſtinguiſh of [*Better.*] 1. They will ſay, It is Better *quoad rerum ordinem*: and it is Better to the creature: (as for God to love him that before he hated: or approve of him, whom before he diſapproved.) 2. They diſtinguiſh alſo between that which may be ſaid to be Better to God himſelf: Either Really, by a real addition to his perfection; and ſo nothing can be Better to God: Or 2. Relatively and Reputatively; as God is ſaid to be Bleſſed, Glorified, Honoured, Well pleaſed, Exalted, Magnified, *&c.* And thus it may be Better to God, though he receive no real addition of felicity; and ſo not Vain or Indifferent.

3. They will deſire you to Anſwer your own Argument as to tranſient Acts, and they think it may ſerve as to immanent acts. (Remembring that they ſuppoſe that there be new acts in God without mutation; becauſe they ſuppoſe that thoſe very things that we call immanent Acts in him are but denominations of his ſimple Eſſence, according to the various aſpects or reſpects of the objects, which make no more mutation then relations do.) Was Gods act of Creation, of raiſing

sing Christ from death, &c. for the Better, or Worse, or Indifferent? I think you will say as before, that it was not Better as to God in the adding of any real felicity to him: But to God Reputatively and Relatively, and to the creature really, it was Better. So will they say about immanent acts, which may perfect the whole (as the Honour of the Prince is the good of the Commonwealth) and may be necessary to the Good of particular persons; and the reputative Good of God himself. Its said, God made All things for himself, Was it for Better to himself, or Worse, or Indifferent?

4. Is it Better or Worse for a looking Glass that it receive a hundred various *species de novo?* You will perhaps say, It is no disparagement to the Glass to be receptive of new *species* without being made Better or Worse: as also that its reception is passive, and so is not Gods Understanding or Willing. I know not what it is: but I confess it must needs be a very improper conception to conceive of God as passive in knowing. And yet man hath no true apprehension of a knowledge which is wholly *sine passione:* But how prove you that God cannot, if he please, by his active Knowledge, Know *de novo*, without becoming Better or Worse? or doing it in vain? Are you sure that every new act of intellection (even in a dream) doth make mans understanding better or worse? or else is vain? I confess more may be here said.

5. Having done with your Argument, they will further tell you, that, If God may have new relations without any real change, then, for ought you know, he may have new immanent acts without a real change: But the Antecedent is unquestionably true: (God was not a Creator before he had creatures: nor is he our Father before we are his children; nor our King, Master, &c. before we are his subjects, servants, &c. except *de jure* only:) The Consequence they prove thus: Relations have as true an Entity, as, for ought you know, these which we call Immanent Acts in God, may have: Therefore the Novation of them will make as great a change. Here they suppose that *Actio* and *Relatio* are both accidents (taken properly) and neither of them meer *Entia Rationis* (for in so thinking they go in the more beaten road) much less nothing: Or if you will say, that *Relatio* is but *Modus entis*, they will say so of action too: Or however they tell you, that it may be so for ought you know, with that which we call an Act in God. And here they suppose that his Acts are not his Essence absolutely and in it self considered; and that it signifies not all one to say, God is God, and to say, God willeth the existence of this worm: And therefore they will say, that these which we call Acts, may be, if not Relations, yet some of *Scotus* his formalities, or something to us unknown, which have either no more Being then Relations, or at least not so much as to make a real change in God. And that there is in his simple, indivisible Essence, a Trinity of persons, without any imperfection: so there may be in his Essence, distinct formalities (or somewhat that we cannot name or conceive of) of a lower nature, then Personality, without any inconvenience: and as these may be superadded to the meer absolute Essence of God (as *Agere, Intelligere, Velle*, are added) without dividing, or multiplying it: so may they on the same grounds be New, or renewed, without any Mutation of Gods Esience; but only of the formality of intellection or Volition, which is added to his Essence.

6. They further think that the nature of transient acts, doth prove that immanent acts may be renewed: But this will be more spoke to anon, when we come to your doctrine of transient Acts. They say, A transient act is not a meer Re-

lation & Passion or Effect: But there is in it that which may be called action *ab agente*, as well as passion *à patiente*. Now if *actio* be *efficientis actio* here, and God in creating the world did *verè agere*, then either the world was created from eternity, or else God did create it from Eternity, and yet it was created only in Time, and the Causation or Causing creating Act was infinitely before the Effect; or else there was a new act really performed by God in Time. The first none will maintain, that I deal with. The second, say they, is against common reason: For Gods act is the *Causa proxima creaturæ*; and *omnis causa proxima reciprocatur cum suo effectu*: i. e. *Posita causa proxima in actu, necesse est effectum poni*: If it be *causa totalis*, yea and requireth nothing else to the effect so much as by preparation, or disposition, no nor a subject matter, then the act of creation must needs immediatly produce the creature; and the *Creare* and *Creari* must needs be inseparable: Its answered that Gods creating act was from eternity, but the effect, or creature, was not till its Time. But it will be replied, That either God did more for the creatures production or creation at the time of its passive creation, then he did from Eternity, or he did no more: If more, then he did something *de novo*: If no more, then either the creature would have had its Being from Eternity, *quia posita causâ ponitur effectus*; or else if you ask whats the reason that the creature was not in Being sooner or later, no cause can be assigned; and so God should not be the cause. This holds equally (say they) whether you make the creating act to be only Gods *Velle*, or a superadded execution of that will, as being the effect of power. For either God willed the creatures present existence from eternity, as much as at the time of its creation, or as at this day; or he did not. If he did not, then he willeth *de novo*: If he did, then the creature would have existed, as soon as it was willed. To say, that God willed from Eternity that the creature should be in Time, is true: But is it as much to Will that it *shall be*, as to Will its present existence? If it be answered, That there is no *Past* or *Future* with God; I answer 1. That this was prevented before; when it was said, that God understandeth Time, and propositions concerning time, though time be only mans measure, and propositions mans instruments. 2. The men that I speak to, maintain that all things coexist not with God from Eternity (though indeed the term [*from*] as here used, contradicteth Eternity;) and they distinguish between Gods willing *rerum futuritionem & existentiam præsentem*; and therefore this seemeth to make against their answer. (But indeed none of all this arguing is solid, because of the different manner of producing effects *per voluntatem, & per potentiam exequentem voluntati superadditam.*) Perhaps it will be said, that if all this be granted, yet it followeth not that immanent acts may be *de novo* without a change in God, because the Creating act, or any transient act is so: For the former is God himself, but the later is not. To which it may be replied, 1. We speak not now of a product or effect, called the Creation, but of the creating act and then why should not that be God himself, as well as an immanent act? If you say it is a Being, then it is God or distinct from God: If distinct from God, it is a substance or accident, or some *modus*, or who knows what? Accidents God hath none: Substance it cannot be; except it be God. If you say it is any *modus*, you know what School contradiction you must expect: Or if you say it is a Reality or a Formality, those that you deal with will tell you, that they can as well prove the immanent acts to be formalities, or such like, as you can the transient. For 2. they say (with others) that these acts are not called Immanent, Positively, as if they had any effect or *terminus* in God himself;

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but Negatively, because they have no effect, *ad extra*; and do *nihil ponere in objecto*. So that as to the nature of the act it self, they say, it is the same; or at least, the later as much essential to God, as the former (though not their effects.) And I have paper converse with a Divine, if I mistake not, full as Learned as Mr K. (to speak sparingly) who maintains, that those which you call immanent acts (viz. Gods Knowing and Willing other things besides himself) are transient, and so to be called; as having as much an extrinsick object, as those that you and I call Transient; though they make no real change on them: and that those only are to be called Gods immanent acts, whose object is himself. 3. Moreover you will acknowledge that Gods *Velle* is an immanent act: But how many and how great are they that maintain that Gods Creating act, was but his *Velle* that things should be! I need not tell you of Schoolmen that are for this: but when you (doubtless) know that Dr *Twisse* himself affirms it, in his *Vindic.* you must either be of his minde, or *handle him unworthily* by your Dissent, as I did in another case. Now if the act by which God produced the creatures be but his *Velle*, then it is an act which you call immanent. And you well know how commonly it is maintained that *Deus operatur per essentiam*; and that there is no act but his essence it self, requisite to any effect, which he produceth, as it is the effect of the first Cause. But this is but *ad hominem*; for these are not their principles whose arguings I now recite. They suppose that creation and other transient acts, are not meer Volitions, but acts of power, in execution of Gods will. To which purpose how largely many famous Schoolmen have argued, is obvious to them that are conversant in them. *Aureolus* hath fifteen Arguments to this end. *Gregor. Arminiensis* hath many Arguments to prove that how ever Creation or Conservation be taken, neither of them is God himself. *Capreolus* I know and other Thomists answer these Arguments: and much may be replied and is, to those answers: so that in so dark and unsearchable a Controversie, strong wits may finde something to say, against each other, longer then the patience of the wisest of their Readers will hold out to know the issue of their disputes. *Ægidius, Thom. de Argent. Occam*, and others plead also for a necessity of an executive act of power, distinct from the meer act of willing, or that Creation is not God. So do *Jacob. Martini, Suarez, Schibler*, and other later Authors. And if (as *Aquinas* saith) transient acts be *formaliter in agente*, as well as immanent, then the inception of new immanent acts seems to have no other inconveniences, then the inception of transient acts as to the form. But indeed the Thomists say the same of both, that they are only Gods essence, and that God hath no transient act at all, but only that his Essence or Will or Understanding may be so denominated for the rational Relation of the Object thereto. And therefore *Aquinas* (1.*q*.25.*a*.1.) maintaining that there is in God *Potentia activa* (though not *passiva*) withall maintains it to be the same thing, as the action, and as his Will and Understanding. (And yet sometime he calleth Gods actions transient: but in this he speaks unconstantly or doubtfully, as *Suarez* noteth *Met. disp.* 20. §.5.) And the substance of all *Capreolus* answer to *Aureolus* fifteen Arguments, is this same distinction, between Gods act of Creation it self (which is his Will and Essence, immanent and eternal) and the *Relatio rationis* between God and the object; from which Gods will is denominated a transient act. But yet in this transient act, it is only the relation, and not the act it self (which is God himself) which may be diversified or renewed. Now if this meer *relatio rationis* be sufficient ground for our denomination of Gods act to be [Transient] and these transient acts to

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be new, then it may seem that the relation of the same act to some extrinsick terminative objects (as of Gods knowledge to the present existence of things *in nunc temporis*) doth give the same ground to call those acts new, though not so properly transient. For if one may be denominated from its respect to its object, why not the other: Nay why the same *relatio rationis* may not as well denominate those acts transient also, which we now call immanent, is not easie to discern: For both have respect to an extrinsick object, if that suffice. Nay doth not that act which is called immanent, produce or effect? seeing it is only *Volendo* without any other executive action that God effecteth all things that are effected: and this *Velle* from eternity is (say they) *causa in actu* of those things that are produced in time. And therefore many say, that God hath no Will as to extrinsicks, but what is effective: and so that his Will hath no extrinsick object properly so called, but only products or effects. That *omne velle Dei est operativum & efficax eorum quæ vult*, and that therefore he may not be said to will any thing but what he doth effect. See *Gibieuf de Libert.* lib. c. 24. & 1.

So that in Conclusion, according to the Doctrine of the most Learned Thomists, there is in God neither immanent nor transient act in Mr K's sense. (Except those that are terminated, as they call it, in himself as the object.) Not immanent; for they are not terminated in the Agent, as Mr K. saith, such are; nay they have respect to things extrinsick; nay, say many, they are productive of these extrinsick things. Not transient; for Gods essence doth not *transire in objectum extraneum*, but only cause it without any other executive action; and so respecteth it. In the same sense therefore, and on the same grounds as you will maintain the transient act to be in time, and not eternal, will these men think to prove it also of the immanent. For even the transient acts of God (so called) are not in the creature, but only respect and effect them. As *Capreolus* saith (*li. 2. dist. 1. q. 2. art. 3.*) *Talis actio prædicamentalis & quæ est motus, est subjectivè in passo: Divina autem actio non est motus, nec mutatio, licet causet motum & mutationem.*

7. But they much insist on that before intimated, that if it be no wrong to Gods simplicity to have diversity or multiplicity of immanent acts ascribed to him, then it is not any wrong to his immutability to have such acts ascribed to him *de novo*: For the reason will prove alike. But that it is no wrong to God to have diversity of immanent acts ascribed to him, is evident by 1. The use of Scripture. 2. The use of all Divines. 3. And the necessity of the thing. 1. I need not tell any man that hath read the Bible, that Scripture distinguisheth of Gods attributes; that it ascribeth to him Understanding, Will, Memory, &c. that it speaketh not of his Love and Hatred, his Approbation and Disallowance, his Justice and Mercy, as being one, not to be distinguished. 2. And what Divines speak otherwise? even of them that make the boldest enquiries into Gods nature, and pass of it the most confident conclusions, as if they had seen the invisible Majesty: I mean the Schoolmen of all sorts: To how little purpose were many a Volume in 1^m *Sent.* for the most part, if it were enough to apprehend in God undivisible Unity? How easily on these grounds might we answer all *Bradwardines*, all *Twisses* sublime disputes, about Gods willing sin, his order of intention, and of his Decrees, his Election and Reprobation, whether absolute or conditional, definite or indefinite, and *de rerum possibilitate & futuritione ab æterno*, with many the like? Its easie to say, that all these are one and the same thing: and the same is not before or after it self, &c. Yet this is not taken for a satisfactory

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way of disputing. 3. Yea is it not apparent, that there is a necessity of such distinguishing language? How many souls would you be likely to convert, and save? how many sins to prevent, by telling your Auditory, that in deed and truth it is all one thing in God to Decree a man to salvation, or to decree him to damnation? Its all one to Will that you shall sin, and that you shall not sin: that you shall die this day, and that your Neighbour shall live fourty years longer: Its the same thing, without any true difference, for God to Love you now you believe, and to Hate you while you were a worker of Iniquity; to be pleased and displeased, to Approve and dislike; His Love to *Peter*, to *Jacob*, and his Hatred to *Judas*, to *Esau* was the same thing, only the effects are not the same. I say, how savoury and profitable would this doctrine be?

And are there not the same Reasons for our ascribing to God, the beginning and ending of Immanent Acts, as the Diversity of them? Is not one as consistent with his Immutability, as the other with his simplicity? Doth not Scripture ascribe to God the Inception and ending of Immanent Acts, as well as the Diversity of them? And is there not as great a necessity of our using that language as the other? How many souls were you like to save by telling them [God Loved you as well before you believed, yea before Christ died for you, as he doth since! God doth Hate you now as much as he did when you were a worker of iniquity, and is as much offended with you since you believed as he was when you were a childe of wrath! He had the same thoughts of you when you were blaspheming, murdering and committing adultery, as when you repent and pray. God is now decreeing to create the world; he is now decreeing to give the Law by *Moses*, to save *Noah* by the Ark, *Lot* out of *Sodom*: he is now Decreeing that Christ shall suffer for us; he now knows all these as future: he is no more Reconciled to the world by Christ, or Pleased in or by his Sufferings and Merits then he was before: God knows now that [Christ is now on the Cross] or [Christ is not Risen] is a true Proposition, because he did once know that it is a true Proposition: and he ceaseth not to know it:] would this kinde of doctrine seem sound and edifying? Do you use to preach thus?

But you'le say, That Gods Knowledge, Will, Power, Goodness, Justice, Infiniteness, his Willing the End and the Means, the futurition of things, and their present existence, mens salvation or damnation are all diversified onely as to *extrinsick denomination*, and not really: from the variety of objects it is, that one act of God is variously denominated.

Answ. 1. But *Scotus* with his followers, *Sirectus*, *Basolis*, *Trombeta le Roy*, *Gothutius*, *Mayro*, *Faventinus*, and the like, tell us of more then extrinsick denominations: And if there be in God a Diversity of Formalities; it may as well be said, that there is an inception and ending of these Formalities in him. This doth no more derogate from the Immutability of God, then the other from his simplicity.

2. Have these extrinsick Denominations any true Ground in the things denominated, or not? If not, it seems they are all false, and therefore not to be used. If they have, then what is it? The difference of names should suppose an equal difference in the Things. A meer Relative difference, some are loth to grant. If they should, as they plead for a diversity of Relations, others may as well plead for an Inception and Cessation of Relations: (Could they prove Immanent acts to be but Relations.) If they say they are *Modi* or *Entia rationis*, or what ever title rash adventurous wits may impose on them, still others will say as much for their

Beginning and Ending, as they do for their Diversity, and that one implies no more a Change in God, then the other denieth his simplicity. The describers of Extrinsick Denomination that place it between *Ens* and *Nihil*, make it to signifie the order of a thing to the subject which yet it is not in. But then it is a meer Relation which is Denominated; or if any more, it should be *ex parte objecti* only in our case.

3. But suppose that it be but a meer extrinsick Denomination, and have no Reall Ground in the thing denominated; see what follows: But this much: That Gods Knowledge, and Will, and Power, and Justice, and Mercy, his Knowing me to be Godly or ungodly, his decreeing *Peter* to life, and *Judas* to death; his loving *Jacob* and hating *Esau*, are all one; his knowing one thing to be future, and another not future, is all one: But yet because of the Diversity of objects it is meet and needfull, that we Denominate extrinsecally Gods acts to be divers: and so to distinguish his Intention of the End, from his Election of the Means; his Election from his Reprobation, his Approbation from his dislike, *&c.* Even so, these acts in God have in themselves no Beginning or End: God did never Begin to Love, to Will this or that, to Know *&c.* But yet because of the Beginning and Ending of objects, it is meet and needfull to Denominate Gods acts extrinsecally as Beginning and Ending, as the objects do, and changing with them. For here the case is the same as to Gods Immutability, as in the other to his simplicity. And if this hold, then those men that should write Voluminous Disputes, about the Beginning and Ending of Immanent acts, would do as warrantably as Dr *Twiss* and others do in writing so of their diversity, priority and posteriority in nature. Nay is it not much more Justifiable then many of their Volumes? For from Eternity there was no reall diversity of objects to denominate Gods Immanent acts from. For that *esse cognitum vel volitum*, which they'le flie to, could be no where, but *in mente & voluntate Divina*: and if there were no Diversity *in mente Divina* at all, then what ground can be imagined of the extrinsick Denominations? For example, *Possibilia & futura* being nothing, could not in themselves differ from eternity: Yet how great a fabrick doth Dr *Twiss* build upon this Proposition, that [the transition of things future *è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum*, being from Eternity, it must needs have an eternal Cause which can be no other then Gods Will.] Now if there were no such transition, but *in mente divinâ*, and if there were no such notion from Eterniy any where else, as is [Future and Possible] and so it must be imagined to be an *Ens rationis Divinæ*, then it plainly follows that there was no such thing as Future, distinct from Possible: for in God is no distinct Immanent acts, (as knowing Possibles, and Knowing things future;) and in the things was no distinction, for they are nothing.

It seems therefore that upon your own Grounds it is as Justifiable and necessary, to Denominate extrinsecally Gods Immanent acts, as having Beginning and End, when the objects have so, as it is to Denominate them divers from the diversity of the object: and that if we made this our ordinary speech in voluminous Disputes, you could no more blame us for it, then all the exactest School-Divines are to be blamed for the other.

Moreover, some may think, that you do teach Infidels to destroy the Christian Faith, or teach a man to prove or disprove what he will, because Contradictories may consist, *e.g.* If they would prove that [Christ is not Risen] thus: That which God knoweth to be true, is true: But God Knoweth this Proposition to be true [Christ is not Risen] Therefore. The *minor* they prove thus: God did

once

once know this Propoſition to be true: Therefore he doth ſo ſtill: for there is no Ending of any Immanent act of God. It will be anſwered, That this onely ſhews a difference in the object, that it was once true, which now is not: but Gods act is the ſame by which he knoweth theſe mutable objects. Be it ſo: (yet whether it be certain and can be proved ſtill, is by them doubted:) but is it fit for us to ſpeak of this act as one only? It ſeems then, it is all one, in God to know a Propoſition to be True, and to know it to be falſe. For the fore-ſaid Propoſition [Chriſt is not Riſen] was True one day, and Falſe the next; and God knew both. You'le ſay, It is all one in God to Know that to be True which is True, and that to be Falſe which is Falſe: but in both he knows *Verè, etſi non verum.* But then you muſt tell us further, what it is for God to Know [*Truly:*] Is it the Congruency of his Knowledge to the Object, which we call the Truth of it? I think you will ſay ſo: And if ſo, then it is not obvious to ſhew how there was ſuch a Congruence from Eternity, when there was Nothing but God; and ſo no other object for his knowledge to agree to: For in God they were all but one, either in *eſſe cognito*, or *eſſe volito*; for in him is no reall diverſity: and out of him, or in themſelves they were not at all: and therefore if God knew all things as many or divers, when they were not at all, and as exiſtent, when they did not exiſt, where is the Congruence of the act with the object? But all this arguing is but light.

But they further argue thus: Gods Immanent acts, which we are ſpeaking of, are not Himſelf: and therefore as they may be either diverſified or multiplied without his Diviſion or Compoſition, ſo they may begin or end without his Mutation. The antecedent they prove by that common Argument: Theſe Immanent acts about the Creature, are Free; God Freely Willeth the exiſtence of this worm or pile of graſs: he ſo Willed it that he could have not willed it, or nilled it. But his own Being is neceſſary, and cannot but be: Therefore, *&c.* It ſeems hard to ſay, that God did as neceſſarily Will the pardoning of your ſins, as he is neceſſarily God: Or that he could no more have Willed one pile of graſs more or leſſe on the earth, or one ſand more or leſſe on the Sea-ſhore, or one day more or leſſe to any mans life, then he could ceaſe to be God. This is a ſhort way of anſwering *Bevereviticus* queſtion, and of anſwering the preſumptuous enquiry, Whether God could have made any thing better, and a thouſand more? *Itane etiam ipſum Numen fato conſtringitur?* Is it a good Argument? *Deus eſt: ergo neceſſe eſt Creaturas eſſe, nec plures, nec pauciores, nec priùs, nec poſteriùs, &c?* One of my Rabbi's (by whoſe name I have acquainted Mr.K. with my ignorance) anſwereth that Gods Decrees are Free, *Solum per terminationem ad extraneum, ſeu in quantum Volitio Dei, circa objectum aliquod extrinſecum practicè eſt.* But this is as much as to ſay, No Immanent act is Free: For Immanent acts (at leaſt if Mr.K know) are not terminated in any thing without: Or if a man ſhould ſay, that thoſe that have an extrinſick object, are objectively terminated in ſomething extrinſick; yet this ſeems none of the Authours ſenſe (as the word *practicè* ſhews:) and if it were (as perhaps it is) his words would run thus: [Gods Decrees are free, onely as they are ſuch and ſuch Decrees about ſuch objects:] which would but yield the cauſe, that as ſuch Decrees they are not the ſame formally with the divine Eſſence. And were it not for the Connotation of the Object, it were no Decree, nor to be called, but ſimply Gods Eſſence. I am ſure Dr. *Twiſſe* will be fully and earneſtly enough for thoſe that maintain the liberty of the Divine Decrees which we now mention: and therefore I ſuppoſe Mr.K will be of the ſame minde.

And that there is not ſuch clear Evidence in this caſe, as to embolden men to ſuch confident Concluſions, or to build ſo much on them, as ſome do, let *Suarez* perplexed Diſpute *Metaph. Diſp.* 30. *Sect.* 9. teſtifie, *Quomodo cum divina libertate ſtet Immutabilitas?* Where after the producing of many opinions, and the Arguments and Anſwers, he concludes, *Ex his quæ circa has opiniones dicta ſunt, ſatis (ut opinor) declaratum eſt quanta ſit hujus opinionis difficultas; faciliuſque eſſe quamlibet ejus partem impugnare, quam aliquam probe defendere, aut explicare. Quapropter non vereor Confiteri nihil me invenire quod mihi ſatisfaciat, niſi hoc ſolum, in hujuſmodi rebus id de Deo eſſe credendum, quod ineffabili ejus perfectioni magis ſit conſentaneum, quodque ab omni imperfectione alienum ſit,* &c.] And how uncertain are men, that ſome of thoſe things may not conſiſt with the Divine Perfection, which yet they confidently affirm to be inconſiſtent with it? If it be a point that is ſo farre paſt the reach of *Suarez* and many other ſuch ſubtil Diſputers, I think Mr. K. ſhould not pretend to ſo full an inſight into it, which may raiſe him to that confidence which is here expreſſed; much leſſe ſhould he think it ſo obvious to the underſtandings of his inferiours.

How light ſo ever Dr. *Twiſs* make of them, certainly they are accounted no children among the moſt learned of their ſide, who do teach, That there may be ſo far a Beginning and Ceaſing of Gods Immanent acts, which have a mutable object, without any change in God himſelf, as that they may have a new tranſition to the object, and ſo God may Will that which before he Willed not, though yet it be all by one ſimple act. Of this minde is *Penottus, Lychetus, Fr. a Sancta Clara:* And the ſaid *Sancta Clara* citeth others as countenancing his Doctrine. But though there are but few for this opinion, yet for the formal diſtinction of Gods Immanent acts (which as is ſaid, ſeems to be as inconſiſtent with his ſimplicity, as this with his Immutability) there are many and that of the moſt Learned: *Vid. quæ habet Scotus in ſent. l.* 1. *diſt.* 8. *Qu.* 3. *& diſt.* 2. *Qu.* 4. *&* 7. *& diſt.* 34. *& paſſim.* And *Rada* ſaith, that *Scoti ſententiam ab ejus diebus univerſa Parienſis Schola ſemper amplexata fuerit, necnon & Lovanienſis atque Bononienſis Academia; Et in univerſa Italia apud omnes vivos doctos eſt celebris & famoſa. In Contr* 4. And their Reaſons are not contemptible, which may be ſeen in their ſeveral Writers: Specially in thoſe that have wrote whole books of the Formalities. Or *Rada* (a man of a clear underſtanding and expreſſion) will afford you many in that one *Contr.* 4. which are worthy conſideration. And if *Ph. Faber Faventinus* his reconciling Interpretation of their Diſtinction *Rationis Ratiocinatæ*, will prove their ſenſe, then many of the *Thomiſts* are alſo of the ſame minde. *Vid.* Faventin. *Tract. de formalitat. cap.* 3.

I do not mean by this Argument to conclude that there *muſt* be (or in all caſes *may* be) an Inception or Ceſſation of thoſe Acts which admit of a formal Diſtinction: But only thus, that if a formal Diſtinction be conſiſtent with the Divine ſimplicity, then an Inception and Ceſſation of ſome ſuch formalities (or acts, *quoad formales differentias*) may ſeem conſiſtent with Gods Immutability: (And I know no other Argument of moment then left, if that be ſolved.) What theſe formalities are, I do not wonder, if they give but a dark account: Yet that they are different objective conceptions they agree. And as *Rada* ſaith, *ad Diſtinctionem formalem duo requiruntur. Alterum eſt, quod utrumque diſtinctionis extremum dicat aliquid Poſitivum in re, ſecluſa operatione Intellectus: Alterum eſt, quod utrumque extremum dicat propriam formalitatem, ſecundum quam ſit in rerum natura extra ſuam cauſam.* And *Scotus* himſelf ſaith of this as applied to God; *Quod Forma in creaturis*

turis habet aliquid imperfectionis, ſcilicet quod eſt Forma informans aliquid, & Pars compoſiti: aliquid etiam habet quod non eſt imperfectionis, ſed conſequitur eam ſecundum ſuam rationem eſſentialem ſive formalem, ſcilicet, quod ipſa ſit quo aliquid eſt tale, e. g. ſapientia in nobis eſt Accidens, hoc eſt imperfectionis: ſed quod ipſa ſit quo aliquid eſt ſapiens, hoc non eſt imperfectionis, ſed eſſentialis rationis ſapientiæ. In divinis autem nihil eſt forma, ſecundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis, quia nec Informans, nec pars: eſt tamen ibi ſapientia in quantum eſt quo illud in quo ipſa eſt, eſt ſapiens, & hoc non per aliquam compoſitionem, &c. *Sent.* 1. *diſt.* 8. *Q.* 3.

Some think yet clearer Arguments might be fetcht from the Hypoſtatical Union, from the Acts of generation and ſpiration, or Love, whereby the Son is begotten of the Father, and the holy Ghoſt proceedeth from the Father and the Son, and from the diſtinction of Perſons in the Trinity. But I will ſtop here (as having run further then I intended) leſt you ſhould miſ-interpret me, and think, that I own all theſe Arguments that I touch upon. I know what D. *Twiſs* againſt *Pennotus* hath ſaid to one or two of them, and what the Schoolmen commonly ſay to the ſame. I mention theſe only to ſhew that a full or clear ſolution of theſe doubts is not alſo facile and obvious, as you ſeem to imagine.

I muſt again intreat you, and every ingenious Reader, to faſten no opinion on me, but what I own, at leaſt none which I diſclaim. If I muſt be of one ſide in this Controverſie, I will be of Mr. *Kendals* ſide, and ſay, that God hath but one act immanent, and that is Eternal. But my thoughts are, that we know not what we talk of when we ſpeak thus, and therefore I will not be of any ſide in this.

I think, 1. That God hath no Act at all in proper ſpeech: but both Acting, and Underſtanding, and Willing are by a very, very, very low remote Analogy aſcribed to him.

2. Yet I am ready to think, that as we are fain for our own underſtanding, to ſpeak of God as Acting, Underſtanding, Willing, Loving, *&c.* and alſo for our own underſtanding to diſtinguiſh his Perfections, Properties, Acts, *&c.* which are but one, ſo may and muſt we as much ſpeak of ſome of his Acts, as beginning and ending (which yet perhaps do not in themſelves:) For the Reaſon and Neceſſity ſeems to be the ſame. For becauſe the word [Knowledge or Underſtanding] is firſt uſed and applied to mans act of Knowledge, and ſignifieth firſt only ſuch a Knowledge as is diverſified by objects; yea and man can have no proper poſitive Conception of a Knowledge which is not diverſified by the diverſity of Objects (but onely a Negative Conception;) therefore it is that we are forced to ſpeak of Gods Knowledge (and ſo of his Will and other Acts) as divers or diſtinct: as Divines generally do. And on the ſame Grounds, as man hath no poſitive Conception of any Knowledge or Will, about mutable objects, which is not varied with theſe objects, as to the Being, Beginning and Ending, therefore we muſt as neceſſarily denominate Gods acts about ſuch objects, as Beginning and Ending, as we muſt denominate them Divers. And ſo we may well ſay, God willed from Eternity the futurition of the worlds Creation, and Chriſts Death, *&c.* But now he doth not will their futurition, but their preterition: and that he Loveth now (as believers in Chriſt) thoſe whom he before Hated as Workers of Iniquity; and that he is ſatisfied and well-pleaſed in his Son, and his Sacrifice, who was not ſo before. Me thinks Mr. K. ſhould think this language as fit for the mouths and pens of Divines, as the former, and not to be blamed or accuſed as

erroneous, becauſe improper, as long as we muſt ſpeak improperly of God, or not at all. And I am ſure that Scripture ſpeaks of God in this language, aſcribing to him Immanent acts, as new or as ceaſing, and as moved by exteriour cauſes: Therefore this way of ſpeaking is not unfit or intolerable.

The Summe of all that I ſay therefore is but this, That we cannot conceive of Gods Immanent acts, as in themſelves they are (nor are they truely the ſame things that we conceive of, when we apply the ſeveral denominations to them:) and therefore we muſt conceive of them by Reſemblance to the Acts of Man ſo denominated, ſtill acknowledging the Impropriety of the terms, and diſclaiming all thoſe Imperfections which in man they do expreſs.

But becauſe Mr. K. hath ſpoken ſo much to this point already, its like he will take it ill if I take no notice of it. I will therefore a little inſiſt on the conſideration of what he ſaith on it, to Mr. *Goodwin*, pag. 93, 94. (but briefly, as being not to me.)

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§. 6.

Mr. K. *THis is ſuch a Reaſon as moſt of your Diſciples needed your favour to reade a Logick Lecture to them, that they might be in a Capacity to give their Judgements on it: You not having been pleaſed to do it, I will for once gratifie them with a Caſt of my old Office; and now ſuppoſing my ſelf again in my Deans Chair, I gravely begin thus. That* Univocum *is that which is attributed to ſeveral things according to the ſame Name, and Nature ſignified by that name; as Animal to a Man and an Aſſe, to which are oppoſed on the one hand* Æquivocum, *which is attributed according to the* ſame Name, *but not ſignifying the ſame Nature, as* Canis *which is ſaid of a Starre, a Beaſt, and a Fiſh: either hath the ſame name* Canis, *but their natures are as different as Heaven, Earth and Water. On the other hand* Analogum, *which is attributed according to the ſame Name, and as ſignifying the* ſame *Nature; but not in the like manner. Now this ſame* Analogum *is of two ſorts; The terms are promiſcuouſly jumbled together by the Logickmongers, but let that be,* 1. Proportionis; *when the ſame Name is given to things of the* Like, *but not the* ſame *Nature: as Laughing,* &c. 2. Attributionis: *where the ſame Name is given to divers things, according to the* ſame *Nature: but this* ſame *Nature doth not agree to them alike; but to the one firſt, to the other afterwards,* ſecundum priùs & poſteriùs: *yea to the later dependantly on the firſt: as Subſtance and Accident are each of them* Ens, *a thing,* &c.

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§. 6.

R. B. HOld a little. 1. The firſt part of your task, you have competently performed, *viz.* to acquaint us of the lower Orbs of your ancient Dignity: Our diſtance is ſo great from the Superiour Planets, that we might never have heard of your Deans Chair, had you not happily here informed us: But I hope you had a more noble Imploiment in your Deans Chair, then this poor, common, Inferiour work, to tell men of *Univocum æquivocum & Analogum*, and to diſtinguiſh *Analogum Proportionis & Attributionis*: But though I had not the happineſs to be educated at your feet, yet in this your Learned, Elaborate, Polemical writing, I may, no doubt, expect the beſt of your Judgement; and may conjecture what you were wont to reade to your Pupils by that which you here ſo *gravely* read to Mr. *Goodwin*. Firſt, you will not, it ſeems [jumble the terms ſo promiſcuouſly

miſcuously as the Logickmongers do?] But, when theſe words had raiſed my expectations of ſome more exquiſite diſtribution then ordinary, or at leaſt of more apt terms, I am put off with the old diſtinction, not only common in the Schoolmen, but in the multitudes of Logick and Metaphyſick Writers, which I had thought you had diſdained: Not the ſmalleſt *Senguerdius* but hath it; (onely he, with many others term it, but Barbarous; whereas *Keckerman* terms it *Inſipid*, and *Burgerſdicius inept:*) And *Rutgerſius* ſaith, that *Analogorum nomine ſolum ea dicuntur quæ ſecundum proportionem apud Ariſtotelem vocantur, prout notant interpretes ex cap. 16. poſt c. 15. maximè verò ex c. 6. 1. Ethic.* &c. *Uſus tamen Latinæ Scholæ & Philoſophorum obtinuit, ut etiam ea quæ ſecundum attributionem vocantur analogorum nomine cenſeantur.*

But though your Diſtinction be very ordinary, I confeſſe there is more then ordinary in your Explication of the members: But it is of ſuch a nature, as makes me begin to abate the apprehenſions of my infelicity, in that I had never the happineſs to be your Auditor, and to have Learned Logick at your feet. Your *Analogum in genere*, is that [which is attributed according to the ſame name, and as ſignifying the *ſame Nature*, but not in the like manner.] Your *Analogum proportionis*, is [when the ſame name is given to things of the *like*, *but not the ſame nature.*] *Analogum in Genere*, is of the *ſame* nature, as well as Name. *Analogum Proportionis*, is not the *ſame Nature*, but the *Like*. And ſo the nature of the *Genus* is not in the *Species*: Nay they are contrary one to the other: and onely the later member (*Analogum Attributionis*) remains an *Analogum*, and each *Species* receives not the definition of the *Genus*. If this be the Doctrine which you ſo [Gravely deliver from your Deans Chair, I will ſay as you do [I cannot perſwade my ſelf to leave my old Doctors to follow You.] I will even turn to poor *Keckerman*, *Burgerſdicius*, *Suarez* again; yea to a *Rutgerſius*, *Facchæus*, *Gorlæus*, *Serguerdius*, *Alſtedius*, or any body that's near me of this generation, before I will ſwallow what I cannot digeſt.

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§. 7.

Mr. K. *NOw if Subſtance and Accident be* Analoga, *becauſe of the dependance of Accidents on the Subject, then what ever is predicated of God and the Creature, muſt be predicated Analogically, becauſe the creature hath it not but by dependance on God, but God independently from the Creature: And as the Being of the Creature, is derived from God* in fieri, *and depends on him* in facto eſſe; *ſo queſtionleſs the Knowledge of the Creature, is but a beam from the fountain of light, which is in God, and cannot longer ſubſiſt, then he vouchſafeth to preſerve it by a continued irradiation*, &c.

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§. 7.

R. B. 1. I Would rather ſay that Subſtance and Accident are *Analogata*, then *Analoga*; but you may uſe your Liberty, and call the *Analoga*, *Analogata*. 2. I ſhould think that it is not directly and ſtrictly [Becauſe of the dependance of Accidents on the Subject, that Subſtance and Accident are *Analogata*: but becauſe of the Imperfect Entity which through this dependance the Accidents have in the more perfect Entity of the Subject. 3. It is not that moſt General

nerall *Analogum*, [*Ens*] as appliable to God and the Creature, that we are now in queſtion of. But it is thoſe inferiour of [Fore-knowledge, Knowledge, Will, Election, *&c.*] 1. Your [Becauſe] is unſound, and I conceive your Conſequence is falſe, *viz.* [then whatſoever is predicated of God and the Creature muſt be predicated Analogically] Do you think that nothing may be ſpoken equivocally of God and the Creature? If you do, you are a ſingular man. 5. I hope you do not think that our knowledge depends on God, as Accidents on the Subject: If you do, then God hath many Accidents indeed, were that true: I had rather ſay plainly, that God effecteth our knowledge (by way of natural Cauſation in ſome reſpect, and by moral Cauſation in other reſpects) as that which had no Being before, then to talk of Emanation as a Beam from the fountain of Light; conſidering what ill uſe many in theſe times have made of the doctrine of Emanation. 6. It ſeems by your former Concluſion [whatſoever is predicated of God and the Creature, muſt be predicated Analogically] and by your preſent predication of [The fountain of Light which is in God] that you judge [Light] or [the fountain of Light] to be predicated Analogically of God too. Which if you do, and this alſo muſt be by Analogy of Attribution, then it ſeems Heat, Cold, Gravity, Levity, Denſity, Rarity, Compoſition, or what ever is in the Creature may be thus attributed to God. 7. As to the point it ſelf in queſtion, 1. I will not meddle with that old Controverſie, Whether *Ens* be ſpoken of God and the Creature Univocally, Æquivocally or Analogically. I have ſeen what *Scotus* ſaith for his opinion in *Sent. 2. diſt. 12. & alibi. & 1. diſt. 3. q. 1. & 3.* And what *Anth. Andreas 4. Metaph. q. 1.* Meuriſſe *Metaph. Scot. l 1. Qu. 8. p. 108, &c.* And *Phil. Faber. Faventin. Phyſ. Scot. Theorem. 95. pag. 654, &c. Rada*, and others ſay for it: And what *Occham in 1. Sent. diſt. 2. q. 8.* And *Guil. Rubio*, ſay for the Nominals opinion: And what *Cajetan* ſaith againſt the Scotiſts. (By which Scotiſts the ſenſe of Univocation, Æquivocation, and Analogy, is a little more ſubtilly opened, then Mr K. doth out of his Deans Chair.) But the Queſtion that I ſpeak to, is onely how farre *Intelligere, Velle* and *Agere*, may be Attributed to God. 2. And for the diſtribution of *Analoga*, and the ſenſe of Analogy, I think, it will be long ere the Chair-men are agreed. *Meuriſſe* out of *Rubio* ſaith, *Univocum opponi ſoli æquivoco, non verò Analogo, & denominativo: quia Univocum ſe habet ad æquivocum ſicut Unum ad Multa: Unum autem propriè ſolum multis opponitur: ſe habet autem ad Analogum & denominativum, tanquam velut ſuperius ad ſua inferiora: Quia Univocum aliud eſt purum, aliud eſt non purum: Non purum eſt aut Analogum, aut Denominativum. Nullum ſuperius autem opponitur ſuis inferioribus: Itaque Univocum non opponitur Analogo & Denominativo; ſed ab Analogo diſtinguitur tanquam Univocum purum, & à Denominativo Univocum quidditativum, ſeu illud quod eſt & prædicatum Univocum & Univocè prædicatur.* Others innumerate *Analoga* with the *Homonyma*, diſtinct from *Synonima*.

Goclenius (who ſpeaks largely of it) gives this diſtribution, *Lexic. Philoſ. p. 100.* I think in fitter terms then Mr. *Kendal*.

Analoga ſunt Proportione
- *Propriâ: ut Ens, bonum, principium, natura, motus, &c.*
- *Impropria*
  - *Attributione tantum: ut ſanum ad animal & medicamentum.*
  - *Tranſlata proportione: Riſus, comparatione hominis & prati.*

But

But I think poor contemptible *Keckerman* and *Burgersdicius* have better explained and distributed *Homonyma* and *Analoga*, then all that ever I had the hap to be acquainted with, not excepting the subtilleſt Scotiſts. 3. As for the application hereof to our Queſtion, I ſtill affirm, That the thing which the word [Knowledge] is ſpoken of, in God, is not only more eminently and perfectly in him then the Creature, but is only in him, and not in the creature at all: And the thing which the word Knowledge is ſpoken of, or doth ſignifie in man, is not at all *formaliter* in God, but there is in him ſomething of an Infinite, tranſcendent Excellency above it, which makes it uſeleſs; and in God it would be Imperfection: And therefore it may be ſaid to be in God *eminenter non formaliter*: The word [Knowledge] is firſt uſed to ſignifie the knowledge of man: It is tranſlated to preſs to us that Incomprehenſible perfection of God, which we cannot otherwiſe conceive of or expreſs. Yet when ever we make uſe of the term, we cannot by it our ſelves attain to a conception, poſitive and true, of any higher thing then ſuch knowledge as our own, with ſome negative additions, for removal of the Imperfections; as that it is Infinite, *&c.* ſo that man can have no true poſitive Conception of the Nature of that which in God we call Knowledge: Only he apprehendeth it to be ſomewhat like that which in man is called Knowledge. But Like is not the ſame. As *Goclenius* out of *Ariſtot.* ὅμοια τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ *non ſunt* ὁμογενῆ. *ſimilia Analogia non ſunt ejuſdem generis: non ſunt eadem genere.* It is therefore a proper ſpeech to ſay [Knowledge is not in God] and proper to ſay, it is in man: But yet it is a neceſſary ſpeech to ſay [God knows] becauſe we have no fitter expreſſion for that perfection of God, which we ſo call. *Aquin. de Veritate Mater.* 2da *Qu.* 1. ſaith, *Et quia nulla Ratio ſignificata per ipſum nomen definit ipſum Deum, nullum nomen à nobis impoſitum eſt propriè nomen ejus; ſed eſt propriè creaturæ quæ definitur ratione ſignificata per nomen: Et tamen iſta nomina quæ ſunt Creaturarum nomina Deo attribuuntur ſecundum quod in Creaturis aliqua ſimilitudo ejus repreſentatur.* The third Opinion which he there rejecteth is, That Knowledge is attributed to God Metaphorically, as Anger is; againſt which he oppoſeth his fourth, *Et ideo aliter dicendum eſt, quod ſcientia Deo attributa ſignificat aliquid quod in Deo eſt.*] As if theſe might not well conſiſt! Even a Metaphorical expreſſion doth expreſſe ſomething that is in God, though it expreſſe it but Metaphorically. And in *Qu. undecima*, he hath no better anſwer to the fifth Objection, which is drawn from [the greater diſtance between God and us, then between *Ens Creatum & non Ens*] then this, *Ad 5m dicendum, quod Enti & non Enti aliquid ſecundum analogiam convenit: quod ipſum non ens analogicè dicitur Ens: ut dicitur in 4° Metaph. Unde nec diſtantia quæ eſt inter creaturam & Deum communitatem analogicè impedire poteſt.* If the Analogy between Gods Acts, Knowledge, Will, and ours, be no nearer then between *Ens & non ens*, ſure it is not ſuch as you imagine, and here expreſs. And *contra Gentil. l.* 1. *c.* 31. he confeſſeth, that *in omni nomine à nobis dicto, quantum ad modum ſignandi imperfectio invenitur quæ Deo non competit, quamvis res ſignata aliquo modo eminenti Deo conveniat.* Now *ſcire, velle, agere*, are terms properly fitted only to mans imperfect Mode of Knowing, Willing, Acting, and do afford us no poſitive Conception of any other: ſo that if we could deviſe ſome *genus* which did comprehend Gods acts *perfectè* and mans *imperfectè*, as *Ens* doth ſubſtance and Accident, yet that muſt not be Knowledge or Will: For theſe are the proper names of the *Genus imperfectum*: As if you ſhould ſay, *Subſtantia eſt Accidens*. A certain kinde of Comprehenſion of the Creature God hath, whoſe Nature being to us unknown, the proper name is unknown too, and therefore we are fain to call it by the proper name of mans comprehen-

ſion, *i. e.* Intellection and Science. And all Divines confeſs, that as to the order of knowing, and ſo as to the name we muſt firſt begin with the creature, to whom the name is firſt applicable. So *Aquinas contra Gentil. l.* 1. *c* 35. *Quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominatim de Deo & aliis rebus dictorum, per prius eſt in Deo ſecundum ſuum modum; ſed ratio nominis per poſterius: unde & nominari dicitur à ſuis cauſatis.* So *Goclenius Lexic. Philoſoph. de Analog. Duo ſunt diſtinguenda; nimirum res ipſæ per nomina ſignificatæ, & nominum impoſitio. Ad res ipſas quod attinet, prius ea de Deo prædicantur, quam de creaturis. Atque hic propriè ordo eſt & convenientia, quam habent creaturæ ad Deum; cujus ordinis cauſa dicuntur nomina Analogicè de Deo & de Creaturis prædicari. Quod verò attinet ad nominum Rationem & Impoſitionem prius iis nominibus appellatæ fuerunt res creatæ quam Deus. Quare quod dicimus analogicè prædicari nomina de Deo & de Creaturis, quia prius de Deo quam de Creaturis: de Analogia reali ſeu ſecundum rem, non autem ſecundum nominis rationem intelligendum eſt.* *Zanchy* hath the ſame words, whoſe they are firſt I know not. How fit a ſpeech this is, *de Analogia reali*, I leave to others to judge: but all grant that the Name is firſt applied to the Creature, and thence to God. Now all this holds of meer Metaphorical expreſſions.

To uſe *Burgerſdicius* diſtribution, I yield that theſe names applied to God and the Creature, are not *Homonyma à caſu*, (ſuch as *Aquinas cont Gentil. ubi ſup.* expreſſeth his meer æquivocals to be) but *à conſilio*. But whether the *Ratio Homonymiæ* be *in Rebus*, or *in nobis*, is not eaſie certainly to determine. *Keckerman* ſaith, *Ambigua ex ſimilitudine conceptus eſt, cum rebus toto genere diverſis, ut Deo & Creaturis, idem nomen tribuitur ex cognatione quam mens format. Nimirum intellectus noſter ut eſſentia & operatione finitus eſt, ita infinitæ Dei naturæ & attributis concipiendis non eſt proportionatus; atque idcircò in Deo nihil concipit directè, ſed obliquè ex ſimilitudine quadam, & imagine rei finitæ tanquam objecti ſibi congruentis. Hinc a nobis Deo & attributis ejus voces certæ, propriæ ac directæ imponi nequiverunt, ſed indirectæ tantum, homonymæ, & ex ſimilitudine eâ qua Deus nobis repræſentatur in creaturis tanquam effectis, quæ repræſentatio valde imperfecta eſt.* Nomen Jehova, *i.e* exiſtentis, *ſibi ipſi impoſuit Deus, at nos ne id quidem directè concipimus: reliqua autem quæ Deo tribuimus, ut miſericordiam, Juſtitiam,* &c. *ejuſmodi vocibus exprimimus quæ directè impoſitæ ſunt virtutibus hominum ſignificandis, indirectè autem ad Deum pertinent, quatenus nos tales in Deo virtutes ſimilitudine earum quæ in hominibus ſunt virtutum concipimus. Unde non minùs pie quam ſcite Cyrillus, in his quæ de Deo dicuntur, Maxima ſcientia eſt Ignorantiam confiteri: &* Auguſtinus, *Deus, inquit, magnus eſt, ſed ſine quantitate, Bonus, ſed ſine qualitate: ut verò à nobis magnum ſine quantitate, bonum ſine qualitate directè & plenè concipi, eſt impoſſibile,* &c. *Et* Julius Scaliger, *Nullis, ait, vocibus tam plenè Deum ſignificamus, quam iis quæ Ignorantiam noſtram prætendunt.*

But ſuppoſe it be granted, that the *Ratio Homonymiæ* is not only *in nobis, ſed in rebus*, the queſtion will remain, Whether it be *ob inæqualem generis attributionem*, or only *ob ſimilitudinem, vel mutuam rerum ad ſe invicem habitudinem?* and ſo be Tropical? Mr. K. aſſerteth the former (under the name of Analogy of Attribution.) The Scotiſts have long defended their Doctors Aſſertion, that *Deus non eſt in genere. Vid.* Fab. Faventin. *Phyſ. Scot. Theorem.* 96. his Vindication againſt *Greg. Ariminenſis* and *Bacconius*: and many others of them have done this at large. So doth *Wickleff.* in his Trialog.

And if this hold, then nothing can be attributed to God and the Creature by this Analogy, *per inæqualem generis attributionem.* Yea *Aquinas* himſelf oft ſaith,

Deus

Deus non eſt in genere (as *Sarnanus* notes) *in* 1.p.q.3.a.5. *&* 1.d.8.q.4.a.2.3^m. *&* 1.*cont.Gent.*c.25. though after in *q.de Potentia*q.7.a.3. *ad ult. Concedit Deum eſſe Genere ſubſtantiæ reductivè:* which *Scotus* refuteth. So *Eſtius* in 1^m Sent. d. 8. §. 10. denieth God to be *in ullo genere.* And *Sarnanus* hath no more to ſay for it in his Conciliation (*pag.*15) then this, *Eſſe in genere ſtat dupliciter: primo modo ut pars ſubjectivacontenta in illo genere: Et ſic negatur Deum eſſe in genere. Secundo modo, ut principium Continens ipſum Genus: Et hoc modo Deus per appropriationem eſt in Genere ſubſtantiæ. Vid.*Gab.Biel.1.*Sent.diſt.*8.*q.*1. But this is not for God to be *in genere,* but for that *Genus* to be in God.

As *Burgerſdicius* ſaith, *Omnium longiſſimè à Synonymis abſunt homonyma a Caſu, quæq; cauſam homonymiæ habent in nobis: propriùs ad ſynonymorum naturam accedunt Tropica, ac imprimis Analoga: at omnium proximè quæ ambigua ſunt ob inæqualem attributionem.* That theſe words are not ſpoken of God and the creature *univocè* all of us agree, and the Schoolmen have fully evinced. Alſo that they are not ſpoken *purè æquivocè*, we are alſo agreed, and the ſaid Schoolmen have evinced (as particularly *Aquin. in ſum. de Verit. ubi ſup.* by many Reaſons: And *Zanchius de Natura Dei* borrows many of them.) But which of the other kindes of homonymy they belong to, is the doubt. Mr.K. thinks that which of all other is the neareſt to ſynonymy: I think not ſo: but rather to the Tropical or Analogical, ſtrictly ſo called, that is, *vel propter ſimilitudinem ſimplicem, vel proportionem* (if not ſome of them, to thoſe that have the *Rationem homonymiæ in nobis*) *Facchæus* ſaith (*Metaph.*l.1.c.6.) *Ego vero mallem iſtam Analogiam referre ad proportionalitatis Analogiam, non Metaphoricam illam* (*quomodo videre attribuitur oculo & menti*) *ſed propriam, quomodo principium dicitur de corde, & fundamento domus.* So he diſclaims Mr. K's Analogy of Attribution: If the thing be not utterly uncertain to us, who know ſo little of Gods nature. But that we may venture on a conjecture, I ſhould rather ſet the Creature at a greater diſtance from God then they do: and think that theſe Attributes are all Tropical, ſomewhat Metonymical, but moſtly Metaphorical. I never ſaw (in *Aquinas* or any other Schoolman that ſpoke for it) any cogent Reaſon to prove, that *Intelligere, Velle, Agere, Amare,* are attributed to God in any other kinde then *Reminiſci, Gaudere, Odio habere, Iraſci,* &c. Only a gradual difference, I eaſily acknowledge, *viz.* That *Intelligere & Velle* having leſſe Imperfection, have therefore leſſe impropriety. And who knows not that there is a wide difference of this ſort among Metaphors, ſome being very near, and ſome ſo farre fetcht, as to be Catachreſtical *Durandus* ſaith (*in* 1.*ſent diſt.*34.*q.*4) *Nullum nomen attribuimus Deo niſi ex Creaturis: non enim ponimus nomen niſi rei quam intelligimus; & quia non intelligimus eum, niſi ex creaturis, & tantum quantum concludimus ex creaturis, ideo nullum nomen imponimus Deo niſi ex creaturis, & quantum ad illa, quæ concludimus convenire Deo ex creaturis: conſtat autem quod non omnia nomina quæ attribuimus Deo dicuntur de eo tranſlativè & metaphoricè,* &c. *Solum autem illa nomina dicuntur de Deo tranſlativè & metaphoricè quæ ſignificant ſpeciales qu dditates rerum creatarum: vel perfectiones ſecundum modum creaturis convenientem, ut Leo, Agnus, Sentire,* &c. *Quia res ſignificata per hæc nomina non eſt in Deo, ſed aliqua ejus ſimilitudo, ut fortitudo, manſuetudo, & cognitio ſingularium, quæ in nobis pertinet ad ſenſum.* But I would fain ſee it proved, That *Intelligere, Velle, Agere,* do not as properly ſignifie *perfectiones ſecundum modum Creaturis convenientem,* as *ſentire* doth? And when we ſay *ſegetes fluctuant,* fluctuation is no more proper to the motion of the waters, then *Intelligere, Velle, Agere,* are to the perfections and action of man, or other rational creatures. And whereas they ſay that the terms are applied to

God, with a Remotion of the Imperfections which they imply in us, I answer, So they may say of those lower terms, which they confesse to be Metaphorical, only allowing a gradual difference of impropriety. Nor doth it follow therefore that there is no truth in these expressions of God, or that they are no helps to our knowledge of him, or means of demonstration. For Metaphors are not as pure equivocals: There's some common reason in the similitude, though in the first and proper sense the name be proper to one. When we say, *Segetes fluctuant*, we expresse not only Motion, wherein both agree, but a motion of the Corn like that of the Water. I think, as I said before, that it is no more proper to call God *Scientem, Volentem, Agentem*, then to call the Firmament a Nut-shell, because both seem to have a convexity or concavity, or contain something else within, *&c.* Or to call the Sunne *Reptile*, or a creeping thing, because it moves, and so do creeping things: or then it is proper to call Knowledge, Light, or to put *Video* for *Intelligo* (as Mr. *K.* cals God the fountain of Light before.) The Scripture saith, *God is Light:* yet I think this will be easily confessed a Metaphor: and I think it is but *Metaphora propinquior*, to say, *Deus Intelligit, Vult, Agit*, &c. And this I judge after long consideration of what *Aquinas* hath said, *1.q.14.a.1. & q.19.a.1. & alibi:* and many other Schoolmen to the like purpose.

Shall I adde one Argument for the Negative (that it is not by Analogy of Attribution, that Knowledge, Will, Power, *&c.* are attributed to God and the Creature; as *Ens* is to Substance and Accident) *ad hominem* specially? That Knowledge which is the same thing with Will and Power, cannot be the one of the Analogates with our Knowledge which is not the same; in this kinde of Analogy *ob inæqualem generis distributionem:* (supposing Knowledge to be the *Genus Analogum.*) But Gods Knowledge is maintained by those that I dispute with, to be the same with his Will and Power) many say, they differ but *denominatione extrinsecâ:*) Therefore, *&c.* For the proof of the *major*, consider: Else on the same grounds [Power] might be thus analogically spoken of Gods Knowledge and mans Power: For where there is no difference in the Thing, there needs to be none in the Name, as requisite from the Nature of the Thing (but only from some extrinsick respect or use) But Power may not Analogically be spoken *de Potestate humana, & scientia divina Ergo*, &c. Common reason and use of speech confirms the *minor*. It seems therefore to be evident truth, that as it is from similitude, or some Tropical respect, that Gods Immanent acts, have divers names, rather then one alone: so is it from the same reason that they have these particular names, rather then other: And consequently that these names are not *Analoga inæqualis Attributionis naturæ communis*; but *Analoga Proportionis*, or Tropical. *Durandus (in sent. 1.dist.2. q.2.)* saith, *Alia est opinio quæ mihi videtur verior*, viz. *quod distinctio attributorum, secundum rationem non potest sumi, nisi per comparationem ad aliquam realem diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis, vel possibilem. Quod prob.1.sic. Differentia Rationis, nisi sit falsa & vana, licet sit completive ab intellectu, oportet tamen quod habeat fundamentum in re: sed differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamentum in natura divina absolutè accepta; nisi comparetur ad realem diversitatem quæ in creaturis est, vel esse potest, ergo differentia attributorum divinorum secundum rationem, non potest verè sumi nisi per comparationem ad creaturas. Major patet: ratio enim, quam intellectus format, nisi fundetur aliqualiter in re, ficta est & vana*, &c. *Vide reliq.*

I will only adde the words of *Burgersdicius Metaphys. l. 2. c. 8. §. 1. sequuntur ea (attributa) quæ creaturis communicari posse diximus, saltem κατ' ἀναλογίαν: quæ tamen*

tamen analogia non in ipſis Dei attributis, ſed in ipſorum effectis ſive operationibus quærenda eſt. Nam cum attributa infinita ſint, æque atque ipſa Dei eſſentia, & attributa incommunicabilia, nullam habent cum creaturis ἀναλογίαν, niſi in ſuis ſuis operationibus circa objecta Creata & finita. Apply this to Immanent Acts.

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§. 8.

Mr.K.pag.94. *IF Fore-knowledge in God and the Creature be not univocally the ſame, as ſurely they are not, then is this Fore-knowledge attributed to God and the Creature, either Equivocally or Analogically: If Equivocally, then hath the Fore-knowledge of God and the Creature only the ſame Name: But that is not ſo; for God, I hope, fore-knows as* truly *as the Creature, and the Creature may ſometimes truly* fore-know. *So that here is more then a nominal agreement between Gods and the Creatures fore-knowledge. It remains therefore that this fore-knowledge be attributed to God and the Creature Analogically: but is this Analogie either of Proportion or Attribution? If of Proportion, then either God or the Creature is is ſaid to fore-know, but either Metaphorically or Metonymically. If only Metaphorically; I pray which of them is but Metaphorically ſaid to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. And ſurely much leſs may God be only Metaphorically ſaid to fore-know theſe, and all other things that ſhall come to paſs in all Ages. If only Metonymically, as ſome things are ſaid to be healthy, becauſe they have the ſigns of ſanity in them, (I am bold to uſe the Boyes inſtance in this caſe) Is either God or the Creature only Metonymically ſaid to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. Not God, for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge: and therefore though his eſſence be not the ſubject of his fore-knowledge, nor his fore knowledge an Accident of his Nature, yet is he ſaid to fore-know without being beholden to any ſuch poor Trope for it. It reſts therefore that fore-knowledge is attributed to God by more then this Analogie of Proportion, and conſequently by that of Attribution Now I demand which is the famoſius* Analogatum? *Gods fore-knowledge, or the Creatures? Queſtionleſs Gods: there being infinitely greater Cauſe to ſet the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge, then on that of the Creatures, then there is to ſet it on ſubſtance rather then accident. If ſo, &c. then onward, as* Analogatum per ſe poſitum ſtat per famoſiori Analogato, *ſo true fore-knowledge mentioned by it ſelf, muſt alwayes be conſtrued of the fore-knowledge of God: and therefore fore-knowledge is moſt properly attributable to God. And thus being now willing to reſign my place,* Hæc ſufficiant pro nunc.

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§. 8.

R. *B.* IF I had once done with you, I would take heed of dealing with a Chairman again in haſte, for your ſake: for I finde I run upon a great diſadvantage. For the credit of ſuch mens underſtandings is ſo great with themſelves at leaſt, that they need no Argument, but their bare affirmation to carry the Cauſe. Your ſole Argument [*ſic dico*] doth put me harder to it, then if you had many: For what to ſay to this, I do not well know. Diſpute againſt it, I cannot: and to ſet my Negation againſt your affirmation, will not do, till we ſtand on even ground.

1. *Aquinas de verit.* and many another Schoolman (and *Zanchy* out of them) might have helpt you to more cogent Arguments, againſt meer æquivocal denomination. When you ſpeak of Gods fore-knowing, as [truly] that word [truly]

is either opposed to *feigned* and *false*, or to *improperly*: that in God which the term [fore-knowledge] doth denote, is *Truly* in him, and him alone, but that which the word [fore-knowledge] doth properly and primarily signifie, is not in God.

2. Our *Rabbi*s (as you call them *ab alto* with a smile) do seem to us punies, to make a fuller distribution then you; as I have before shewed: and therefore we take yours to be defective, and consequently your reasoning void: I have told you of divers that please me better.

3. How greedily did I reade on, and follow you at the heels, to see how you proved that it is not spoken of God Metaphorically? and when I come to the businesse, What's the proof? Why you say [surely much lesse may God be onely metaphorically said to fore-know.] You passe your word on it: And this is the knotty Argument that I cannot answer, because I am not of your standing in the University: A little more of the University would have done me no harm (as you say) when I am to deal with this kinde of Argument.

4. Our Tutor *Burgersdicius* told us, I remember, that *in cæteris tropis non minus est homonymiæ locus, quam in Metaphora.* And therefore Metaphorical and Metonymical, are not a sufficient enumeration.

5. Do not think ever the worse of your self for using the Boyes instance: for (as you have partly salved your credit by intimating that you are above it, so) *Aquinas*, *Scotus*, and most of the Schoolmen that I have read, besides *Zanchius*, and many another of our great Divines, do make use of the same instance: And to play with this bigger sort of Boyes, is no such disgrace to you.

6. Here I meet with a thing that runs in the form of a Reason: [for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge] therefore he fore-knoweth not onely Metonymically. I confesse the Conclusion is true; but I see not the reason of the consequence. As I remember a Metonymy of the effect is, when the efficient is signified by the name of the effect, either by a Verb, as *pallet pro metuit*, or an Adjective, as *mors pallida*; or a Substantive, as *scelus pro scelesto* (I purposely choose the Boyes examples, as best beseeming me.) And I have heard men often call Mr. *Nath. Ward*, *Discolliminium*, and the simple Cobler: And the Author of that Comedy, by the name of *Ignoramus*. I confesse it is a good Argument [He is the Author of our fore-knowledge, therefore he hath fore-knowledge *eminenter*, or somewhat that is more excellent then fore-knowledge.) But I dare not say, that God hath formally in himself whatsoever he is the Author of. For he is the Author of Nutrition, Augmentation Composition, of Sorrow, of Fear, of Hell, of Worms, Toads and Vipers. But it was the former (the Metaphorical Denomination, and also that of strict proportion, which some distinguish from the Metaphorical) which I had hoped you would have disproved. But I must take what will be had.

7. You think you plead for the Glory of the Divine Majesty, when you tell us he need not be beholden to a poor Trope. As if we should dispute, whether the Sunne do creep as *reptilia* do? and I say, Yes, Metaphorically: and you will stand up for the honour of the Sun, and say, we debase it; and that it doth creep without being beholden to a poor Trope for it: Or if the Question were, Whether the Sunne be a Vegetative, or sensitive creature? and I say, Yes, Metonymically: for it causeth Vegetation and sense. And you will say, It is Vegetative without being beholden to a Trope. What a Patron is he of the honour of mankinde, that will prove that he is a Worm, a Beast, Nothing, and his life a shadow,

dow, a dream, a Weavers ſhuttle, without being beholden to a poor Trope! Yet are theſe unſpeakably nearer, then the names of man and his acts, to God: for *inter finitum & infinitum nulla eſt proportio.*

8. You conclude that the *famoſius Analogatum*, is Gods fore-knowledge, your proof is [Queſtionleſs it is ſo:] As ſtrong as the reſt. But, when I look further I finde ſomewhat like a Reaſon: [there being Infinitely greater cauſe to ſet the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge, *&c.*] My dread of Gods moſt ſacred Majeſty, forbiddeth me to ſet on him ſuch a Crown of Vanity. As if the Sun muſt be the *famoſius Analogatum inter Reptilia*, becauſe the Crown of [Creeping] muſt be ſet on its head! What if we ſhould yield to you, that the term [Knowledge, Will, Action, *&c.*] being firſt Metaphorically applied to God, that yet it is partly Analogical *quoad inæqualem Generis attributionem*, the term expreſſing (though improperly as to one) a Nature common to both? It would not yet follow, that here the more noble ſort, even Divine Knowledge, *&c.* were the *famoſius Analogatum:* For though it be moſt excellent and unexpreſſibly glorious in it ſelf, yet the term agreeing firſt with the lower, even humane Knowledge, therefore that is the *famoſius Analogatum*, as being the thing moſt famouſly and notoriouſly meant by that term. If you ask, Whether the Sunne do gliſſen (as Glow-worms, or rotten wood) or do *Rutilare* or *Candere?* If you ſay, Yea; yet I think the Sunne here is not the *famoſius Analogatum*, though the light which this word intendeth be more eminently in the Sun, then in the other things.

You conclude, that [true fore-knowledge mentioned by it ſelf, muſt alwayes be underſtood of the fore-knowledge of God.] Is that ſo indeed?

1. Why then do the Schoolmen generally acknowledge, that the names are all firſt applicable to the Creature, though the thing be moſt excellently in God?

2. Then, it ſeems, it is not a ſtrictly proper ſpeech to ſay [Man knows, or fore-knows, or Wils, or acteth:] for none of the *Homonyma*, are ſpoken of both, in ſtrict propriety. But if you would undertake to prove, that God may in as ſtrict propriety be ſaid to Know, Will or Act, as man is, there are many that would undertake to prove the terms Univocal: which in moſt Divines Judgement, would be to prove, that man is God: an opinion, which our new world in the Moon *(in Anglia lunatica)* have very confidently imbraced of late years.

In a word, Sir, my thoughts of man, and his Acts, Knowing, Willing, are ſo low, and my thoughts of the Infinite God, ſo high, or at a loſſe, when I go about to have any poſitive, true apprehenſions of his Nature, that I conceive you and I can no more tell what that is in God which we call Knowing, Willing, Acting, then my Horſe can tell what Reaſoning or Diſcourſe is in me, or thereabouts. And yet I believe that the Knowledge of God is eternal Life too, *viz.* Now (as to the beginning) to know that there is a God, and that there is ſomewhat in Him which mans Knowledge, Will, Goodneſs, Juſtice, *&c.* have ſome exceeding, low, diſtant reſemblance of, and which we cannot better apprehend or expreſs then under ſuch notions, and by ſuch terms; it being yet in it ſelf of more unconceivable excellency. And though I know the Schoolmen are confident (without proof) that *Scire, Velle*, &c. do expreſs no Imperfection, but only Modal, and therefore may be applied to God (which I conjecture will alſo be your Argument) yet I do not believe that Aſſertion. Comparatively to lower or equal Creatures, it may be ſaid, that it is not Imperfection, which they expreſs. But abſolutely,

absolutely or comparatively as to God, it is Imperfection: Not only some accident or *Modus*, but the very thing expreſt by theſe terms, is Imperfect: Elſe the Creature ſhall have ſomething equal to God, and ſo be God. And if it were but a Modal Imperfection; yet when the term doth ſtrictly and properly expreſſe that Imperfect *Modus* it ſelf, as well as the Thing, then that term cannot be applied to God any nearlier then Tropically. Knowledge, Will, Action, and all the terms fitted to man, are ſo ſtrictly fitted to expreſs the humane Mode, as well as that which you ſeparate in your Intellect, and call perfect, that it cannot be applied to one without the other, but abuſively or tropically; No more then [creeping] is applicable to the ſwift motion of the Sun, when the term doth intimately ſignifie the ſlowneſs and Mode of the motion, with the motion it ſelf.

God forbid that I ſhould doubt, whether that in God be Perfect, which we call Knowledge, Will, Action: But what it is that under theſe names of infinitely remote ſimilitude we do expreſs, what earthly man can tell? Becauſe I believe Gods Immanent acts to be perfect, therefore I believe them not to be the ſame thing that man apprehendeth under theſe terms.

Oh that frail man were more acquainted with his Nothingneſs! then would he not dare ſo to lift up himſelf in compariſon with his Maker! Then would not the Chriſtian world for ſo many hundred years have been filled with quarrels about unſearchable Myſteries; and the great Divines of the Church, be the great Dividers of the Church by voluminous contentions, and cenſorious, uncharitable, zealous emulations about Gods ſecrets: They would not have faſtened upon utter uncertainties, and things unrevealed, and then have ſtiled their fancies [the Orthodox Doctrine] and reproached or quarrelled with thoſe that were diſſenters. The world would not have been altogether by the ears about things that they know no more then a beaſt knows what is the ſoul of man; ſuch as many of the Schoolmens writings are, and moſt of thoſe points in which the Controverſies between the Arminians and anti-Arminians, the Jeſuites and Dominicans, are ultimately reſolved: Yea, and your Academ cal Chairs would have been better imployed: and then God would not have been ſo provoked againſt them: Nor ſhould I have needed to fear that your Chair is coming down, while I reade here that you are coming down; nor have cauſe to ſalute you ſo ſadly at your deſcent, as fearing a future vacancy of your reſigned place.

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§. 9.

Mr. K. Pag. *I Shall now ſee what Mr. Baxter ſaith, though not to anſwer this Argument, or any other, yet to detract ſomewhat from the Reputation of the Concluſion, that there can be no new Immanent act in God, but all are Eternal.*

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§. 9.

R. B. TO feign a wrong end to a mans ſpeeches, is uſually the way to faſten on them a falſe and alien ſenſe. I therefore who am better acquainted with my own End and meaning then Mr. K. is (as well as he knows me, by looking through his Proſpective-Glaſs from *Cornwell* to *Kidderminſter*) ſhall better acquaint others what was my meaning in the words, which he faſtens on. And this is the true and plain Analyſis of my words.

Having affirmed Juſtification to be a tranſient act, and that therefore the Inception

ception of it argueth no mutation in God, I was fore'd to meet with the opinion of D. *Twiſs*, who takes it to be an Immanent Act, and therefore if it ſhould begin *de novo*, it would argue a change in God. (Not ſpeaking of that *in ſore Conſcientiæ.*)

These two Concluſions therefore I took as certain, and neceſſary to be held of every knowing Chriſtian.

1. That God doth not change.

2. That God doth not pardon or juſtifie men from Eternity; (no nor from the time of Chriſts death) and therefore that he doth in time juſtifie and forgive men, even when they believe. These two Concluſions being Certain and neceſſary, I take the later as aſſaulted by D. *Twiſs*; who thereby would make them ſeem inconſiſtent.

His Argument is, Juſtification and Remiſſion are Immanent Acts, therefore from Eternity. To this I anſwer, 1. By denying the Antecedent: For I had before ſhewed, that they are Tranſient acts, and what Tranſient acts they are. 2. Having premiſed, that no acts are Immanent in God Poſitively but onely Negatively (as *Schibler* ſpeaks;) I anſwered, That many doubt whether Immanent acts are any further Eternal then Tranſient acts (which I will open anon when we come to it:) and therefore that this is not a matter of ſuch Certainty as the Propoſition oppoſed is: and therefore Uncertainties muſt be reduced to Certainties, and not Certainties to Uncertainties: *q. d.* I am ſure God doth not pardon and Juſtifie from Eternity from plain Texts of Scripture: But you are not ſure that all Immanent acts are Eternal any more then Tranſient are; Therefore if theſe two Propoſitions were as inconſiſtent as you imagine, yet I would rather hold the former, and let go the later, then hold the latter and let go the former. Here I ſuppoſed it objected, that it is not to be endured that any ſhould argue God of mutability: but the foreſaid Doctrine doth ſo: Therefore, *&c.* To which I anſwered, that there is no change in God: and they that do hold this opinion, do yet hold it is conſiſtent with Gods Immutability: and I gave two or three ſhort touches of their reaſoning: If you ask me, whom I mean, I anſwer, I mean *Lychetus*, *Pennotus*, *Franciſcus a Sancta Clara*, and in part *Suarez* and *Burgerſdicius*, in the words which I ſhall anon cite in his Metaphyſicks. And mark that I do not ſay, that theſe plead for the Inception or Ceſſation of Immanent acts: but that Immanent acts are new as Tranſient are; that is, not *quoad ſubſtantiam actus*, but *tranſitionem in objectum extraneum*. For here it is ſuppoſed, that it is not thoſe Immanent acts, whoſe object is God himſelf, which is ſpoke of, but only thoſe that are about the Creature; Note alſo, that I never thought of owning this opinion; but had ever owned the opinion of the Eternity of all Immanent acts; and ſo farre as the matter is diſcernable, do hold to it ſtill: but I take the point in Queſtion to be paſt our reach; and therefore not of ſuch Certainty, as to encourage us to reject a plainly revealed truth, upon ſuppoſition of their inconſiſtency.

After this I returned to my firſt Poſition, and made it my full, final Anſwer, that Remiſſion and Juſtification are Tranſient acts, and not Immanent, and that in this I had moſt Divines on my ſide, though they did not ordinarily explain the Nature of this Tranſient Act: which thereupon I more fully explain'd.

Thus, Reader, I have given the true Analyſis of all theſe words about Immanent acts, which Mr. K. makes the occaſion of his quarrel with me: and which

he layeth such a heavy charge on. And, I think, if I had said no more to him, but onely given you this true Analysis, it had been enough to satisfie the impartial, and Judicious, and to free my words from that sandy incoherence and senslesness, which (not understanding them) he doth fasten on them in his charge; and to vindicate my self from those corrupt intentions and errours which he intimates.

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§. 10.

Mr. K. *First, saith he, Acts have not the respect of the Adjunct to its Subject, but an effect to its cause: Therefore new Immanent Acts will not inferre an alteration in God: Therefore,* &c.

To this antecedent, I answer, that no Act is properly an effect, or relates as such to the Cause: the Act is rather the Causality then the effect, as Mr. Baxter *may please to learn from his great Doctors in the Metaphysicks, whom I think enough to name in general, though he useth to quote them so exactly, as it were the Chapter and verse.*

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§. 10.

R. B. IF I have learning enough to understand your meaning, you endeavour in these words to prove two Conclusions. The first and principal (and I think, the whole scope of your writing) is, that I am Ignorant and unlearned. The second and subordinate is, that Immanent Acts are certainly Eternal, or that the change of them will inferre a change in God. The first you prove by my Pedantick citing of *Schibler* and *Burgersdicius*, the Boyes companions, and that as if they were Doctors in the Metaphysicks, and that so exactly, *&c.* which you think it enough to name. To this I answer, 1. Your Argument labours of two diseases, 1. Obscurity: which may make some, that know you not, conjecture that your design was scarce honest, which you so carry under hand by intimations, when yet it seems the great Cause of this your undertaking: For my part, I think you would never have mentioned my name here, but to this end. 2. Of Needlesness: If you had stooped so low as to consult me in this business, and opened to me your design, I could by three lines have saved you the writing of these leaves: but that's too late: But yet I may prevent your voluminous labour perhaps for the future, if I do it yet. Be it known therefore to all men by these presents that I *R. B.* do confess my self ignorant and unlearned, especially compared with such as Mr. K. and his *Genius*. *Habetis confitentem reum.* What need you any more Witnesses? I hope now you may save the main labour of your next writing.

Yet, let me tell you the reason of my crime, a little more fully. I take the common good to be the best. I have about thirty Tractates of Metaphysicks by me (an ill workman, that needs so many tools) and I value these two or three Common ones which I cited before all the rest: and I think so do the Schools that use them most commonly. Nor do I see any great reason hitherto to take Mr. K. for a more learned, authentick, unquestionable Doctor in the Metaphysicks, then *Suarez*, *Schibler* or *Burgersdicius*, as highly as I value him above my self. Nor indeed did I ever before this, hear of his name (to my remembrance;) much lesse of his Metaphysical writings. But as soon as ever Mr. K's Metaphysicks come

to

to my hands, if I do not bow to them, *& vestigia tanti Philosophi adorare*, then let him call me an unreverent fellow.

Now to your second business: Where, 1. I might better have been understood, if you had not left out the fore-going words; [by Immanent, they must needs mean Negatively, not Positively.] For by this they that see all might have understood that, 2. It is Gods acts that I speak of, 3. And you do out of your own brain, affix the *Ergo*, as if it were mine, making that an Argument, which I there take as presupposed. The rest we will come to anon.

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§. 11.

Mr. K. *THus when the fire warms my hands, the heating is not the effect; but the Heat produced in my hand by the fire. This heat now is considerable three manner of wayes. I shall not honour my Papers with the name of* Suarez *for this, but referre my Reader, if he be a young Scholar, and not satisfied in it, to his* Smith *and* Brerewood.

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§. 11.

R. B. YEt again! You will make men believe that I am grown to some Reputation of Learning, when you think it necessary to use so many words, to prove me a freshman. Is not one word of your mouth enough to blast the reputation of such a puny?

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§. 12.

Mr. K. *EIther, 1. As it encreaseth, and in order to the highest degree of heat, and so it is called Motion, which is nothing else but the* Terminus in fieri. *Or 2. As tis received into the subject, and so it is called Passion, heating like beating being as well taken in a Passive sense as an active. Or, 3. As it is derived from the Agent, and so it is called action: but this action again is considerable two manner of wayes; Either Physically or Logically. Physically, and so the Patient is the subject of it: the heat which undergoes these several denominations, being in my hand, as was supposed. 2. Logically, and so this action is but an extrinsecal denomination, and the Agent is the subject of it: Now take it how you will, Action is an adjunct, as denominating the agent, no way an effect as an action, &c.*

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§. 12.

R. B. 1. THe word [Effect] is sometime taken for every thing that hath a Being and a Cause, and so every Action is an Effect, as having a Being dependant on its Cause: sometime it is taken more restrainedly, for that only which is permanent after the Action, or is Effected by it, and so Action is not an Effect. 2. The use of your distribution or distinctions to our business seems to me so small, as that I know not well to what end you bring them forth. 3. The order of your distinguishing I have no great minde to learn. I should rather have distinguished Logical and Physical Action, in the first place, had there been any use for it. 4. But your Logical action we have nothing to say to: Nor did I speak *de subjecto prædicationis*. 5. Yet I have no great desire of imitating

you, in calling the Agent, the ſubject of the extrinſecal denomination [*viz.* Action.] It is your Phyſical Action, which is ſo denominated: Though of the verbal predication [*agit*] I would willingly ſay, that the Agent is the ſubject. 6. But it is your Phyſical Action which we have now to do with: and that not as it is *in Patiente*, for ſo it is Paſſion, and not formally Action. Whether *Scotus* opinion of a Real difference be true or not (which yet may have more ſaid for it then ſome ſuperficial anſwerers do take notice of) yet formally its like it will be granted, that they are not the ſame: And therefore you ſhould ſpeak of Action as Action, *Ut dicit egreſſionem & dependentiam ab agente*, and not as it ſignifieth Paſſion, that is, Reception of Action, and the effect of it: and ſo the Patient is not the ſubject of Action; Nor do I believe it a fit ſpeech to ſay, that Calefaction is in your hand, though *Calor* be. But we muſt hear you further: to how great purpoſe we ſhall ſee.

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§. 13.

Mr K. 1. *NOw take it how you will, Action is an adjunct, as denominating the Agent, no way an Effect, as an Action.* 2. *Nor doth it carry that ſtile in any of theſe learned* Sophies, *commonly quoted by Mr.* Baxter *with ſo much reverence.*

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§. 13.

R. B. 1. SAy you ſo! is it an adjunct as denominating the Agent, take it how I will? What if I take it, [as it is received into the Subject, and called Paſſion] which is your ſecond ſenſe? Why ſaid you that your Logical Action was an extrinſecal denomination of the Agent, if your Phyſical Action be ſo too? When you ſeemed by this to difference them? 2. I marvel that my Reverence to theſe *Sophies* ſhould be the matter of ſo many of your lines, and you ſhould think it neceſſary to rehearſe it ſo oft: Sure you are jealous that your Reader will be very unobſervant of your weighty obſervations. But, Sir, is not Reverence a ſign of Lowlineſs? Why then are you offended at it? You ſhould rather applaud me, and ſay, If *R. B.* do ſo much Reverence a *Suarez*, a *Schibler*, a *Burgerſdicius*, if he knew me, how much more would he reverence me! But, to deal more plainly with you, the further I go in peruſal of your learned Labours, the more I perceive my Reverence to abate. Let any man except your ſelf judge by the next paſſage, whether you deſerve more reverence then theſe Rabbies and Sophies (as you have honourably be-Titled them.) You boldly and flatly affirm, That Action [is no way an Effect, as an action, nor doth it carry that ſtile in any of theſe learned Sophies, *&c.*] Either this Aſſertion is True or Falſe. If True, Mr. K. hath got little: but I am falſe, if this be true. If it be falſe, either Mr. K. knew it to be ſo, or he did not. If he did, and yet ſpoke it, and that ſo confidently, then he muſt pardon me for Reverencing theſe childiſh Authors before him. If it be falſe and he knew it not, then, 1. He is one that will ſpeak boldly what he knows not, and accordingly to be believed. 2. And then it ſeems he knows not what he ſuppoſeth his Boyes to know, and he looks at as his *A. B. C.* I will finde out a *Tertium* to ſalve his credit as ſoon as I can. If there be no other, I'le lay it on a defect of memory, conjunct with a certain audacity, to tell the world in print, that thoſe things are not written which he read when he was a boy, and hath ſince forgotten.

Let

Let us try the truth of his Assertion. I must not tell him of some Schoolmen or any other Philosophical Writers, that call [action] an effect, for then he will say, Those are not the Sophies in Question: It must therefore be the very same men. Let *Schibler* speak first *Met. l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. Punc. 2. p. 54. Quod ad actionem immanentem attinet; dicitur ea Immanens ab in manendo, quod scilicet in agente maneat, Existimo tamen eam non esse intelligendam Positivè, sed Negativè. Nam actio Immanens quâ talis est, est in Agente, hoc sensu, quia non transit ad Patiens. In ipso autem agente non est per modum Adjuncti, sed simpliciter ad ipsum comparatur ut ad Causam. Unde hæc Propositio, Homo intelligit, vel disputat, non est ut adjuncti de subjecto, sed ut Effecti de Causa: Et patet; Nam Actio transiens nullum habet subjectum, ne quidem ipsum patiens, ut visum est. Ergo etiam actio Immanens à fortiori non postulat subjectum. Consequentia firma est, quia actio transiens magis est ex subjecto, & magis postulat subjectum, quam actio Immanens. Sed actio Transiens in esse Actionis, nullum habuit subjectum, &c. Ergo & confirmatur, quod Actio ut sic, non dicit nisi egressum à virtute activa alicujus agentis. Egressus autem opponitur tò esse in. Et hinc relinquitur generatim loquendo de actione ut sic, eam non postulare subjectum. Neq; enim Genus debet habere Naturam repugnantem suis speciebus, &c.*

Yet more, that you may be past doubt of Mr. K's Veracity and Ingenuity, *lib. 1. cap. 22. Tit. 28. Art. 1. Caterum vox effecti ambigua est, &c. Primò Propriè & Adæquatè significat causatum specialiter, nempe cum connotato respectu ad causam efficientem, &c. Deinde effectum sumitur generalius & per Synecdochem speciei pro genere, quomodo dicitur æquipollenter ad Causatum, quomodo jam Cicero loquebatur, &c. Jam præterea 3° effectum (sicut & Causatum) aliquando specialiter accipiuntur; prout significant esse stans & permanens post actionem: In quo distinguuntur contra effectionem vel actionem, vel motum: atque ita aliqui aiunt Actionem non esse effectum: sed id quo producitur effectus. Hic tamen communius Effectum & Causatum sumuntur, Dicituruque id omne Causatum quod habet esse per dependentiam ab aliqua Causa sive sit Actio, sive Res per Actionem facta. Atque ita etiam* Ramus *in Logic. l. 1. c. 9.* Huc, *inquit, in doctrina Effecti,* pertinet motus & res motu facta, *&c. Vid. ult. 11. Et Art. 3. De effecto specialiter dicto. Nihil autem occurrit hic explicandum præter* specialia nomina effectorum; *qualia sunt* ἐνέργεια, ἐνέργημα, ἀποτέλεσμα, πρᾶξις & ποίησις. *Igitur* ἐνέργεια *hoc loco nihil aliud est quam* ipsa Actio, *Damasc. lib. 3. de Orthod. fid. c. 15. eam definit, quod sit efficax & substantialis naturæ motus. De hoc effectus genere, hoc est, de Actione, intelligendus est iste Canon,* Cessante causa cessat effectus: *Effectus inquam qui est* ἐνέργεια: *Cessante Patre cessat, (non Filius sed) Generatio Filij: Cessante Architecto cessat (non domus sed) ædificatio.* ἐνέργημα *autem opus est post actionem manens, &c.* πρᾶξις *quandoq; generatim significat operationem, sicut & Latina vox Actionis, &c. Vid. reliq.*

So in his *Compend. Philos. de Logic. l. 1. §. 1. c. 5. p. 17. Ad effectum tanquam exemplum ejus pertinet motus, & res motu facta.*

And *Metaph. l. 2. c. 3. Tit. 17. n. 630.* he saith, *Resp. Esse ambiguitatem in voce* creati entis: *Creatum enim Ens quandoque dicitur id solum quod per Actionem creativam incipit esse, quodque est quasi Creationis terminus: Et sic Creatio non est aliquid creatum: Quandoque vero Creatum Ens dicitur omne illud quod dependenter est ab Ente increato, sive id sit per modum Actionis, sive per modum rei factæ per actionem. Et hoc modo Creatio est quid Creatum. Simile quid est in voce Effecti vel Effectus: Dicitur enim quandoque effectum pro eo quod est quasi Actionis Terminus, quomodo domus, v. g. est effectum. Aliquando* *Calovius* Metaphys. Divin. *saith, p. 524.* In genere causatum est operatio, & ἐνέργεια, vel opus & ἐνέργημα.

vero ſumitur communiùs ut dicatur effectum quicquid à Cauſa eſt, ſive id ſit per modum Actionis ſeu motus, ſive per modum rei per motum factæ; Et ſic etiam ipſæ Actiones dicuntur effecta, &c. Atque ita ſicut noſtræ Actiones ſunt effecta, ipſæ tamen non poſtulant, ut per alias actiones fiant, &c.

So *lib.2.cap.10. Tit.3. Art.3.n.31,32. Nam & ipſæ Actiones dicentur effectus præciſe, & in ſe, quia habent eſſe dependens aliunde*, &c. So n. 41, 42. & n. 49, 50, 51. *Et confirmatur per* Ariſtot. *l.3. Phyſ. T.20. Ubi ait, eundem Actum eſſe Agentis tanquam à quo, & patientis tanquam in quo, hoc eſt, ibi habet reſpectum effecti; hic vero habet reſpectum adjuncti.*

Again, *l.2 c.3. Tit.14.n.418. Potentia ad ſuum Actum comparatur ut effectum illius, Unde Intellectio*, v.g. *eſſet effectus potentiæ intellectivæ*, &c.

Now let Mr.K's auditors conſider the next time he aſcendeth his Chair, how farre their great Maſter is to be credited, and with what Cautions his moſt confident Aſſertions muſt be received. Let a man ſpeak never ſo many Doctrinal untruths, we may modeſtly and handſomly confute them without offenſive language: but when men ſpeak ſuch palpable untruths in matter of fact, I love not to diſpute with them, ſeeing a man hath no anſwer for them, beſeeming their errour, but a plain *deſideratur veritas*, which ſeems ſo unhandſome language that it is uſually ill taken what ever be the cauſe.

But let us hear another of the Sophies, *viz.* Suarez. *Metaph. diſp.18. Sect.10. n. 8. Quod ſi nomine Effectus comprehendamus non ſolum rem productam, ſed quicquid à virtute agentis manat, ſic concedimus actionem eſſe aliquo modo effectum agentis, cum ſit dependens vel potius ipſamet dependentia ab illo: Eſſe autem Effectum hoc lato modo, non repugnat cauſalitati: quin potius in omnibus cauſis quas hactenus tractavimus, Cauſalitas eſt effectus cauſæ*, &c.

It were no hard matter to produce more Reverend Sophies for Mr.K. who uſe the ſame language and call Actions Effects; but being about ſo ſmall a matter, I think it is not worth the labour. In this much the Reader may perceive to what a loſs of time he may be lead in reading ſuch Controverſies, where men leave the Things, and fall upon Perſons and Words, out of an earneſt deſire to finde out ſome way to caſt Contempt upon their Brethren.

Vid. *Aluing.* Problem. Theolog. part.1.p.55.

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§. 14.

Mr.K. *WHat was wont to be more common in horſe-fair then* An Actio ſit in Agente, *which with the knack of this hackney diſtinction, every dull Jade could turn at their pleaſure, and hold ſometimes affirmatively, ſometimes negatively. So then thus farre little is ſaid to the prejudice of that truth, that there is no new Immanent act in God?*

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§. 14.

R.B. YOur horſe-fair, and hackney diſtinction, and dull Jade, are paſſages ſo profound that I muſt paſs them as unanſwerable by any that hath not attained to your Degrees. But doubtleſs you knew alſo how common it is to maintain the Negative on other grounds, and to ſay, that *Actio eſt Agentis, non in Agente*: and this is the language that I have hitherto thought fitteſt: and your contrary judgement alone will ſcarce move me to change. As for the ſafety of your Concluſion,

Concluſion, I muſt tell you, it is no ſuch glorious Atchievement for you to vindicate it againſt one that never oppoſed or denied it.

§. 15.

Mr. K. *But 2. Though this ſhould be granted to Mr.* Baxter *to be true in acts tranſient, yet an immanent act is queſtionleſs an Adjunct, and not onely denominate the Agent, but inhere in it. For I ask, Is Knowing or Willing a Subſtance or Accident? an Accident queſtionleſſe. If an Accident; In what Subject? Out of the Agent, you will finde no place where it may ſet the ſole of its foot. Therefore it is in the Agent, and ſo an Adjunct: and if ſo, ſure Immanent acts in God muſt needs infer an alteration. For*

§. 15.

R. B. I Confeſs your firſt on-ſet (ſo ſudden, ſo cauſleſs againſt a feigned Adverſary) made me ſuſpect you to be ſome *pugnaciſſimum animal* (as Dr. *Twiſs* cals his Adverſary) but your proſecution puts me out of doubt. 1. Had you confined theſe ſpeeches of yours only to the Creatures Acts, you had ſaid but as many others have done before you: But it is Gods acts that you ſpeak of, as you aſcertain us in your application [and if ſo, ſure Immanent acts in God muſt needs inferre an alteration.] But indeed do you believe that God is compounded of Subſtance and Accident? Yea doth the contentious diſpoſition ſo potently carry you on, that you dare ſpeak in ſuch confident language, as to ſay that it is [an accident queſtionleſs] which you attribute to God? What could *Vorſtius* have ſaid more? I thought you had concurred in opinion with your Brethren, that uſe to call Gods Immanent acts, as diverſified and as diſtinct from his Eſſence, only Extrinſick Denominations: But it ſeems you think otherwiſe (for a little time, while your haſt doth hurry you that way *per modum naturæ.*) 2. If you ſay, That you meant onely this much [Immanent acts are Accidents inherent in man: Therefore they inferre an alteration in God] You might ſo eaſily foreknow that I would deny your Conſequence, that me thinks ſo great a Diſputant ſhould not ſo drily have paſſed over the proof. I do not ſtick on the ſtrangeneſs of the Concluſion it ſelf, that [Immanent acts in God muſt needs inferre an alteration;] which is againſt your ſelf and all Divines, who maintain that there are Immanent acts in God. For I doubt not but your haſte which the diſputing itch provoked you to, cauſed you to put [Immanent acts] for new Immanent acts.] 3. But its ſtrange, that you could bethink you of no anſwer that might be made to your Queſtion [If an Accident, in what Subject?] when you know it is ſo common to deny that Inheſion is neceſſary to every Accident; And when you know that in this caſe an *eſſe ab*, or a dependant *Egreſſe*, is affirmed ſufficient by ſo many. I cited the words of *Schibler* to that ſenſe even now, where he purpoſely oppoſeth that which you aſſerted, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 10. *Tit.* 3. n. 54, 55. I will not trouble you to rehearſe them, it being a Book ſo farre below you. Now to your Proof.

§. 16. Mr. K.

§. 16.

Mr. K. *For, 3. Though Action as Action logically considered, be but an extrinsecal Denomination, and so only denominate the Agent, not inhere in it, as much of Reality as there is in all Transient Actions being in the Patient, even Physically, or rather Metaphysically considered; yet these Immanent actions have their Terms too, say the said Sages, and those in the Agent; he that hath a minde to look it, may soon finde it in* Suarez, *or his* Scapula Schibler, *in the predicament of Action. Thus then the first bolt hath done little execution against this truth, that there can be no new Immanent Acts in God.*

§. 16.

R. B. IS this all the proof that we have waited for [Immanent actions have their terms too?] 1. Either you mean it of all Immanent acts, or but of some, if but of some, then it is a learned Argument: [some Immanent acts have their terms: Therefore there can be no new Immanent acts in God.] But I suppose you mean it of All: But then by [terms] do you mean [objects] which sometime are called *termini*? Or do you mean, the form to which the action tendeth, and which by it is produced or induced? If the first, then the *Terminus* of these Divine acts which we are speaking of, is oft *Without*, (as we use to say;) as when God knoweth, Approveth, Willeth, Loveth the Creature. And therefore some few will not call these Immanent acts, but onely those whose object is God himself. But I suppose you mean the later, and then, 3. You might easily foresee, that though I had yielded all that you say of the Creatures acts, yet I would deny it of Gods: And blame me not for it, if I be lesse bold then you: and if I dare not imagine that there is in God either *Motus* or *Terminus ad quem*, or effect, or form acquired, when he Knows, Willeth, Approveth or Loveth the Creature. I am in hope that you believe no such thing your self, when the disputing itch is a little allayed. But however, could you possibly think it so obvious and easie a point as to need no proof? Why have we never a word here to that end, who need so many? I love not these Happy Disputers that can prove that by silence, which neither themselves nor any other can prove by Argument. If you will flie to your Analogy, and say [There are *Termini actionum Immanentium* in man: Therefore there are so in God] I should tell you that you may as wisely say [There are Accidents, Effects and Mutations in man: Therefore there are such in God.] At least I should importune you for the proof of your consequence. 4. But for the Terms of Immanent Actions you say [The said Sages say it] and [he that hath a minde to look it, may soon finde it in *Suarez*, and his *Scapula Schibler*] Truly, Sir, I have hitherto hinted your faults in Ironies: but I think it fit to ask you now (seeing it is not once or twice, nor a slip of your pen) how you dare put such things in print, and set so light by honest Truth-telling, and leave such things on record against your self? You that do *tanto fastu* referre us to *Schibler* as our *Scapula*, sure know his Doctrine: or at least, if you know it not, you should not take on you to know it, and say, we may soon finde that in him, which he so largely and purposely disputes against. He saith indeed, that some Immanent acts have terms, as Syllogizing: but that cannot be your meaning: for you well know it will do nothing to inferre your Conclusion: But doth not *Schibler* (*l.*2.*c.*10. *Tit.*3.*art.*3. *punct.*

punct. 1, 2.) largely diſpute it, that many Immanent acts have no term, no not Viſion or Intellection! and anſwer the Objections againſt him? and conclude that *Actio ut ſic non dicit reſpectum ad terminum?* And if Intellection have no Term, then Decree, and the reſt that we were mentioning in the beginning, can have none *in agente*. 5. Nay what a great part of the great Philoſophers and School-Divines do deny, that Immanent acts are true acts? *Scotus* takes them to be qualities, and not in the predicament of Action. *Soucinus, Ferrarienſis* (and ſaith *Schibler Thomiſtæ frequenter ita docent*) deny them to be true acts. And if ſo, then ſure they have not the *terminos* of true acts.

And I before told you at the beginning of your Diſcourſe, that we do not all agree with you in your Deſcription of an Immanent act, if you mean that it is ſuch as is not only negatively, but Poſitively terminated in the Agent, as your words import: You may ſee *Schibler* denying it (when you ſhall condeſcend to look it in him) *in Met. l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. n. 54. & Tit. 5. art. 1. n. 64.* But let this be how it will in man, I do very confidently deny that there is any ſuch act in God, either of Knowledge or Will, as is either in the predicament of Action, or hath any *Terminus* in himſelf, further then as himſelf is the object of any act. And therefore you ſhould firſt prove, that ſuch Acts are in God at all, before you diſpute whether they may be in him *de novo*.

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§. 17.

Mr. K. *Conſider we what follows: [Whether all ſuch Immanent acts are any more eternal then tranſient acts, is much queſtioned] ſaith Mr. Baxter. By whom I pray? A clear difference between them as between heaven and earth: tranſient acts as I told you but now, being in the Patient, Immanent in the Agent.*

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§. 17.

R. B. 1. O Happy, too happy wit! that hath not onely with *Moſes* ſeen the back parts of God, but hath taken ſo full a Survey of his Nature, that it can diſcern as clear a difference between his ſeveral acts, as between heaven and earth! I dare not attempt the like ſurvey: but I may receive inſtruſtruction from you that have ſurvey'd it. And what is the difference? Why [tranſient acts are in the Patient, and Immanent in the Agent.] What's the proof? Why it is this [I told you ſo but even now.] This may be a Demonſtration to thoſe that are capable of it: but *recipitur ad modum recipientis*: with me you have loſt your Authority, ſo farre, that I need another kinde of proof. I will rather call it Paſſion then Action when it is *in Patiente*. *Forma dat nomen*: and Paſſion and Action are not the ſame *formaliter*, whatſoever they may be materially. Uſe the names promiſcuouſly, if there be no difference in the things.

You know the ſubtil *Scotiſts* ſay, That Action and Paſſion are not the ſame, and that Action is in the Agent. And I have yet ſeen no reaſon to preferre you before *Scotus*. But I rather ſay, that Tranſient Acts are *ab agente*, but neither *in agente nec patiente*; as having a Cauſe but no Subject, as I have before expreſſed. And you may finde in my *Scapula, Met. l. 2. c. 10. Tit. 3. n. 51.* That *Omne accidens eſt in alio ſenſu Negativo, &c. altas loquendo de generali eſſentia accidentis, non eſt ea in Inhærendo, ſi rigoroſe loquamur, ſed in eo quod id quod accidens eſt afficit ſubſtantiam extra eſſentialiter, ſive extra eſſentiam, aut rationem ejus exiſtendo. Proinde etſi alio*

rigoroſe loquendo non inhæreat, tamen ſatis habet de ratione accidentis, quia ſubſtantiam aſficit & denominat extra eſſentialiter. Unde porrò reſp. ad aſſump. proſyllog. admittendo quod Actio Tranſiens non ſit in Patiente, loquendo de actione ut ſic, & ſub eſſe Actionis. Quod igitur Actio tranſiens dicitur eſſe in patiente, id non eſt Intelligendum formaliter, ſed materialiter: nempe illa res quæ eſt Actio eſt in Patiente: non tamen ſub formali Actionis, ſed ſub formali paſſionis: Eadem enim res quæ Actio eſt, eſt etiam Paſſio. Now I hope you are more accurate in your ſpeeches then to uſe to denominate from the matter, rather then the form: and therefore I hope hereafter you will forbear ſaying, that *Actio eſt in Patiente*, how common ſoever it may be. At leaſt remember that you humbled your ſelf but even now, to uſe a Hackney diſtinction, with which every dull Jade could maintain the Negative at their pleaſure. And what if I adventured to uſe one Argument, *Actio eſt efficientis cauſalitas: At efficientis Cauſalitas non eſt in Patiente: Ergò, Actio non eſt in Patiente.* The *major* I prove by Infallible Authority, *viz.* Mr. K's, pag. 136. For the *minor*, If the Cauſality of the Agent were in the Patient, then we might fitly call it *Patientis Cauſalitas.* (For the name ſhould be fitted to the thing) But that were abſurd, Therefore, *&c.* Further, That which is in the Patient is a *Cauſatum*, or effect of the Agent *per Actionem vel Cauſalitatem.* But Cauſality or Action is not a *Cauſatum* or effect of the Agent *per actionem vel cauſalitatem:* Therefore that which is in the Patient is not Action or Cauſality. The *major* needs no proof; and its meant of every received form. The *minor* hath a full demonſtration, *viz.* Mr. K's Authority; who denieth Action to be an effect. And thoſe that be not moved with his authority, may obſerve that I here take the word [effect] in the more reſtrained ſenſe as it excludeth Cauſality or Action; and therefore that I ſay [it is not an Effect *per Actionem*] and that is proved fully, in that otherwiſe, there muſt be another Action to effect this Action, and ſo *in infinitum.* But I did not think to have ſaid any thing on this. All that Mr. K. can expect we ſhould grant him is, that *Actio qua Paſſio eſt in Patiente:* but ſtill *Actio tranſiens qua Actio non eſt in Patiente*, no more then is an Immanent action. Or if it were, yet the Authority of ſo many learned gain-ſayers, makes the difference ſeem ſcarce ſo clear as that between heaven and earth.

Moreover, that which in God we call a Tranſient Act, is by the Schoolmen in greateſt credit, affirmed to be Gods Eſſence only connoting the creature-*Relatio* to it: ſo that beſides the creature it ſelf (which though *Scotus* eals Creation, yet is ſure the effect and not the act) and beſides the Relation (which can be no proper act) there remains nothing but Gods eſſence, to be the ſubſtance of the Act which we call both Immanent and Tranſient. *Capreolus* ſaith, *Nulla Divina operatio aut actio qua formaliter agit aut operatur, eſt tranſiens in paſſum, ſic quod in paſſo formaliter recipiatur, cum ejus agere ſit ejus Velle & Intelligere, quæ ſunt actiones Immanentes. Sed concedi poteſt quod divina actio dicitur quandoque tranſiens propter reſpectum rationis ad realem effectum in Creatura, ut Creatio, Conſervatio, &c. l. 2. diſt. 1. q. 2. art. 3.* And the Thomiſts (ſaith *Suarez*, *Met. diſp.* 20. §. 5.) ſay, That *Non ſolum Creatio, verum neque ulla actio reſpectu illius poteſt eſſe Tranſiens.* Where then is Mr. K's clear difference as between heaven and earth?

And though I am loth to put my finger into the fire, by medling with Mr. K. any further then he invites me, yet perhaps he may expect I ſhould ſomewhat take notice what he ſaith of this point to Mr. *Goodwin*, pag. 150, 154.

1. When he ſaith, [There are ſo many Immutations in Gods Eſſence] if tranſient operations be the ſame with his Eſſence, *&c.* I deny the conſequence:

becauſe

becauſe the *Terminus* or effect is not the ſame with his Eſſence, though the act be. The Effect only is Many; the Act but one. 2. To his ſolution of the firſt Queſtion, where he ſaith, It is a myſtery paſſing all underſtanding, that God ſhould incline the heart to believe and not act anew, *&c.*] I ſay, I believe him for the myſteriouſneſs. But as all multiplicity comes from Unity, ſo do all temporals from that act which is Eternal. To all Mr. K's Inſtances the Schoolmen ſay, It is the effect only that is New: In giving the ſpirit, faith, raiſing Chriſt, *&c.* God had no new act: Yet God did it by *Velle*, which is his eternal act and eſſence. To his anſwer to the ſecond Queſtion, I Reply, M. K's Queſtions are inſipid and fallacious. [Did he Plant faith by making Plants? Did he make me to differ by making the world?] For though it was by the ſame act, yet that act hath divers denominations from its reſpect to divers objects. To [make the world] connoteth a particular object, *viz.* the world: and therefore the act which cauſeth you to believe, cannot be called [Creating the world] not becauſe the act is not the ſame, but becauſe it reſpecteth not the ſame object. The third Queſtion belongs not to me. To the fourth I ſay as before: the act is Gods *Velle*: his *Velle* is his Eſſence: Therefore Eternal. His Queſtions [Whether the world were drowned by the ſame Act by which it was made? *&c.*] are anſwered as before: It was by the ſame Act, *viz.* *Velle Divinum*; but to be denominated variouſly according to the Variety of objects which it doth reſpect and connote. Even as it is the ſame Act which is Immanent and Eternal, which in Time is denominated Tranſient from its reſpect to the effect.

But *Pag.* 154. I finde him citing Mr. *G.* as ſaying [Learned men Generally acknowledge, that (the act) is really and formally one and the ſame thing with his Eſſence.] And Mr. K. ſaith contrary, that [No man ever aſſerted Tranſient acts to be the ſame with the Agent] and that [all Tranſient acts be the ſame with the term, ſay all men that meddle with Metaphyſicks] and he appeals to any Reader that hath but taſted the firſt principles of Logick. Truly theſe two Divines are very contrary: and have bewrayed both of them that which they might have concealed with much more credit to their Reading. Yet Mr. *G.* may interpret [Generally] with ſuch limitations as may bring him off in part: but Mr. K's preſumption and boldneſs is intolerable. When a man of ſo ſmall Reading as I am, know ſo well, that the Metaphyſical Doctors do ſome ſpeak one way, and ſome another: as I undertake by quotations now to manifeſt when I ſhall underſtand it worth any time and labour. I remember Mr K's words in his third Epiſtle of the ſufficiency of [a pair of Sheers and a met-yard.] But it is not ſo farre ſufficient without more Reading, as to encourage a tender conſcienc't man, to averre untruths ſo confidently, that [*No man ever aſſerted*, &c.] And where he ſaith [The Queſtion is not of the acts of his *Will*, but of his *Power*, &c.] Knoweth he not that Dr. *Twiſs* and the highly honoured Thomiſts do make God to work *per eſſentiam*, and ſay, that his Power is but his Will, called Power in reſpect to the effect which it doth produce? *Vid.* Aquin. 1. *q.* 15. *art.* 1. 4^m. Truly me thinks that Mr. K. doth even to the meanly learned expoſe himſelf to great diſgrace, to ſay ſo boldly, that [all men that meddle with Metaphyſicks ſay, that all Tranſient acts be the ſame with the term.] Did he never at leaſt reade *Scotus* ſo oft aſſerting and arguing for the contrary? Nor any one of his followers, nor one of all the other parties that deny this? If he had not, yet he ſhould have bluſhed ſo peremptorily to affirm what he did not know. At leaſt he ſhould have known that *Schibler* hath this Concluſion, which he largely argues for [3° *Actiones quæ tendunt*

tendunt ad terminum non ſunt realiter idem cum termino] and ſaith, *Calefactionem à Calore ſpecie diſtingui.* And he there tels you of *Fonſeca, Arriaga, Suarez & Colleg. Conimbric.* that ſay as he: At leaſt he that ſo derides me for citing theſe puerile Authors, ſhould not have dared to ſay All men [that meddle with Metaphyſ.] ſay as he in this, when both common School-books, and the two moſt famous Sects of Schoolmen, Scotiſts and Thomiſts are againſt him (as *Suarez* will tell him, *diſp.48. ſect.5.n.2. of Cajet. Hiſpaleuſ. Flandr. & communiter Scotiſt &c.*] And for the fuller anſwering of Mr.K's Queſtions before mentioned, I deſire the learned Reader among others to peruſe the foreſaid Anſwer of *Caprevlus* to *Arriolus* 15. arguments *in l.2.ſent.diſt.1.q.2.a.3.* But I muſt intreat you ſtill to remember that my own opinion is, That action is not properly aſcribed to God at all; nay farre more Improperly then men will eaſily believe: *Suarez* himſelf *Metaph. diſp.48. §. 5.n.11.* maintaineth Gods Immanent acts, *Intelligere & Velle* are properly not acts, nor to be ſo called. But of this before.

Reade alſo *Gibieuf. de Libert.l.1. cap.25. §.13.* ſhewing that the act whereby God made all things of nothing is Eternal: and *c.6. p.323.* And Cardin. *Conarenus de prædeſtinatione, pag.* (*operum*) *606.* ſaith, *Simplici & Unica Actione, quæ cum ipſius ſubſtantia eadem eſt (ſi tamen ſubſtantiam appellare licet) omnes effectus producit: ita nullo etiam tempore aut temporis aliqua parte, actionem ejus contineri,&c.*] *Vid.* Aquin. *contr.Gent.l.1,2.c.35,36,37. 17,18,19.*

And that the Action is not the ſame with the *Terminus*, ſee the Arguments of *Ludovic. à Dola de Concurſu Part.1. cap.2. §.6. Aquin.* is cited by *Caprevlus in 2. ſent. diſt.1.q.2.a.3.* as ſaying thus, *de pot.Dei q.3.a.17 ad 12m. Dei Actio eſt æterna cum ſit ejus ſubſtantia: dicitur autem incipere agere ratione novi effectus, qui ab æterna actione conſequitur diſpoſitionem voluntatis qui intelligitur quaſi actionis principium in ordine ad effectum.*]

2. But the other part of the aſſigned difference goes down with me no better, but much worſe, 1. In that he knows, I think, that it is not ſuch a commonly received opinion [that Immanent actions are in the Agent] in a Poſitive ſenſe, and not meerly negative, as that he ſhould think it needed no more proof then his mentioning. I gave him the oppoſition of one Sophie, as he cals him, even now. 2. And if it were ſo in man, I again tell him, that I will not take his bare word, no nor his oath, that it is ſo in God.

But Mr.K. muſt needs know who they be that make queſtion of this. What if it were but ſome private familiars of mine? Muſt Mr.K. needs know their names? But I had thought he had been well acquainted with the doctrine of *Lyobetus, Pennotus* and *Sanctâ Clarâ* in this Point, Who affirm, That though the act in it ſelf be God himſelf, and ſo eternal, yet the tranſition of it to ſeveral objects, and ſo the denomination may be new; and ſo that God may to day predeſtinate him that before was not predeſtinated, or Love him that before was not Loved, and this without any change in God. Indeed theſe are the men that I mean. I thought with theſe men of the higher form you had deigned to be familiar: but becauſe you ſpeak of the matter ſo ſtrangely, I will come down again to our own form, and rehearſe a few words of *Burgerſdicius* familiarly known to thoſe at your foot-ſtool. *Metaph.l.2. §.16. Eſt enim in Deo concipiendus unus actus, qui nihil aliud eſt quam eſſentia divina. Hic actus reſpicere poteſt diverſa objecta creata, ſeu, quod eodem redit, Deus per iſtum actum tendere poteſt in diverſa objecta, vel etiam non tendere: & cum in illa tendit, reverâ ea vult: Dixi in objecta creata: Nam ſeipſum Deus non poteſt non amare. Decreta ergo Dei duo involvunt, actum ſcilicet, & illius actus tendentiam*

ſine.

ſine applicatione ad diverſa objecta creata. Actus ipſe liber non eſt, non magis quam Dei vel Immenſitas, vel Æternitas: ſed libera eſt illius actus applicatio ad objecta: quæ tamen quia nihil Deo addit entis, ſed ſolum denominationem quandam externam, ſumptam a connotatione objecti creati, tanquam termini ſui, neque compoſitionem efficere poteſt, neque mutationem. Quod adeo verum eſt, ut exiſtimem, ſi Deus decreta reſcindere poſſet, illud imperfectionem allaturam Deo, non propter mutationem Decretorum, ſed propter cauſam mutationis, quæ aut imprudentia ſemper eſt aut impotentia.

Suarez hath ſuch a like paſſage, which *Fr. a Sancta Clara* reciting, anſwers this Objection about Imprudence or Impotency, as *Poſnanienſis* before him: *Problem. quart. pag. 31. ſed hæc ratio ejus eſt debilis, ut recte notavit* Poſnanienſis: *Nam imprudentiæ vel inconſtantiæ vitium non eſt, ſiquis propoſitis duobus bonis, primo eligat minus bonum & poſtea majus: niſi forte ex paſſione vel timore difficultatis, vel alia inordinata affectione id proveniat; ut patet de bono cælibatus & conjugii. Deus autem nullo modo obligatur, nec paſſionibus laborat, ſed ex mera liberalitate hoc non illud eligit: Ergo poteſt eligere ſine nota inconſtantiæ. Hæc ille. Unde* Auguſt. *Si non es prædeſtinatus, fac ut prædeſtineris. Et* Ambroſius (*in c. 1. Luc.*) *Novit Dominus mutare ſententiam, ſi tu noveris emendare delictum. Subtiliſſimus etiam* Bradwardinus *dicit, hanc ſententiam ſuum aliquando pulſaſſe animum, &c.*

Thus I have given you ſome anſwer to your incredulous Queſtion [By whom I pray?] But another kinde of anſwer might be given, concerning another ſort of men, who deny the Act it ſelf to be Gods Eſſence, but ſomewhat that hath no more Being then a Relation, or a Formality, or *Ens rationis ratiocinatæ*, or at leaſt then a *modus Entis*: and conſequently that as this may be without any compoſition in God (which they prove by the confeſſion of our own Doctors) ſo may it begin and end without Mutation in God. But I'le not offend Mr. K's ears with the names of theſe men.

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§. 18.

Mr. K. Surely tranſient Acts there could be none before the Creation, there being no term of ſuch Acts, no ſubject for them, unleſs there were either ſomewhat that was not made, or ſomewhat made before there was a Creation: but as for Immanent Acts, as Knowing and Willing in God, they were before the foundation of the world was laid. It is a very crude paſſage thus to ſay [It is much queſtioned whether all ſuch Immanent Acts are any more eternal then tranſient Acts:] For if the meaning be that any tranſient Act be eternal, that is a myſtery beyond all that hath been heard: then ſomewhat was made from eternity: If the meaning be, that no Immanent Act is eternal, that's after the ſame rate. The firſt made the Creature eternal: the ſecond denies God to be eternal: Did he not know from Eternity, yea fore-know all that hath been ſince the Creation, is or ſhall be to the diſſolution of the world, he were not perfect, and therefore not God from eternity. So then neither can it be affirmed, that there was any tranſient act eternal, nor can it be denied but that ſome Immanent acts are eternal: and if ſome, then all, or els a change muſt of neceſſity be granted. So that if the meaning be [It is queſtioned, Whether ſome Immanent Acts be no more eternal then tranſient Acts] that is, ſome immanent Acts be not eternal, the Argument returns with the old charge, that an alteration muſt be yielded in God, immanent Acts being not to be reckoned with any colour among effects, but adjuncts, and no ground of putting any ſuch new immanent Act in God in time, which I demonſtrate further thus.

§. 18.

R. B. THe meaning of my words is not hid, but according to the proper literal ſenſe, and I had ſome reſpect to the two ſorts of men before-mentioned, but chiefly to one. And what I ſay in Reply to your words, you muſt be ſo juſt as to take to be according to their grounds, and not mine own: For it is but the unſearchableneſs of theſe things that I am all this while maintaining.

And firſt to your Argumentation againſt the Eternity of tranſient acts, it may be replied, that in tranſient acts you muſt diſtinguiſh between the Act it ſelf, which is called tranſient, and the Paſſion or Reception of that act in the ſubject or the product, or effect of that act. The denomination of *Tranſient* is given to that act in the later reſpect as it doth connote the Product, Effect, Paſſion and Subject: yea is properly taken ſo from them, as that it ſignifieth nothing eſſential to the Act it ſelf as an Act: So that all that ſame Act which is in Time denominated Tranſient, becauſe in time it did produce its effect, was really from eternity it ſelf, though the effect were not; and ſo differs not *quoad rationem formalem actus*, from an Immanent act. Proved, 1. The Act by which God created the world, was his ſimple *Velle*: But Gods ſimple *Velle* was from Eternity: Therefore *&c.* The *major* is indeed denied by ſuch Punies as *Schibler*, and many more of his minde: but it needs no proof with Mr. K. for it is the opinion (I am ſure the ſaying) of Dr *Twiß*: And indeed it comes all to one, as to our buſineſs, if you go on the others grounds. The *major*, Mr. K. maintains. 2. *Deus generatur per eſſentiam immediatè: ſed eſſentia divina eſt æterna: Ergo*, &c. The *major* is ſpoken excluſively as to all acts which are not Gods Eſſence; and is ſo common with many Schoolmen, that I will ſpare the proof (for I perceive its eaſier taking it for granted then proving it) The *minor* none denieth that confeſſeth God. So that it is granted Mr. K. that theſe acts were not to be called Tranſient from Eternity, becauſe they were not received, or rather did not produce the effect but in time: But yet the act which in Time received the denomination of Tranſient, was it ſelf Eternal: God Willed from Eternity that the Creature ſhould Be in time, and produced it in that time by that Will which was Eternal. So much on that ſide.

Now to your Argumentation for the Eternity of Immanent acts, you would receive two ſeveral kindes of Anſwer from the ſeveral men that I before told you of.

One ſort of them think that the Thing it ſelf which we call an Act, is nothing but Gods Eſſence, and ſo Eternal: but that the tranſition of this Act to ſeveral objects (as *Sancta Clara* cals it) or the Application of it to theſe objects (as *Burgerſdicius* ſpeaks) and ſo the connotation of, and reſpect to theſe objects, is not Eternal, where the object is not Eternal: and withall they think that the denomination ſpecifical of the ſeveral Acts, yea and the diverſification of them, is taken from theſe temporal tranſitions, or applications and reſpects to objects; and therefore that they muſt be uſed as temporal denominations, and it is fitteſt to ſay, God Knew, Loved, *&c.* *Peter* as exiſting, not from Eternity, but when he did exiſt: Yea they think the very name of an Act, is moſt fit to be uſed in this later ſenſe; rather then applied to the pure Eſſence of God: however ſome call him in another ſenſe, a ſimple Act.

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The other ſort of men do think, that the very Act it ſelf is ſome *Modus* or formality diſtinct from Gods Eſſence, and may begin without his Mutation, as it may be his without his Compoſition, as I have before ſaid. Now both theſe ſorts will Reply, that your Charge of [making God not Eternal] and of [making alteration in God] which you oft repeat, are but your bare word without any proof, and therefore not by them to be regarded. That God fore-knew all things that ſhould come to paſs they eaſily grant you: but if he know not that to be exiſtent, which is but future, or that to be future which is wholly paſt, they ſay, this makes not God to be imperfect, or not eternal.

But I marvel that you ſtill call Gods Immanent Acts [Adjuncts in God] which before you alſo called Accidents; not fearing hereby to be guilty of making a Compounded God, while you maintain him Eternal: Or not diſcerning that you give advantage to your Adverſary to maintain, that thoſe Accidents or Adjuncts which may be in God without Compoſition, may as well Beginne or End notwithſtanding his Immutability, if their Object be ſuch as doth Beginne or End. Now to your New Demonſtration.

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§. 19.

Mr. K. *IF there be a ground of putting a New immanent Act in God*; Ergo, *This ground muſt be either in God or the Creature. If a Ground in God which was not before, then an alteration in him beyond reply: a ground in the Creature there can be none to put a new immanent Act in God; for that an immanent Act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent; it being herein contradiſtinguiſhed from tranſient Acts, that tranſient Acts* terminantur in paſſo, *immanent Acts* in agente. *I confeſs ſomewhat without the Agent, is many times, yea commonly the object of immanent Acts: but if ever either the Subject or Term, I will publickly burn my Books, as Mr.* Baxter *deſires his may be, when he goes one note beyond Dr.* Twiſs. *I am confident he needs not fear coming ſo high: I am ſure he fals infinitely ſhort in this Argument, as will appear more fully by what he ſubjoyns.*

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§. 19.

R. B. THis is the Demonſtration. I ſhall underſtand that word, in your mouth, better hereafter. Your horned Argument will be thus anſwered. The word [Ground] is ambiguous. If you take it largely for any ſufficient Reaſon of the attribution, then there is Ground both in the Creature and in God: But if you take it more ſtrictly for ſome one ſort of Reaſon, then it may be in one and not in the other. The ground may be in the Creature as the Object, and in God as the efficient: and in one as the relate, and the other as the correlate. But you ſay [if in God, then an alteration in him, beyond reply:] that's a pretty way to prevent a Reply: But your confident Aſſertions ſhall hereafter be annumerated with the weakeſt of your Arguments, though called Demonſtrations.

1. Some will take it for a ſufficient Reply to deny your Conſequence, and think you had dealt fairlier to have proved it. For they will think that there may be in God an Eternal Ground of a New Immanent Act, as well as there is of a New Tranſient act: The newneſs of the Act, will not prove the newneſs of the Ground. And therefore you eaſily ſuppoſe that it muſt be [a ground in God which was not before]:

before] if the act be such as was not before. But this you should have foreseen would be denied. And if you say, that the newness or change in the effect doth argue something changed or new in the cause; they will deny it; and tell you that then every transient act would argue something new in God.

2. Those (of whom I spoke before) that maintain that immanent acts as acts need no subject, will think they reply sufficiently by telling you, that the novity of immanent acts, having a ground in God, will only prove that *aliquid Dei velu Deo* is altered, but not that *aliquid in Deo* is altered; because that action speaks but a dependant egress, and not an inhesion. The like they will say as to any form introduced in the subject by immanent acts, who deny to many and most immanent acts, a *terminus*; and particularly to intellection. And if you think that there can be no action without some effect within or without, I refer you for an answer to my *Scapula*, as you conceit him.

3. However many of us will hardly be brought to beleeve that Gods immanent acts have in proper sense a *terminus*: though mans may.

4. Some will think they Reply sufficiently, by telling you that by [alteration in God] you mean, either [an alteration of his essence] and then they deny your consequence: or [an alteration of some *modus*, or relation, or formality;] and such they will grant; and say, as oft before, that it is no more against Gods immutability, then the existence of that *modus*, relation, or formality is against his simplicity.

5. If when God created the world, he had a* new relation (of Creatour) which he had not before, and this without change, then he may have a new immanent act without change, for ought you know.

* *All consent not the Relation is only* ex parte creaturæ *and not mutuall.*

6. For Gods acts are not so well known to such Moles and Bats as you and I are, that we should be able so peremptory to conclude that the novity of them must needs argue himself to be mutable: we know not so well how much Being, or of what kinde, those acts have.

So much for Reply to that which is past Reply. Now to the next horn of your Dilemma.

You say [A ground in the creature there can be none to put a new immanent act in God.] And why? Because [an immanent act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent.] 1. How? nothing! neither as an occasion, nor an object? do not you confess within a few lines that something without may be its object? It is ordinarily said, and by some of your friends, that the Attributes and Immanent acts of God are diversified only by extrinsick denomination; as an immoveable rock in the sea that is washt sometime with one wave and sometime with another, without its own change: (It seems they take the passion or reception of these motions of the waves, to be no change.) So do diversity of objects, say they, diversifie Gods acts and attributes *quoad denominationem extrinsecam*. If that be so, then objects specifie those acts *quoad denominationem extrinsecam*, which in themselves are but one: and then the said objects may as well cause a novity as a diversity of immanent acts *quoad denominationem extrinsecam*: And then there is no more impropriety in saying, God doth *de Novo* Will or Nill; then in saying, that it is not all one, for God to Will my salvation, and to Nill it: see what you have brought your cause to. 2. There are men in the world

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that conceive of God, as we do of the ſun, that is ſtill ſhining, but not ſtill ſhining on this or that creature: it may begin or ceaſe to ſhine on this place or that, without any change in it ſelf or its actual ſhining: and ſo they think it is with God as to ſome of his acts, which have the creature for their objects: And for your objection, That this is a tranſient act of the ſun, I ſhall reply to it anon, where you mention it.

But you are again harping on your old ſtring; *viz.* [That immanent acts are terminated in the Agent.] And I again tell you, that Gods acts and mans are not ſo near kin, as that you may conclude of the termination of his acts from the termination of ours: yea I tell you, that I will not beleeve you that Gods willing or knowing the creature hath any *terminus* in himſelf (further then as you may ſay the creature is in himſelf;) that is no *terminus* ſtrictly aſcribed to actions diſtinct from a meet objective termination. A word of proof. 1. Where there is neither *motus* or mutation there is no *terminus*? But in God acting immanently there is neither *motus vel mutatio*: Therefore, *&c.* I think I need not confirm either part. 2. Where there is no effect or form acquired or introduced, there is no *terminus* (in the ſenſe in queſtion:) But in God there is no effect or form acquired or introduced (by ſuch immanent acts) Therefore, *&c.* The *major* is plain from the common definition of a *terminus*. The *minor* is paſt queſtion.

But here you confeſs that *the objects of immanent acts may be extrinſick* (Yet I could tell you, that *Viguerius Inſtitut.* and others conclude, that *Voluntas Divina non habet objectum extrinſecum:*) *but if ſubject or term you will burn your Books*, &c. But hold your hand a little. Before I dare be guilty of that, I would fain know what Books they are. But you ſpeak cautelouſly: for you tell us not who ſhall be Judge in this buſineſs: and if I ſhould ſhew you never ſo many that are againſt you, you may keep your word by ſaying they all miſtake, and by being the Judge your ſelf. But, alas Sir, what cauſe have you thus to threaten your Books? Who can riddle the occaſion of it? I tell you, that as good Philoſophers (for ought I yet finde by you) as you, do think that ſuch acts have no ſubject nor term: and you ſay, that if any thing extrinſick be the ſubject or term you will burn your Books! which if you do, let all bear witneſs that I was no occaſion of it: If they have no ſubject or term at all, then they can have none without. Sure if you were not very quarrelſome you would not in ſuch high words feign him to be your adverſary, that ſaith more againſt the oppoſed Point, then your ſelf

As for that out-leap wherewith you recreate your ſelf, of my coming ſo *high* as Dr. *Twiß*, in the ſenſe I ſpoke I yet deſire it not; in the ſenſe you ſpeak (luſorily) I expect it not: nor do I know any man ſo ſimple as to compare me with him, or that needed this learned Digreſſion. Yet I confeſs I thought my ſelf ſomewhat neerer both Dr. *Twiß* and your ſelf then you ſuppoſe me to be: For though I was ready to obey your concluſive command, of adoring the footſteps of ſuch, yet I thought not that I had come *infinitely ſhort*, as you here inform me, I do. I thought only God had infinitely excelled the meaneſt creature. Nay then, if you will be needs our Gods, *Numina Academica*, I am afraid you will ſhortly be lower then men; and leſt I ſhall hear that news which I equally fear and abhorre, that you and ſuch like will ere long be caſt out of that Academical Paradiſe. But let that go: I ſuppoſe [infinitely] was but a high word, by a high ſpirit, *quaſi ab alto*, from a high place. I have ſtood my ſelf ere now on a mountain, and every thing in the valley ſeemed ſmall to me.

But I forgot to tell you one thing: that (though I suppose I know what kinde of termination you mean, yet) you should have spoken more cautelously, and distinguished, and told your Reader more plainly what you deny; and not have resolved to burn your Books, if we prove things without the Agent to be a term in general. For you know that we distinguish of Objects into Motive and Terminative; and ordinarily say that the creatures are terminative objects of Gods Will, though not moving objects. *Meuriſſe* saith (*Metaphyſ. Scot. li.* 1. *Q.* 15. pag. 127.) *Objectum ſecundarium non poteſt movere intellectum divinum ad cognitionem ſui, licet poſſit illum terminare, ut docent Theologi.* And *Schibler li.* 2. *c.* 3. *tit.* 15. *n.* 507. *Non quaſi putemus eſſe aliquid quod actiuet quaſi voluntatem divinam, (quod officium alias ſolet eſſe objectorum, in ordine ad habitus & potentias,) ſed quia apprehendimus voluntatem Divinam Terminari ad aliquid quod hactenus habet rationem objecti. Eſt enim ad rationem objecti ſatis, ſi terminet actum aliquem.* And *Punct.* 2. *n.* 510. the assertion is, *Dei voluntas terminatur etiam ad res creatas.* But enough of that. Now lets see the proof of our infinite distance.

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§. 20.

Mr. K. [*As for God to know that the world doth now exiſt: that ſuch a man is ſanctified, juſt, &c. Gods foreknowledge is not a knowing that ſuch a thing is which is not; but that ſuch a thing will be which is not: yet doth this make no change in God, no more then the ſun is changed by the variety of creatures which it doth enlighten and warm; or the glaſſe by the variety of faces which it repreſenteth, or the eye by the variety of colours which it beholdeth: (For, whatſoever ſome ſay, I do not think that every variation of the object makes a reall change in the eye, or that the beholding of ten diſtinct colours at one view doth make ten diſtinct acts of the ſight, or alterations on it: Apb.* p. 173, 174.] *I cannot tell what to make of this rope, but ſand it is, and nothing elſe, as ſhall ſtrait appear; and how ill a match the Authour was, thus to deſcend in* arenam *with* Twiſſe, Pemble, *and I dare ſay all the ſober Divines that ever were worthy to ſpeak to a School Point.*

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§. 20.

R. B. *Sanguinolent* men do dream of fighting and killing: It seems you have accuſtomed your minde so to contending, that through the errour of your phantasie, all words seem chidings, and all actions seem fightings to you: And so you dreamed not only that I was in *arena*, but 2. that Dr. *Twiſſe* and Mr. *P.* were there with me. 3. Yea and all Divines worthy to speak to a School Point. 4. And that we were there coping for masteries: and in the end of your dream you rise up as Judge and give them the better, and proclaim me an ill match. But 1. he that reades my Book will finde that I argue not as from my self, but only shew how other mens argumentations do manifest such a difficulty in the Point, that we should not lay too great a stress on it; as I have shewed you before in the explication of my own words. Nay I do not once deny the Point (that immanent acts are eternal) but only say, It is much questioned (by others) whether they are any more eternal then transient acts: and annex a touch of some mens arguings for it: concluding only in a parenthesis, that the Point is, as I think, beyond our reach. So much to the first fiction. 2. And if I contended not with any then not with Dr. *Twiſs* and Mr. *P.* on this Point; it being plain that it is

on

on another Point that I deal with them. Thats for the second fiction. 3. The third is mounted with great confidence; you [dare say:] What dare you say? Why that I [thus descend in *arenam* with all the sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point.] You are a daring man, that dare say this. But I have tasted so much of your temper before, that I perceive your veracity is oft least where your audacity is greatest: I thought I had contended with no man in those words; and you dare say, I contend with all men, worthy to speak to a School Point. What if it had been true that I had been here contending, and that against a Point which all these hold? doth it indeed follow that I do in *arenam descendere* with them all? and seek to match them? And what reason have we that know you not, to take you for Judge of all the Divines in the world, who shall be accounted sober, and who not; and who is worthy to speak to a School Point, and who not? Or why should I think you more worthy then the Learned men that I have before named, *Lyebetus*, *Pennottus*, *Burgersdicius*, &c?

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§. 21.

Mr. K. *TO know that the world doth now exist when once it did not, and that such a man now is sanctified which before he was not, makes no change in God, but only shews a change in the object: but to know now that the world doth exist which before God did not know, or to know now that such a man is sanctified, who before was not, which before God did not know, makes a change in God, as well as the object.*

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§. 21.

R. B. WHo would look for such answers from you, that had heard you judge of School Divines with such Authority? The first part of your Answer is not against any thing that I said: The second is a meer begging of the Question. Some think that *quoad substantiam actus* Gods knowledge is the same whatever the object be; but yet because [Knowing this or that] connoteth the object with the act, therefore the eternal essence of God simply in it self considered is not to be called [Knowledge] much less [the knowledge of this or that creature;] and that without the object it neither is Knowledge, nor ought to be so called; and so as from the object we distinguish Gods Knowing and Willing, so must we the several acts of his knowledge; and though the act *quoad substantiam*, which we call [Knowledge] in God be but one, yet the *ratio formalis* which must give the denomination, being in the respect of that one act to its objects, it is most fit to say that Gods knowledge of *Peters* salvation and *Judas* damnation, is not the same knowledge, though it be the same substantial act: the like is said of his Will: And as this must be said without wrong to his simplicity, so the like must be said of his beginning or ceasing to Know, without wrong to his immutability: and that as it is not all one for God to know the Futurity and the present existence of a thing, so we must say, that he began to know the present existence when the thing began to exist, and that God did not know before the creation, that this proposition was true, *Petrus existit*: and that he ceaseth to know the Futurition of a thing that ceaseth to be future; and that God doth not now know, that Christ will be born and dye and rise: and that therefore immanent acts in God are not

to be said to be all eternal; but only those that have an eternal object; because the act is to be denominated from its respect to the object: and therefore it being Gods Knowing and Willing which we call immanent acts here, where it is unmeet to say that act of Knowledge or Will is eternall, then it is unmeet to say, Gods immanent acts are eternal: but when you will express Gods immutability, it is fitter to say [God is unchangeable, or Gods essence or nature is eternall,] then to say, his knowledge, will, or immanent acts (in this sense) are so: because when we connote not the object, we are to call it Gods Essence, and not Gods Knowledge, Will, or such acts: so that here is no real change in God himself, but only a respective, or modal, or formal (as the *Scotists* speak) or such as we cannot now apprehend, affording new objective conceptions; all the change being in the creature.

Now how doth Mr. K. prove that this doctrine must [make a change in God as well as the object?] why he learnedly affirmeth it. He that can finde a word more, let him make his best of it. But in this case, all the proof lieth on the affirmer; which we might well have expected from him.

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§. 22.

Mr. K. *AND therefore all sober Divines use to be wary in their expressions in this kinde; acknowledging no difference between Gods knowledge and foreknowledge, but this, that his foreknowledge is in order to the object only, and not of any act of Gods: so that it is not opposed to post-science, but it signifieth only a futurity of the object, as was shewed at large in the third Chapter. God knows that that is to day which was not yesterday; but God as perfectly knew it yesterday as to day, and knew at once, all the various successions in time; or did he otherwise, a change cannot possibly be avoided, notwithstanding all Master* Baxter *alleadgeth to the contrary.*

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§. 22.

R. B. 1. IF your first sentence be true, I must lament the paucity of sober Divines; for sure I am, that of those which have written on these Points, too few have been wary in their expressions: and no wonder when they are no more wary in their conceptions; and when men dare maintain themselves to have that capacity which they have not, and to know certainly that which they do not, and might easily know they do not: When even such learned men as you will not be perswaded that these things are above your reach, but do with such haughty contention oppose one poor sentence in a Parenthesis (which is all my sentence) wherein I say, it is beyond our reach.

2. You lift up your self too high, in taking on you to judge all those Divines to be unsober, that are not in this of your opinion.

3. If the word [prescience] signifie only a futurity of the object, then these are equipollent expressions [*Deus hoc præscit*] and [*Hoc est futurum*:] but that is not true.

4. The same humane frailty and distance from God, which makes it necessary to us to ascribe Acting, Knowing and Willing to God, and to conceive of him under these notions, doth equally necessitate us to conceive of his Knowledge and Will, as distinct, and not altogether the same: else we should ascribe a meer name,

without

without any conception of the thing named: For we cannot conceive of any such Knowledge as is the same with Willing, nor of any such Willing which is the same with Nilling; and yet we beleeve the simplicity of God. And the same necessity that compelleth us to conceive of Gods Knowing, Willing and Nilling, as divers, *ab objectorum diversitate*, doth compell us to conceive of his Knowledge of things as Future, and his Knowledge of things existent, as divers: yet still we deny a Mutation of God himself; only we conceive as the Scotists, that there is a diversity of the objective conceptions, and that our various denominations have *fundamentum in re*: but what it is, let him tell that knows.

5. Against all this that which you oppose is but your naked assertion, which I regard less then perhaps you expected. I affirm the uncertainty, and you the certainty; and therefore it is you that should prove that certainty which you affirm to have: For no man hath a certainty without some evidence or other to force assent; and therefore that evidence should be produced, if you are indeed a man of as Angelicall intellectuals as you seem to conceit your self.

6. God did yesterday know that the sun is not risen to day, *i. e.* that to day is not come: You will say, he did at the same time yesterday know that to day is come and the sun is risen? some will think to make this true, you must verifie contradictories, and say, [It is] and [It is not] at once, may both be absolutely true (and then farewell our first Metaphysicall certainty in composition.) Or else you must assert the coexistence of all things with God in eternity; which how loath you will be to admit, I conjecture partly from the tendency of your tenets, and partly from your adhesion to Dr. *Twisse*, and others of his minde.

7. For your third Chapter I have said as much to it already as I finde either need or list, being loath you should cast on me Master *Goodwins* task.

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§. 23.

Mr. K. *AND to the first illustration the case is strangely different; yet I confess, if it did hold, it would prove the point a fortiori*: Thus the sun, *saith he*, enlightens and warms variety of creatures, yet is not changed: therefore nor need God be said to be changed, though he know to day a variation in the creature: *I yield all the conclusion: but all that is nothing to the purpose; for the question is not whether to know a variation in the creature prove a change in God? but whether a variation of the acts of his knowledge, according to the variation in the creatures do not prove a change in him? now the putting of a new immanent act, as a new knowing, is a putting of variation upon him.*

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§. 23.

R. B. 1. WEre my advice of any weight with you, I should perswade you never to expect any illustration of Gods immanent acts by the creature, without a great difference in the case; and therefore that you would no more take such difference as so *strange*. 2. Your concession that it will prove the point *a fortiori*, if it hold, is as much as I could desire or expect. 3. A man would think, that the argument you here lay down as mine, were mine indeed,

who finds so Learned a Divine saying so, that should abhorre falshood: when you put the words in a distinct character, with a [saith he,] as if they had been my express terms: but I desire the Reader not to judge of all your Writings by such passages as this: He may speak true at one time, that yet takes liberty to speak falsly at another. You did take the easiest course imaginable, to fain a conclusion which you could grant, and then to grant it and say it is nothing to the business. 4. I will not consent to your stating the question in new terms of your own, in the midst of a dispute. Do not feign me to dispute any question which you make many years after my Writing, and which is not to be found in my Writing in terms. 5. The word [Act] may signifie 1. the Divine essence; and so he that feigns a new act feigns a new God: 2. Or that mode, formality, respect (or whatever else it is to be called,) of God, arising from the nature or state of extrinsick objects; which *Burgersdicius* cals, the Application to the Object The question is only of this now, which some think may most fitly be called, Gods acts. Your naked repeated affirmation that a variation is put on God, when you prove it not, I take no more for a Demonstration.

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§. 24.

Mr. K. *Secondly, When we are speaking of immanent acts, what have we to do with the suns enlightening or warming? I had thought those had been transient acts, and so not proper in this case! Yet*

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§. 24.

R. B. Remember you not the *crude* question that we were on? [Whether such immanent acts are any more eternall then transient acts?] The Questionists mean it *quoad formalem naturam actus*; for they take the denominations of [immanent] and [transient] to be but from the effect or *terminus*: And that you may see what they imagined, when they mention the similitude of the sun, let me intreat you to suppose for disputation sake (*per possibile vel impossibile*) that God had made at first no creature but the sun: I would fain know whether that sun in shining and casting out its rayes and emanation, did act immanently or transiently? I conceive not transiently: because there were no subjects existing into which its act should pass, or which should as its extrinsick *terminus* receive from it any new form. It seems then it must be immanently: but that is but *in sensu Negativo*, because it is not transient: suppose next that the rest of the creatures were afterwards made, and placed as they are under the influence of this sun, and so were the receptive subjects of its action: Is it not the same sort of Action, without any change in it self, which before was immanent, and now is become transient?

But I need say no more to this; for you are pleased to confess.

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§. 25.

Mr. K. *Yet thirdly, Did it hold, I yield it were* Argumentum a majori ad minus: *If the sun be not changed notwithstanding all its warmth and lightening, then neither were God. But sure the sun is changed, and changeth perpetually, and could not act as a Universall cause upon the great variety of creatures in the world, did it not rejoice*

like

like a Gyant to run its course; did it ſtand ſtill but one year together at one point, yea or but walk within one Hemiſphere for a year, What ſhould we do for that variety of ſeaſons we need? All Summer would be as bad as all Winter. In oppoſition to this change of the Sun, is the Father of Lights ſaid to be without ſhadow of turning. He hath no ſuch Solſtices or Tropicks; no motions, but a perpetual permanency. There is a great difference between Immanent acts and tranſient: that ſuppoſing the Sun to ſtand ſtill as in Joſhua's time, and to act without motion; here were no alteration to be acknowledged in the Sun, notwithſtanding all the variety of objects, yea and variety of operations upon thoſe objects, all which might proceed from the ſame Act as to the Sun, the difference being meerly in the Patient: As for inſtance, the ſame live-coal doth at once by its heat melt the wax, and harden the clay; here are different tranſient acts, but no change or difference at all in the fire; but only in the diſpoſition of the matter on which it works. But in Immanent acts the Caſe is contrary; for they being in the ſubject, the variation of them makes an alteration in that, and not the object: as the ſame man unchanged may be the object ſometimes of mens Love, ſometimes of their hatred: the variety of theſe acts makes a difference in the Agent, doth not alwayes ſuppoſe any in the Object; and ſo here, Gods knowing now that this is, Gods not knowing yeſterday, that it is now, makes a change in God, but indeed God cannot be ſaid now to know that ſuch a thing is, but to know that now ſuch a thing is [which was not before] and this he did know, what ever is now even from all eternity, his preſcience being a Knowledge in præſenti *to him; though not* de præſenti, *as to the object; againſt whoſe being in eternity more ſhall be ſaid hereafter againſt* Mr Goodwin, *but now I attend* Mr Baxter, *who proceeds.*

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§. 25.

R. B. 1. YOu ſeem rather to anſwer in jeſt then in earneſt, when you tell us of the Suns local motion, when our Queſtion was, Whether [the Sun be changed by the variety of Creatures which it doth enlighten and warm] that is, Whether it ſelf receive any change from the *terminus* or objects of its acts? Do you intend the information of your Reader, or the diſcovery of Truth, when you ſhuffle in ſuch an alien Anſwer? 2. All that its good for, that I know of, is to acquaint us, that you have ſome full Demonſtration againſt *Copernicus*, which hath given you a Certainty that he erres; And if one ſhould hear it, perhaps it would prove like your Ordinary Demonſtrations: for that which is hinted in your words, ſeems of kin to them. 3. You yield all that I ſay concerning the Sun, acknowledging that it is not changed by the variety of Objects: And in the firſt words you ſay [Did it hold, I yield it were *Argumentum à majori ad minus.*] Lay both theſe together, and judge whether you yield not the whole Cauſe which you oppoſed. 4. You ſtill harp on the old ſtring, affirming, Immanent Acts to be in the Subject, and that their variation alters it, when as good Philoſophers ſay they have no Subject, and that Viſion, Intellection, *&c.* have no *Termini*: Your naked affirmations ſo oft repeated, rather weary then convince. 5. However you cannot from mans Immanent Acts, argue to Gods, unleſs they were more like. 6. I am unſatisfied whether a Tranſient Act (though not *qua* Tranſient) make not as much alteration on the Agent as an Immanent? Whether a Tranſient act be not the ſame with the Immanent, containing in it all that it contains, with the ſuperaddition of its Reception in, and effect upon a Paſſive Subject? As in the fore-mentioned inſtance: If the Sun had been created firſt alone, its action whereby it now lighteth and heateth, would have been immanent.

nent; and yet when the same action shall afterwards become transient, by the addition of other creatures to be its Objects, who will imagine that it is ever the less in the Subject (as you say) or that the alteration of it would make ever the less change of the Agent? I confess, I conceive not yet why there should in this point of changing the Agent be any difference between Immanent acts and Transient: though I easily conceive that one only doth change the object. 7. Your friend Mr *Jeanes*, pag. 231. useth the similitude of [a Rock in a River standing immovable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it;] which I think is as defective a similitude, as these here used: yet its plain, that you cannot truly say, This Rock toucheth the water that is an hundred miles from it. Suppose the Sun were an eye, and could see all the world at once, and that *purâ activitate sine receptione specierum ab objectis*: Suppose one man be born, or one flower spring up this day, which was not in being or visible yesterday: This Sun would see that to day which it did not see yesterday without any mutation in it self: And yet *seeing* is an Immanent act. Now I would know, whether it be fit to say, This Sun sees that as in *being* which is not in being: Or, Whether it be not fittest to say [It begins to day to see that Creature which begun this day to exist] though by so beginning it be not changed? Its true, God *fore-knows* all things that shall be: but that is not to *know that they be*, but that *they shall be*. 8. Mr *Jeans ibid.* saith [Yet this is no hinderance but that there may be and is a change in the extrinsecal Denominations of Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects hereof, *&c.*] so others commonly: And may I not hence conclude, 1. That then I may denominate Gods knowledge of the present existence of things, as Beginning with its object: and his knowledge of the existence or futurity of things, as Ending with its object; that is, when the thing ceaseth to be future or to exist? 2. And may I not conclude, that this Denomination is fittest, and so those that thus speak, do speak more fitly then they that speak otherwise? 3. And that there is some *fundamentum in re* for such a denomination: or else it were an unfit denomination, seeing names and words should be fitted to the things signified as neer as may be? 9. Do not you imply as much your self, when you say his Prescience is a Knowledge *in præsenti* to him, though not *de præsenti*? You confess then that God doth not know *de præsenti*, the things that now are not: but when they exist he knoweth them *de præsenti*; I confess the doctrine of the coexistence of all things with God in Eternity, would salve many of these things: but that you here disclaim. 10. Where you say, that [Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that such a thing is, but to know that now such a thing is (which was not before, as in the *Errat.* you adde)] it is a saying which I understand not, and conjecture it is still maimed of some necessary limb which should make it speak your sense: For I hope you do not believe what ever you say, That Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that those things are, which are indeed: If he know it not Now, when will he know it?

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§. 26.

Mr. K. AS the glass by the variety of faces which it represents, *hoc est, as the glass without any change in it represents various faces*, now one, now another; *so doth God know various objects, now one, now another, yet without change. The Antecedent is manifestly false; for that each of these several faces cast a new* species *on the glass, and those several* species *make several changes. For this purpose Mr.* Baxter

might

might have remembred what his great Logick and Metaphyſick Maſters ſay, concerning Ens intentionale, *that it is oppoſed to* reale *and* materiale: *The* ſpecies *in the glaſs is indeed* Ens intentionale, *in oppoſition to* Materiale, *it is not ſo in oppoſition to* Reale: *But their putting and* non-*putting, or the preſence and abſence of the* ſpecies, *makes a real change, though not a material one in the glaſs; ſo real a one as that it may be ſeen, though not a material one that the childe that catcheth at is ever like to take hold of it; Plainly thus, That is a Real Accident which is in the Subject really, and ſo is that* ſpecies, *for we ſee it in the glaſs; that is a Material Accident which is ſo in the ſubject as to depend on it alone for its ſupport, without influence of the efficient; heat or cold have ſuch dependance on the ſubject, as that that alone can maintain them; as the heat will ſtick a while in the water, though taken off from the fire, and cold in my hand, though taken out of the water: But theſe Intentional Accidents though really in the ſubject, yet are ſo little ſupported by it, as that if the efficient do not continue its influence, they immediately periſh as light in the air, theſe* ſpecies, *whether in my glaſs or my eye; who hath ſo much Logick and Metaphyſicks to ſpill upon all occaſions as Mr.* Baxter, *would have betrayed, I will not ſay ignorance, but incogitancy in ſo trivial a punctillio? Onwards, the caſe is the ſame for the* ſpecies *in the eye and the glaſs, and a change is made by the preſence or abſence of the* ſpecies.

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§. 26.

R. B. *Diſputatore nimium fœlici, nihil infœlicius; & nimium ſapiente quis minus ſapiens?* If I ſpill as much Logick upon all occaſions, as you do words, ſure I am a voluminous Logician, and make up in number what I want in weight. You wanted an opportunity to multiply words, for ought I know to no purpoſe, unleſs to acquaint the unobſervant world with your well-furniſhed Intellect, that they may be aſſured, that you have all thoſe things at your fingers end, as trivial punctillio's, which I am ſo ignorant of; and theſe few words of mine have occaſioned the opening of your pack, and the expanſion of your wares.

But, 1. You are fain to uſe the old artifice of putting my words but as the ground of your paraphraſe, and then dealing with that paraphraſe of your own. This is not ſo innocent as common a trick. I ſpeak of a change [*of the glaſs*] and you put [*a change in it:*] Had not you newly riſen up as the final decider, I ſhould have ſaid, it is yet *ſub Judice*, whether the Intentional or Spiritual Being, in queſtion, be indeed *Res* or not? And ſo whether it make any Real change in the glaſs. I confeſs you eaſily diſpatch the buſineſs, which makes me think of *Gorlæus* words, *Exercit. Philoſ.* 7. §. 2. p. 108. *Quid ſpecies ſint viſibiles inquirendum eſt: Tam enim earum natura intellectui eſt ignota, quam ex ſenſibus notæ. Peripateticis tamen & hic, ſicut & alibi facilis expeditio. Qualitates aiunt eſſe ſpirituales, & corporis eſſe objectivum, quod habet in ſpeculo vel ſimili corpori. Nobis hoc non eſt ſatis: qui quærimus porrò, quid qualitas ſpiritalis, aut quomodo corpus objective poſſit eſſe in ſpeculo? Nam hæ videntur contradictionem quandam implicare, corporis dari qualitatem ſpiritalem, & rem extra ſpeculum exiſtentem eſſe in ſpeculo*, &c.

2. But ſee what unreverent thoughts ſuch Ignorants as I, are apt to have of learned men! I am confidently perſwaded, that you, who are ſo fully acquainted with Gods Nature and Immanent Acts, as to be at a certainty where I am at a loſs, for all that do not know what that is that you ſee with your eyes; nor whether it be in the glaſs or not! And therefore the Lecture that you have read me of *Ens intentionale* hath been loſt labour as to me!

3. And you had done but your part if you had observed that I speak not of the meer Reception of the agents action, but of the Representation to us of the *species*: which should not be confounded.

4. Are you sure that it is from the object, that the glass receives that variation that you imagine? If it be, Rocks and stones are more active creatures then some dull souls will easily believe; when at the same time the same Rock or mountain may perform 100000 actions upon so many eyes or glasses. Yea if in the midst of the Action of this stone or Rock, you do but give your glass a knock, and break it into a hundred pieces, it will multiply the action of the Rock an hundred fold; and that without touching or coming near the Agent! Is it not pretty sport to see the activity of these nimble Rocks and Mountains? I am one of those Hereticks, that think these works of God must be the matter of our admiration, but cannot be comprehended by us here: and that it is no good consequence, that because you and your fellows nakedly affirm the contrary (yea notwithstanding all your proofs) therefore *Des Cartes*, Sr *K. Digby*, *White*, *Hobbes*, besides all the old Adversaries, are certainly in errour. I shall acknowledge more action of the Light, or air on the glass, then of the object, which seems but *sine qua non*. But withall I suspect, that the same Light or air doth perform the same action in the glass when you stand not before it, or when the object is absent; and yet no *species* is then seen; no nor visible. And I think that there is the same action on every glass-window, yea on every wall, or stone, or other body, as is on your *speculum*, and yet you see nothing on them as you do on it. And *Hobbes* saith, That it is in the eye and not in the glass, which you think you see in the glass (his reproaching of our Doctrine of visible *species*, I pretermit:) and if so, then there is not so much alteration in the glass, as you imagine. And indeed, you say little to prove it. If your Argument from sight would prove any thing, it would prove that the face is a foot or a yard (or more if you draw back) behinde the glass, and not in the glass: And yet if you go behinde you shall see nothing: Will you believe your eyes that things change into such various colours, and shapes, and quantities as some glasses by small mutations of posture do represent them? Will you believe your eyes that a strait staff is crooked in the water? I can tell you by my observation when I was a Boy, that if you will kill a Fish in a River with a Gun, you must allow much to the fallacy of your *medium*. If then either it be the action of the light or air, or something else, and not the object, then it is nothing to me, who spoke only against a change by variation of objects: Or if the foresaid action being supposed to be the same on the glass, when several objects, or no objects are before it, that which is superadded from the object is *nihil reale*, this is nothing against me: Or if the *species* which seems a foot behinde the glass be not in the glass, but in the eye or some where else, and so the glass be more truly an Agent by Reflection, then a Recipient of that *species* which I see, still this is nothing against what I said. So that laying aside all that Reception of the action of light, or any thing else, which the glass receives when there is no object present, and laying aside all that which is Received into the eye and air, and not in the glass, and whereof the glass is but a *Causa sine qua non*; then call the rest an *Ens intentionale* or *spirituale*, or what you will; but prove it to be *quid reale* altering the glass, and do not nakedly affirm it.

You say, that my great Logick and Meraphysick Masters say, That *Ens intentionale*, is opposed to *Reale & Materiale*: and yet you say that the *species* in the glass is not opposed to *Ens reale*. It is, and it is not, seem reconcilable to you then without a di-

a distinction. Indeed as Real is opposed to [feigned] I doubt not it is Real, but as it is opposed to Modes and Relations, and such like, that some place between *Ens* and *Nihil*, it must better be known what it is, then the name of *Ens intentionale* or *spirituale* will acquaint us, before we can conclude for certain that it is Real.

As for your Material Accident, it will require more ado to prove, that there is any such thing in the world, as an Accident depending on the Subject alone for support, especially a quality, as you instance in: Sure you intend not the withdrawing of the influence of every efficient, but of some lower or instrumental: I think, at least, Gods efficiency is necessary to be continued, for the Continuation of the being of every Accident, and ordinarily some lower efficiency too.

As for the Logick and Metaphysicks which on all occasions I spill, I take the charge as unfit to be answered, as not coming from your head or heart, but from your Naturals, your spleen and gal.

My Ignorance in comparison of you, I am so easily brought to acknowledge, that I wonder you should think so many words necessary to evince it: (yet you should have done it in intelligible language, and not abrupt expressions, defective of sense, almost such as *Hierom* describeth in his *lib.* 1. *cont. Jovin. initio.*) But how did you prove my Ignorance or Incogitancy of *Ens intentionale*? Deep silence! Beeause I did not mention it, or else who knows why? By that reason I am ignorant that Mr K. is an honest man, because I do not mention it; But by what is said, you may see its possible to have heard talk of *Ens intentionale*, and yet to think this similitude tolerable.

And what if you obtain all that you contend for? *viz.* That the similitude is faulty! Alas, I shall easily grant it of any similitude whereby we illustrate the Nature or Acts of God. Suppose then that this glass did make the same Representations *sine receptione specierum*: Or because these Inanimates are more remote, use the similitude of the *Oculus Universalis*, which I mentioned even now. I am troubled that you force me to weary the poor Reader with so many words on so poor and unprofitable a business: But there's no remedy.

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§. 27.

Mr. K. *NOw whereas Mr.* Baxter *addes, That whatsoever some say, he doth not think, that the beholding of ten distinct colours at one view, doth make ten distinct acts of the sight, or alterations on it; I do not think that ever rational man said they do, for it were strange there should be but one view, and yet ten distinct acts of sight; but the question is, Whether the change of one of these objects doth not change the* species *in the eye, and so occasion another view or sight? Or rather it is beyond all question that they do: and yet whether they do or no need not be questioned neither; the point that lies before us, is, Whether distinct or new acts do not Cause an alteration? Which is that that we have just Cause to affirm with confidence, can have no place in God; and consequently no new immanent Act; so then there being nothing produced by Mr.* Baxter *which may suggest a suspition that there may new Immanent Acts be admitted in God, or any but such as are Eternal, Come we to the* ———

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§. 27.

R. B. YOu are minded to play with the ambiguity of the word [View] which I take for all that Reception in the eye, or activity of it which it performeth

formeth in one Inſtant; and ſo for that natural Act whereby I fix my eye on one place at once, ſeeing as many things as at once I am capable of ſeeing: You take it, it ſeems for your intentional Action, or alſo the act which the viſive power performeth, as in reception of that alone. I think the ſenſe I uſe it in, is more common. And I ſay again, that it is none of our queſtion, what light, air, *&c.* do on the eye: for they do no more when I behold one Rock, then when I behold the ſands on the ſhore: But the Queſtion is, What the objects do over and above on the eye? And whether if I ſee many millions of millions of ſands at one inſtant, there be ſo many Real Actions of my eye at that inſtant? And whether every diſtinct ſand that is added or taken away, there be one Act added or taken away, and ſo a real alteration in my eye? The reſt which you adde is over and over anſwered before, and therefore being aſhamed that I have ſaid ſo much on ſo unprofitable a point (though conſtrained) I ſurceaſe: Onely adding this brief rehearſal of what is ſaid before.

1. Remember that we ſpeak not of thoſe Immanent acts whoſe object is Eternal: but of thoſe that have a temporary object, as the actual exiſtence of things, *&c.*

2. Theſe kinde of Immanent Acts may be called Tranſient after a ſort, in that they do *quoad Terminationem objectivam*, paſs to an extrinſick object.

3. *Agere*, in the ſenſe now taken, when applied to God, ſignifieth ſomething more then meerly *Eſſe*.

4. The whole Generical Eſſence of Action is found in the *ſpecies* of Action.

5. *Intelligere*, *Velle*, *Amare*, relate to ſome Objects: *Qui Intelligit, aliquid Intelligit: qui Amat, aliquid Amat.* Theſe terms therefore do alwayes (when affirmed as being in God) connote their Objects.

6. There is a neceſſity therefore that the acts be variouſly denominated from the diverſity of objects. It is no way fit to ſay, That God doth Nill Good, or Will ſin, or that his *Velle & Nolle* is all one: Or that his *Intelligere & Velle* is all one. For, as it is ſaid, the Act connotes the Object: and therefore we are not ſo much as to aſcribe the act to God when there is not an object for it; or as to an aliene Object. Elſe we might ſay, *Dei Intelligere & Velle ſunt idem: Deus Intelligit Peccata: Ergo Deus Vult peccata:* And that God Nilleth Good, becauſe he Willeth Good, ſeeing in God *Velle* and *Nolle* are all one.

7. This neceſſity of various extrinſecal denominations is ordinarily confeſſed by the moſt rigid Divines. I ſhall cite one more anon.

8. This Denomination hath *fundamentum in re*, or elſe it were deluſory and abuſive; theſe being the fitteſt names that moſt agree to the Things (of which ſee *Meuriſſ. Metaph. Scoti, li. 2. c. 3. Conclu. 3. &* Durand. *l. 1. diſt. 19. q. 5. §. 13, 14. &* Aquin. *de Veritate, Mater. 7. q. 1, 2, &c.*) Notions and Names are true or falſe, as they agree or diſagree to the things.

9. On the ſame ground as God may thus be ſaid to Underſtand, Will, Nill, Love, *&c.* and theſe may be ſaid to be not the ſame, he may alſo be ſaid to have divers acts of Intellection, Willing, Nilling, and theſe not to be the ſame: *e. g.* That it is not all one to elect *Peter*, and to elect *John*.

10. Whatſoever this diverſity of names implieth, as its foundation in God, (whether a bare Relative diverſity, or alſo a Modal, or what ever the like) it is certain that it implieth no Compoſition in him, but it is onely what is conſiſtent with his ſimplicity.

11. Some of the objects of Gods Knowledge and Love, are not from Eternity.

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The Existence is more then the meer *Esse Volitum*, or Will that they shall exist: And it is not all one to know the Thing it self in it self, and to know it in its Cause. Though God therefore did from Eternity intuitively know the *Esse Volitum*, and know the Creature in himself its Cause, and know its futurity, and so fore-know all things: yet it follows not that he intuitively knew the Creature in it self, as existing, (Unless we assert the co-existence of all things in Eternity with God.

12. There is therefore the same reason to Denominate Gods Intellection, Love, &c. as beginning and Ending with its Objects, as there is to denominate them as divers from the diversity of objects. And therefore this is a fit and necessary way of speech. It is not fit to say, God is now Creating the world *quoad actionis formalitatem*, though you ever-look the effect: it is not fit to say, That God now knows that the world will be Created (unless you respect some new Creation) or that *Abraham*, *Moses*, *David*, shall Die, or that Christ shall rise again, &c.

13. This Denomination of Gods acts as beginning and ending, hath as much foundation in the thing, and is as true as the Denomination of his acts as various. And this may as well consist with Gods Immutability, as the other with his Simplicity. The reason is evidently the same.

Now for the one, hear what others say. Schibler *Met. l. 2. c. 3. Tit. 6. n. 247, 248. Quæstio est de Accidentibus quæ in Deo sint. Hæc enim solum possunt compositionem in Deo facere*, &c. *Unde specialiter relinquitur, quod in Deo non fiat compositio ex subjecto & accidente, si maximè ei conveniat* Agere, *tali actione quæ prædicamentalis dici possit. Nam actiones non comparantur ad agens, per modum* essendi in, *sed solum per modum essendi* ab *alio, ut infra*, &c. *Atque ita actiones tantum apprehenduntur ut egredientes ab essentia rei. Quod autem egreditur ab essentia rei, hoc, eo ipso, non potest cum essentia facere compositionem, quæ extremorum unionem requirit.* And *n. 97. Nam Actiones Divinæ transeuntes, non sunt sub activè in Deo, sed solum a Deo procedunt; unde nullam compositionem cum Deo faciunt*, &c. *Quanquam id etiam* (verum) *est de actionibus Immanentibus: Hæc enim non dicuntur Immanentes positivè, quasi in agente rigide loquendo subjectentur, sed Negativè solum, quia in externam materiam non transiunt. Unde ad rationem actionis simpliciter & Immanentis & transeuntis, non requiritur esse in, sed solum esse* ab: *Ideoque neutrum facit cum agente Compositionem. Et sic anima nostra, si incipiat intelligere aut Velle, non tamen componitur, tum ex suo esse & Intellectione & Volitione quà tales sunt: sed in utroque statu æque est Anima simplex. Dixi*, quà tales sunt, *Quia ad intellectionem potest consequi aliqua compositio, si sit per speciem Intelligibilem.*]

Keckerman in System. Theolog. l. 1. c. 3. maintaineth, that the Persons in the Trinity, differ from the Divine Essence, as *Modus a re*, and from each other as *Modus a Modo*, and that *Ens* and *Modus* make no Compcsition. Much more may it be so said of Relations to things external.

Altingius Problem. Theolog. Par. 1. pag. 55. distinguisheth Gods actions, 1. *Sunt actus intrinsici & Immanentes qui non transeunt in objectum externum & nullum prorsus respectum aut σχέσιν ad τὸ ἔξω. Tales sunt actus personales quos Scholastici* notionales *vocant, gignere, spirare*, &c. *Horum absoluta est necessitas absque potentia ad oppositum, & sunt æterni.* 2. *Sunt actus extrinsici qui non sunt in Deo, sed à Deo; sive qui a Deo sunt effectivè, in Creaturis autem subjectivè: velut creare, gubernare, redimere*, &c. *Deus enim extrinsecus solum ab iis denominatur.* 3. *Sunt Actus Intrinseci quidem in Deo, sed Connotantes respectum ac σχέσιν ad extra, ut scire, velle. Scit enim*

Deus non ſolum ſe, ſed etiam omnino quicquid eſt ſcibile, ſive ut poſſibile, ſive ut futurum. Vult etiam non ſolum ſe, ſed etiam alia extra ſe &c. Hujuſmodi actus ſunt Decreta, relativi nempe ad extra, & præter voluntatem Dei ſtatuunt rerum externarum. Compoſitio autem hinc male infertur, &c. Mark alſo, that he names the firſt ſort onely Immanent acts.

And for the fitneſſe and neceſſity of the Denominations, hear what *Eſtius* confeſſeth *in Sent. l. 1. diſt. 39. §. 3. De hac igitur ſcientia Dei* (viz. *ad enunciabilia*) *quamvis & ipſa ſine dubio ſit in ſe invariabilis, variè tamen loqui nos oportet, prout* variantur propoſitiones ſecundum tempora. *Cum enim nullam propoſitionem ſcire quis dicatur, hoc ſciendi modo, niſi veram, eademque propoſitio propter mutationem rerum ac temporum, modo vera ſit, modo falſa; conſequens erit, Deum nunc ſcire propoſitionem aliquam quam poſtea neſciat, & contra. Quod per ſingulas temporum differentias facile eſt declarare. Nam propoſitionem veram de præterito, ut, Chriſtum natum eſt, ante bis mille annos non ſciebat, ſed Chriſto nato ſcire cœpit; eademtamen nunquam ſcire deſinet, ſicut nec ullam aliam quæ ſit præteriti temporis, quia propoſitio de præterito vera, ſemper erit vera. Quod intellige de præterito in genere: Nam ſi certum tempus deſignet, ut Heri natus eſt Chriſtus, ſcire eam deſiit, & de futuro ſimpliciter, ut, Poſt biduum paſcha fiet. Rurſum propoſitionem de futuro veram, ut Omnes reſurgemus, ſcivit quidem ab æterno, nec fieri poteſt ut talem aliquando incipiat ſcire, quia propoſitio de futuro vera ſemper fuit vera, loquendo ſimiliter de futuro in genere. Sed eam aliquando ſcire deſinet; nempe poſt reſurrectionem factam, quia tum vera eſſe deſinet ipſa propoſitio. Denique propoſitionem de præſenti veram, ſcit tantiſper dum ea vera manet, velut iſtam, Eccleſia militat. Ac talem incipit aliquando ſcire, & aliquando ſcire deſinit; niſi forte veritas propoſitionis ſit perpetua, &c. Porro omnis hæc loquendi varietas non inde naſcitur, quod circa Dei ſcientiam accidat aliqua Mutatio, ſed quia mutantur res ſubjectæ. Unde neceſſe eſt & ipſas mutari propoſitiones, &c. Manifeſtum eſt autem rebus mutatis non neceſſariò ſcientiam mutari, ne creatam quidem, niſi quid aliud concurrat, velut Compoſitio aut diviſio, aut certitudo major per experientiam rei præſentis accepta. Quæ in Deo locum non habent. Sicut ergo ſcientia Medici invariata permanet dum eidem homini ob variam ejus affectionem, modo hæc pharmaca, modo alia diverſa præſcribit, &c.*]

14. Laſtly, I again deſire the Reader to remember, that if I ſeem in all this to ſpeak ſceptically, it is no wonder, when all that I intend is but to convince theſe ſelf-conceited Learned men, that theſe things are indeed beyond their reach, and that they know not what they think they know: it being my own opinion, That Action, Intellection and Will, are but Metaphorically aſcribed to God, and that we cannot know what that is in propriety, which theſe expreſſions do ſhadow out in God. *Tho. White* ſaith; *Inſtitut. Sacrar. li. 2. Lect. 1. pag. 136, 137. Quare dicimus abſtrahendo a noſtris conceptibus, eſſe Deum unam ſimplicitatem ſimpliciſſimam, quæ neque ſit Deus, neque ens, neque aliud formaliter quod nos cogitare poſſimus; ſed noſtras cogitationes eam inadequate repræſentare; non quaſi accipientes aliquod unum ex pluribus quæ ibi actuſint, ſed accipiendo participationes quaſdam inferiores eo quod ipſe eſt, & diſſimiliores quam ſalivæ vel pediculus eſt reſpectu hominis.* Whether this hold or not of the notions, *Deus & Ens*, I doubt not but it holds of Intellection and Volition: or at leaſt that we men are uncertain what theſe are in God. And the ſtrange confidence of men in this, that they know that which no man knows indeed, hath made them unreverently vent their conceits, and fill the Church with perplexing controverſies about things that none can determine. As Mr *Burgeſs* ſaith of Juſtific. Lect. 20. [Only you muſt take notice that we are

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in meer darkneſs, and not able to comprehend how God is ſaid to act or work, &c. Therefore it is a ſure truth, *De Deo etiam vera dicere periculoſum eſt, & tunc dignè Deum æſtimamus, cum inæſtimabilem dicimus*; then do we rightly eſteem of him, when we Judge him above our thoughts or eſteem.] *Matth. Paris* ſpeaking of the Dominicans teaching, which cauſed that great diſſention and confuſion in the Univerſity of *Paris*, writes thus (*ad annum Dom.* 1243. as he is cited by the Prefacer to *Guiliel. de Sancto Amore*) *Incipiebant diſputare & diſſerere ſubtilius & celſius quam decuit aut expedivit: Qui non verentes tangere montes a gloria Dei opprimendi nitebantur ſecreta Dei inveſtigabilia temere perſcrutari, & Judicia Dei quæ ſunt abyſſus multa, nimis præſumptuosè indagare. Deo enim plus placet firmæ fidei ſimplicitas, quam nimis transcendens in Theologiâ ſubtilitas.*] Dr. *Twiſs Vindic. Grat. l. 2. Crim.* 3. §. 15. *Sed quid fiet ſi hæc humana ratio non ferat? An nihil credendum nobis incumbit niſi quod quomodo fiat, humana ratione explicare poſſit? Myſterium hoc forſitan adorandum potius quam ſcrutandum*, &c. *Et li. 2. Crim.* 3. § 20. pag. (*mihi*) 405. *Etiam non erubeſco fateri, licet nunquam dubitarem de ſancta Dei natura, tanquam de omni ſceleris reatu alienſſima, hoc tamen diu me ſuſpenſum tenuiſſe (forte etiam hodie non paucos ſuſpenſos tenet) quænam ſcilicet ſit illa vera ratio, qui modus operationis Divinæ quo fiat ut ſe in omni actione tanquam Cauſa efficaciſſima immiſceat, extra tamen omnem vitii contagionem, citra juſtam culpæ ſuſpicionem: Et an hodie per omnia ſatis explicatum habeamus, Deus novit*, &c. *Significat etiam* Calvinus, *multis hunc nodum viſum eſſe inexplicabilem*, &c. *Hoc modo tutius conſulendum cenſuit noſtræ pietati, ſi fateamur hebitudinem ſenſus noſtri myſterium hoc non capere.*] And why ſhould not the ſame Confeſſion extend to the preſent caſe alſo? Though we do not uſe to confeſs our Ignorance till we are utterly at a loſs (and then we ſay as *Cajetan* when he was ſtall'd, It doth not *quietare intellectum*) yet we have oft as great cauſe to confeſs it where we are confident ſometimes; as perhaps *Ariba* that blames *Cajetan* for his Confeſſion of Ignorance, might know as little as *Alvarez* that commends it for a moſt holy and pious ſpeech.

See Mr K's own confeſſion, how little we can conceive or expreſs of God, In the end of his Epiſt. Dedicat.

I had thought to have ſaid no more to this point, but finding a moſt Learned, * Orthodox, Judicious Divine *Robert Baronius* (Camero *ſecundus*, *vel* Cameroni *ſecundus*) to ſpeak ſo fully in this point, in his excellent Treatiſe *de Peccato Mortali & Veniali*, I have adventured to tranſcribe the whole Chapter, it being not long, both that the Reader may ſee the Reaſons of the like paſſages in my fore-going Replies more clearly, and that Mr. K. may be yet better ſatisfied that I am not ſo ſingular in theſe things, as he ſeems to think me.

* *I know Mr.* Rutherford *hath ſome jarring with him; and I do not undertake to juſtifie all that any man hath ſaid, when I call them Orthodox; but I confeſs I think that for ſolidity in the controverted points that they meddle with,* Davenant, Camero *and* Baronius *are the glory of* Britain, *as having happily hit on that mean, which many others have miſt of, which I would not have underſtood as diſparaging any others: for even in this, they have many excellent Companions, and others have their excellencies, that were not in this ſo happy as they. Our Renowned* B. Uſher, D. Preſton, D. Field, *and many another famous light in* England, *have not only deſerved the honour of eminent Learning and Piety, but even in this judicious Diſcovery of the truth, between the extreams which others have run into, they have helped to reduce the violent to Moderation, and to ſhew men a ſurer way to overcome the adverſary, then their diſadvantagious extreams.*

Diſp.

Disp. Parte 1ª sect. 6. Deum Posse eos amare quos prius odit, & odisse eos quos prius amavit, absq; ulla vel physica, vel morali voluntatis suæ mutatione, obiter Declaratur.

EX doctrina præcedenti sectione tradita de justificatorum ad certum tempus exclusione ab eo favoris Divini gradu, quo prius diligebantur, nequaquam sequitur Deum, aut voluntatem Dei in se mutabilem esse, sive loquamur de mutabilitate physica, sive de mutabilitate morali.

Nam quod ad divinum amorem executionis attinet, Deum non amare justificatos peccati mortalis reatu involutos amore executionis, nihil aliud est, quam eum non conferre in illos ea bona spiritualia, seu media salutis, quæ prius in eos conferebat nulla igitur est hic mutatio quoad actus immanentes, qui in ipso Deo existunt, sed tantum quoad actus transeuntes, qui sunt extra Deum & in hominibus recipiuntur, & proinde iis mutatis non mutatur Deus, sed illi in quibus hi actus, & eorum effecta recipiuntur. Dicet aliquis: Deus non solùm non confert illa beneficia in eos, sed etiam durante eo statu non vult ea conferre: prius autem voluit ea conferre: & proinde mutatus est. Resp. Voluit prius illa beneficia communicare iis existentibus in alio statu. Sed iis existentibus in hoc statu impietatis, & impœnitentiæ, neq; jam vult, neq; unquam voluit, imo ab æterno noluit hæc beneficia communicare. Quamvis igitur durante hoc statu benevolentia Dei quasi ligata & impedita sit; ut supra monui, hinc tamen non sequitur eam in se mutatam esse: sed tantum mutatum esse ejus objectum, quia viz. objectum ejus, hoc est, homines electi, prius erant capaces istorum beneficiorum nunc vero eorum capaces non sunt.

3. Major & gravior difficultas est de amore complacentiæ, & odio displicentiæ ei oppositio. Cum enim hi actus sint immanentes, hoc est, in ipso Deo existentes, iis mutatis videtur ipse Deus in se mutari. Responderi solet primo, non mutari hos actus realiter, & a parte rei; quia uterq; hic actus in Deo fuit ab æterno, & in æternum in eo durabit, cum respectu ad diversos istius hominis status, quorum alter alteri in tempore successit. Ita respondet Fonseca tom. 3. Metaph. lib. 7. cap. 8. quæst. 5. sect. 7. Quod si (inquit) quis objiciat eundem posse prius odio haberi a Deo, si sit injustus, postea verò diligi, si fit justus, & vice versa, sine ulla divinæ voluntatis mutatione, ergo nihil repugnare quo minus divina voluntas nullo modo mutata transeat a nolitione in volitionem rei ejusdem, ex dictis patet solutio. Deus enim non eundem odio habet, ac diligit pro eodem tempore, sed pro diversis. Adde, quod etsi in eodem homine justitia succedit peccato, aut peccatum justitiæ, tamen odio, quo Deus illum prosequitur ut peccatorem, non succedit amor, quo illum diligit ut justum, aut contra; sed uterq; affectus divinus æternus est respiciens diversos hominis status, quorum alter alteri succedit in tempore.

4. Secundò respondeo: quamvis concederemus esse aliquam mutationem & successionem in actibus immanentibus amoris & odii divini formaliter consideratis, quatenus per rationem distinguuntur ab essentia divina & inter se, hoc est, quamvis diceremus actum amoris complacentiæ erga electum in hoc casu non amplius esse in Deo, eiq; succedere actum odii displicentiæ, non tamen inde sequeretur esse mutationem aliquam realem in ipso Deo. Nam actus Dei liberi nihil superaddunt voluntati aut essentiæ divinæ, præter respectum seu relationem rationis, aut extrinsecam aliquam connotationem, quæ tamen ad realem eorum entitatem non pertinent: nam tota eorum entitas realis est ipsa Dei essentia, nihilq; intrinsecè includunt præter eam. Quamvis

igitur

igitur Deus desineret amare eos quos prius amabat, non mutaretur mutatione reali, quia nihil reale amitteret, sic incipiens eos amare quos prius odit, non mutaretur, quia nihil reale ei accederet, mutatio autem realis non fit, sine aliqua additione aut ablatione reali.

5. Non necesse est ut hic probem actus illos nullam realem entitatem (sive ea vocetur perfectio, sive extensio actus divini ad objecta) superaddere essentiæ divinæ. Nam Evangelici omnes hoc unanimiter tenent: & quod ad Pontificios attinet, quamvis Cajetanus in 1^m partem Thomæ quæst. 19. art. 2 & 3 Fonseca tom. 3. Metaph. lib. 7. cap. 8. quæst. 5. sect. 4. & Salas 1. 2æ. quæst. 6. art. 3. tract 3 disp. 3. sect. 8. docuit actus liberos Dei, seu decreta ejus, superaddere essentiæ divinæ realem quandam entitatem, quæ ab æterno potuit non esse in Deo, quæque revera in eo non fuisset, si ab æterno aliter decrevisset, & hos actus non habuisset, major tamen & melior eorum pars in contraria est sententia viz. Suarez. tom. 2. Metaph. disp. 30. sect. 9. & Vasquez. in 1^m partem Thomæ. disput. 80. cap. 1. & 2. Valent. tom. 1. disput. 1. quæst. 19. punct. 4. Arrubal in primam partem Thomæ, disput 54 cap. 2. & se sequentibus. Becanus in summa, Parte 1. Tract. 1. cap. 11. quæst. 4. Trigosus in summa Theologica Bonaventuræ quæst. 13. art. 2. dub 3. conclus. 1. Franciscus Cumel variorum disput tom. 1. in disp de præscientia Dei dub. 3 p. 57, &c. Horum sententiæ proculdubio est verior illa altera, quia si in Deo est realis aliqua entitas, quæ ab æterno potuit in eo non esse, atq; adeo potuit non omnino esse, seu esse merum nihil, necessariò sequitur aliquid esse in Deo quod non est Deus.

6. Dicet aliquis: si mutatis actibus liberis Deus realiter non mutatur, poterit salva sua immutabilitate, mutare decreta sua de rebus futuris, & proinde poterit incipere velle quod unquam antea voluit, vel desinere velle quod prius voluit. Nam talis mutatio decretorum divinorum fit sine aliqua additione, aut ablatione realis. Resp. Duplicem esse mutationem, viz. Physicam & Moralem. Physica, seu realis mutatio fit per additionem, aut ablationem alicujus entitatis realis. Moralis mutatio est propositi & voluntatis, aut etiam cognitionis & scientiæ mutatio; ut si quis quod antea putabat verum, deinde falsum judicet, & quod antea facere decreverat postea nolit, quod sane magnam imperfectionem in eo qui sic mutatur arguit. Vide Vasquezium in 1^m partem Thomæ super quæst. 9. art. 4. Cum igitur Deus dicitur absolutè immutabilis id non minus intelligitur de morali quam de Physica immutabilitate, nam mutatio propositi & consilii quæ moralis vocatur, arguit inconstantiam, imprudentiam, & cognitionis imperfectionem, quæ non minus summæ & absolutæ Dei perfectioni repugnant, quam Physica, seu realis mutatio, ut bene observat Suarez. tom. 2. Metaph disp. 30. sect. 1. num. 58.

7. Ex his patet Deum, cum odio displicentiæ prosequitur electum, quem prius amabat amore complacentiæ, non mutari; quamvis fortasse nunc minimè sit in eo actus complacentiæ, consideratus ut respectum rationis ad tale objectum divinæ essentiæ superaddit: Primò enim ablato tali actu, Deus physicè & realiter non mutatur, quia nihil ei decedit præter merum respectum rationis ut irrefragabilibus argumentis demonstrant Suarez. & Vasquez, locis citatis. Secundò, neque mutatur moraliter, quia non mutat propositum, sed contra, permanet in suo proposito, aut potius in naturali sua inclinatione, quâ ab æterno fuit, nunc est, & semper erit, propensus ad amandam virtutem, & ad detestanda vitia, seu peccata. Permanet etiam in suo proposito perducendi eos quos elegit & justificavit ad æternam gloriam, nam solidum stat Dei fundamentum, habens sigillum hoc, Novit Dominus eos qui sunt sui, 2 Tim. 2. 19.

Mark here that the reason which *Baronius*, *Burgersdicius* and others give against Gods change of his Decrees, *viz.* he should be morally mutable, holds not of the immanent acts which presuppose their objects, and whose objects are really mutable: as *Baronius* here manifesteth. It is certain that things are sometime future, sometime present or existent, and sometime past: and that they are so is of God, but without moral mutation: therefore his Knowing them so, and his Willing and Approving them so, is without moral mutation too. So the same man is good or holy to day that was bad and unholy yesterday: therefore God may love him to day with complacency and approbation, whom he disliked before; and may know him to be as he is, which before he did not, because he was not as he is. 2. Note the reason why God cannot change his Decrees: Both because they do effect or produce their own objects (as commonly called) viz. *Rerum futuritionem*, when as Gods Approbation, his Knowledge *pure visionis*, his Complacency, *&c.* do presuppose their objects. 2. And it would be a contradiction for the same event, to be future and not future, *e. g.* mans salvation: therefore if God absolutely Decree that *Peter* shall be saved, and after Decree the contrary, the first Decree must be changed causlesly, and for want of power not be executed; and also as it is *verbum mentis*, it must be false; which cannot be.

I Had thought to have said nothing of particular Scriptures that speak of Gods acts which we call Immanent as Beginning or Ending, because they are so commonly known: But lest any should think I slight Scripture Argument, which I principally esteem, or lest they take it for granted that there is none such, because none are produced, I will adde some texts in confirmation of the *minor* of this following Argument.

If God himself, in his Word do ordinarily speak of his own Acts, which we call Immanent, as Beginning or Ending, then is it not unfit for us to do so too. (God knows best how to express his own Acts.)

But God himself in his Word doth ordinarily speak of his own Acts, which we call Immanent, as Beginning or Ending:

Therefore.

Luk. 2. 52. *Jesus increased in favour with God and man.*] Gods [favouring] Christ is an Immanent act: and yet Christ increased in Gods favour: Increase signifieth mutation, by an inception of further degrees.

Rom. 9. 25. *I will call them my People which were not my people, and her Beloved which was not beloved.*] Love is an Immanent act.

Joh. 16. 27. *The Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me and believed, &c.*] Therefore it was when they believed and loved Christ, that the Father in this sense began to love them.

Joh. 14. 21, 23. *He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, &c. And my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, &c.*]

Pro. 8. 17. *I love them that love me, &c.*] Therefore with this same love, they were not before beloved, though with another sort of love they were.

Joh. 10. 17. *Therefore doth the Father love me, because I lay down my life, &c.*

Hos. 11. 1. *When Israel was a childe then I loved him.*

Deut.

Deut.7.12,13. *If ye hearken,&c. the Lord thy God will keep unto thee the Covenant,* &c. *And he will love thee,&c.*

Hos.9.15. *I will love them no more: All their Princes are revolters.*

Psal.5.5. *Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.*] Such are the Elect before conversion.

Gen.4.7. *If thou do well shalt thou not be Accepted, &c?*

So all those texts that speak of Gods being reconciled, which properly signifies an Immanent act.

Act.10.35. *He that feareth God and worketh righteousness is Accepted of him.*

Mat.3.17. *This is my Beloved Son in whom I am well pleased.*

Heb.13.16. *With such sacrifice God is well pleased.*

Heb.11.5. *He had this testimony that he pleased God.*

1 King.3.10. *And the speech pleased the Lord that Solomon asked, &c.*

Heb.11.6. *Without faith it is impossible to please God.*

1 Thess.4.1. *How ye ought to walk and please God.*

1 Cor.7.32. *He that is unmarried careth, &c. how he may please the Lord.*

Rom.8.8. *They that are in the flesh cannot please God.*

Prov.15.8. *The prayer of the upright is his delight.*

2 Sam.15.26. *If he thus say, I have no delight in thee,&c.*

Jer.9.24. *For in these things do I delight saith the Lord.*

Zeph.3.17. *He will rejoyce over thee with joy, he will rest in his love; he will joy over thee,&c.*

Deut.28.63. *And it shall come to passe, as the Lord rejoyced over you to do you good,* &c. *so the Lord will rejoyce over you to destroy you,&c.*

Deut.30.9. *For the Lord will again rejoyce over thee for good.*

Psal.104.31. *The Lord shall rejoyce in his works.*

Isa.62.5. *As the bridegroom Rejoyceth over the bride, so shall thy God Rejoyce over thee.*

2 Tim.2.15. *Study to shew thy self approved unto God.*

Deut.32.19. *When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them.*

Gen.1.4,10,13,31. *God saw the light that it was good.*

Isa.59.15,16. *And the Lord saw it, and it displeased him that there was no judgement: And he saw that there was no man, and wondred,&c.*

Gen.29.31. *When the Lord saw that Leah was hated, he, &c.*

Jer.26.2,3. *Diminish not a word. If so be they will hearken and turn every man from his evil way, that I may repent me of the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, because of the evil of their doings.*

Jer.36.3. *It may be the house of Judah will hear all the evil which I purpose to do unto them; that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive,* &c.

Gen.6.6. *It repented the Lord that he had made man.*] So the 7th verse.

Exod.32.14. *And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people.*

1 Sam.15.35. *The Lord Repented he had made Saul King*] So the eleventh verse.

2 Sam.24.16. *The Lord Repented him of the evil, and said to the Angel,&c.*

Psal.106.46. *He remembred for them his Covenant, and Repented according to the multitude of his mercies.*

Jer.26.19. *And the Lord Repented him of the evil,&c.*

Amos 7. 3. *The Lord Repented for this: It shall not be, saith the Lord.*] So verse 6.

Jonah 4.2. *I knew that thou art a gracious God, and mercifull, slow to anger and of great kindness, and Repentest thee of the evil.*

Jon. 3.10. *And God saw their works that they turned from their evil way, and God Repented of the evil that he had said he would do unto them, and did it not.*

Joel 2.13. *He is gracious,* &c. *slow to anger, and Repenteth him of the evil.*

Jer. 15.6. *I am weary with Repenting.*

Hos. 11.8. *My heart is turned within me: my repentings are kindled together.*

Psal. 30. 5. *For his Anger endureth but for a moment.*

Psal. 103.8,9. *The Lord is mercifull and gracious, slow to Anger,* &c. *Neither will he keep his Anger for ever.*

Isa. 63.10. *Therefore he was Turned to be their enemy,* &c.

Psal. 85.3. *Thou hast taken away all thy wrath, thou hast turned thy self from the fiercenesse of thy anger.*

2 Chron. 12.12. *And when he humbled himself the wrath of the Lord turned from him that he would not destroy him.*

Josh. 7.26. *So the Lord turned from the fierceness of his wrath.*

So 2 Chron. 29.10. & 30.8,9. & Psal. 106.23. Jer. 18.20. and so frequently.

Also very many places that mention the kindling or arising of Gods wrath.

Psal. 78.38. *Many a time turned he his anger away and did not stirre up all his wrath.*

Prov. 24.18. *Lest the Lord see it, and it displease him, and turn away his wrath from him.* There are three several immanent acts mentioned together.

So all those Texts where Remembring and Forgetting are spoken of God,

So many more Texts that mention Gods being displeased, *Gen.* 38.10. *Num.* 11.1. 1 *Chron.* 21.7. *Ps.* 60.1. *Zech.* 1.2.15.

So many Texts that speak of Gods *seeing*, as *Gen* 18.21; &c.

Psal. 34.17. *The righteous cry and the Lord heareth and delivereth,* &c.

Psal. 69.33. *For the Lord heareth the poor and despiseth not his prisoners.*

With many more places that speak of Gods Hearing and Hearkening.

So many Texts that mention his Regarding, and his Considering, and Pondering.

And many that mention his Abhorring, and his despising.

And many Texts that speak of Gods Pity and Compassion to the miserable.

And many that speak of his Favour as beginning or ending, and mans finding favour in his eyes.

And many that speak of his Grace when it signifieth favour, and is expressed as beginning or changing. With many more to the same purpose.

Judg. 10.13.16. *Ye have forsaken me and served other Gods; Wherefore I will deliver you no more.* Vers. 16. *They put away the strange Gods and served the Lord, and his soul was grieved for the misery of Israel,* &c.] And he did deliver them by *Jephtah*. Yet here God seemeth to revoke a peremptory sentence.

If any shall say, that all these later are but figurative speeches applied to God from the manner of men: I as easily grant it as any man: But withall remember these two things. 1. That I suppose it is as true of Gods Knowing and Willing, his Electing, Decreeing, Purposing, *&c.* only differing in the degree of impropriety: Till the contrary be better proved then I have seen it, I think this will be my

my opinion. 2. It is onely the fitnesse or unfitnesse of these wayes of speech concerning God, that I am now enquiring into; and not of the propriety. If it be the Scripture-way so ordinarily to speak of Gods Immanent acts as New, as Beginning or Ceasing, then is it not unlawfull or unfit for us so to speak, in imitation of the holy Ghost: still acknowledging the unavoidable Impropriety of our expressions, and the Incomprehensibleness of that in God, which by such expressions is hinted out unto us.

I remember what *Zanchius* saith *in Epist.* Joh. Cratoni, in the third Vol. of his Works, pag. (*mihi*) 135. *Quod ais, Precibus moveri Deum ἀνθρωποπάθεια est, quam si tollamus è Scripturis, quæ impietates & quot pugnantia non è Scripturis colligentur?*

The Second Point.

§. 28.

Mr. K. Second; *That there is somewhat like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie men.*

§. 28.

R. B. IF this also be intended against me, then, Whether this Learned man did not want work, when he undertook this, I leave the indifferent Reader to judge. The former Question which he propounded to dispute, he knew and confessed that I denied not: (Yet he hath forced me to spend many words on it, and to say more then I thought to have done.) This which he makes his second Labour, he will not say that I was ever his adversary in; or that ever I debated the Proposition, much less denied it: And yet all this seems intended against me, and by name anon he brings me in. If this man had not somewhat *ab homine* more forcible then any thing in the matter disputed, which instigated his pugnacious soul to this conflict, then must I confess my self quite mistaken in the Motives of his undertaking. The former part of his Dispute hath convinced me of this. I remember we had such sparks among us when I was a School-boy, that were wont (for maintaining the reputation of their valour) to appoint fighting matches, and to the field they must go, before ever they thought what should be the matter of quarrel, and when they came to the place, they must be dared by a third, to spit in anothers face to make the quarrel; and he that refused was the Coward, and he that spit first, and struck first, had the first glory, though sometime not the last.

What I should do with all these following words of Mr. K's that concern me not, I do not well know. I hope none will expect that I should engage my self against him to prove, that [there is nothing like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie] nor that I should answer to all that he brings to prove

it? Yet because I take his Discourse to be very feeble, and to small purpose, I shall take a brief notice of it in the way, whether it were intended against me Directly, or but Collaterally.

§. 29.

Mr. K. *And I make it good, not from this, that by reason of this Decree, God is said to have Justified whom he predestinated,* Rom. 8. *For indeed he is said to have glorified them also; though glorifying of many of them be not till the end of the world, yea that full glorifying of none of them be till then, and the Decree to glorifie all whom he will glorifie at the end of the world, was before the beginning of the world: and yet this expression shews the Certainty of their Justification and Glorifying, who are predestinated; the Preter tense being used only to expres the Certainty of the future. But this I will not insist on; but run another course, and that is this: Justification is by the Consent of all men (I mean Protestants) a Remission of our sins, and Accepting of us as Righteous: Now this is either a meer immanent, or a meer transient Act, or both. I know no man will say it is a meer transient Act: there being no transient Act of God which doth not suppose an Immanent one; for that he acts nothing upon the Creature, but what he first purposed in himself to act: so then an Immanent act there must be confest, if there be a transient one; and a transient one I shall acknowledge as well as an Immanent, and what it is will enquire by and by: But first I contend that immanent Act there can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient Act, and that this Decree of God to pass the transient Act of Justifying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods Remission of sins, and Acceptance of us as Righteous; and therefore hath much in it like to Justification; and may be stiled so without Blasphemy, as Mr.* Goodwin *is pleased to brand it in his Rhetorick. And that this Decree to Justifie us, carries as much as concerns Remission of sins, and accepting of us as righteous, I prove thus: If it do not, then the Remission of sins, and Accepting of us as Righteous, are other immanent Acts. But that cannot be, for then, either in the Understanding or Will: but neither can be said with sobriety, for sure God cannot be said to Decree to know any thing, or to decree to Will any thing: not to know any thing: for though he know things in his Decree, yet doth he not decree to know, his Knowledge being necessary, his Decree arbitrary: and if he did decree to know any thing, we must conclude he might have not known it; for decrees are only of things which may be or not be: Therefore whatsoever it be, it is no such distinct immanent Act in Gods Understanding; and though we use to say,* Now a man is Justified in Gods sight, *yet doth not this put any new Act of Knowledge in God, but signifies only a Testimony given by God, whereby he makes us know that we are Justified before God, or in his sight; and I am sure that Mr.* Baxter, *who quotes* Suarez, Schibler *and* Keckerman *at every bout, cannot be ignorant that the word of sight, though it be for the form Active, is for the substance of it rather Passive, and therefore is not attributable to God as it is to us; but in him it signifies a making of us to see, and we are said to be Justified in his sight, when he makes it as it were evident to our sight that we are Justified: as when God is said to know what was in* Hezekiahs *heart, the meaning is, he made known to* Hezekiah *what was in his heart.*

2. *To Decree to Will God cannot be said; for that is as much as to Will to Will, which was never heard of, the object of the Will being at best but the imperate Act, not his own elicite Act; for what need of Willing to will a thing, when one Willing is enough? And he that wils to will, wils no more then he doth already, which is to will, one of these Acts must needs be superfluous; and there is no ground to put any such in God, yea or man.*

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I acknowledge a man in some cases may be said to Will to be more willing, as when the flesh interposeth and draws him off from willing fully, or at least from executing his will: but this is rather to will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite, than to will the exercise of the rational will; now such an incumbrance of the will of God, there can be none, and consequently no ground whereon to raise such an assertion as this, that he may be said to Will, or decree to Will, which is equivalent. And thus it appears in general, that there is no new immanent Act in God required, yea possible, to the Justifying of a man, besides his decree to Justifie him.

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§. 29.

R. B. I Confess I had farre rather be imployed in debating the point of Justification, then of Gods Immanent acts, which you before insisted on. But to deal freely with you, I never read from a Learned, Orthodox man, a more superficial, unprofitable Discourse on that Subject, or that less expresseth a competent understanding of the point, if my Judgement fail not, as probably it may.

1. To what purpose you tell us what Arguments you will not use (viz. from *Rom.*8.30.) I know not.

2. Though I little know to what good use it would be, to acquaint us *what is like Justification*, yet, me thinks, were it useful, it should have been better proved. And first me thinks your Memory fails you (which you had need to take extraordinary care of:) The last Discourse was much spent in shewing that [there is a *great* difference between Immanent Acts and Transient] and that [there is a clear difference between them as between heaven and earth: Transient Acts being in the Patient, and Immanent in the Agent] So that to equal them in Eternity [is either to make the Creature eternal, or to deny God to be Eternal.] And now the second Discourse must be to prove them to be like: For the Decree which is an Immanent Act hath somewhat like Justification, which you confess a Transient Act. But yet I doubt not but your Learning can make this good: For you that can prove that Gods Immanent Acts which are his Essence, do differ no more from poor mans, then as you have expressed, may well prove, that Gods Immanent Acts are like Transient Acts; much more that Heaven and Earth are like. And doubtless your undertaking is very feasible: For you may well prove, that there is a similitude between Gods Immanent acts, and a stone, or a tree, or a worm, or any thing in the world: For you will say, that Gods Immanent acts are God himself, and that these Creatures are all Good: and then all things that are Good, are somewhat Like to God: Therefore every thing in the world (having some Good) is somewhat Like God: Also they have a Being, and therefore have some likeness to the first Being. But then what Likeness this is, or in what Degree, you have more Wit then to undertake to tell.

4. The Reason that you give for your not arguing from *Rom.*8.30 is because [indeed he is said to have Glorified them also.] But how fell it out that you observed not, that on the same Reason, you should have rejected the Argument which you here use? Because indeed it saith as much (for ought I know) to prove Gods Decree to be like Glorification, as to be like Justification.

5. Should you not have told us in what sense you take Justification before you

Define

define it? Who knows whether you mean Justification Constitutive, or Sententiall? (not to speak of the many other distinctions of Justification.)

6. Why would you tell the world what *all Protestants* take Justification to be? as if you knew them all?

7. Atleast, how comes it to pass that so Learned a man hath read so little, and would bewray it so easily? as to say that [All Protestants consent that Justification is the Remission of sin, and Accepting of us as Righteous?] Would you be believed in such notorious untruths which you fear not to utter even in a matter of fact, where there is so much visible evidence against you? How many of our English Divines (besides all others) affirm Remission of sin to be a fruit or consequent, and no part of Justification? had you read but Mr. *Bradshaw* and Mr. *Gataker*, you would have known some. How many on the other side make Remission of sin antecedent to Justification in order of nature? and Justification to be its immediate consequent? How many take Remission of sin to be the whole of our Justification? yea what full Disputes and Treatises are written only or principally, or at least very much to prove this? and what famous Divines are they that maintain it? How many be there that take Justification to consist partly in Remission of sin, and partly in the imputation of Christs own Righteousness? and these with the former say, that Accepting us as Righteous is a consequent of Justification: Sin must first be remitted, say the former, and Christs Righteousness imputed ours, say the later, before God can Accept any man as Righteous: For man must first be Righteous, before he can be accepted as such. Yea Mr. *Arthur Dent* in his Catechism, defines justification to be, A cleansing and renewing of our nature by the Spirit of God.

The number that are of these several opinions are so great, and the men so eminent, and well known to Divines that have been much verst in this Controversie, or are of any considerable reading in our Modern Writers, that I shall think it needlesse to cite any of them. Hath Mr. K. read none of all these? or will he blot out their Names from the number of Protestants?

8. Yet more grossely doth he affirm, that he [knows no man that will say it is a meer transient act.] I think then you have either read little of this Controversie, or little remember what you have read: at least, are an unfit man to tell us what All men hold, or all Protestants, when you profess to know so little. You might have seen this in some plain English books, that are in the hands of the multitude of those below you. Mr. *Tho. Hooker* maintains it, That Justification is not an Immanent but a Transient act. But what need I name any, when it is known to to be the common Judgement of our Divines, and those few that have maintained Justification to be an Immanent act (and consequently eternal) have been taken for Erroneous therein, and as militating so farre for the Antinomians. See Mr. *Burgess* of Justification, *Lect.* 20. *p.* 167, 168, 169.

9. If Justification be a Transient act, and yet not a meer Transient act, then is it both an Immanent and a Transient act. And if so, then either it is two acts, or else the Immanent and Transient act are one. If Justification (Active) be two acts, then it seems it is divisible; yea and one part of it is Eternal, and the other in Time only: And then we must not enquire, What the justifying act is? but What each of these justifying acts are? Of this if I knew your minde, perhaps I might say more. If the Immanent and Transient act be but one, diversly considered (1. As in the meer form of an Act, having not yet effected any thing; 2. And as the same act is received into the subject Passive, and so is the Passion)

then

then the ſame act is no more immanent, when it is once tranſient: and then we muſt ſay, that the act of Juſtification was eternal, but the paſſion or effect in time only. But this ſenſe ſeems ſo much to contradict, both your foregoing diſcourſe of the difference of Immanent and Tranſient acts, and your after hint of the Tranſient act which juſtifyeth, that I will not imagine it to be the ſenſe you intend.

10. But your reaſon why no man will ſay it is a meer tranſient act, is very darkly diſcovered; It is becauſe [there is no tranſient act of God, which doth not ſuppoſe an immanent one.] But doth it follow that therefore Juſtification is not a meer tranſient act, becauſe it ſuppoſeth an immanent act? Why did you not tell us whether it ſuppoſe it as an antecedent, or as a part of Juſtification, or as what elſe? But you know that all that is ſuppoſed is not therefore a part. Or if it were never ſo neceſſary a foregoing cauſe, yet it follows not that the neerer cauſe may not be *cauſa totalis in ſuo genere*, and ſo be denominated. May not you on theſe grounds as well ſay, that there is nothing in the world is a meer tranſient act, becauſe it ſuppoſeth an immanent? The building of a houſe I think is a tranſient act; and yet it ſuppoſeth divers immanent acts in the builder, and an immanent act of God that willed it.

11. But what is this immanent act? You adde [For that he acts nothing upon the creature, but what he firſt purpoſed in himſelf to act.] I doubt not but you eaſily ſee, that if this reaſon prove any thing, it will as well prove that Creation, Redemption, Sanctification, Reſurrection, Glorification, are none of them meer tranſient acts: For God acts theſe in Time: and therefore he firſt purpoſed to act them. Yea it will do as much to prove that God never did, nor can perform a meer tranſient act: becauſe he can do nothing but what he purpoſeth. What need you then apply this to Juſtification any more then to any thing elſe? as if Juſtification had any peculiar participation in this honour, above ſome other acts! By your reaſon, the dividing the red ſea, the ſending of Manna and Quails, the writing of the ten Commandments, were none of them meer tranſient acts.

12. Immanent acts paſs not into the extrinſick objects and make no change on them, and therefore are not cauſall: and therefore cannot well as cauſals be denominated from their effects: therefore no immanent act of God can be called Juſtification, or part of Juſtification, or a juſtifying act: For it muſt be ſo denominated from the effect of juſtifying: But it is the tranſient act only that effecteth Juſtification (Paſſive:) therefore it is the tranſient act only that is to be called Juſtification.

13. I have oft times asked the Antinomians, what text of Scripture they could ſhew that calleth any Immanent Eternal act of God by the name of Juſtification, or of part of Juſtification? and I could never yet ſee any that they produced: and I ſuppoſe that you are alſo unable to ſhew any ſuch; or elſe you would its like, have done it.

14. When you ſay [God decreed to Juſtifie] do not you plainly make [Decreeing] and [Juſtifying] two things? and denominate only the tranſient act which is in time [Juſtification?] So of other acts; as when we ſay [God decreed to create:] you do not ſay, His Decreeing was Creating.

15. You conclude that [an Immanent act muſt be confeſt if there be a Tranſient one.] *Anſ.* It is eaſily confeſt that an Immanent act (ſo called, for our underſtanding) there is from Eternity concerning every thing that is in Time

produced: but that proves not that the producing act in Time, is not meerly transient. I all this while suppose that you mean by denying Justification to be [a meer transient act] to include some other act justifying, or as part of Justification, and not only to prove an antecedency or concomitancy of such an Immanent act. Else your reasoning would be absurd or against your self.

16. Having thus proved that there must be an Immanent act, you next say, that [There can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient act.] Your contention for this is bold, your proof of it weak. As Gods immanent acts are the same with his Essence, so he hath but One, that is, he is but One: Understanding, Willing, Nilling, is all One; and so there is but one Immanent act in Justification, Condemnation, or what you will else, because there is but One God: Or rather God hath nothing properly called an Act, because he is God. But as we ascribe One act to God Analogically speaking of him according to our capacity, so must we on the same necessity ascribe to him more then One, and that is by denominating them from the variety of objects which they respect and connote. And so as truly as you can distinguish between the Divine Intellection and Volition, so truly may we distinguish the Volitions of God, according to the divers state of the objects. And so if we could yield to you that there is any Immanent act a part of Justification, or that carrieth in it as much as concerneth acceptance of us as Righteous, we might fairly say as much, at least, for another act, as you can do for the Decree: For the Decree that you speak of, is only [a Decree to pass a transient act] and so hath for its object something future: But the Will of God *de præsenti*, by which he willeth the relation of the justified person, is yet nearer the effect. So is his mentall approbation, and his acceptance of the person as Righteous (Willingly and Approvingly judging him Just;) some call his estimation of us to be Just *sententiam conceptam* as distinct from *sententiæ latæ*, but neerer to it then the Immanent Decree to pass an act *de futuro*.

17. You adde [That this Decree of God to pass the transient act of justifying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods remission of sins, and acceptance of us as Righteous.] By which words you may mean almost what your list; but how any man should understand your meaning that knows not your minde by some better discovery, I do not know. 1. Whether do you mean by [as much as concerns] an essential constitutive concernment, *q. d.* [as much as constituteth?] But if so, then you should exclude your transient act, and the immanent alone should not be [somewhat like Justification] but Justification it self. For if this immanent be as much as constituteth remission of sin, and acceptance of us as Righteous, and Justification consisteth of these two only, then the immanent act is the whole of Justification. Or if you mean [as much as concerneth it antecedently *ex parte Dei*] that were manifestly false: For the giving of Christ, the accepting his Satisfaction and Intercession, and many other acts concerning Remission and Acceptance, are antecedent to Justification. Or if you should mean it in the full latitude, as your words import, *viz.* That nothing concerneth our Remission and Acceptance but only Gods Decree, then it is yet more palpably false: but this is so gross that I may not suppose you guilty of it, though your unlimited words do seem to express it. Or do you mean [as much of Gods immanent action as concerns Remission and Acceptance is found in this Decree to pass the transient act,] supposing this to be part of our Justification, and the transient act the

other

other part? But 1. your next words before and after seem to contradict that. For you say it is [a Decree to justifie] which therefore cannot be part of the thing Decreed. 2. And what mean you then to plead that it is [somewhat Like Justification] if it be a part, and such a part. Is it worthy a Divine laboriously to prove that a mans soul is Like a man? Or that [laying the Foundation] is somewhat Like to Building? The truth is, your terms perswade me either that you hold that Antinomian eternal Justification, which you are ashamed plainly to reveal, or else that you know not what you hold your self.

18. Yet do you repeat these ambiguous words again, as those, it seems, which best fit your design: and you prove them thus: [If it do not, then the Remission of sins, and Accepting of us as Righteous, are other immanent acts: but that cannot be:] Here you seem to explain your meaning of the former words, that it is [a constitutive concernment] that you spoke of: (but whether as the whole or as a part only I cannot tell.) For you say, that else these [*are* other immanent acts] *viz.* [Remission and Acceptance *are* either Gods Decree, or other immanent acts.] But 1. why then do you make it your design to prove Gods immanent act to be somewhat like Justification? Remission and acceptance of us as Righteous, are more then like it. Did not you say before [Justification is, by the consent of all Protestants, a Remission of sin and an acceptance of us as Righteous? 2. Why did you before lay your proof no higher then this, [that every transient act *supposeth* an immanent, *viz.* Gods Decree.] 3. It seems to me here that you assert eternal Justification in the definition, while you disclaim it as to name. 4. At least, you seem (if I can understand you) to maintain that Remission of sin and Acceptation of us as Righteous are from eternity. For you here import that these [*are*] Gods Decree, and you elsewhere say enough for the eternity of the Decrees. But you knew, its like, that this is such grois Antinomianism, as that it was not for your credit openly to own it in the plainest terms. You give me not sufficient occasion here to stay long in confutation of this Error: yet briefly this I shall oppose. 1. He that was not a sinner from eternity, was not a pardoned sinner from eternity: (or, he that had no sin, had none remitted.) But you were not a sinner from eternity: Therefore, *&c.* For the *minor*: He that *was* not from eternity, was not a sinner from eternity: but you were not from eternity: Therefore, *&c.* If you say to the *major*, that it is enough to make us capable of Remission, that we were sinners *in esse cognito*: I answer, either you speak *de esse futuritionis*, or *de esse existentiæ ut cognito*: If of the former, the assertion is false: for [Future] is a term of Diminution, as to any true Being. An innocent man is not a subject capable of Remission of sin, *eo nomine*, because he will sin hereafter. If of the later, I say, God knows no man to be a sinner *quoad existentiam præsentem*, that is not a sinner: Else he should know untruly. 2. Where there is no obligation to punishment there is no remission of sin. But on you or me there was no obligation to punishment from eternity: Therefore, *&c.* The *major* is proved from the definition of Remission: which is A dissolution of an obligation to punishment. Where there's no obligation, there's none to be dissolved. The *minor* is proved thus: He that is not a sinner is not obliged to punishment: But you were not a sinner from eternity: Therefore, *&c.* Also *Qui non Est, non est obligatus ad pœnam: At tu ab æterno non fuisti*: Therefore, *&c.* 3. That which is undone in Time was not done from Eternity. But sin is unpardoned in Time, (*viz.* till we be united to Christ by faith, as Scripture abundantly witnesseth:) Therefore it was not pardoned from Eternity. 4. God accepteth

cepteth no man as Righteous that is not Righteous (yea that is not) (for he accepteth men as they are, and not as they are not.) But no man was Righteous from Eternity: Therefore God accepted none as Righteous from Eternity. But enough of that, till you ſpeak more openly.

19. Your proof (that Remiſſion and Acceptance are no other acts immanent but the Decree) is this: [For then either in the Underſtanding or the Will: but neither, *&c.*] *Anſ.* 1. I eaſily yield that Remiſſion is no other immanent act; becauſe it is none at all. 2. But your proof ſeems none to me. You ſay, [Surely God cannot be ſaid to Decree to know any thing, or to Decree to will any thing.] Your argument I think lies thus: [If God cannot be ſaid to Decree to know or will any thing, then he hath no other immanent act but his Decree: But, *&c.* Therefore, *&c.*] But here's no proof of the Conſequence; which needs proof. God cannot be ſaid to Decree to know himſelf (according to you; for I profeſs I am ignorant of theſe high myſteries:) Doth it follow that therefore he doth not know himſelf? I think not. Nor doth it follow that the knowledge of himſelf is only his Decree, as I hope you will eaſily confeſs. Moreover (according to you) God cannot be ſaid to Decree to know things to be Paſt. (For you ſay he cannot be ſaid to Decree to know.) Yet I think God doth know, as his own Eternity, ſo our Time, and the Futurition, Preſence, and Preterition of things in our Time: and therefore it doth not follow that he hath no knowledge of things, but his Decree. For his Decree (as now taken) is *de futuris*: but beſides that God hath 1. a knowledge *de Præteritis*, and 2. *de Præſentibus*. You argue, from the Neceſſity of Gods knowledge and the Arbitrarineſs of his Decree: and many words you uſe which ſhew that confidence, which I admire at: that you ſhould pretend to be ſo far acquainted with the Divine Nature, as not only to aſcribe to God the acts of man ſo far as you do, but to determine which acts are neceſſary, and which arbitrary, and that he cannot Decree to Know or to Will. I confeſs I am ready to tremble inſtead of replying, to think into what Myſteries you lead me ſo boldly. But I reſolve no further to follow you, then to manifeſt your preſumption, and to ſhew you that they are things unſearchable which you vainly pretend ſo well to know. Gods Knowledge is commonly diſtinguiſhed into *ſimplicis Intelligentiæ, & Puræ Viſionis*: The former is ſaid to be in order before the Decree, and the later in order after it: therefore neither of them are taken for the Decree it ſelf: and will you overthrow both by reducing all to the Decree? The knowledge of Viſion is taken not to be neceſſary ſimply, but only on ſuppoſition of the Decree, which anteceding in order of nature doth cauſe the Intelligible objects. For, ſay they, it is by this Decree that things paſs from the number of Poſſibles, into the number of things Future: and they cannot be known as future, till they are future; and they are made future Freely and not Neceſſarily: therefore in the knowledge of Futures there is a freedom *radicaliter & participativè*. And ſo it is no ſuch hard or abſurd conceſſion, to ſay, God might not have known what he knows: as long as he might not have made it an intelligible object.

20. You next proceed to an objection, which you caſt in your own way: and though I conceive you would not have made your ſelf any work, but what you were confident you could honourably and eaſily diſpatch, yet here I think it fals out otherwiſe. The objection is from our uſe of ſaying [Now we are juſtified in Gods ſight.] Here 1. you ſay [This puts not a new act of knowledge in God] of which I have ſaid enough before. 2. You tell us the ſenſe of it: *viz.*

that

that [It signifies only a Testimony given by God, whereby he makes us know that we are justified before God] and you say [Sight in God signifies a making us to see: and we are said to be justified in his sight, when he makes it, as it were, evident to our sight that we are justified.] This interpretation is to me something strange, and not easily received, both because of its Errour, and because you say so little to cover that Errour, but thrust so gross a conceit upon us upon your own authority. I rather think that the ascribing of such New acts to God, is 1. From the Moral Act of his Law, God being said to do that which his Law doth: and so he is said to judge us Righteous, when his Law of grace doth so judge us: and we are said to be Righteous *in estimatione Divinâ*, when we are so *in sensu Legis*. 2. From the change of the object: For as the variety of objects denominateth Gods acts as divers, so on the same reason the Novity of the objects must denominate them as new, though they be immanent acts. 3. And by an Anthropopathie, Sight is oft put for Gods Remembrance or Observation.

But you thrust upon us pure Antinomian fancies. 1. If your conceits be true, then none is to be accounted [Justified in Gods sight] that do not see themselves to be justified; for you think [Sight in God, signifies a making us see.] Then wo to all those honest souls that see not themselves justified, nay rather think themselves condemned: But yet if I discourse with such, I will venture to give them better encouragement, for all your doctrine; and to tell them [You may be justified in Gods sight, when you are condemned in your own.] 2. Shall we peruse the Scriptures that use that phrase, and see whether all or any one of them can be understood as Mr. K. expoundeth them in the Antinomian way of *Manifestation*. Psal. 143.2. *For in thy sight shall no man be justified.* Doth it mean, no man shall see himself justified? Jer. 18.23. *Forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from thy sight.* Is that only meant of hiding the remission from their sight? or letting them know the *non*-forgiveness? Where the Scripture speaks so oft of *doing that which is good in the sight of God*, or *that which is evil in his sight*, Doth it mean Gods making us to see that it is good or evil? What is so good in the sight of sinners as that which is evil in the sight of God? Job 15.15. *The heavens are not clean in his sight.* Job 25.5. *The starres are not pure in his sight.* Is this sight of God a making the creature see? Heb. 13.21. *Working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight.* Is this making us see? It were too long to recite all; if the Reader will peruse the rest, 1 *Joh* 3.22. *Exod.* 15.26. 2 *Sam.* 12.9. 1 *Chron.* 19.13. *Psal.* 72.14. *Hos.* 6.2. *Rom* 3.20. *Mat.* 11.26. *Luk.* 10.21. & 15.21. *Psal.* 19.14. & 51.4. & 9.19. & 5.5 *Gen.* 18.3. & 19.19. or any other where this phrase is used concerning God, I leave it to his own judgement whether any one of them be taken in Mr. K's sense: That of 2 *Chron.* 32.31. which he brings, is neither the same phrase, nor hath the same sense, and therefore is nothing to the matter. Yet is not Mr. K's exposition of that satisfactory neither: For he cannot prove that it is meant meerly of discovering *Hezekiah*'s heart to himself. It may be as much the discovery of it by the effects to others for their warning, and so shew the frailty of man: But the plain sense of the text referres that knowledge to God himself and not to any man; even by such an Anthropopathie which is ordinary in Scripture, as in *Ezek.* 12.3. *It may be they will consider, though they are a rebellious house*, as if God had been in an uncertain hope of it. So *Luk.* 20.13. *Jer.* 36.3. So where God is said to repent. If God speak of himself to man after the manner of his own infirmity, must we therefore say, he means [our knowledge] when he mentioneth his own?

21. That I may know whom he ſpeaks to, he addeth [I am ſure Mr. *Baxter* who quoteth *Suarez*, *Schibler* and *Keckerman* at every bout cannot be ignorant, &c.] The matter which he mentioneth is nothing to his Cauſe. But ſee what an overcharged ſtomack this Learned man hath? How many caſts hath he had already in vomiting up the choler of his ſcorn? And yet it comes up ſtill as freſh and as bitter as if he felt no *levamen* by all that evacuation. Truly his oft ſcornfull repeating my quotation of theſe childiſh Authours, cauſed me at laſt to turn over all my Book to ſee how oft it is that I quote them. And I can finde *Suarez* but once named, and no place of him cited. *Keckerman* but once cited, and there twice named; and *Schibler* thrice. Yet doth this man tell the world I quote them at every turn; ſo well may we believe his confident Aſſertions about the unſearchable nature and myſteries of God, who hath the face to ſpeak thus in a viſible matter of fact, where any man that will but try it may finde him —— Nay, ſee the modeſty of the man! I cited two of them once, and the third thrice in a whole Book: and in theſe five or ſix leaves he tels me of it, or ſcorns me for it twelve times!

22. He next addeth [To Decree to Will, cannot be ſaid: for that is as much as to Will to Will, which was never heard of; the object of the Will being at beſt, but her imperate act, not her own elicite act.] *Reply*, 1. I ſtill abhor your preſumptuous pretence of knowing more of God then you do know, and of ſo meaſuring him by man. 2. Still *deſiderantur modeſtia & veritas*. Who would think that a man pretending ſo much to Learning, ſhould never have met with Schoolman, or Philoſopher that ſpeaks that which he here ſaith [was never heard of] or having read it (yea or not having read it) durſt ſo boldly ſpeak thus? At leaſt he might have ſeen it in the moſt ordinary and obvious Writings of our own Divines. In *Ameſius* his Caſes of Conſc. *l.* 1. *cap.* 7. theſe are the laſt words: *Hinc verè dicimus & ex omnium gentium conſenſu, Velo Velle.* Believe which thou wilt, Reader; but I am ſure there's a wide difference between theſe two men: when one ſaith, *Dicimus omnium gentium conſenſu*; and the other ſaith [*It was never heard of.*] Yea *Ferrius in Scholaſtic. Orthodox. cap.* 29. (a Chapter worth the reading *de prædeterminatione & cauſa peccati*) affirms it of God himſelf [*Ideo videtur quod cum Deus permittit lapſum, non ſe habet mere Negative, ſed cum aliquo actu poſitivo: & ideo non ſolum non vult, ſed etiam vult non Velle, i. e. Voluntas reflectitur ſupra ſe non volentem: Dum ſcilicet non Vult* Adamum *peccare, ſuſpendendo actum Volitionis mera negatione, ſed etiam Vult ſe non Velle: & hæc eſt actualis & poſitiva permiſſio. Ita tamen ut in primo ſigno ſit Negatio pura*, &c. *Proinde cum Deus Voluerit ab æterno non Velle lapſum, habuit actum reflexivum ſuper negationem*, &c. *At Determinavit fore inquies. Minime: Abſit hoc.*] This is approved by Churches of *France*. And yet this Learned man dare tell the world in print, that it was never heard of: which that he might have ſafely done, he had need of more ears then two. And it ſeems this Learned man hath read little of the contentions of the Jeſuites and Dominicans about the nature of free-will, where he might have ſeen many of them touch this Queſtion, as *Petavius* doth againſt *Vincentium Lenis*, alias, *Fromondus*, and others frequently. Nay it ſeems he is a ſtranger to the Schoolmen too: Perhaps inſtead of reading them, he contemns them as he doth *Schibler*, *Suarez* and *Keckerman*. *Scotus in* 4. *ſent. diſt.* 49. *q.* 3. *fol.* (mihi) 266. B. ſaith, *Finis extra eſt ſimpliciter optimum & ſummè volendum: Ergo inter ea quæ ſunt ad finem quod eſt ſibi immediatius eſt magis volendum: ſed Velle eſt ſibi immediatius, quia immediatè tendit in ipſum ut in finem ultimum, cum finis ultimus ut hujuſmodi ſit proprium objectum ipſum Velle. Probo majorem: Illud eſt magis Volendum voluntate*

libera

libera quod appetitui naturali naturaliter est magis appetendum: hujusmodi est quod propinquius est ultimo, quod simpliciter maxime appetitur naturaliter. Praeterea Voluntas potest Velle suum actum, sicut Intellectus Intelligit suum actum: aut ergo Vult suum Velle propter Intelligere, aut è converso, aut neutrum propter alterum: & loquor de Velle ordinato.

Nicol. d' Orbellis saith, *in sent. l. 2. dist. 25. dub. 2.* [*Omne quod Vult, appetit ad sui ipsius imperium: quia sic Vult aliquid ut* Velit *se* Velle *illud: Et ideo in actu Volendi seipsum movet, & sibi dominatur, & pro tanto dicitur liberum (arbitrium) quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud.*] And *Gibieuf* shews, that God hath *Actum voluntatis positivum circa suam permissionem li. 2. de Libert. cap. 24. & cap. 22. §. 7, 8, &c.* And why not as well then about his act. And Gods Will is his Essence: Therefore he willeth it. For that *Deus vult seipsum* hath hitherto been unquestioned, for ought I know (so farre as he may be said at all to Will.) *Aquinas 2. 22. q. 25. a. 2. c.* saith, *Quia enim Voluntatis objectum est Bonum Universale, quicquid sub ratione boni continetur, potest cadere sub actu Voluntatis. Et quia ipsum Velle est quoddam Bonum, potest* Velle *se* Velle, *sicut & Intellectus cujus objectum est Verum, Intelligit se Intelligere, quia hoc etiam est quoddam Verum.*] *Vid. & 1. q. 87. 3. 2m.* If I thought it necessary, it were easie to heap up many more that are of the same minde. But I shall only in brotherly duty admonish Mr. K. to make more Conscience hereafter of false speaking: and seeing he hath read so very little, or lost it again, rather humbly to acknowledge his Imperfection (as we that are guilty of the like must also do) then to make a confident vain-glorious ostentation of that which it seems by this, and many the like passages, he hath not.

Let us adde some Reasons, that the Elicite acts may be the objects of other Elicite acts of the Will, and not the Imperate only, as Mr. K. saith.

1. As *Scotus* argueth before from the proportion with the Intellect. A man may understand that he doth understand, by a reflect act: Therefore he may Will that he Will.

2. That which is an apprehended Good may be Willed: But an Elicite Act of the Will may be an apprehended Good: Therefore, *&c.*

3. A man may Will his everlasting Happiness: (For if the End may not be Willed, what may?) But his everlasting Happiness consisteth partly in the Elicite Acts of his own Will, everlastingly to be exercised on God: [God being Objectively our Happiness) Therefore, *&c. Velle, Amare, Frui,* are acts that must be perpetuated, and either may be Willed, or no man may will his own happiness.

4. Whatsoever is apprehended to be a fit means to this End or Happiness, may be Willed: But the Elicit acts of the Will may be apprehended a fit means hereto: Therefore, *&c.* They are commanded, and they are made Conditions of Happiness: and therefore are a means.

5. The Effects of Gods special saving Grace on the soul may be Willed: But the Elicite Acts of the sanctified Will, are the Effects (and principal effects) of Gods special saving Grace on the soul: Therefore, *&c.*

6. That which a Christian may pray for, that he may and must Will: But he may pray for the Elicite Acts of a sanctified Will: Therefore, *&c.* As he may pray, Lord, I Believe, help my Unbelief: So he may pray [Lord I am Willing, make me more Willing, and hereafter Willing, *&c.*

7. Experience is in stead of a thousand arguments, I feel that my Willingness is the object of my unwillingness; and that in these several wayes. 1. I feel that

upon

upon the review of my past Willingness, and the sight of my present Willingness (in any Good), my Will hath a Complacency in it, which is a true *Velle*, yea the first and principal Elicite Act of the Will. 2. I finde that by a less perfect and intense Act, I do Will a more perfect Act. I am somewhat Willing, but I would fain be more Willing. Nay to procure the Amendment of my own heart by this increase of my Willingness (which is indeed the Increase of most of my Graces) is the main business of my life, committed to me by God, and to be intended by my self. And if I should cast off this great business, and neither desire more Willingness or Grace, nor pray for more, nor labour for more, because Mr. K. out of his subtilty tels me, that the Elicite Act is not the Wils object, I should be befool'd out of my Christianity and Salvation by a trivial trick of vain Philosophy. 3. I finde that by a present Act of Will, I do Will a future Act. I do Will now that I may also Will to morrow, and to my lives end, and for ever in glory, and that better then now I do. 4. I feel that I do Will a more sincere Willingness. I do Will Salvation with too much respect to my self in it, and too little to Gods honour. Now I would fain Will this more for God then I do. 5. I would fain Nill many things which through my corruption I now Will. 6. I would fain oft suspend a vicious act of my Will, at least. In all these respects, the Elicite Act of my Will is the object of my Will.

But Mr. K. will be Learned in despight of Natural and Gracious Experience (for I hope, for all his Learning, that he Would Love God more, as Love is taken for an act of the Rational part, and that he Wils a greater and a persevering, yea a perpetual Willingness of God and obedience; and a fruition of God, and *frui* is an act of the Will:) He will therefore prove what he once saith, and that's thus. [For what need of Willing to Will a thing, when one Willing is enough? And he that Wils to Will, Wils no more then he doth already, which is to Will: one of these acts must needs be superfluous, *&c.*] To which I Reply; You may see in the several Instances which I gave before, that it is needfull, and that it is not superfluous, as you say, and that it is more then he did before; A more perfect act, a future act, a perpetuated act, are more then he did before. Yea its a doubt, Whether a very graceless man may not *Velle intendere Deum, vel frui Deo* yea strictly Will to Will God as his happiness, or to Will Holiness before Voluptuousness, who yet doth it not already. And me thinks so acute a man might see that this is not the same act which he performeth already, for it hath not the same object. The man is Willing to be saved from Hell, but Unwilling to be Holy: He is convinced that he shall not be saved, unless he become Willing to be Holy; Therefore he willeth he were Willing to be Holy: If this were but with a Velleity, it is yet an Elicite Act of the Will, but it may be called a Volition, though uneffectual, because there is a stronger contrary Will: So that it is *Volitio quoad actum Absolutum*, but *quoad actum Comparatum*, he is unwilling. The Object of that Will which he hath, is his *Velle sanctitatem*: the Object of that Will which he would have, is Holiness it self. If that *Velle & sanctitas* be not all one, then these two Acts be not all one.

But Mr. K. confesseth at last that a man may be said to Will to be more Willing, but he saith [this is rather to Will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite, then to Will the exercise of the rational Will.] But why is it that this man would not be disturbed by the sensitive appetite? Is it not because he would Will freely? Doth not he that Willeth the means, much more Will the End?

And

And is not the Removal of the Impediment, a Means to your freer and more Intenſe Willing? And do not you your ſelf Will the increaſe of your Willingneſs upon the quieting of that Appetite? Beſides, I hope you do not think that the diſturbance of the ſenſitive Appetite, is the onely Cauſe of our Imperfection in actual Willing: Or that our own Habitual Corruption and diſtemper of the Will it ſelf, is not a greater Cauſe.

After all this you conclude, that [it appears there is no new Immanent act in God required yea poſſible to the juſtifying of a man, beſides his Decree to juſtifie.] To which I ſay, Though it little appear to me from any of your arguing, yet I eaſily yield to the Negative part of your Concluſion; and I ſay, that the Decree it ſelf is no part of Juſtification, but an Antecedent.

Again, Let it be obſerved, that all this arguing will as much prove that Gods Immanent act is like to Creation, Sanctification, Glorification, Damnation, or any thing that ever God did, as to Juſtification: For of all his Works it is as true, that he doth nothing but what he decreed to do. And ſo it may as well be ſaid that our Glorification is an Immanent act from Eternity, as our Juſtification.

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§. 30.

Mr. K. *More particularly, it will be as Evident that his Decreeing to Remit our ſins, carries a Remiſſion of them tantamount: For who ſhall charge them on us, where God decreeth to remit them? The Conſcience I confeſs may; ſo may the Devil joyning with our conſcience; but all this while their charge is of no great danger to us, when God hath decreed to remit them to us: and though they may trouble us they cannot damn us, for that their charge is to be brought in Gods Name, as for ſins committed againſt his Crown and Dignity: Now where he hath decreed to remit thoſe ſins, there is no danger of ſuffering for them, let what ever accuſers manage the Evidence againſt us, all that they can do is but this, to bring us to cry Guilty, and thereupon to appeal to God for Mercy; who upon our appeal to him for Mercy, be is graciouſly pleaſed to pronounce pardon to us. God himſelf I acknowledge alſo may charge them on us; and proceed in ſeverity againſt us for a while; but this charge is not any way obſtructive to his Decree to remit ſin, but rather ſubſervient to it, and to bring us to ſee and confeſs our ſins, and caſt our ſelves wholly on his Mercy in Chriſt, in which reſpect I might better ſay, that God doth ſhew love even in puniſhing unregenerate men that are Elect, then you did erewhiles, that he may be ſaid* to hate Godly men, *when he puniſheth or rather correcteth them: Puniſhment ayming chiefly at the ſatisfaction of Juſtice, Correction at the amendment of the offender. So then his Decree of Remitting carries in it as much as is required for any Immanent Act in him to our Remiſſion, and ſo much as neceſſarily procures the tranſient Act in the time that he hath appointed for it. His Decrees are like Mount Zion, and ſtand faſt for ever:* The Counſel of the Lord ſtandeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations, *Pſal.* 33.11.

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§. 30.

R. B. YOur [tantomount] is a word made for your uſe; Cauſes that dare not ſee the light, uſe to go covered with ſuch terms as will ſtretch. But if you mean plainly, that the Decree doth amount to as much as a remiſſion of ſin,] then I muſt needs ſay, that your Doctrine is tantamount Antinomianiſm. Let

the conſcientious Reader that loves Gods truth and his own Peace, conſider by theſe few particulars following, what a Theology, nay what a Chriſtianity this Learned man would introduce.

1. Doth not this lead men to ſlight Chriſt and his ſufferings, and to look on his Death as that which did them no great good? For when all our ſins were tantamount forgiven from Eternity, there was little left for Chriſt to do by his Death, Merit, Interceſſion, &c. as to our Remiſſion.

2. How ſmall a matter is left for the Regenerate to receive upon their Repenting and Believing in Chriſt, as to Remiſſion of ſins, when they are tantamount (I muſt uſe Mr. K's School-term) remitted already? Is this the Repenting and Believing for Remiſſion of ſin which Scripture mentioneth?

3. How ſmall a matter is left for Baptiſm to ſeal and exhibit, as to Remiſſion, when all ſin was tantamount Remitted from Eternity?

4. Where is the Excellency and Glory of the Goſpel, either as to the Narrative, Preceptive, or Promiſſory part? For the Natrative, it makes a large Declaration how Chriſt was Promiſed, Incarnate, Born, how he Obeyed, Suffered, Satisfied, Merited, Roſe, Intercedeth to procure a Remiſſion which was tantamount done already even from Eternity. For the Preceptive, it preſcribeth man a way to obtain Remiſſion by coming to Chriſt, and to maintain that Remiſſion by abiding in Chriſt, when our ſins were tantamount remitted from Eternity. The Promiſe ſeemeth to hold forth an excellent benefit, and all men are invited to Receive it; and when all's done, it offereth and promiſeth to do that which is done tantamount already from Eternity. If you ſay, that yet Chriſt and the Goſpel have their Excellency as they reſpect other benefits, viz. our Sanctification and Glorification: I anſwer according to Mr. K's grounds, it muſt be ſaid that theſe alſo were done tantamount from Eternity, in that they were Decreed.

5. How ſmall a matter have Chriſtians daily to pray for, in that Petition [*Forgive us our treſpaſſes*] when they were tantamount forgiven from Eternity? And what a ſput is this to prayer?

6. How ſmall a matter have they to Give Thanks for, as received through Chriſt from the promiſe, upon prayer, &c.

7. How ſmall a matter as to Remiſſion of ſin, do we receive in the Lords Supper, when it was done tantamount before?

8. How great a help doth this Doctrine give to Obedience, when men are told that all their ſins are tantamount forgiven from Eternity?

9. How ſmall a Difference between the ſtate of the Regenerate and unregenerate, ſuppoſing them Elect? The ſins of one are forgiven, and the other tantamount.

10. How unſoundly do we perſwade wicked men of their miſery, and tell them that God hateth all the workers of iniquity, and that they are by nature children of wrath, &c. when for ought we know all their ſins were tantamount forgiven from Eternity? And how hard to convince them of any ſuch miſery, when they have this Reply? Lay all this together, and ſee how much of our Religion and Chriſtianity is left!

But he proves all this by a Queſtion [Who ſhall charge them on us where God decreeth to remit them?] I Reply, The ſame perſons, and as many as might have charg'd them on us, if God had not decreed it. His Decree takes off no charge, nor diſables any from charging us. It were not an Immanent Act, if it did *ponere aliquid in objecto*. 2. We are as much under the Charge, Curſe, or

Condemnation

Condemnation of the Law, till we believe, as if no such Decree had passed. 2. What the Law doth, God doth by it; for it is his Instrument. 3. Satan may charge us. 4. And so may conscience. 5. And men. But you confess your self that Conscience, Satan, and God may charge us: But you say [there is no danger.] Reply. 1. What if you were to lie all your life in torment with the stone or gout, and yet were sure that you should die never the sooner, and so there were no danger? Would you think your self tantamount a sound man? Is it so small a matter in your eyes for an elect man to lie under the guilt of sin, and as an enemy to God till near his death, so be it he be not in danger of damnation? 2. If you mean that their damnation is *non-futura*, I confess it: And so it would be if God should but fore-know it, and not decree it (supposing it might be the object of such a fore-knowledge.) 3. But yet I think it is not fit language to say [there is no danger of suffering for sins that God hath decreed to remit.] I see still whither Antinomianism tends. 1. If Christ did die to deliver us from danger of suffering, then we were in danger of suffering: But Christ did die to deliver us from it: Therefore, *&c.* Would you make us believe that Christ saved us from no danger by his death? 2. The actual Conversion and Justification of the Elect, is a saving them from danger: Therefore they were in danger. 3. If the Elect unconverted are in no danger, then you must preach no danger to them, nor perswade them to avoid any, nor to repent the incurring of any: or if, because you know not the Elect, you speak to all of danger, you must tell them that you mean it not of the Elect: But what success such preaching would have, is easie to conjecture. 4. Where men are bound to Fear and Apprehend danger, there is danger: But God bindeth the Elect (even after Conversion, much more before) to Fear and Apprehend danger: Therefore, *&c.* There can be no Fear, where there is no Apprehension of danger; no more then there can be Love without the Apprehension of Good to be beloved. Christ bids his Disciples, *Fear him that is able to destroy both body and soul in hell fire:* And so *Heb.* 4. 1. *Fear lest a promise being left of entring into his rest, any of you should come short of it.* God bids us fear: Mr. K. tantamount bids us, Fear not, by telling us there is no danger. 5. Where men are bound to labour, run, strive, and use much means to escape danger, there is danger: But so God hath bound the Elect: Therefore, *&c.* How many Texts might be cited that binde us to save our selves, and seek our deliverance, and that speak of our escaping, our deliverance and salvation, which all imply a danger from which we escape, are saved and delivered? *6. Matth.* 5. 21, 22. *He that calleth his brother Fool, is in danger of hell fire:* But an Elect man hath called his brother fool: Therefore, *&c.* 7. Nay if this be true, then God never saved his people from any Danger. For he that never was in danger cannot be saved out of it. And he that was from Eternity Decreed to be pardoned, according to your Doctrine, was never in danger. 8. And then we ought to give no thanks to God the Father, or to Christ the Redeemer, or to the holy Ghost the Sanctifier, nor to any Preacher or other Instrument, for saving us from any danger of punishment. I think these are not matters to be made light of: nor that Doctrine of Libertinism to be cherished, which plainly leadeth to such unhappy fruits.

But let us peruse your Reasons: You say [the charge is to be brought in Gods name.] Reply. So it may be nevertheless for the Decree; for that takes off none of the charge. You adde [All they can do is but this, to bring us to cry Guilty, and thereupon appeal to God for Mercy, *&c.*] Reply. 1. Must they cry Guil-

ty, and look for Mercy and Remiſſion, that were tantamount forgiven from Eternity? 2. Either you ſpeak of an unconverted elect perſon in this life; or elſe as ſuppoſing he were at Judgement in that eſtate. If the later be your meaning, then their Accuſation might and would do more then you ſpeak of, and would tend to condemnation (if ſuch a caſe might be ſuppoſed.) If the former be your meaning, then theſe Elect perſons do [Cry Guilty, and appeal to Mercy] with true Faith, or without it. If with Faith, then their ſins are remitted further then by Decree, and theſe are not the perſons now in Queſtion. If without faith then they are not Forgiven for all this. As long as the Elect remain unregenerate, though that Law, and Satan, and Conſcience accuſe them, yet they do not Believingly ſeek mercy: and if they were in that ſtate at Judgement, it were too late to ſeek Mercy.

Next you [acknowledge that God himſelf alſo may charge ſin on us, and proceed in ſeverity againſt us for a while; but this charge is not any way obſtructive to his Decree to Remit ſin, *&c.*] Reply. God may be ſaid to charge ſinne on the Elect before faith. 1. By obliging them by his Law to puniſhment. 2. By inflicting ſome ſmall part of the puniſhment on them. You ſeem to me to take notice notice only of the later. But every Chriſtian muſt acknowledge that for all Gods Decree, we are all *Obligati ad pœnam ſempiternam*, till we are united to Chriſt by faith. To ſay this is not obſtructive to Gods Decree, is nothing to the queſtion. The worlds being uncreated from Eternity, did not obſtruct Gods Decree of making it, and the Elect's being unſanctified or unglorified doth not obſtruct Gods Decree of Sanctifying and Glorifying them: and yet this proves not perſecuting *Saul* was tantamount ſanctified and Glorified. And what if God make the knowledge of our Damnable ſtate, or our *non*-remiſſion, a means to Remiſſion? That doth not prove that we are before remitted in whole or in part, or tantamount.

Whether you ſpeak to Mr. *Goodwin* or me, about the phraſe of [hating the Godly] I know not: but if to me, I do not believe that ever I ſo ſpoke.

Your diſtinction of Puniſhment from chaſtiſement, is perverſe: ſo learned a man ſhould know, that Puniſhment is the *Genus* and Chaſtiſement is a *ſpecies* of it. All Puniſhment is for the Demonſtration of Juſtice; but not all for the ſatisfaction of Juſtice, Correction is as well for a Demonſtration of Juſtice, as for Amending the Offendor: Elſe it were meer Affliction, and no Correction.

Your Concluſion next laid down, much differs from the divers formerly laid down, and which you ſhould have proved; and yet I have ſhewed, for part of this, how ill you have proved it: though, for my part, I know no Cauſe that I am engaged in that will be any whit prejudiced by yielding you all; as I eaſily yield you, that the Tranſient Act will certainly follow.

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§. 31.

Mr. K. *NExt his Decree to Accept us, carrieth as much too; and there needs nothing but a Tranſient Act to prove his Acceptance, and evidence it to us: for to decree to look upon us as righteous, is not to look upon us as righteous in our ſelves, but his ſon; and to this looking on us, there needs no new immanent Act, beyond his electing us to faith in his Son, and perſeverance in that faith: Thus he may be ſaid to give us to his Son before*

before, and ſo then there is no new immanent act. Gods Remitting our ſins, and accepting us as Righteous, though they ſound like Immanet acts, are to be ſenſed as Tranſient, and how ſhall be ſhewed next: in the interim *this which hath been ſaid is ſufficient to ſhew, That in the Decree of God to juſtifie us, there is ſomewhat that looks like Juſtification; and no other immanent act in God is required to our Juſtification; beſides his Decree from Eternity to juſtifie us in time.*

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§. 31.

R. B. I Shall never think the higheſt pretenders to exact explications to be the beſt performers, for your ſake. You treat of Acceptance; but who can finde by all that you ſay, what you mean by [Acceptance.] You ſay, [Though it ſound like an Immanent act it is to be ſenſed as Ttranſient,] but what that Tranſient act is, for all your promiſes, I can hardly finde you diſcovering. Surely [to Accept] in our ordinary ſpeech ſignifieth an Immanent act of the Will; but ſo you take it not; elſe muſt you yield that Immanent acts may be Decreed. Beſides this, it may ſignifie the Moral action of the Law of Grace, which virtually judgeth the perſon Righteous, and its action is Gods action. But this you can leſs digeſt: and therefore what your [Acceptance] means, let him tell that knows. All that I can finde is, either that it is [the Giving of faith] or [the Making us know our Acceptance] of which more anon.

You ſay [There needs nothing but a Tranſient act to prove his Acceptance, and evidence it to us.] *Rep.* Here is then but two Acts needfull: the one is [Decreeing to Accept us as Righteous;] This is not Accepting, as the word and your own confeſſion witneſs: The other is [a Tranſient act to prove and evidence his Acceptance.] This cannot be acceptance neither: For what man will ſay, that the evidence and proof is formally the ſame with the thing proved and evidenced? Is it all one [to Accept] and [to evidence and prove Acceptance?] What a maze do you run your ſelf into under pretence of diſcovering the truth? You have fairly diſputed [Acceptance] into Nothing.

You adde [For to Decree to look upon us as Righteous, is not to look upon us as Righteous in our ſelves but in his Son.] *Rep.* To Decree to look, is not to Look: elſe you may ſay, it is a Decree to Decree. Your phraſes of [in our ſelves] and [in his Son] may be ſo interpreted as to make your ſenſe true; but if you mean that it is Chriſt only and not we, who is the ſubject of that relative Righteouſneſs, which formally makes us Juſt, then it is falſe.

You ſay [And to this looking on us, there needs no new Immanent act beſides electing to Faith and Perſeverance.] *Rep.* I pray you then tell us what you mean by [Looking on us:] an Immanent act it is not, you think: And is Gods [Looking on us as Juſt] a tranſient act? What act then is it? Did you ſay, That God is ſaid to Look on us as Juſt, when his Law call us Juſt, I ſhould not diſagree with you: but you diſclaim that. But I forgot that you did expound your meaning before upon [Gods ſeeing:] as Gods ſeeing is a making us to ſee, ſo its like you mean [Gods Decree to look on us as Juſt] is a Decree to make us Look on our ſelves as Juſt: and ſo the perſon is changed. But if this be your meaning, I had as lieve you ſaid nothing.

But I will tell you again, that if you will take [an Immanent act] *formaliter* for Gods eſſence, ſo there is none new, nor is there any more then one; Knowing, Willing and Nilling, Love and Hatred are all one. But if you will condeſcend

to us of the ſimpler ſort, and ſpeak of Immanent acts as applied to God after the manner of men, and as his acts are *formaliter*, or *modaliter*, or *relativè*, or *denominativè*, or however elſe (in a way unknown to us) diſtinct from his eſſence, ſo as they may be diverſified among themſelves without diſparagement to Gods ſimplicity, they may alſo begin and end without diſparagement to his Immutability, for any thing that you have yet ſaid to the contrary. And ſo as they are diverſified or ſaid to begin *denominativè ex connotatione objecti*, they may as well be ſaid to be the objects of Gods eternal Decree. And thus I conceive, Decree reſpecting the future, and [Accepting and Approving] being acts that connote a preſent object, and ſo may not be ſaid [to be ſuch acts] till the object exiſt, therefore God may well be ſaid to Decree to Accept us, and Approve us, and Love us, and Delight in us, *&c.* though all be Immanent acts. And ſo my concluſion ſhall be contrary to yours, that you have not proved that there is no other Immanent act in God required to our Juſtification, beſides his Decree; and if you had, yet you had done little to the buſineſs: And that you have no more proved [that in the Decree is ſomething that looks like Juſtification] then that it looks like Creation, Salvation, Damnation; And had you proved it never ſo ſtrongly, I know not to what purpoſe it is. It is ſomewhat like God that is called his Image in his Saints: and yet he that cals the Saints, God, may blaſpheme for all that.

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§. 32.

Mr. K. 3. *THat this Immanent act cannot be called Juſtification, appears hence, that no Immanent act makes a real change in the ſubject, as Juſtification doth; That a Will to juſtifie us, is as Mr. Baxter rightly ſaith,* terminus diminuens, *and cannot be the act whereby we are juſtified, That Juſtification is on all hands confeſſed to be pronouncing or declaring of us Righteous, which cannot be done by an Immanent act alone: What then is the Tranſient act? Before I can ſpeak punctually to this, it is fit to ſet down that Remiſſion of ſins, and eſtating us in the condition and priviledges of Righteous, are the two main parts diſtinguiſhed* ratione ratiocinata *at leaſt, all grant, I muſt needs ſay, I think Really. Remiſſion of ſins being the firſt, and which of courſe draws the other after it, enquire we* 1. *Whether there be a Tranſient act of God whereby he remits our our ſins?* 2. *What this is?*

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§. 32.

R. B. I Am loath to ſpeak againſt you where you are pleaſed to plead my cauſe; yet I muſt give you theſe brief Animadverſions. 1. That Juſtification makes on the ſubject a real change, as oppoſed to Feigned, Nominal, Potential, *&c.* I yield: but not as oppoſite to Relative: Wherefore our Divines ordinarily call Sanctification a Real change, as oppoſite to the Relative change of Juſtification. 2. It is but one ſort of Juſtification which is [on all hands confeſſed to be a pronouncing or declaring us Righteous:] your ſelf do afterwards ſpeak of Juſtification in a ſenſe that will not agree with this. Who doth not yield that Conſtitutive Juſtification goes before Sentential? Doth not God make us Juſt before he judge and pronounce us ſo? Yet in this confuſion do you go on ſtill; and ſuch a ſtirre do you make with [Immanent and Tranſient] as if you would wear theſe words threadbare, or never have done with them? So Immanent are

theſe

these Notions in your Phantasie, that when they will be Transient I cannot tell.

So often do you promise us over and over to enquire what is the Transient act in Justification, and talk of [speaking punctually to it] that you raised my expectation to such a height, that I looked for much more then ordinary: But when I had read to the end, and could scarce perceive certainly, whether ever you spake to the Point at all, or at least in so few syllables and so obscurely, that I am uncertain whether I understand what you mean, I confess you left me between admiration and indignation! that after all your prologues and promises, and our greatest hopes, you should drop asleep when you should come to the work, or cease before you remembred the performance, made me resolve to set lighter by such promises hereafter.

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§. 33.

Mr. K. [*To prove that there is a Transient act, they tell us no more (saith Mr.* Baxter*) but this, that it doth* transire in subjectum extraneum, *by making a morall change on our Relations, though not a real upon our persons.*] *I confess every* transitio, *to use that word,* in subjectum extraneum *making a Morall change, is not necessarily a Transient act: For if it be only as upon an Object, whereto is given but an extrinsecall denomination, not as upon the subject of a Reall change, made by the act, the act hath no title to Transient: for knowledge doth this much: but wheresoever is a Moral or a Legal change made, there is of necessity a Transient act: for that the Laws of men take no notice of Immanent acts; and the Law of God takes no notice of any change made in the object of bare Immanent acts: A man by lusting after a woman commits Adultery punishable by the Law of God; the woman is nothing the more defiled: So a man that covets his neighbours goods, is looked on by God as a thief; the goods notwithstanding remain in the same place, and possession of the Owner, nor doth God challenge them as Felons goods; no change made on them; Wheresoever then there is a Morall, i. e. a Legall change, there is a Transient act, and this being in Justification a Transient act is necessarily required to this change. Now I yield Mr.* Baxter *that* [*no Transient act is immediatly termined in a Relation, and the immediate effect of Gods Justification or Remission of sins, must be somewhat Really wrought, either upon the sinner, or somewhat else for him.*

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§. 33.

R. B. I Will not stand to open any weaknesses or impertinencies in this Section, as long as the scope is sound, lest I shew my self as quarrelsome as you.

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§. 34.

Mr. K. *The second Question is, What is this? and so what the Transient act is? Mr.* Baxter *saith,* [*1. That the passing the grant of the New Covenant, or the promulgation of it, is a Transient act. 2. So may the continuance of it also be. 3. This Law or Grant hath a Moral improper action, whereby it may be said to pardon or justifie, which properly is but eternall justifying. 4. By this grant 1. God doth give us the Righteousness of Christ to be ours when we believe. 2. And disableth the Law to*

oblige

oblige us to punishment or Condemnation. 3. Which Reall foundations being thus laid, our Relations of Justified and Pardoned in Title of Law do necessarily follow.]

I cannot perswade my self to leave my old Doctors to follow Mr. Baxter, *for any thing he hath said in all this. Let the promulgation of the New Covenant first and still be a transient act; this Covenant hath an odde empty Morall action in justifying us when we believe; and by the promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ, and disable the Law to condemn us, as shall appear by considering that all here spoken of actions, is but of actions improperly so called, and such as cannot suffice to make a Reall effect.*

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§. 34.

R. B. WHo your old Doctors are is utterly unknown to me; for I remember not that I have ever read any Doctor before you that goeth your way (if I know it) and am in hope that I never shall reade any such hereafter. For your not following me, as I have not been very eager to obtrude my opinions on any, so if it be no more for your own advantage then mine, I am not so desirous of your company, but that I can be without it. Now to the matter.

I am very glad that I am come to a Controversie more easie and more usefull then that which you made and stuck in so long before. As for my opinion about the nature of Remission of sin, I have had occasion to view and review it since the writing of my Aphorismes, and have received Animadversions on this very Point of another nature then are these of Mr. *K*'s, both for Learning, Sobriety, and Exactness of Judgement; and upon my most faithfull and impartial perusal of all, I must needs profess my self much more satisfied in my first opinion, and confident of its verity, then I was before: And some Learned men (as most *England* hath) do fully consent to it, and confirm it in their Animadversions; and I remember none of the rest (save the first-intimated Reverend Learned Brother) that doth contradict it, of all those Judicious excellent men that have vouchsafed me their private Animadversions. And even he doth confess all that action of the Law and change made by it, which I mention, as being a known truth beyond Controversie; only he thinketh that the name of Justification is to be given to no act but a Judicial Sentence, which I call, the most perfect sort of Justification. Indeed I am ashamed that I spake so strangely of so easie and familiar a Truth, as if it had been some new discovery, when all that are verst in Politicks and Laws may discern it to be so obvious: but the reason was, that I had not read any thing of it in Divines as to our present case.

Before I come to Mr. *K.* let me tell the Reader my thoughts of Remission more fully. Pardon actively taken is an act of God. Passive pardon is the *terminus* or effect of that act. Pardon Active, is 1. Mentall, in a more imperfect, diminute, and less-proper sense called Pardon: As when a Prince doth pardon a traytour secretly in his own thoughts and resolution only. This is applied to God speaking after the manner of men (in which manner we are necessitated to speak of God:) and it is not (as Mr. *K.* imagineth) to be conceived of by us as being the same with his Decree *de futuro* (so far as we may conceive of Gods Immanent acts as divers:) though it be but the same act that receiveth these divers denominations

nations from the diversity of the objects. 2. The second Active Pardon is Signal, Legal and Constitutive; which by signifying Gods Will, doth Legally constitute us pardoned, by causing our *Jus ad Impunitatem vel Liberationem, i. e.* by dissolving the Obligation to punishment, or by taking away guilt. The action or causation of this pardon, is but such as is that of every *Fundamentum* in causing its Relation. 3. Pardon taken actively also may signifie the very Grant of the act of Pardon (whether particular or general, absolute or conditional) that is, the act of Legislation (in our case) whereby the Law of Grace is formed, as the remitting Instrument. This goes before that forementioned; as being the causing of that *Fundamentum*, which in time causeth the Relation aforesaid. 4. The Promulgation or Proclamation of this Law of Grace, or Act of Oblivion, may also be called Pardon. This Legal pardon is an Act of God as *Rector supra Leges* in respect to the old Law whose Obligation it dissolveth; and it is the Act of God as Legislator in respect of the Law of Grace which dissolveth the Obligation of the Law of Works.

Accordingly Pardon in a Passive sense, is taken as many waies. 1. With men for the effects of mentall pardon in the heart and minde. 2. For the *Jus ad Impunitatem*, or the Dissolution of the Obligation to punishment, caused by the second act. 3. For the Law of Grace, or the promise it self. And so the pardoning Instrument of a King, is commonly called a Pardon. 4. For the hopefull Relation or state that he is in that hath pardon offered him on very easie and reasonable terms (as for the Acceptance with thanks.) I think all these senses the word is used in the Scriptures; I am sure in Writers and common speech it is so. Now it is easie to discern that all the rest are but imperfect pardons, and so called in a diminute sense, exeept only the second, which is the full and proper pardon. 2. All this I speak of Pardon in Law sense, the same with that which I call Justification constitutive (or but notionally differing:) But besides all this there is Pardon and Justification *per sententiam Judicis*, which these are but the means to, and which is the most perfect of all. But note that as the word Justification is most proper to [the sentence:] So the word [*Pardon*] is most proper to the Civil or Legal act that goes before Judgement. 3. And as God pardoneth 1. as *Rector supra Leges* by Donation and a new Law, 2. and as Judge by sentence: so 3. also as the executor of Law and sentence or his Will: And so pardoning is but Not-punishing. Where note 1. That this sometime may be before and without the first, by meer providence: and so wicked men are pardoned without a promise, in such measure as God abateth and forbeareth punishing them. 2. That in our case this executive pardon *quoad initium* presupposeth the first Legal pardon, and *quoad complementum* it presupposeth the sentential absolution. 3. Note that this sort of pardon hath divers degrees, according to the degrees of any due penalty which is remitted: and so may alter. So that in a word, all pardon is of one of these three sorts. 1. By God as Author of the New Covenant, giving Right to Impunity. 2. By God as Judge absolving. 3. By God as executing.

All this being premised our question is, which of these it is that Scripture ascribeth to Faith, and is called Remission, or Believing, or Justification by Faith? Some say, It is only Gods mental pardon: Some say, It is none of these, but a Declaration to the Angels in heaven, who is Just. Some say, It is none of these, but a Manifestation to our consciences (as some speak) or a sentence of God in our hearts (as others speak.) Some say, It is *ipsa Impunitas*, or *non Punire* (as

Twisse sometime, or *nolle Punire*, as other times.) I think it is the Dissolving of the obligation to punishment, or the giving us a *Jus ad liberationem vel ad impunitatem*, or Gods remitting his *Jus puniendi*: Where the immediate *terminus* is the Dissolution of the obligation, or our *Debitum liberationis, vel jus ad impunitatem*: and the remote *terminus* (which is yet connoted in the term Pardon, as essentially necessary) is Impunity it self, or actual liberation from punishment, or *non-punire*. And withall, as in man a mentall Remission goes before the actual Signal, Legal Remission, so there is in God, a *Nolle punire*, and after the manner of men, it may be ascribed to God, as then beginning when the Law remitteth, and the sinner is a capable subject, because it cannot be denominated Remission, but by connotation of the object, and that must be, when there is an object fit: And so after the manner of men, we attribute it to God, as an act which in time he is moved to by an Impulsive cause, *viz.* the Satisfaction and Merits of Christ: though strictly we use to say, there is nothing *ab extra* can be an impulsive cause to God: Much more then this I have said for explication of this Point in private Papers to some Learned Friends; but this may suffice for the right understanding of what here passeth between Mr. K. and me. And now I proceed to his words.

1. He acknowledgeth the Promulgation of the New Covenant to be a Transient act: It is the same Instrument of God that is called his Covenant and his Law here. And as it is a Law, the term [Promulgation] doth most fitly agree to it. And I doubt not but either Mr. K. implieth Legislation (perhaps he mistakes the terms for equipollent) or at least he will as freely acknowledge that a Transient act. But he saith, 1. That [this Covenant hath an odde empty morall action.] Let any man that reades these words of this Learned man, judge whether I be not excusable for that censure in the Preface to the Appendix of my Book of Baptism! A School Divine and a Chair man, and know no more the nature of a Law, Covenant, or any Legal Instrument! A Divine, and an *Aristarchus*, and yet dare to speak such words of all the holy Laws and Covenants of God! Why what doth this man study and preach, that thinks so basely of Gods Laws? The Moral action of the Law of Grace or Testament of Christ he calleth [an odde empty Moral action:] Yet its like he knows that Commonwealths are chiefly upheld and ordered by Laws, Contracts, Conveyances, *&c.* and consequently by actions of the same nature. The whole body of the Commonwealth and each member of it, do hold their Estates, Liberties and Lives by such odde empty actions. Take away the odde empty Moral action of Laws, Testaments, Obligations, Deeds of Sale, Leases, *&c.* and what is a Commonwealth, and what a Rector, and what security have you of any thing you possess? or what orderly commerce among men? His next assertion is as desperate as the former, that [by the promulgation of this Covenant, God doth as improperly give us the Righteousnes of Christ, or disable the Law to condemn us.] Could any words (not certainly destructive to Christianity it self) have fallen from this Learned man more unworthy a Divine? Doth not the Testament of the Lord Jesus properly convey the Legacy? Doth not Gods Deed of gift of Christ and his Righteousnes to us, properly convey? and doth not God properly Give thereby? Why how can a more proper way of Giving be imaginable? 1. If a man do properly give, by a Testament or Deed of Gift, then so doth God: But a man doth, *&c.* Therefore, *&c.* 2. Where there is a plain signification of the Will of the Donor to confer thereby the benefit on the Receiver, there is a proper Giving:

But

But in the Gospel-promise or Testament of Christ there is such a signification of the Donors Will: Therefore, *&c.* Doth not an Act of Oblivion or Pardon properly give pardon to all that it pardoneth? Doth not any Act of Grace give the favours expressed?

2. And where he saith, that [God doth hereby as improperly disable the Law to condemn us.] I Reply. 1. Nothing in the world can more properly disable the Law from effectual condemning us, that is, so as to procure sentence and execution, then a general Act of pardon, or then the new Law doth, which is in its very nature *Lex Remedians, & obligationem ad pœnam prioris dissolvens.* Though still the Law as to its sense is the same, and therefore doth virtually condemn till the said dissolution. How can the Law of the Land be more disabled from effectual condemning all Traytors, for what is past, then by an Act of Oblivion, or a particular pardon under the Soveraigns Hand and Seal? 2. Yea this Learned man disputes against the very formall nature and definition of a pardon; which is to be *an Act of the Rector freeing the guilty from punishment by dissolving the obligation.* And certainly as the obligation it self is one of these [odde, empty Moral actions,] so must the dissolution of it needs be. Indeed *Theologus est Jurisconsultus Christianus,* a Christian Lawyer: and what a Lawyer he is that knows not the nature, use and force of Laws, is easie to be judged. I could wish men would lay by their over-bold enquiries into Gods Decrees and other Immanent acts, or at least, their vain pretendings to a knowledge which they never had of them, and study this intelligible and necessary part of Theology a little more.

But Mr. K. tels us that he will make all this strange doctrine [appear:] and how? Why [by considering that all here spoken of actions, is but of actions improperly so called, and such as cannot suffice to make a real effect.] *Rep.* Do you oppose [Real] to [feigned or nominal] or to [Relative?] If the former, it is such doctrine as I dare say, no Divine will believe, no Lawyer, no understanding member of a Commonwealth, and I think, no Christian, that understandeth what you say. Think not the words rash, for I think him not fit to be accounted a Divine, no nor a Christian (supposing him to understand the matter) that will or dare maintain, That neither the curse of the Law, or threatning of the new Law, whereby so many are adjudged to Hell, nor yet the Testament, Covenant, Promise of the Gospel, whereby Christ and his Benefits, Justification, Adoption, Salvation *(quoad Jus)* are given, do any of them make a true change? But if you oppose [Real] to [Relative,] then I must tell you, that [Remission and Justification Passive] are no Real effects, but Relative; which I had thought you need not have been told. The act of Legislation and Promulgation makes a real effect; but the *Fundamentum* once laid, causeth but a relation. Do not you know that the very formal nature of all morality is Relative? What else is *Æquum, Justum, Meritum, Debitum, Jus,* yea *bonum morale, & malum,* &c?

Again I must tell you, that you do not well to mention *Promulgation* alone, when I spoke of Enacting, or Granting, or Legislation, before Promulgation. I hope you take not both these for one. Nay indeed Promulgation is proper to a Law as it is obligatory to the subject, and so is necessary after Legislation, *ad actualem obligationem:* but a Law of Grace which doth conferre benefits, and whereby the Legislator doth, as it were, oblige himself, may be in force in some degree, without a Promulgation: because a man may be made capable of Right to Benefit without his knowledge, though he cannot be obliged to duty without his knowledge, except when he is Ignorant through his own fault.

§ 35.

Mr. K *For first, The Covenant Justifies us, not by any act, but meerly by the tenour of it, as a Law, not Agent, and many things in this kinde are said to do, when there, I wis, is no action at all:* Quantitas facit quantum; *I hope no Action, it doth it* formaliter, *not* efficienter: Paternitas facit patrem; *I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation, it doth it* formaliter, *not* efficienter: *and so doth the Covenant not Justifie a Believer by any Act, let Mr.* Baxter *mince it as he will,* a moral improper Action, *but as his* great Metaphysical Rabbies *would speak* aptitudinaliter, *and this but* extrinsecè *too; for* fœdus non facit Justum *of it self, but it must be beholden to many intervenient Causes.*

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§. 35.

R. B. 1. THanks to Inadvertency (as I suppose) it is here acknowledged that the Covenant doth Justifie, and that as a Law, which if it do, we shall see anon whether it can be any other way then that which I affirm. 2. But little thanks is due to this Authour from the friends of Truth, for his discovery of the way of the Covenants Justifying. [It is (saith he) by the Tenour of it, as a Law:] True: How else should it be? [but not Agent] Not by a Physical proper Action: that's true: But have Laws, Testaments, Covenants, Grants, Pardons, *&c.* no Moral Action? Or is this Moral so contemptible a matter, that a Learned Divine should make Nothing of it? When all mens estates and lives depend on it here, and all mens Salvation or Damnation hereafter. But how is it then that the New Covenant Justifies? why he thus proceeds [*Quantitas facit quantum*; I hope no Action: it doth it *formaliter*, not *efficienter*: *Paternitas facit patrem*, I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation, it doth it *formaliter*, not *efficienter*.] Reply. 1. I thought that [*facere*] had been as improperly applied to a formal Causation, as [*Agere*] and that I may, at least, as fairly do the later, as you the former. 2. If this Learned man do indeed think that the Covenant doth *formaliter* Justifie, as *Quantitas facit quantum, & paternitas patrem*, I shall the less repent that I was not his Pupil: And if I knew who be his old Doctors that he here speaks of, I would never read them, if they be no better in the rest: nay, I would take heed of looking into them, lest they had a power of fascination: What is the *Matter* that the Covenant doth Inform? Gods Act, or mans Quality, Act, or what? What matter doth it concurre with to constitute the *Compositum*? Is not *Justitia* that which formally maketh Just? Is the Covenant the Relation of *Just* in the Abstract? Why then doth not the denomination follow the form? Is it the Covenant *quod explicat, quid sit Justificatus*? Or by which *Justus est id quod est*? But let us make the best construction imaginable of Mr K's words, and suppose that he would only prove the Negative [what way it is by which the Covenant justifieth not, *viz.* not *efficienter*] and not [what way it doth Justifie, *viz. formaliter*] yet I should demand, 1. What is then the use or purpose of his Instances, or fore-going words? 2. What the better are we for his discourse, if he tell us not what way it is? 3. What Cause will he make it if not an efficient? Will he say it is either Material or Final? I think not. But he saith, that [the Covenant doth not Justifie a Believer by any Act, let Mr. *B.* mince it as he will, a Moral Improper Action, but as his great Metaphysical Rabbies would speak, *aptitudinaliter*, and this but *extrinsecè* too.] Reply. What Reader is much the wiser

for

for this anſwer? Would you know whether *Fœdus facit Juſtum, ut forma, vel ut efficiens?* Why Mr. K. telleth you, it doth it but *aptitudinaliter?* If ſo, then certainly, not *ut forma:* for *forma aptitudinalis faciens informatum*, is a ſtrange creature. It muſt then be matter or efficient. I would not think ſo hardly of Mr. K. as to imagine that he takes it for a Material Cauſe; much leſs that he takes it for *Materia aptitudinalis Juſtificationis actualis.* I hope ſuch doctrine never dropt from his Chair. What is left then, but that it be an efficient. And if ſo, is not all efficiency by Action of one ſort or other? And moreover, how comes *Efficiens tantum Aptitudinalis*, to be *Efficiens Actualis?* And if not *Actualis*, how comes the Effect to be produced, *viz.* The Believer to be Juſtified? But I dare not impute this *non*-ſenſe to Mr. K. Perhaps he takes the Covenant to be no Cauſe at all of Juſtification? But that will not hold neither? For he plainly ſaith, that [the Covenant juſtifieth] twice here together. And ſure *Juſtifying* ſignifieth ſome Cauſation.

Yet he amuſeth me more by adding [and this but *extrinſecè* too.] Why, who is it that hath found out another Juſtifying efficient, But onely the extrinſecal? By this I ſee he takes it not for Matter or Form; for they are not extrinſecal. But is not the Law, the Jury, the Advocate, the Judge, each of them an extrinſecal efficient in juſtifying every man that is juſtified *in foro humano?* It may be Mr. K. hath reſpect to the juſtification of Conſcience: But doth he think that there are not extrinſick efficients, that do more properly and more nobly juſtifie then our conſciences do? Then let man be his own pardoner and juſtifier, and be preferred before the bloud of Chriſt, the Law, the Advocate, and the Judge of Believers. I think it is no diſparagement to our Glorious Judge, that he will juſtifie us extrinſecally. Conſcience which juſtifieth (in ſome ſenſe) intrinſecally, doth it by ſo low an Act, by ſo ſmall Authority, that it is very doubtfull whether it be fit to call that Act either Conſtitutive or ſentential Juſtifying, ſo great is the Impropriety: (Of which I have ſpoke more fully elſwhere.)

If Mr. K. had named ſome of thoſe Metaphyſical Rabbies, and been guilty of naming as it were the Chapter and Verſe (of which crime he accuſeth me) I ſhould the better have known whether he ſay true or falſe, when he tels us that they would ſay the Covenant juſtifieth *aptitudinaliter*, and not by any act. Its true that the Covenant juſtifieth, *Ut ſignum voluntatis Divinæ per hoc Peccata remittentis:* And had he ſaid that it is *Signum Aptitudinale* to men before they believe, and *Signum Actuale* after, there had been ſome ſenſe in his words, though yet they had been defective of Truth or Fitneſs: For they are *ſignum actuale* to millions of the unjuſtified, though not *ſignum actualiter Juſtificans.* But it is Believers that are actually juſtified, of whom he ſpeaks expreſly: and therefore he hath ſome other meaning, what ever it is.

Yet if Mr K. had denied to the Covenant in juſtifying, a proper Phyſical act only, we were agreed; But he denieth [an improper moral action] as he tels me, I mince it: which if I ſhould do, I ſhould expect to be told, that I were a very ſingular man indeed: For I doubt not but this Learned man hath read many a large Volume of Politicks, and particularly *de Legibus*, and there read their Diſcourſes *de Legum actionibus*, viz. *præcipere, prohibere, præmiare, punire:* I doubt not but he hath read many a large Volume of the Civil Law in ſpecial, and therein of the Nature of Obligations of all ſorts: (For I would not ſuppoſe him defective in his reading of any thing.) And after all this for ſo Orthodox a man to deny [a Moral improper action] to Gods Laws, and ſo to all Laws, and

therein differ from all the Lawyers and Divines that ever the world knew (ſo farre as I can learn) is ſingularity indeed! Yea and never yet to write one Volume of his Reaſons againſt all the world, that we might be undeceived? Seriouſly I wonder what he thinks of Gods Laws, Covenants, Promiſes, Teſtament, and how he preacheth them, yea or believeth them, or what work they have on his ſoul, who takes them to have no Moral improper Action? I ſhould think ſuch a *merus Phyſicus* were a ſtrange man to make a Divine. But let us hear his reaſon: e[For *Fœdus non facit juſtum* of it ſelf, but it muſt be beholden to many intervenient Cauſes] Reply. 1. It ſeems to be here granted that *Fœdus facit juſtum intervenientibus alijs Cauſis*: And if ſo, it is an efficient; and if ſo it hath ſome kinde of Action. 2. *Negatur ſequela*: What if the Covenant juſtifie not *niſi intervenientibus aliis quibuſdam Cauſis?* Doth it thence follow that it hath no moral Action? And we muſt ſpeak *non* ſenſe to ſay, that it juſtifieth but *Aptitudinaliter?* 3. I deny that there is any other Cauſe doth intervene between the Covenant, and the Effect. A Condition on mans part muſt be performed before the Law or Covenant of Grace will *Actu Cauſare*, i. e. *Juſtificare*. And this Condition hath its Cauſes: But Remiſſion and Juſtification have no intervening Cauſes.

I have in Anſwer to other Reverend Brethren ſo fully and diſtinctly laid down my own thoughts of this whole buſineſs, *viz.* of the ſeveral ſorts of Righteouſneſs, and of the nature of each, and the Cauſes, that I will ſuppoſe I may be excuſed that I do it not here. Only I may tell Mr. K. that I take Righteouſneſs as now in Queſtion, to be a Relation (whether predicamental or Tranſcendental, we will not now diſpute; but I ſuppoſe it is the later.) And as Relation is ſo ſmall or low a Being, that it is by ſome reckoned between *Ens & Nihil*, ſo the way of its production muſt be anſwerable; and muſt be by as low a kinde of Action. Yet if it have any kinde of Being at all, it muſt have ſome Cauſe, and that muſt have ſome Action. And therefore Rabbi *Keckerman* ſaith, *Fundamentum idem ſignificat quod Efficiens; Terminus idem quod finis*. I ſuppoſe Mr. K. will acknowledge the Cauſation of procatarcktick Cauſes, *objectum*, *occaſio*, *meritum*: and yet will finde theſe efficients to have but an improper Action (at leaſt ſome of them) as well the *Fundamentum* hath in cauſing a Relation. Beſides all this, it is found no eaſie matter to reduce all Politicall Notions to the Notions of Logick or Metaphyſicks; and ſome think that when we ſpeak of Politicks, we muſt ſpeak in the terms of Politicks, and that it is an unfit or impoſſible attempt to ſpeak there in the ſtrict language of Logicians, though I am not of their minde in the later.

But ſuppoſe that I had granted all that Mr. K. hath hitherto ſaid: What is it to that which he ſhould prove? He undertakes to prove, 1. That the Covenants Action (as I call it) is [an odde, empty, Moral Action] and ſo cannot make this Effect: But he hath not yet proved, that the Relation of our Righteouſneſs may not Reſult from the Covenant as its *Fundamentum*, though without a proper Action; as ſoon as the Condition is performed on our parts to make us fit Subjects. 2. He undertakes to prove, that [by the Promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt, and diſable the Law to condemn us, becauſe all here ſpoken of Actions, is but of Actions improperly ſo called] But doth he indeed think that Legiſlation, or Promulgation, or Covenant making is but Improperly called Action? If he do, I will not waſte time in ſuch a work as the Confuting him is.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, If his Argument be good [We are not properly juſtified by an Action improperly called Action: But the Action of the Covenant is Improperly called Action: Therefore, *&c.*] then it will follow that we are not properly Juſtified by any Action of God. For it is generally held, that [Action] is not properly applied to God, but Analogically, and after the manner of the creature. I think this firſt Argument of Mr. K. deſerves no more anſwer.

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§. 36.

Mr. K. 2. *God is not properly ſaid to Juſtifie us by this tranſient Act of the Covenant: For either he Juſtifies all, or only ſome. Not all: for all I hope are not juſtified: not ſome more then others; for the New Covenant makes no difference of it ſelf: and ſo God juſtificth none by it.*

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§. 36.

R. B. 1. EIther you mean, that [it is not by the Tranſient act Alone that God Juſtifies] or [not by it at all.] If the former, I confeſſe it, becauſe the Moral Act which followeth doth intervene to the production of the Effect. It is not by the tranſient Act of Generation *alone*, that *Pater cauſat filiationem.* But it ſeems you take it in the later ſenſe, and ſo it is falſe. Though the *Fundamentum* do *ſuo modo Cauſare Relationem, idque immediatè*, yet that Act which Cauſeth the *Fundamentum*, doth properly Cauſe the Relation too.

2. I ſeriouſly profeſs that it ſeems to me a very ſad Caſe, that any man that is called a Divine, or a Chriſtian ſhould argue, and that ſo weakly, and ſo wilfully againſt all the efficacy of Gods Teſtament, Law or Covenant in conveying to us the ſaving Relative benefits of Chriſt! If it were only (as ſome Divines that I deal with) that he acknowledged the thing, and denied onely the fitneſs of the Name of Juſtifying to the Act of the Covenant, it were a ſmaller matter: But it is Remiſſion of ſin it ſelf; the giving us Chriſts Righteouſneſs, the diſabling the Law to condemn us, that he ſpeaks of, as you may ſee before: and ſo he here dares to conclude, That God juſtifies none by it. To this lamentable *Dilemma* here brought for proof, I ſay, 1. *Conditionally* God Juſtifieth *All* by his Covenant, at leaſt All to whom it is Revealed. *Actually* he Juſtifieth only them that have the Condition. I oppoſe *Actually* to *Conditionally*, becauſe that while it is but *Conditional*, it is not *Actual* in Law ſenſe, that is, Effectual, though it is *in Actu*, ſo farre done as it is: And indeed it is not in ſtrict ſenſe that a man is called, Juſtified, while it is but Conditional: though yet it is a common phraſe, becauſe the Agent hath done it *quantum in ſe*, when the Condition is but Acceptance. 2. God doth Juſtifie ſome more then others by his Covenant, *viz.* Believers more then Unbelievers: This me thinks a Divine ſhould not have denied. But he hath reaſon for his denial: and what's that? Why, he ſaith [for the New Covenant makes no difference of it ſelf.] A ſtrong Reaſon: It doth it not of it ſelf: Therefore it doth it not at all. But I Reply: There is a two-fold difference made between men in theſe ſpiritual changes. The firſt is Real, when one that was an Infidel is made a Believer: and this is done by the Spirit and Word ordinarily; and it is but to prepare men to be fit objects for the juſtifying Act: The ſecond is Relative, when we are Pardoned, Juſtified, Adopted, and have a Right given

given us to other Benefits: This difference the Covenant makes of it ſelf, the former preparatory difference being before made. To ſay, the Covenant makes not the firſt Real difference; Therefore it makes no difference, is ill arguing.

I would deſire the Reader to try how Mr. K's argument will fit the Laws or Conveyances of men. If a Parent bequeath to each of his children an hundred pound on Condition they marry, to become due at the day of Marriage; according to Mr. K. you may argue thus: Either this Teſtament Giveth the Legacy to All, or to None: Not to All, if All marry not: Not to ſome above others: for the Teſtament of it ſelf makes no difference: Therefore it Giveth it to none. Or if a King give out a Pardon, or paſſe an Act of Pardon or Oblivion for all Traitors that are up in arms againſt him, on Condition that they lay down arms, and Accept the pardon: Mr. K. would argue, it ſeems thus: Either this Act pardoneth All, or Some: Not All: for All will not lay down Armes, and Accept it: Not Some onely; for the act makes no difference of it ſelf: Therefore it pardoneth none. See what an Interpreters hand the Goſpel is fallen into at *Bliſland!*

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§. 37.

Mr. K. 3. *MAn ſhall properly be ſaid to Juſtifie himſelf (a thing which Mr.* Baxter *looks on, as well he may, as* Monſtrum horendum) *For where there is a promiſe of a reward made to All, upon a Condition of performing ſuch a ſervice, he that obtains the reward, gets it by his own ſervice; without which the promiſe would have brought him never the nearer to the reward: and thus a man wiſely Juſtifies himſelf by Believing, and more a great deal then God doth Juſtifie him by his Promulgation of the New Covenant, which would have left him in his old Condition had he not better provided for himſelf by Believing, then the Covenant did by Promiſing.*

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§. 37.

R. B. OHow much have I been too blame, in my indignation againſt poor ignorant Chriſtians, for taking up the abſurdeſt Antinomian fancies ſo eaſily! When even ſuch Divines as this ſhall uſe ſuch reaſoning as I here finde!

1. I deny the Conſequence, as being *verba ſomniantis.*

2. I think, I ſhall anon ſhew, that himſelf is undeniably guilty of this Conſequence, which here is called *Monſtrum horrendum.*

3. For his reaſon, 1. Its pity that he cannot diſtinguiſh between a Cauſe and a meer Condition: Where he ſaith [he that obtains the reward gets it by his ſervice] I ſay, it is here *By it,* as by a Condition *ſine qua non,* but not By it, as by a Cauſe. 2. And its pity that any Divine ſhould not diſtinguiſh between ſervice and ſervice. There is a ſervice which is *operari,* or ſome way profitable to him that we perform it to; which therefore may oblige by commutative Juſtice to reward us: and here the Reward is not of Grace, but Debt; and the Work is a Meritorious Cauſe, properly ſo called. There is a Work which is a Means of Moral-natural Neceſſity (on terms of Reaſon and common honeſty) to our orderly participation of a Benefit freely Given: As if a Traitor ſhall have a pardon

don on Condition he will Accept it, and come in: Or as if a Woman-Traitor should not only have pardon and life, but also be Princess, on condition she will marry the Kings son, that hath Ransomed her. Here the act may improperly be called service, because Commanded: but properly and in its principal Consideration, it is a necessary reasonable means, to her own happiness: And this act is but a meer Condition *sine qua non*, of her Pardon and Dignity, and no proper Meritorious, or efficient Cause.

4. What a dangerous reasoning is this, to teach men proudly to thank themselves for their pardon and happiness, and deny God the thanks! To say [Gods promise would have brought me never the nearer the reward, had not I believed: and I did a great deal more to Justifie my self by Believing then God did by his Covenant.]

5. Nay, I would desire the Reader to observe, what shift Mr. K. hath left for himself to disclaim this wicked Conclusion: Is there any of the Premises which he doth not own? 1. I hope he will not deny but the Promise of pardon and salvation is made to all that hear it, on Condition, they will Repent and Believe: 2. If he regard not better proof, I hope he will believe Dr. *Twiss* (so oft repeating it) that salvation is given *per modum præmii*. 3. I hope he believes, that without believing, the Covenant would not have brought him to salvation. Must not this man then conclude on his own principles, that [he wisely justifies himself by believing? and more a great deal then God doth justifie him by his promulgation of the new Covenant, which would have left him in his old Condition, had he not better provided for himself by Believing, then the Covenant did by promising.] I am loth to give those words so bad an Epithete as is their due. Why may not any Traitor say the like that Receives a free pardon? Or a beggar that Receives a free alms, when Receiving or Accepting is the Condition *sine qua non* of their attaining and possessing it?

6. The Gospel hath a promise of Faith it self to some: and this Faith is Caused by the holy Ghost: Therefore it is still God that provideth for the Elect, better then they provide for themselves, howsoever such disputers may talk. But we must not therefore confound the nature of Gods Gifts, nor their Causes or way of production. The Spirit gives us Faith first, which is our Condition, and makes us capable objects or subjects of Justification: which being done, the new Law of Grace doth immediately Pardon, Justifie and Adopt us: which way then doth Mr. K's desperate consequence follow? Or what shew of ground hath it? It seems if this man had forfeited his life, if a pardon were offered him but on Condition that he would Take it, and say, I thank you; he would say, he did a great deal more to his own pardon by Thanks and Acceptance, then the King that granted it, did by his Grant; because the Grant would have left him in the old Condition, had he not better provided for himself by Thankfull Acceptance, then the King did by his Pardon.] Yea and in our Case the Acceptance is Given too, though another way. I confess my detestation of this disputing, is beyond my expression.

Zanchy in 1 Joh. 1. *loc. de Remiss. p.* 41, 42. saith, Baptism is not perpetually a visible Instrument by which Remission is offered [*Verbum autem perpetuò est tale Instrumentum. Verbum ergo non Baptismus, est illud proprium & perpetuum instrumentum per quod perpetua peccatorum remissio nobis offertur & donatur* (so multitudes more) And *in compend. Theol. p.* 764. *Per Evangelium Deus gratis Justificat.*

§. 38.

Mr. K. *It's clear in the case of the New Covenant, as in that of the Old: The Covenant ran,* In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die: *This was Gods Threat: I pray who brought death into the world, God or Adam? Just so in the New Covenant,* Believe and be Justified: *Who justifies the Believer, God or himself?*

Turpe est doctori cum culpa redarguit ipsum.

§. 38.

R. B. NEver let any cause be thought so bad, but that it may have the greatest confidence to credit it with the world. [Its clear] saith Mr. K. in the beginning, and with his proverbiall Poetry, he triumphantly concludes. But if ever man met with weaker grounds of such triumph and confidence, in a man of such learning, he is of larger experience then I am.

1. To his first Question, I Reply: *Adam* brought death into the world as the Deserver, God as the Legislator, making it Due to him, if he sinned, and as the Judge, sentencing him to it for sin; and as the principal Cause of the Execution. But *Adam* was the culpable Cause.

2. To his second Question, I say, God justifieth the Believer, as Legislator, and as Judge, and as Rector *supra Leges*, and as Donor or Benefactor. And the Believer is not so much as the Meriter of his own Justification, as *Adam* was of his Condemnation. Did I think that any Learned Protestant had not known this? That he hath his Condemnation by his Merit, and his Justification without his Merit, upon the performance of that Condition which is the Acceptance of Christ that hath Merited it for us? That Death is the wages of sinne, and Eternal Life the Gift of God through Jesus Christ.

3. But again, I admire what the man means? Whether he own the wicked Conclusion [Man justifieth himself] or not? For he makes it to be the Consequence of this tenour of the Covenant [Believe and be Justified] And dare he say, that the Covenant doth not say, Believe and be Justified? Yea nevertheless, though it also give faith.

§. 39.

Mr. K. *THat first born of Abominations in Mr. Goodwins phrase is unluckily laid at Mr. Baxters own door; and it may appear it is not wrongfully fathered upon him, by that very argument which he undertakes to answer, and doth well enough for so much as is expresst, but there is more implied in it.*

§. 39.

R. B. 1. [UNluckily] must be interpreted [by false accusation] I expect to have such unlucky hands lay more such abominations at my door.

2. Mr. K. confesseth, that I well enough answer the Argument for so much as is

is expreſt: And let the Reader well obſerve what the implied addition is that he makes.

§. 40.

Mr. K. *THat the Promulgation of the New Covenant was from the beginning: Many men ſhall not be Juſtified till towards the end of the World: No man till a long time after the Promulgation: Therefore not ſo much by Gods Promulgation of the Covenant, as the man covenanter by performing the Condition, which is the Immediate Cauſe of it, and therefore he juſtifies himſelf, and that more then God in the New Covenant.*

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§. 40.

R. B. 1. WHat is here added as implied to that which he confeſſeth, that I well enough anſwered? Let him tell that can.

2. How can he prove that *Adam* was not juſtified till a long time after the Promulgation of the New Covenant? A bold aſſertion, me thinks.

3. The Conſequence is a putid *non-ſequitur*: What ſhew doth the man bring to make any man believe his Conſequence, but the bare Credit of his own word?

4. What a ſtrait doth this Diſputer bring himſelf into? He muſt either ſay, that the Goſpel or New Covenant doth not promiſe Pardon and Juſtification on Condition of Believing. (And is he fit to preach the Goſpel that would deny ſo great a part of it.) Or elſe he muſt hold his wicked Concluſion, That man juſtifieth himſelf, and that more then God in the Covenant. And for ought I can underſtand by him he means to own one of theſe.

5. The ground of all this rotten doctrine, is another notorious errour here expreſſed, *viz.* That [mans performing the Condition *is* the Immediate Cauſe of his Juſtification:] when it is properly no Cauſe at all. A Condition may ſometime be alſo a Moral Cauſe, *i.e.* when there is ſomewhat in the excellency or nature of the thing Conditioned, to move the principal Cauſer: But ſuch a Condition as is purpoſely choſen for the abaſing of man, and the honour of free Grace, and conſiſteth but either in Accepting a free Gift, or in not rejecting it again, or not ſpitting in the face of the Giver, this is no Cauſe, but *ſine qua non*. It ſeems, this Learned man hath too arrogant thoughts of his own faith, as if it were the Immediate Cauſe of his Juſtification, and ſo he juſtified himſelf more then God by his Covenant.

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§. 41.

Mr. K. *AS for inſtance: There was a Law made in Queen* Elizabeths *time, That every Engliſh man having taken Orders in the Romiſh Church, coming into* England, *ſhall ſuffer as a Traitor: That Engliſh man, which having taken Orders in the Romiſh Church, comes now into* England, *and is condemned, hath not ſo much reaſon to charge his condemnation on the Queen, as himſelf.*

§. 41.

R. B. THat is becauſe he is the culpable meriting Cauſe. Are we the Deſervers of pardon?

§. 42.

Mr. K. *THe Law condemns him; but ſhe doth not who made the Law, who died many years ſince: yea the Judge who pronounceth the ſentence doth not ſo properly do it as the Seminary himſelf: No nor the Law, as the Prieſt himſelf; who had he been minded to have ſecured himſelf, might have done it at his pleaſure, ſtayed at* Rheines *or* Doway, *and condemned the Law of Tyranny; yea and avouchs all thoſe that ſuffered by it as Traytors to be really Martyrs. The caſe is the ſame, though in a different matter.*

§. 42.

R. B. 1. YOu confeſs here that the Law condemneth: and then no doubt it juſtifieth too.

2. Where you ſay, [Shee doth not that made the Law] I ſay, that is becauſe the Law doth operate or cauſe, as it is a ſign of the Will of the Rector, to conſtitute that *Jus* which he had power to conſtitute. Now when the Queen and Parliament were dead, they had no power to oblige them that ſhould live after them, much leſs if contrary to the Will of their ſucceſſors: Nor yet had they power while they were alive, ſo to binde poſterity. The Laws therefore were divolved into other hands, and now bindes as *ſignum voluntatis Rectoris jam exiſtentis*: For it is his will that it ſhould continue; and that will animates it: Yet where any hath power, the ſigns of their will may be effectual when they are dead: Or elſe Teſtaments were little worth, and Legataries were in an ill caſe. But whats this to our caſe? God dieth not, and the Laws of his Kingdom loſe not their force, nor change their Maſter, by the change of Governours. But if you had dealt ingenuouſly, you ſhould rather have enquired, whether the preſent Rector and Maſter of the Law, may be ſaid to condemn him that the Law condemns. And that methinks you ſhould not deny. Yea, and it may be ſaid that dead *Lycurgus* was a cauſe of the condemnation of ſurviving offendors, for all your bare denial!

3. Where you ſay that [the Judge who pronounceth the ſentence doth not ſo properly condemn him, as the Seminary himſelf.] Seeing you yield that both condemn him, the Judge Sententially, and himſelf Meritoriouſly, and the queſtion is but of the greater or leſs propriety in the word [Condemn] I think it not worth the contending about. Yet *Appello Juriſconſultos*: and if they ſay not that it is a more proper ſpeech to ſay [The Judge condemneth him] then to ſay [He condemned himſelf by breaking the Law] then I am content the next time its acted to take *Ignoramus* his part, and confeſs that I know little of the Lawyers language. Indeed I ſtill ſay it is the offendour that is the culpable cauſe. Where you ſay that the caſe is here the ſame: I anſwer, then it ſeems you think you deſerve a Pardon, as a thief deſerves the Gallows. I durſt not have called theſe caſes the ſame.

§. 43. Mr. K.

§. 43.

Mr.K. *IN a like matter take it thus. A man is found guilty of a felony; the Law ſaith, He ſhall be ſaved if he ſhall reade: he reads and is ſaved: Gramercy, ſaith he, to my Reading more then to the courteſie of the Law: and though he acknowledge* pro forma *that it is the courteſie and grace of the State to him, yet as the bad Engliſh man, God bleſs her Father and Mother that taught her to reade, elſe the Law would have been ſevere enough; he may be ſaid to have ſaved himſelf.*

§. 43.

R. B. 1. YOu ſay, [It is a like matter.] But you ſay ſo much and prove ſo little, that you loſe much of your labour, as to me. It is not a like matter. The Law for ſaving him that reads *ut Clericus*, was made partly to ſpare Learned men, becauſe the Prince or Commonwealth hath need of them, and ſuſtaineth a greater loſs in the death of ſuch then of the unlearned; and partly in a reſpect to the worth of their Learning, if not with ſome ſpecial indulgence to the Clergy for their Office, and to pleaſe the Pope. But Gods Law of Grace pardoning a penitent, gracefull Believer, hath no ſuch intent: God needs not us, as the Commonwealth needs the Learned. Beſides the Law hath laid the condition of eſcape in intellectual Abilities, without any Moral reſpect to the virtue of the party: but God hath laid it more in the meer conſent of the Will.

2. But if you will interpret the Law of the Land otherwiſe, as if it were an act of pureſt grace, then I ſay, your Client with his *Gramercy* is an ungratefull fellow, and your bad Engliſhman, is the picture of a bad Chriſtian, indeed no Chriſtian: But by your ſpeeches I perceive that about theſe matters experience is a great advantage to the right underſtanding of the Truth; by the means whereof many an unlearned Chriſtian knows more then ſome Learned Diſputers. He that hath felt what it is to be condemned by the Law, and afterward pardoned by the Goſpel, and put into a ſtate of ſalvation by Chriſt, doth not ſay as Mr.K. that he is more beholden to his believing then to Gods promiſe, but heartily aſcribeth all to God. Faith is the act of an humbled ſoul accepting of Chriſt as he is offered in the Goſpel. And can any humbled ſoul give thanks to his own Acceptance, more then to Gods Gift? yea when the power and act of Accepting is his Gift alſo? If Mr.K. have an imagination that in every conditional Donation, there is more thanks due to the performer of the condition then to the giver, I dare ſay, he is an ungratefull perſon to God and men. If his father leave him all his Eſtate on condition he give a younger Brother 6d out of it, or that he give 6d to the poor; it ſeems he will more thank himſelf then his father. If he had forfeited his life, and a pardon were given him, on condition he would Accept it thankfully and humbly on his knees, and that he would not ſpit in the face of him that giveth it, nor ſeek his death, he would give the chiefeſt thanks to himſelf. As for the phraſe of [ſaving himſelf] he knows it is the Scripture phraſe, 1 *Tim.* 4. laſt. though pardoning our ſelves he not.

§. 43.

Mr. K. YEa *Mr.* Baxter *expreſſeth ſomewhat in his anſwer which makes up full meaſure of evidence againſt him. He ſaith, The condition being performed, the Conditionall grant becomes abſolute.* Ergo, *ſay I, He that performs the Condition, makes the grant to be abſolute, and ſo doth more to his Juſtification then God, who made only a Conditionall grant, and which notwithſtanding he might have periſht, yea muſt without his own act of believing. And truly whoever makes faith the Condition of the New Covenant in ſuch a ſenſe as full obedience was the Condition of the Old, cannot avoid it, but that man is juſtified chiefly by himſelf, his own acts, not ſo much by Gods grace in imputing Chriſts Righteouſneſs, but more by his own faith, which I hope is his own act, though Gods work.*

§. 44.

R. B. 1. ALl's clear againſt me, if you be Judge; but the whole charge depends but on the credit of your bare word. That [*Ergo*, ſay I] is the ſtrong proof. Your conſequence is none, but a meer fiction. By [Abſolute] I mean, it actually conferres without any further Condition, when all the Condition is performed. Its a hard caſe that a man ſo Learned in his own eyes ſhould be ignorant what a Condition is, *in ſenſu Civili, vel Legali.* Were you not ſo, you would not ſtill make it a cauſe; when (unleſs ſomewhat beyond the meer nature of a Condition be added) it is no cauſe at all. It is falſe therefore that the performer in our caſe makes the grant to be Abſolute, if by *making*, you mean *cauſing*, as you before expreſs your ſelf, it is only a performing that, *ſine qua Donatio non erit Actualis vel Abſoluta.* It is the Donor (yea though he were dead before) that makes the Conditional grant become Actual or Abſolute when the Condition is performed. And if it ſtill ſtick in your ſtomack, that he performeth no new act to do this; I anſwer, it needs not: the firſt act of making his Teſtament, Deed of gift, Contract, Law, *&c.* doth all this. The Law or other inſtrument, is but the ſignifier of his Will, and therefore conveyeth when and on what terms he will (in a caſe within his power.) If it be his will that this Inſtrument ſhall *Jus* conferre preſently and abſolutely, it doth it: If but *in dieu* and abſolutely, it doth it: If *ſub conditione*, it doth it: and in both the laſt caſes, its his will that the Inſtrument ſhall give no Actual Right till the day come, or till the Condition be performed: ſo that a Condition is no true cauſe of the effect: the *non*-performance of it ſuſpendeth the act of the grant, but the performance doth not cauſe it; unleſs you mean it of a *cauſa fatua*, which doth but *removere impedimentum*; ſo that if the Day be twenty years after the Teſtators death, that the Legacy becomes due, or if the Condition be ſo long after performed, it is the will of the Donor that maketh that Inſtrument then convey Right, which did not before; becauſe it works only *ſignificando voluntatem Donatoris*, and ſo when and how he expreſſed his will it ſhould work. Would one think ſuch trivial obvious points ſhould be unknown to Mr. K.?

2. Where you talk of [faith being a condition of the New Covenant in the ſame ſenſe as full Obedience of the Old.] I ſay your words [in the ſame ſenſe] are ambiguous: *Quoad rationem formalem Conditionis in genere*, it is in the ſame ſenſe a Condition. But it is not a Condition of the ſame *ſpecies*. It differs in the matter;

matter; one being the humble thankfull Acceptance of Christ and Life freely restored and given; the other being a perfect fulfilling of a perfect Law: the ends are different: One is to obtain part in Life purchased by Christ, when we were undone by sin: the other to maintain continued interest in the felicity first given by the Creator: One is to abase the sinner by self-deniall, and to extoll Free-grace; the other was to obtain the Reward in a way as honourable to man, as he was capable of. More differences might easily be added.

3. Let the Reader mark what our Question was [Whether God Pardon or Justifie us by the Covenant grant?] and whether Mr. K. hath now carried it? It was all this while maintained, that the performer of the Condition, is not Justified so much by the Covenant as by himself: Now it is come to these terms: [Not so much by Gods Grace in Imputing Christs Righteousness, but more by his own faith.] He seems to me to yield, that we are as surely Justified by the Covenant, as by Gods Grace imputing Christs Righteousness.

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§. 45.

Mr. K. YEt *say I against Mr.* Baxter 2. *That faith is the Real effect which God works, by a Transient act on a person whom he justifies.*

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§. 45.

R. B. YOu are resolved, it seems, it shall be against Mr. *Baxter* whatever you say. But what Rational Animal besides your self can tell how this is against me? If it be against me, its either Directly or Consequentially. If Directly, then I have somewhere denied it, or spoke the contrary: Shew where and shame me. If Consequentially, why is there no hint given us which way it makes against me? or against what opinion or words of mine? It seems it was intentionally against me, not against my Doctrine but Me: Your minde may be against me, but Truth is not against me.

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§. 46.

Mr. K. THat *faith is a Reall effect, others will admit without proving: Mr.* Baxter *who denies faculties and habits distinct from the soul, may be forced to yield it by this Argument. If faith be not a Reall effect on the soul, then neither is any other grace, for all flow from faith, and consequently no reall alteration wrought in Sanctification, and consequently no sanctified soul Really differs from her self when unsanctified, no nor more then* numero *from unsanctified worldlings; they are all alike. Taking it then that faith is a Real effect: 2. It is acknowledged it is wrought by God, and that not of our selves, it is the gift of God. And 3. that it is wrought by a transient act, as being a Reall effect by God in* subjecto extraneo. *Let us see now how by this transient act whereby God works faith, he may truly be said to justifie us in time as he decreed from eternity?*

§. 46.

§. 46.

R. B. 1. THe man would have his Reader believe that I muſt be forced by his Arguments to confeſs faith to be a real effect. 2. Till he prove it, I will take it for a meer ſlander, that I deny Faculties and Habits diſtinct from the ſoul. 1. I ſaid I thought [it would not be proved,] but I roſe not to the confidence of a flat deniall; as knowing what is ſaid on both ſides. 2. What was it that I ſaid would not be proved? That the faculties were not *Really diſtinct* from the ſoul or one another: but not that they were not *diſtinct*, as Mr. K. ſaith. They may be diſtinct modally or formally, though not *ut Res & Res*. 3. When did I ſay this of Habits, as Mr. K. affirmeth? But I will hereafter expect no more truth from him, even in matters of fact, then according to the proportion of the foregoing diſpute. 4. To the point it ſelf I ſay, we muſt diſtinguiſh of Reality: If you oppoſe Real either to Feigned, or Privative, or Negative, or Potential, or to an extrinſecall denomination, or to meerly Relative, ſo its out of doubt that faith and all graces in the act and habit are Real effects. But if by Real you mean more then a diſtinction formall, or *Ratione Ratiocinatâ*, or Modal, I will neither affirm nor deny it, till I better underſtand it: You that know ſo well the nature of the Immanent acts of God, may a thouſand times more eaſily know the nature of the Immanent acts and habits of man: but I confeſs exceeding great ignorance of both: and to tell you my opinions of theſe things would be but vain and unſeaſonable. 5. Your laſt words contain the myſtery, that by [that tranſient act whereby God worketh faith, he may be ſaid to Juſtifie;] we ſhall have good ſtuff, I think, when this myſtery comes to be opened.

Whether Faith Juſtifie as an Inſtrument.

§. 47.

Mr. K. *Mr Baxter objects againſt faiths being an inſtrument of our Juſtification: and that it is neither mans nor Gods inſtrument. I ſhall make it appear to be both Gods and mans in ſome ſenſe, though in different reſpects, notwithſtanding all he hath ſaid to the contrary. Saith he, If faith be an Inſtrument of our Juſtification, it is the Inſtrument of God or man: not of man; for man is not the principall efficient, he doth not juſtifie himſelf. I Anſwer 1. According to his doctrine, man doth juſtifie himſelf,* ut ſupra. 2. *That man is not the principall efficient of his faith, more then of his Juſtification; it is God who muſt have that honour. 3. That man doth receive his Juſtification by faith as an Inſtrument, as ſhall be ſhewed hereafter.*

§. 47.

R. B. THis quarrelſome man wanting work, had a minde to take in this Controverſie alſo, about faiths Inſtrumentality in Juſtifying: but what an unhandſome Tranſition he makes to draw it in, may be eaſily diſcerned. Let the Reader remember, that the thing which I deny is, that faith is an Inſtrument

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in the ſtrict Logical ſenſe, that is, an Inſtrumental efficient cauſe of our Juſtification: and that I expreſly diſclaim contending *de nomine*, or contradicting any that only uſe the word Inſtrument in an improper larger ſenſe, as Mechanicks and Rhetoricians do: ſo that the Queſtion is *de re*, whether it efficiently cauſe our Juſtification as an Inſtrument? This I deny. And to his triple Anſwer I Reply. 1. The firſt is of the old ſtamp; a groſs untruth, needing no other reply then a deniall. 2. The ſecond if it be ſenſe, implieth the deniall of this maxime, that [*Inſtrumentum eſt efficientis principalis Inſtrumentum*] and thence inferreth, that [as man may be his own Inſtrument in effecting faith, though he be not the principall cauſe, ſo may he be in Juſtification of himſelf.] If this be not the ſenſe of it (if contradictions may be called ſenſe) then I cannot underſtand it. But the denied maxime needs no proof: that man is his own Inſtrument in effecting his faith, needs no more then a deniall to diſprove it (ſpeaking thus *de homine*, and not *de parte aliqua hominis organicâ.*) That man is not *cauſa principalis* in beleeving, is untrue; though God be *Cauſa prima*: May none but the *Cauſa prima* be called *Cauſa principalis*? then no creature is capable of uſing an Inſtrument. 3. His third muſt be conſidered when we come to the fuller proof which he referres us to.

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§. 48.

Mr. K. *BUt when he ſaith, Faith is not Gods Inſtrument, 1. I do not ſay it is properly, but it is his work, and by giving us faith he juſtifies us, as ſhall be ſhewed anon, he giving us that which is our Inſtrument, whereby we receive the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt.*

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§. 48.

R. B. 1. EVennow he undertook to prove it Gods Inſtrument, but now, he doth not ſay it is properly: and I will not contend againſt an improper term, when the thing is diſclaimed. 2. Here is another touch upon the myſtery, that [by giving us faith he juſtifies us] but we ſhall be ſhewed it anon: therefore I muſt not overhaſtily anticipate it.

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§. 49.

Mr. K. 2. *BUt it is as much his Inſtrument as the new Covenant is: for faith working in my heart, is that whereby God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Juſtification.*

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§. 49.

R. B. 1. IF the New Covenant be properly Gods Inſtrument, and faith be not, then faith is not as much his Inſtrument as the New Covenant: But the Antecedent is true: Therefore, *&c.* The ſecond member of the Antecedent Mr. K. now yielded. For the firſt I will appeal to all Lawyers and Politicians, or any that underſtands what an Inſtrument is, what Civil commerce is, and what a Law or any Contract is, whether a Deed of gift, a Teſtament, or a Law be not as proper Inſtruments *conferendi Jus, conſtituendi Debitum*, as is imaginable,

or as the nature of the thing constituted or conferred (*Debitum*) is capable of. In the mean time, I leave Mr. K. to examine it, by the common Canons and properties of an Instrument. 2. Faith is not [Gods pronouncing,] but your belief of what he pronounceth, and Acceptance of what he offers: Will you confound faith with its object? Divine Testimony is the object of faith, and you make it faith it self. 3. I know the Antinomians take faith to be [the belief of our Justification: or the perswasion or apprehension of Gods love to me in special,] but so do not our modern Protestants. 4. If this be true doctrine, then wo to poor Christians that have no Assurance of their Justification: and then, how few have faith? For I think it is comparatively but a small number that have felt God pronouncing in their hearts, that the Covenant is of benefit to their own particular Justification: except by the term [of benefit] be meant, a conditional Justification, or a tendency or means towards their Justification; and so even ungodly men may know that it's [of benefit] to them for Justification (as Mr. K. phraseth it.) 5. Doth not Mr. K. shew here that the Truth sticks in his minde, and that he is fain to hide it in ambiguous terms. What can he mean by this saying [God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Justification] but this [That the New Covenant justifieth me?] He would not openly tell us which way it benefiteth him to Justification, and yet be no efficient instrumentall cause of it.

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§. 50.

Mr. K. AND 3. *it may be Gods Instrument notwithstanding his Argument: whereof the first is* [*for it is not God that believeth*] *nor needs it, say I: it is enough that God maketh me believe, and so receive the Righteousness of Christ: yea God by making me believe gives me an hand wherewith to receive, opens my hand whereby I receive it: I alone receive, but these are Gods acts, and though God be not said to believe, he truly may be said to be the Author of my belief; my belief is an immanent act in me, and so denominates me the believer, a transient act as from God, and denominates him only the Author of my believing: in me it is an adjunct, it hath to him only the relation of an effect. For example, I throw a bowl: the motion of this bowl is more from me then the bowl, and I accordingly am said to have bowled well or ill: but the motion doth not denominate me otherwise then in the Agent, not the subject; and though I be said to bowl well, the bowl in this case is only said to run, not I. So the chief Author of my Believing is God, and he must have the glory of turning and framing and upholding and working all in my heart, as being the Author, Preserver and Finisher of my faith; yet I alone am said to believe, not God; though my faith be more properly Gods work, then it is my own: had not he begun it in me, I had no more believed in Christ, then the bowl would have run to the mark of it self; all the progress of my faith is from him, and to him be all the glory.*

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§. 50.

R. B. 1. NOne of all this is brought against my Conclusion, for he yieldeth that; (that our faith is not properly Gods Instrument in justifying) but it is to shew the strength of his wit against my *mediums*. If he yield it to be the truth which I maintain, the matter is the less if I fail in proving it: Or if one *medium* be defective, it is little matter, if the rest, or any one suffice. 2. What

hath

hath he ſaid in all theſe words, more then what I ſaid in thoſe few words which he oppoſeth, *viz.* [It is not God that Believeth, though its true he is the firſt Cauſe of all Actions.] Is not this the full ſubſtance of his ſpeech? 3. All his words ſeem to tend but to prove that God may be ſaid to be the principal Cauſe of our faith, and it to be his act: but what's that to its inſtrumentality in juſtifying. 4. I intended this firſt Propoſition, chiefly as preparatory to the reſt, rather then as a full proof of the Concluſion by it ſelf. Perhaps we may give him ſome plainer Argument anon, when he hath done with theſe.

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§. 51.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxters *ſecond Argument to prove it, not Gods Inſtrument that man is* Cauſa ſecunda *between God and the Action, and ſo ſtill ſaid to juſtifie himſelf. I anſwer,* 1. *Man is indeed* Cauſa ſecunda, *but not between God and the Action, for God doth immediately concurre to it, and man is in regard of the habit of faith purely paſſive, not active at all, for that though other habits may be acquired, faith is infuſed both for the eſſence and degree.* 2. *Man may not be ſaid by his believing to juſtifie himſelf, but to Believe to his Juſtification, and to receive Juſtification by believing, for that by faith, as it is Gods work, God doth juſtifie him,* viz. *declares hereby the Righteouſneſſe of Chriſt to be his own; he doth apprehend or receive the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt by believing, as it is his own act, whereof ſtill he is the Subject, not the Author, as the Bowl is of it running.*

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§. 51.

R. B. 1. WHether God concurre Immediately to all humane actions, I have no minde to diſpute: If Mr. K. want work on that ſubject, he may anſwer *Ludov. a Dola.* But it ſufficeth me that man alſo is an Immediate Cauſe of his Believing. 2. Whether man be Paſſive or not in receiving the habit, is nothing, that I know of, to the matter; as long as the act which juſtifieth is immediately by him. 3. It is a great uncertainty which you affirm ſo confidently. You know not but that the Spirit of God by the Word, may excite an act of faith before he infuſe a habit, and by that act (or more) produce a habit. 4. And ſo the habit may be ſaid to be Infuſed as from God, and acquired by man too: and it is commonly granted, that Infuſed habits are attained *ſecundum modum acquiſitorum.*

To the ſecond Anſwer, I ſay, 1. For your Receiving Inſtrument, we ſhall ſpeak to it anon. 2. *Si fides efficit Juſtificationem, tum Credens per fidem efficit Iuſtificationem: At fides ſi modò Inſtrumentum Iuſtificationis eſt, Iuſtificationem efficit: Ergo,* &c. The *major* is evident, in that man is the immediate proper Cauſe of the act, therefore if the act doth it, the Agent by that act doth it. The Inſtrument is his that immediately and properly uſeth it. The *minor* is undeniable, ſpeaking of a true inſtrumental Cauſe: For there is no inſtrumental Cauſe in any kinde, but of efficients.

2. A hint I perceive more here of your opinion, what is Gods juſtifying act, *viz.* Working faith in us: but I will wait till this opinion dare come into the light.

3. I perceive alſo here what you take Juſtification to be, *viz.* [declaring Chriſts

Righteouſneſs to be his own] Right Antinomianiſm. 1. Will you tell us whether [Declaring Chriſts Righteouſneſs to be mine] do not ſuppoſe it to be firſt mine? Elſe it is the Declaring of an untruth. And if it were mine before, was not I juſt before? and ſo *conſtitutivè* juſtified? 2. Why did you not tell us when and how that was done? And what was the act whereby God did conſtitute me juſt? Which is firſt to be known, and which you knew that I was ſpeaking of. 3. Where, and to whom is it that [God declares this] you ſpeak of? Onely in Conſcience, and not to others, no doubt. But I doubt not fully to ſhame (in due place) this Antinomian fancy, that Juſtification by faith (in Scripture ſenſe) is but Juſtification in Conſcience. 4. Many a ſoul hath juſtifying faith (of Aſſent and Conſent) who yet doth not believe that Chriſts Righteouſneſs is their own. 5. May not other Graces declare Chriſts Righteouſneſs to be ours? (I know not whether it be *ſano ſenſu* that you ſpeak of Chriſts Righteouſneſs being made ours, but I will not digreſſe to enquire further into it now.) 6. You do ſtrangely affirm, that man is not the author of his own act (whether he be the ſubject, I referre to what is ſaid:) If by the Author, you mean, not the perſwader, but the Agent, the vital, voluntary ſelf-determiner, then he is the Author; or elſe I could tell you of ſuch unavoidable conſequents, as you will be aſhamed to own. If you be indeed one of thoſe that think man a free Agent, is no more the author of his own acts, then your Bowl is, I ſhall fear, leſt you will think your ſelf very excuſable for all the evil you do, and therefore little care what you do: I ſhall be loath to truſt a man of ſuch principles, if his carnal intereſt carry him to do me a miſchief. How many Philoſophers or Divines are of your minde in this, that man is but the Subject and not the Authnr of his own act of Believing?

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§. 52.

Mr. K. *TO his third Argument, that the* Action of the principal Cauſe, and of the Inſtrument is the ſame, *is true, and when he asks,* Who dare ſay that faith is ſo Gods Inſtrument? *I underſtand not any great danger in affirming, that God giving me faith, the habit and thereby the act of believing, concurs with my faith which he hath given in enabling me to receive Chriſt; he gives me an hand, ſtretcheth it out, and opens it, and puts Chriſts Righteouſneſſe into it: Why is not my hand here his Inſtrument whereby he conveys Chriſts Righteouſneſs to me, as well or more then my own whereby I apprehend it?*

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§. 52.

R. B. 1. IF it be true, that the Action of the Principal and Inſtrumental Cauſe be the ſame, then it unavoidably follows, that man juſtifieth and pardoneth himſelf, when God doth it. For then when God effecteth our Juſtification, Faith, which is his Inſtrument doth effect it too: When God forgiveth us *effectivè*, faith forgiveth us *effectivè*: and conſequently the immediate agent man, doth it too. 2. Again, I tell you, the place to examine your Receiving Inſtrumentality is anon where your ſelf hath deſigned it. I may not anticipate you.

§. 53.

§. 53.

Mr.K. *And whereas he ſaith, Fourthly, The Inſtrument hath an Influx on the effect, by a proper Cauſality, which who dare ſay of faith? I anſwer, 1. That it hath a proper Cauſality upon our Juſtification paſſively taken, that is, upon our Receiving the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt. And no more need: for we make it an Inſtrument not to work, but to receive. But ſecondly, according to him it hath more then the Influx of an Inſtrumental, that of the principal efficient upon our Juſtification, as being that which makes this Conditional Grant in the Covenant to become Abſolute: And all the benefit we receive by the Covenant is more to be aſcribed to our faith, then Gods grace in the Covenant, which would have been of no advantage to us at all, had it not been that our faith came in and rendred it of uſe to us. Thus then we do not deprive God of his Glory in juſtifying us by faith, though we aſcribe Juſtification to faith; for we aſcribe our faith to God, and make our believing his work, which as it comes from him is an active declaration, as in us a Paſſive reſenting of his favour to us in Chriſt, of which we always may though we not actually aſſure our ſelves.*

§. 53.

R. B. 1. REceiving is either Properly, which is alwayes Paſſive: Or improperly, morally, imputatively, which is the Conſent of the will when a thing is offered, and it is active, called Receiving, becauſe it is neceſſary to the Paſſive proper Receiving.

In the former ſenſe, to Receive pardon and Juſtification is nothing but to be pardoned and juſtified: it is a meer Relative Reception. In the later ſenſe, faith it ſelf is our [Receiving] If Mr.K. mean the former, when he ſaith, that [faith hath a proper Cauſality upon it] I ſay, His words are ſcarce ſenſe. To have [Cauſality upon] implieth a ſubject upon which there may be ſuch Cauſality: But the Reception of a Relation is no ſuch capable Subject. If he mean only [a Cauſality of that Reception] I ſay, There is no natural proper Cauſe of the Reception of a Relation, but that which cauſeth the Relation it ſelf, by Cauſing its foundation: though there may be other Cauſes of the fitneſs of the Subject, yet that fitneſs effecteth not the Reeeption. Moral Cauſes there may be beſides; but this is not pleaded ſuch. An efficient Inſtrument of the Reception of a Relation, (that is, *Juſtitiæ, vel juris ad impunitatem*) we ſhall believe it to be when we firſt finde ſenſe, and then truth in that aſſertion. 2. And for the ſecond kinde of *Receiving* Chriſts Righteouſneſſe, it is Faith it ſelf. And to ſay, that faith hath a proper Cauſality on it ſelf, is a hard ſaying.

Your ſecond Anſwer is the meer repetition of a notorious ſlander, not onely unproved, but bewraying the groſſe miſtake of the Nature of a Legal Conditionjas I have ſufficiently ſhewed, and will not waſte time to recite.

I conclude therefore contrary to your Concluſion, that if you make faith the proper Inſtrument of juſtifying, you make man his own pardoner, and rob God of his Soveraignty. Your reaſon to the contrary is ſuch as the Papiſts bring to excuſe their doctrine of Merit: they ſay, Chriſt hath Merited for them a power of Meriting, and ſo the glory redounds to him: ſo you ſay, [We aſcribe our faith to God, though we aſcribe Juſtification to faith.] But you muſt needs aſcribe it alſo immediatly to your ſelf, if you be the man that believes.

Again, you touch the way of Gods juſtifying darkly: [As it comes from him (you ſay) it is an active declaration, as in us a Paſſive reſenting his favour to us in Chriſt.] But, 1, do you mean, it is a Declaration Enunciative? Or meerly ſignal? If the former, it is very falſe. To ſpeak a Truth, and to Cauſe one to believe it, are not all one. If the later, then it ſeems you think God juſtifies a man, every time he giveth him any Evidence of his Grace. And if ſo, then other Graces juſtifie as well as faith; and then Juſtification is increaſed upon every increaſe of every Grace: But more of this when you come to it of purpoſe.

And Paſſive Reſenting Gods Love or Favour is an ill deſcription of juſtifying faith, and not a little dangerous.

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§. 54.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxter *proceeds to take off an Objection.* [*But ſome would evade it thus: Faith, ſay they, is a Paſſive Inſtrument, not an Active*] *I know not who ſay it, nor matters it much, yea it is needleſs to ſay ſo: But Mr.* Baxters *anſwer to this I conceive to be very unſatisfactory: For where he ſaith* [1. *Even Paſſive inſtruments are ſaid to help the Action of the principal Agent,* Kecker. *log.* p. 131. *and he that ſaith faith doth ſo, in my judgement gives too much to it*] *I anſwer, That without offence it may be ſaid, that Faith doth help the Action of the principal Agent,* i. e. *God in our Juſtification, God doing nothing in it without faith; I ſpeak of ſuch as are* adulti, *or of years.* 2. *That Mr.* Baxter *muſt ſay ſo, for that according to him faith makes Gods Conditional Grant in the New Covenant to become abſolute, and therefore doth the main of Gods work.*

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§. 54.

R. B. 1. Let it be obſerved that Mr. K. takes it for needleſſe, to ſay, Faith is a Paſſive Inſtrument: and therefore he muſt maintain it to be an Active Inſtrument, or none.

2. I doubt Mr. K. would have thought me near to a Blaſphemer (ſuppoſing the intereſt of his Cauſe to have carried him another way) if I had ſaid and maintained that mans Faith doth help the Action of God: 1. If Gods Action were taken to be *Cauſa partialis* (which I think Mr. K. doth not believe it to be) yet mans Action would help to produce the Effect, only by concurring with Gods Action, but not properly, help Gods Action; for it would have no influx into it. 2. If Gods Action be *Cauſa totalis in ſuo genere*, and mans Action ſubordinate to it, much leſſe can mans Action be ſaid properly to help Gods action. 3. But the truth is in pardoning ſin, and juſtifying us, Mans action of believing is no Cauſe at all, and therefore no proper Help to Gods action. God hath no need of our help to pardon our ſin. The performing of our Condition by Thankfull Accepting Chriſt and Life, is no Helping Gods Action. But its ſtrange to ſee how Mr. K. reels too and fro! Sometime he dare ſay it over and over, that if the New Covenant ſay [Believe and be Juſtified] and make our faith the Condition of our Juſtification, then a man juſtifies himſelf by believing, and more a great ... hen God doth by the promulgation of his Covenant, and that he is juſtified ... y by himſelf and his own acts, and not ſo much by Gods Grace in im... g Chriſts Righteouſneſs, but by his own faith.] And yet now he dare

dare ſay, that mans Believing doth help God in Pardoning or Juſtifying him.

3. And what's his proof? Why [God doth nothing without faith.] A ſtrange proof! So every Matter, Object, *Diſpoſitio Materiæ*, or Condition *ſine qua non*, ſhould help the Action of the Efficient. Sure Helping is acting, and therefore Effecting. So he may as well ſay, that the preparation of the ſoul for Receiving Regenerating, Sanctifying Grace, doth help the Spirits Action of infuſing it.

4. As for his ſecond Anſwer, that [I muſt ſay ſo too, for that according to me, faith makes Gods Conditional Grant to become abſolute] I Reply, that this is an oft repeated ſlander of a hard fore-head, without ſhew of proof. If this be mine, it is either directly or conſequentially. If directly, let him produce my words. If conſequentially, let him prove it if he can. If he attempt it, it muſt be by this Syllogiſm, [He that ſaith, Upon the performance of the Condition, the Covenant becomes abſolute, doth ſay in ſenſe, that the performance of the Condition, makes the Covenant become Abſolutely, *i.e.* effects it: But M. *B.* ſaith the former: Therefore, *&c.*] Let him that knows no difference between an efficient Cauſe, and a meer Condition *ſine qua non*, believe the *major*. I know ſo much difference, that I dare ſay, it is falſe.

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§. 55.

Mr. K. *WHereas he ſaith* [2. *It is paſt my Capacity to conceive of a Paſſive Moral Inſtrument.*] *I anſwer, whatever Mr.* Baxter *may conceive, nothing is more obvious then that many men at leaſt are uſed by others meerly for blindes, to bring about their deſignes, and ſo do very much towards them, by doing nothing but ſtanding ſtill.*

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§ 55.

R. B. I Knew before I heard of your name, that the ſame thing which *in ſenſu Phyſico* is a Paſſion or Privation, may *in ſenſu Morali*, i. e. *reputativè*, be Action or an Inſtrument. But I ever ſuppoſed that as it is *Moraliter vel reputativè Inſtrumentum*, ſo hath it *Moralem vel reputativam actionem*. 2. That [ſome men are uſed by others meerly for blinds about their deſigns] this blinde work of Mr. K. doth partly perſwade me.

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§. 56.

Mr. K. *WHen he ſaith* [*how can the act of believing (which hath no other being, but to be an Act) be poſſibly a Paſſive Inſtrument? Doth this act effect by ſuffering? Or can wiſe men have a groſſer conceit then this?*] *I anſwer that this Act is equivalent to ſuffering, as conſiſting chiefly in a reliance on Chriſts righteouſneſſe, without exalting our thoughts againſt it, captivating our thoughts to it, renouncing all thoughts of our own righteouſneſs, yea all thoughts that are too apt to riſe againſt it from the conſideration of our own righteouſneſs; howbeit for the* form *it be an action, yet* virtually *this action is a ſuffering our ſelves to be led by the Spirit of God, and by his Authority againſt the ſuggeſtions of our own reaſon.*

§. 56

§. 56.

R. B. 1. TWo things you have here to prove: 1. That the Act of faith is a ſuffering. 2. That by ſuffering it effecteth our pardon or Juſtification as an Inſtrumental Cauſe. For the former, you ſay [It is equivalent to ſuffering.] Reply 1. It ſeems then it is but equivalent. 2. Wherein it is equivalent? 1. As to its nature? That were a ſtrange act. 2. Or in excellency: ſo it is more then equivalent to ſuffering. 3. Or is it as to its uſe and end? I eaſily grant you that the uſe of this Action is to make us capable ſubjects of pardon, or fit objects for Gods act, and diſpoſed matter to receive Juſtification; as Mr. *Benjamin Woodbridge* hath plainly and truly, though briefly taught you in his Sermon of Juſtification (think not much to learn of him in that, and other points there touched.) If you have a minde to call this *Paſſio Reputativa vel Moralis*, I will not contend with you: it being *Conditio activa ad Receptionem propriam requiſita*. Doubtleſs the Reliance and Renunciation which you mention, are actions. 3. And where you ſay, that it is [*Virtually* a ſuffering our ſelves to be led by the Spirit, though it be an action for the form] I never heard before of an Action immanent which was *virtually* ſuffering: and that from ſuch a Cauſe as Authority is: Sure it is ſomewhat more then ſuch a ſuffering; and therefore it is new Logick to ſay, that it is *Virtually* ſuffering. Though as I ſaid, if you have a minde to call it a Moral or Reputative Paſſion, I will not contend. 4. But then what a ſuffering is that you imagine it? I thought you would have come nearer the matter, and have ſaid that it is *Receptio Chriſti, vel Juſtitiæ donatæ*: but you ſay, It is a ſuffering our ſelves to be led by Gods Spirit and authority.

2. But now I come to the great buſineſs, I finde you as mute as a fiſh: You had another Aſſertion to prove, [that this Act doth by ſuffering Effect our pardon:] On this lay all the controverſie: and of this I finde not a word. I pray you remember by the next to ſatisfie your Reader, that [this Act which is Virtually a ſuffering our ſelves to be led by Gods Spirit, and by his Authority againſt the ſuggeſtion of our own Reaſon, doth by that ſuffering effect our pardon or Juſtification.] Nay, I thought if you had made it but a Receiving inſtrument, as you phraſe it, that it had been the Receiving Chriſt or Righteouſneſs, and not the ſuffering our ſelves to be led by Gods Spirit and Authority againſt the ſuggeſtions of reaſon, which (*qua talis*) would have been affirmed the inſtrument of our Juſtification? But you ſaw not what Roman doctrine this implieth.

§. 57.

Mr. K. WHereas he adds [4. *And laſtly, I believe with* Schibler, *that there is no ſuch thing as a Paſſive Inſtrument*] *I believe he hath ſeen a man often hold up a fire-ſhovel to receive coles, which fire-ſhovel is an Inſtrument, but in that caſe meerly paſſive, and he hath ſeen queſtionleſs boyes at trap hold up their hats to receive the ball; here their hats are Inſtruments, but meerly Paſſive. What examples* Burgerſdicius *or* Keckerman *give, is not conſiderable; What if they miſtook in their inſtances of Paſſive Inſtruments? Follows it there are none?*

§. 57.

R.B. 1. THe Smith may call his fire-ſhovel, a Paſſive Inſtrument, and ſo your boy may do his hat. I will allow them both that name among Mechanicks, Rhetoricians, *&c.* but I ſhall not believe that Logicians ſhould ſo call them, or that either of them is an inſtrumental efficient Cauſe, or do effect by ſuffering, till you have better proved it, then this put-off comes to. 2. I have found no reaſon yet in all the reading of your labours, to judge your Logick more conſiderable then *Burgerſdicius* and *Keckermans*; or that you are likely to finde out fit inſtances, where they could finde none. 3. *Callovius* and many more are of the ſame opinion as *Schibler* in this.

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§. 58.

Mr.K. BUt ſay you [*the Inſtrument is an Efficient Cauſe: all efficiency is by action: and that which doth not act, doth not effect:*] *You have forgotten that the great Inſtruments of the Roman State, did all by doing Nothing.* Unus homo nobis cunctando reſtituit rem. *Their ſtrength, ſaith the Prophet, is to ſit ſtill.*

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§. 58.

R.B. 1. SUch a thing I now perceive may be: for I think when you have here done all, you had done more if you had done nothing.

2. I anſwered enough to this before. What if the Conſequents of doing nothing prove better, then if there had been Action, and thereupon you do call [doing nothing] by the name of [Action?] Is it therefore Action indeed? Or if you therefore aſcribe a Cauſality to it, is it therefore a Cauſe indeed? I ſay again, as ſuch are *Moraliter vel Reputativè inſtrumenta*, i. e. *Cauſæ efficientis inſtrumentales, cum Phyſicè & revera non ſint*; ſo morally and reputatively they are Agents, and therefore not to be called Paſſive inſtruments.

3. Let it be obſerved what a ſuperficial kinde of anſwers Mr. K's Chair doth vouchſafe us? He durſt neither plainly deny, that an inſtrument is an efficient Cauſe; nor yet that all efficiency is by Action: and yet ſatisfies himſelf with the touch of an alien inſtance, implying the denial of the later.

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§. 59.

*Mr.*K. [INdeed (*ſaith Mr.*Baxter *in the cloſe*) *as ſome extend the uſe of the word, Inſtrument, you may call almoſt any thing an Inſtrument, which is any way conducible to the production of the effect under the firſt Cauſe, and ſo you may call ſaith an Inſtrument.*] *Belike it is* Inſtrumentum quoddam vocatum, *what you will in the Lawyers Latine, and you muſt be beholden to that to make the New Covenant Gods Inſtrument in Juſtification.* Inſtrumentum Novum *for* Teſtamentum Novum, *ſay the Criticks.*

§. 59.

R.B. 1. THese words I spoke, to signifie my resolution, not to contend about words; and if any man will use the term [Instrument] improperly, and tell us his meaning, and not make it the efficient Cause of our pardon and Justification, much less make the Papists believe, that in that notion lieth the very kernel of the Protestant doctrine about Justification by faith alone, I am content such a man speak as he thinks meet, allowing others the like liberty. To this Mr. K. gives this learned answer [Belike its *Instrumentum quoddam vocatum*, what you will in the Lawyers Latine] Out of which words, or any yet spoken by him, if the Reader can pick an argument to prove faith the instrumental Cause of forgiveness or Justification, let him make his best of it. A jest is readier then a good Argument.

2. It ill becomes any Preacher of it, to deny or jest at the instrumentality of of Gods Law, Covenant or Testament. It bewrayes that which you might with more credit have concealed. If Gods Deed of Gift of Christ, Life, Pardon, *&c.* be any Cause of our Right to Christ, Life, Pardon, *&c.* then is it an instrumental efficient Cause, constituting that Right: (Let Mr. K. tell me what other cause it is, if not this.) But some Cause it is: Therefore, *&c.* Onely as Relations have an imperfect Being, so the Causing of them is answerable to it. If Gods Deed of Gift, Law, Covenant, Testament, be no proper instrument, than there is no such thing as a proper instrument known in Laws, Politicks, Morality, for the conveying of any Right. As *Bayrus* saith, *Clav. Regiâ li. 6. cap. 6. n. 23. p. 330. Natura instituit voces & signa tanquam Instrumenta & media sine quibus unus homo alteri non possit obligari.* Not only are they certain Instruments when used, but is commonly held that they are so necessary instruments, that by a meet mental Conception without words a man is not obliged to another. So saith *Almain. in 4. d. 15. q. 2. Jos. Angles in sor. 4. sent. q. de voto art. 2. diffic. 4. Armil. verb. promissio. Petr. de Arragon. 2. 2. q. 88. art. 3. dub. 4. Mich. Salon. in 22. to. 1. q. 5. de domino art. 2. dub. 1. Lud. Lopez. p. 2. instr. conf. cap. 30. Emanuel Rodriquez part. 2. Sum. c. 27. Concl.* And its certain that conceptions give no Right to men, though the conceiver of a promise may *coram Deo* be obliged.

§. 60.

Mr. K. *THis were not worth the insisting on, but to shew with what tools Mr.* Baxter *endeavours to break the works of so many eminent Master-builders, and with what formidable weapons he valiantly sets himself against those great Champions,*

——Sic dama Leonem
Insequitur, audetque Viro concurrere Virgo——

O the miserable fate of poor Divinity! that must be put to School to Burgersdicius *and* Keckermans *Logick! and be so beaten for grousie* Jack Seaton! *Had not Mr.* Baxter *been as they say he was αὐτοδίδακτος, he had not set so high a price on these beggarly elements, as to let them make* utramque paginam *in this noble controversie.*

§. 60.

§. 60.

R. B. WHether this merry Rhetorical Triumph were grounded on such a reall victory as the man dreams of, or whether premises and Conclusion be any other then a meer Rapsody of windy ostentation, I must leave to the judgement of the impartial, understanding Reader. I confess they shew that he is not only unreasonable; for *ridere* is proper to a Reasonable Creature. I had thought to have given a particular answer to each passage in this Paragraph, but upon review I finde that the Replying to such like, hath occasioned more ironies and sharp passages then I dare approve; and therefore I think it best to say nothing to it, only to reminde him of these few things:

1. That I will be none of his adversary, where he argues only to prove me ignorant. It never came into my head to make it the Question, whether Mr. K. or I were the more wise or learned man? I have much more ignorance then he is aware of.

2. That yet I dare contend with him in point of veracity, if he use to do with others, as he doth with me, particularly to talk of [making *utramque paginam*] and to scorn at it no less then twelve times in five or six leaves, for my citing these Authours once or twice, and *Schibler* thrice in a whole book.

3. That all is not Divinity that such Theologues maintain: For I think he is not Theology in the Abstract: and therefore its possible to finde an errour in such a man as Mr. K. without Schooling or hearing Divinity: Nor do I think that sound Theology would feel it, though he had a knock or two more.

4. That he proves out of *Keckerman*, or others such like, that two and two is four, doth not much abuse Divinity by it: Nor he that cites them to shew that all efficiency is by Action, though as learned a man as Mr. K. deny it. Nor do I finde Mr. K. having recourse to the Bible to prove the contrary, *viz.* that there is efficiency without Action. And I think the Scripture Texts may be soon numbred by which he attempts to prove Faith to be the instrumental Cause of Justification.

§. 61.

Mr. K. HE *hath one Question more* [*But though Faith be not the Instrument of Justification, may it not be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ who Justifies us? I do not* (*saith he*) *stick so much at this speech as at the former* (*we are beholden to you: some indulgence yet in this particular*) *Yet is it no proper or fit expression neither. For,* 1. *the Act of Faith which is it that justifieth is our Actual Receiving of Christ, and therefore cannot be the Instrument of Receiving. To say our Receiving is the Instrument of our Receiving, is a hard saying.*] *Be the act of Faith the actual Receiving of Christ: Why I wonder may not faith be said to be the Instrument of Receiving Christ? Is faith only an Act? I had thought it had been an Habit? And though the Receiving be not the Instrument of Receiving Christ, as being the actual receiving of him; yet faith may very well be so called: as though my receiving of a book be not the Instrument of receiving it, yet the hand may without any great absurdity be allowed that name.*

§. 61.

R. B. 1. I Argued, that if faith be the Inſtrument of Receiving Chriſt, then either the Act of faith, or the Habit: but neither the Act nor Habit: Therefore, *&c.* To prove that the act of faith is not the inſtrument of Receiving Chriſt, I uſed the words that he here cites. What doth this Learned man but confute this by ſaying, that the Habit is the Inſtrument? [I had thought (ſaith he) faith had been a Habit.] Thus he confutes me, who argue that the Act is not the Inſtrument, by ſaying that the Habit is. I think he that is ἀυτοδίδακτος need not much lament that he loſt the benefit of ſuch a diſputants tutorage, if he be never in a more waking mood then here.

2. His Rhetorick is the beſt part of his anſwer. But when will he prove that the Habit of faith ſo farre differs from the act, and both from the ſoul, as that the Habit may as truly or fitly be called the inſtrument of Believing or Receiving, as the Hand is of its Act or the effect? If his ſimilitude would prove any thing it would rather be that the Faculty is the Inſtrument, then that the Habit is: which yet I finde him not here attempt: I think that the Habit of faith, and the act are not of ſo different natures as is the Hand and its act.

3. Let it ſtill be remembred, that I do not much regard how this Queſtion is determined (for which Mr. K. doth ſo humbly tell me, he is beholden,) it being much different from the former Queſtion. For in the former, the term [Inſtrument] is taken properly for an inſtrumental efficient Cauſe, in which ſenſe I deny that faith juſtifieth: But here it is taken Metaphorically or Vulgarly, and not properly: For that which effecteth not is not an inſtrumental efficient Cauſe. And that which they call an Inſtrument of Receiving, is in Naturals but *Diſpoſitio materiæ*, and in Morals, but *Diſpoſitio Moralis, vel Reputativa, vel Actus ad Receptionem paſſivam, propriam, veram neceſſarius*; and in our preſent caſe, ſtrictly nothing but a Condition. Now if any will be pleaſed to ſpeak ſo vulgarly and improperly, as to call ſuch a Condition, or Aptitude Moral or Natural [an Inſtrument of Receiving] ſo he do not build any unſound Doctrine upon it, I do again profeſſe that I will not contend with him. But the Reaſons why I thought it neceſſary for all that, to contradict the common Doctrine of faiths being the Inſtrument of Juſtification, I have fully manifeſted in anſwer to other Brethren.

§. 62.

Mr. K. BUt ſecondly, ſaith *Mr.* Baxter [*The ſeed or Habit of faith cannot fitly be called an Inſtrument,* 1. *The ſanctified faculty it ſelf cannot be the Inſtrument, it being the ſoul it ſelf, and not any thing really diſtinct from it, as* Scotus, D' Orbellis, Scaliger, *&c.* *Dr.* Jackſon, *Mr.* Pemble *think, and Mr.* Ball *queſtions.* 2. *The Holineſs of the faculties, is not their Inſtrument: For,* 1. *it is nothing but themſelves rectified, and not a Being ſo diſtinct as may be called their Inſtrument.* 2. *Who ever called Habits or Diſpoſitions the ſouls Inſtruments? The Aptitude of a Cauſe to produce its effect, cannot be called, The Inſtrument of it. You may as well call a mans Life the Inſtrument of Acting, or the ſharpneſs of the knife, the knives Inſtrument, as to call our Holineſſe or Habitual faith, the Inſtrument of Receiving Chriſt.*] *I anſwer, you proceed by certain ſteps, and to deny the Habit of faith to be the Inſtrument of Receiving Chriſt,*

Christ, you say, 1. *The sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument. And* 1. *What if it cannot? Who reckons the Habit of faith for a sanctified faculty? This is that which sanctifies the faculties: The faculty is of one* Species *of quality,* potentia naturalis; *faith which sanctifies of another,* habitus. *You are, it seems, now and then out in your Logick, as much as you trouble us with it, and had need review your* Burgersdicius *and* Keckerman. 2. *How prove you that the sanctified faculty is the soul it self, In stead of the few Names you muster up, I may bring you thousands that are against it: and yet a few Reasons weigh more then all these great Names. If the faculty be the same with the soul, then the Holinesse of the faculty cannot be really distinct from the soul, for that this Holiness is to be received into the faculies; and if no faculty be really distinct from the soul, then is there no receiving into it any thing really distinct from the soul, and if Holinesse be not Really distinct from the soul, a holy soul, and an unholy one, are not Really distinct, and so you seem to imply in your second, when you say* ——

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§. 62.

R. B. 1. Mr. K. yieldeth, if I am able to understand him, that the Act of faith is not the Instrument of Receiving Christ: and he layes it on the Habit. Before we proceed here observe,

1. That the Generality of Divines that plead for faiths instrumentality, say, that it is not the Habit, but the Act of faith that justifieth: (I said so too when I wrote my Aphorisms, taking it on trust, but I now recant it.) If that be so, then they cannot (as they do) argue thus: [Faith is the Instrument of Receiving Christ and his Righteousness: Therefore faith justifieth as an Instrument] because they speak of the Habit in the Antecedent, and of the act in the Consequent; and so by [faith] mean not in both the same thing: and so there are *quatuor termini.*

2. Observe, that it is commonly granted, that the Habit of faith is not alwayes in act: as in sleep, and when we are wholly taken up with thoughts of an aliene subject, and all the time of Infancy (according to them that think Infants have the Habit of faith.) This being so, it must needs follow, that faith is not alwayes the Instrument of Receiving Christ, and of Justifying: (nay perhaps, but seldome comparatively) For the Causality of the Instrument is in Action, and faith is not alwayes acting. If therefore faith justifie as an Instrument, and we are alway justified, and yet faith be not alway an Instrument, then either we are not justified by faith, but some other way, at those times when faith acteth not, or else *cessante Causâ non cessat effectus*: which though in some cases it may be true, yet here it cannot: because the effect being but a *Jus ad rem,* a transcendental Relation, it hath no neareſt Cause, but its Foundation and Subject: and when those cease the Relation ceaseth: And none affirmeth that faith is a Remote cause of Receiving Christ, that is, Right to Christ (with his benefits.) And if it were, yet the *Fundamentum Relationis* must have the sustentation of a continued Cause. But in the way that I affirm faith to justifie, as a moral Condition only (having no Causality) all these inconveniences, or rather contradictions are avoided: For it being the meer will of the Donor, that createth the neareſt necessity of the Condition, and so requires the Condition to such an end, he may make either act or Habit the Condition, and may make the act the Condition of Beginning our Right to Christ and Life, and the Habit continued, to be the Condition of continuing that Right, even when the act is intermitted:

and yet the effect may still continue, because the Will of the Donor, and the Law or Covenant which is his Instrument, do both continue; and it is they that are the efficient Causes.

3. Observe also, that both the man for whom Mr. K. is here so zealous, *viz.* Mr. *Pemble*, and many more, do make the Habit of faith to be nothing else, but our New Life, our Holiness of the renewed faculties, the Spirit of God in us, and that all Graces are in the Habit and seed but one, and so accordingly it follows, that it is our inward Sanctification or Holiness that is the Instrument of our Justification: A Doctrine that I think these men will scarce own upon consideration.

4. Observe also, that hence it will follow, that it is other graces that justifie instrumentally as well as faith: because they say, it is the Habit that is the Instrument: and this Habit is but one: not one Habit of faith, and another of Love, Hope, *&c.* but all one: and this one Habit justifies, even when men are Infants, or asleep, and do not act.

5. That which is now commonly called, the Habit of Grace, is in Scripture called, [the Spirit in us:] and so the holy Ghost is made our Instrument of Justification.

Now to Mr K's words here. In the words of mine which he cites, I do both indirectly, or *in transitu* confute a third opinion, *viz.* that the sanctified faculties are the Instrument, though the sanctity of the faculties be not: and directly I argue *à fortiore*, that if the sanctified Faculties themselves may not properly be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ, much lesse can the sanctity of the faculties be so called: But, *&c.* Therefore, *&c.* Hereupon this too learned man feigns me to think, or say, or imply, the Habit of faith to be a sanctified faculty; and with seeming seriousness fals a schooling me, and tels me, that [the faculty is of one *Species* of quality, and faith of another;] yea proceeds in his dream as confidently as if he were waking, to tell me, that I [am now and then out in my Logick, and had need to review my *Burgersdicius* and *Keckerman*.] But would he a little rub his eyes, I would desire him to tell his Reader, where I did directly or indirectly say, that Faith is a sanctified faculty? And I would know of him, whether a man should not understand a matter before he make an answer to it?

Next, it seems, he expected I should have proved, that the faculty is the soul it self: And would not that have been as wise a Digression, and as Necessary, as is this of his? The Scope of my words was but this, *q. d.* [It is a controverted, doubtful point, Whether the Faculties are distinct from the soul, as *Res & Res*, and therefore not fit to bear such a weight as those that I oppose do lay upon the affirmative] (and my own opinion inclineth to the Negative: yet so as I dare not be so presumptuous as confidently to interpose among so many learned men, and maintain my own opinion as certain truth.) As wise a man as Mr. K. (and in my opinion an eight at least above him) thought the like answer to be good in another case. *Davenant. Determ. Qu* 37. *pag.* 166. *Quod philosophantur voluntatem & intellectum esse duas potentias reipsa distinctas, dogma Philosophicum est, ab omnibus haud receptum, & Theologicis dogmatibus firmandis aut infirmandis, fundamentum minimè idoneum.* And he knows, that the two Questions, 1. Whether the faculties be *realiter inter se distincta?* And, 2. Whether they be *realiter ab anima distincta?* use to stand and fall together in the Determination.

For the few names that he tels me I muster up, its like he may know that it were

easie

eaſie to give him a farre larger muſter-roll, eſpecially of the Scotiſts. And as for the thouſands that he ſaith he may bring againſt it (no doubt he means Writers) I confeſs plainly, that he hath ſo farre loſt his credit with me, that I do not believe him. For though I know they are many, yet I do not think he hath read many thouſands on all ſides of that Subject. But if he have indeed read ſo many thouſand books of that one point, alas, how many hath he read in all? No wonder if poor *Burgerſdicius*, *Schibler* or *Suarez* be deſpiſed by him. It may be that's the reaſon that both the margin and Text of his book are ſo naked of quotations; he having read ſo many thouſands that he knew not which to preferre, or where to beginne; or elſe would have few mens names to his Works but his own (except as Adverſaries) leſt they ſhould ſhare of the honour. Nay, if he ſhould have ſaid or meant, that there are thouſands that ſo write, which others have read though he have not, I doubt he cannot prove it true.

For his great weighing Reaſons, I will honour them as ſoon as I can ſee them, but he had little Reaſon to expect me to Reaſon that Caſe. If this that he next addes be one of his few Reaſons, that weigh ſo much, I muſt tell him, Every man to his minde. I doubt he overvalues his own Reaſons: For my part, one thouſand great Names, yea one, will weigh as much with me, as this his Reaſon. For, 1. I deny his Conſequence, and ſay, that the Holineſs may be Really diſtinct from the ſoul, though the faculties are not; and that Holineſs may immediately inhere in the ſoul without the mediation of faculties really diſtinct from it. It had been eaſie to have ſeen the neceſſity of giving ſome anſwer to this deniall. As wiſe a man as moſt we have (if I conjecture not amiſs) and a publick Profeſſour in *Oxford*, and now reſident where Mr. K. had his Chair, I mean Mr. *Wallis*, ſaith thus: [And ſo, however it may be true, that a faculty or natural Power may be ſo far the ſame with the ſoul, as that it differ only *ratione ratiocinatâ*, yet in a Habit we muſt of neceſſity grant a diſtinction *ex parte rei*: For where there may be a real ſeparation, and not only mental, there muſt needs be granted a diſtinction *in re*.]

But what if I grant Mr. K's hardeſt Concluſion that Holineſs is not Really diſtinct from the ſoul, nor a holy ſoul from an unholy as [Really] is taken for a diſtinction *inter Rem & Rem*. We ſhall ſee anon what danger would be in it. But then Mr. K. muſt be ſo honeſt, as not to perſwade any that I therefore deny a Real diſtinction, as [Real] is oppoſed to feigned, mental, called *Rationis*, Relative, or Denominative.

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§. 63.

Mr. K. *You ſay* [*The Holineſs of the faculties is not their Inſtrument, for it is nothing but themſelves rectified, and not a Being ſo diſtinct as may be called their Inſtrument.*] *But is it nothing but themſelves rectified? I had thought it had been the Rectifying of them, which poteſt adeſſe & abeſſe ſine ſubjecti interitu? and conſequently it is not the faculties themſelves. As well you may ſay, that the righteneſſe of a ſtick is nothing but the ſtick made right; and the whiteneſſe of the wall, nothing but the wall made white* Quis tulerit Gracchos ſive Graculos!

§. 63.

R.B. 1. ALl that I assert is, that Holiness differs not from the faculties, as *Res & Res*, but as *Res & modus*. 2. I think the abstract hath no existence, but as in the Concrete, but is a meer Notion: Seeing therefore that is so, I think the propereſt denomination, as most agreeable to the thing denominated, is to speak of it as *in Concreto*. 3. You did therefore too suddenly start up into your wondering interrogation, as if there were any contradiction between those two sayings! As if he that saith [a Rectified faculty: a white wall] did not as truly expresse the Rectitude, and the whiteness, as you that express them *in Concreto*! It is too grosse a fiction, if (as you seem) you would make men believe that I intend to prove the Rectitude to be *Formaliter* the same with the Faculty or soul! My meaning is plainly, that Holiness is nothing but the souls Rectitude, and though I expressed it in the Concrete, I say not, that it is the Faculty as a Faculty, but as Rectified; shewing in the next words what it is that I exclude, *viz.* [A Being so distinct, *&c.*] 4. May not a Relation or *Modus* be present or absent *sine subjecti interitu*? though it be not a distinct Thing?

For your *Quis tulerit*? I Reply: Pride makes men impatient. Did you think no more highly of your own Note, then some wise observers do, you would instead of your impatient *Quis tulerit*, have compassionated your self and me, and sit down by me, with a *Nos Graculi*. However, why should you be so impatient with one so farre below you? Will you set your wit to the wit of a *Graculus*?

But I will make bold to try your Patience further. Will you hear the voice of the afore-said Learned and Judicious man Mr *Wallis*, who is now in the same Nest that you were bred in? See his *Truth Tried*, chap. 8. pag. 44, 45. [A Habit therefore whether Infused or Acquired, being but a facilitation of the faculty, cannot be a Thing distinct from that faculty, but only a *Modus* of it, which hath not in it self a Positive Absolute Being of its own, but is a Modification of another Being: And its Physical Being, *Existentia Rei*, must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated: For it is not *ipsum existens*, but *Modus existendi*: And this Manner of Existing, hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth Exist in this Manner. Yet its Formal and Metaphysical Being is distinct. Yea and its Physical Existence, such as it is capable of, that is, *Existentia modi*; for not being *Res*, but *Modus Rei*, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own, besides the Existence of a *Modus*: and this *Existentia modi* is the actual modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner: The which Existence, though it be not *Existentia Rei*, yet is it a real Existence *(Existentia in re)* and not Mental: For the thing Existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus ordered, thus modificated: And therefore that *Modus* doth actually and really modificate, and is not only supposed so to do. But if you will not admit with *Scotus*, &c. And thus it is true which his Lordship speaks, that Habitual Knowledge is Nothing but Light more or lesse Glorious. It is Reason cleared: It's only *Facultas facilitata*, or *Facultatis facilitas*: And to this Faculty or Readiness to operate, *I cannot allow a Physical Existence of its own, as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as being but* Modi, *and not* Entia: It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being: Not

Ens,

Ens, but *Aliquid Entis*. And I ſhould eaſily be perſwaded to grant the ſame concerning all accidents whatſoever, which have long ſince been called *Entis entia*. And however an Accident hath been accounted to be *Res*, and ſo to have *exiſtentiam Rei*, yet not *ſubſiſtentiam Rei*.] So far Mr *Wallis*.

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§. 64.

Mr. K. SAy you [*Who ever called Habits or Diſpoſitions the ſouls Inſtruments? The Aptitude of a Cauſe to produce its effect, cannot be called its Inſtrument.*] *I Anſwer and yield you, that ordinarily it is not ſo: In all Acquired Habits, there is meerly an Aptitude gotten: but by faith which is an infuſed Habit, there is an Ability gotten; this being indeed a Habit, but a Habit equivalent to a new Faculty; and ſo we hear of a new heart and new ſpirit, and without faith a man can no more receive Chriſt nor do ought towards it, then a dead man can walk or ſpeak, and ſo it gives life to the ſoul in regard of all ſpiritual operations: and though life cannot be ſaid to be an Inſtrument, yet I hope that which gives life may; as doth faith, which is as the ſoul to the ſoul in all its holy and heavenly thoughts and deſires: Life cannot be ſaid to be an Inſtrument: for Life as Life is no cauſe at all, but an Union of thoſe cauſes which are required to the making up of the* Animatum.

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§. 64.

R. B. 1. IF Habits were never ſo properly to be called the ſouls inſtruments, yet this reacheth not the Queſtion, whether they may properly be called (*Logicè loquendo*) inſtruments of Receiving when they are not inſtruments Effecting. I did therefore give them too much advantage in this arguing.

2. If you grant that acquired Habits are not to be called the ſouls inſtruments, and yet maintain that infuſed are, you muſt give ſome good reaſon from the difference.

Your reaſon is that [This is a Habit, but equivalent to a new faculty.] To which I Reply, 1. What reaſon is this? When I even now ſaid, That [the ſanctified faculty it ſelf cannot be the Inſtrument] you never did gainſay it: therefore if faith were a faculty or *Potentia*, it were not therefore the inſtrument of Reception.

2. The term [equivalent] is ſo ambiguous, that you may yet make your words true or falſe by an interpretation. 1. If you mean that infuſed Habits are of the ſame nature, and of the ſame *ſpecies* of quality, as the *Potentia naturalis* is, that ſhould have been well proved, and not nakedly aſſerted. 2. If you mean that it performeth the ſame kinde of operations, and *quoad uſum* is equivalent, though not of the ſame nature or kinde; that alſo needs great proof, ſeeing it contradicteth common principles: The operation of things is ſuch as the Being. 3. If you mean but that it is of equal neceſſity to the Act, thats nothing to the purpoſe: for the neceſſity proves it not an inſtrument.

But I conceive the firſt of the three is your ſenſe, or elſe I cannot make ſenſe of it; for the two later do no way tend to prove it an Inſtrument; and your words do moſt plainly import that ſenſe. But, if ſo 1. Sure you forgot your own words but a little before, where you were pleaſed ſo farre to School me, as to tell me that [the faculty is of one *ſpecies* of quality, *Potentia naturalis*, faith which ſanctifies of another, *habitus*.] And you gravely told me, I was now and then out in

my Logick, and demanded of me, Who reckons the Habit of faith for a ſanctified Faculty? 2. How can you ſay ſtill that it is a Habit? For if it be truly a Habit, it muſt be of the ſame *ſpecies* of quality, as Habit; and admit the definition of a Habit, and therefore not admit the definition of *Potentia* or *Facultas*, nor be of that *ſpecies*: and I ſuppoſe you will not ſay it is of both, and be but one Quality: And I ſuppoſe alſo that you will not ſay, it is *Potentia ſupernaturalis*, and therefore may be of another *ſpecies* then *Potentia naturalis*, ſeeing it is not the way of efficiency, but the nature of the Effect or Thing produced, which diverſifieth the *ſpecies* of Quality.

But becauſe I have great reaſon to think, that you will honour the ſame thing from Dr *Twiſſe*, which you contemn from me, will you be pleaſed to hear him ſpeak to you a few words: *Contra Corvinum* pag. 361. [*Sed quia deventum eſt ad genus diſputationis Philoſophicum, agendum ſecundum principia Philoſophiæ, ſive naturalis, ſive moralis, ſive mixtæ, cum doctoribus illis congrediamur. Itaque juxta Philoſophiam quid aliud eſt voluntas, quam Potentia volendi? rurſus quid aliud eſt objectum quam bonum? unicuiq; vero quod apparet; non ſyllibæ ſolum recto, ſed Ariſtoteliſ magni illius naturæ myſtæ. Ergo non modo ſecundum Auguſtinum, ſed & ſecundum Ariſtotelem, naturæ eſt hominum poſſe Velle quod ei appareat eſſe bonum, poſſe autem Velle quod vere bonum ſit, ne Corvinus quidem hoc loco attribuit gratiæ ſuæ communi. Ego vero ultra feror, & ex Auguſtino diſputo, etiam poſſe credere, poſſe Deum amare, naturæ eſſe hominum, juxta argumentationem ſuperiorem: quod & hoc argumento contendo. Si potentia credendi, vel quidvis boni faciendi, nobis accederet ex gratia, tum potentia ſubjectum eſſet potentiæ; naturalis gratioſæ, quod quidem hactenus prorſus eſt inauditum; nempe ut potentia volendi ſubjectum eſſet potentiæ volendi. Voluntas fatear eſt ſubjectum habituum; etiam omnis potentia rationalis, tam intellectus quam voluntas capax eſt habituum, ſive naturalium, quibus magis idonea fiat ad res naturales, tam intelligendas, quam agendas; ſive ſupernaturalium, quibus elevetur ad objecta ſupernaturalia: At ut potentia aliqua capax ſit potentiarum novarum, ne fando quidem hactenus accepi, priuſquam myſteria ſua mundo communicaruut Arminiani.*] Many more places to the ſame purpoſe might be cited out of Dr *Twiſſe*, *Boethius de Trinit.* ſaith, *Forma ſimplex ſubjectum eſſe nequit*: I leave you to gather the conſequent. What if I adde a Noveliſt or two (they ſhall not be unlearned) that Mr K. may ſee that a *Graculus* is not ſo ſolitary as a *Phœnix*?

Thom. White in his *Inſtitut. Sacr. l.* 1. *lect.* 13. *p.* 90. ſaith, [*Sed & Habitum non eſſe aliud quam ipſum actum debilius manentem, omnino conſtat, ex eo quod impreſſio facta in ſubjectum, abſq; aliquo contrario deſtruente, interire non poteſt: quia eſt modus ipſius ſubjecti; & quod alio modo imbui requirit novam actionem. Permanet itaq; actus donec a contrario deſtruatur. In anima vero non eſt alia contrarietas quam contradictionis. Donec itaque retractetur, ex neceſſitate ſemper manet actus, & dicitur Habitus. Objicies, eſſe contra manifeſtam experientiam quod actus maneant, &c. Reſpondetur, manifeſtum eſſe poſt actum intellectus vel phantaſiæ, potentiam manere in actu illius objecti quod cognovit. Experientia enim docet, eam poſſe iterum cognoſcere quod vult; quod ante primam cognitionem non potuit, &c. Manet itaque impreſſio; id eſt actus ſubſtantia, quatenus ens; & non tantum motio eſt: Unde cum in anima non poſſit eſſe motus, ibi adhuc manet impreſſio; id eſt actus. Quod autem non appareat manere, eſt quia anima in corpore non agit ex ſeſe; ſed præciſe quatenus movetur a corpore, ſeu per corpus; & per conſequens non facit ſenſum ſui, niſi in effectu corporeo. Et hinc fit ut cum rurſus agimus, ſentiamus actum faciliorem, vel fortiorem, vel directum & modificatum ab anima, ratione prioris actus; quod arguit impreſſionem manere: Sed modum ipſius impreſſionis,*

in sese, videre non possumus; & ideo credimus ipsum actu non mansisse.] And pag. 94. [*Ex quibus satis clarum est, non esse habitus supernaturales, suis primis actibus prærequisitos; neque esse per modum potentiarum, sed omnino sicut habitus naturales; nisi quod circa alia objecta versentur; & discurrendum esse prorsus de iis, ad modum quo philosophamur de naturalibus, observatis specialibus differentiis.*]

Yea there are some that think Habits are in the body. *Taurellus in Philosoph. Triumph. pag.* 52. saith, [*Vere tamen rem si quis intueatur, nil habitus aliud sunt, quam acquisita quædam intelligendi, vel alicujus expetendi promptitudo, non animæ, sed corpori adscribenda, cum per se anima nec impediatur, nec aptior fieri possit, ad exercendas actiones, sed quoniam corpore, ceu instrumento utitur, fit ut ejus respectu, vel habiliores, vel ineptiores ad aliquid efficiendum simus.*] This he afterward thus correcteth, [*Non corpori solum, sed animæ etiam, videntur esse ascribendi (habitus) Eundem intellectum & agentem esse dicimus & patientem: Per se quidem actionum causa est, nec pati, nec impediri dicitur; sed respectu ejus cui conjungitur corpori patitur, atque impeditur quo minus probe possit intelligere. Hac habitus accidentis ratione, non menti, sed corpori primo possunt attribui; veluti vice versa menti primo actiones, sed corpori secundariò adscribuntur. Eadem voluntatis est ratio.*]

I cite not these, as owning them; but to shew Mr. K. that as learned men as he, have not the same thoughts of Habits, and therefore he should not be too hastily confident: And I confess, as highly as I think of Mr. K's learning, I do not think he truly and clearly knows what a Habit of the soul is, nor wherein it is distinct from the soul, the faculties, and the act, and the intelligible *species*; no nor a wiser man then himself neither. Every man knows not so much as he boasteth of, or thinks he knoweth. (And how likely then he is to know so much of God as he here pretendeth to, we may easily judge.) It was as wise a man as he that said [*Nam quomodo intellectu Deum caput homo, qui ipsum intellectum suum, quo eum vult capere, nondum capit?* August. *de Trinitat. li.* 5. *cap.* 1.]

3. I easily acknowledge that grace giveth such a *power* as is commonly called Moral, distinct from the natural faculties, as our corrupt estate contains an opposite impotency. But this is but an applying of the terms [Can] and [Cannot] [Power] and [Impotency] to Dispositions and Undisposedness, to Habits and their Privations.

4. A new heart and spirit, I easily confess necessary. But those words do commonly signifie in Scripture, only new Inclinations, Dispositions, Qualifications. It is a new heart, though only the old faculties and substance. I hope you will not follow *Illyricus*.

5. Where you say that [without faith a man can no more Receive Christ, nor do ought towards it, then a dead man can walk or speak.] I Reply 1. That proves not faith to be equivalent to a *Potentia vel facultas*, any otherwise then that it is of as absolute necessity, but not that it is of the same nature. If you shew an illiterate man a Greek or Hebrew book, he can no more reade in it then a dead man, that is, both are truly *in sensu composito* impossible: But yet it is but a habit that is wanting to one, and a power or faculty natural, to the other. And so it may truly be said that a sinner cannot do well that hath accustomed to do evil, no more then a Leopard can change his spots, or a Blackmoore his skin. Yet if you mean that such are equally distant from an actual change as a dead man, it is but a dead comparison. A dead man wants both natural faculties, and an inclination or moral power. An unbeliever wants but one.

2. That [without faith, such can no more do ought towards the receiving of

 Christ,

Christ, then a dead man can walk or speak] is a dead doctrine, like the rest of Antinomianism, tending to licentiousness, and to subvert the precepts of the Gospel, and the salvation of men, and unfit for any man that shall use the Name of Christ, much more unfit for a Divine. The Ranting sect hath got the word too: and when they are reproved for wickedness, or perswaded to duty, they say, [*What can the creature do?*] To go out of an Alehouse or Whorehouse, and to go to hear the Gospel preached, is somewhat *towards* receiving Christ: for faith comes by hearing; and can no man do this without faith? Cannot the Eunuch reade a Chapter and ask help of an Interpreter without faith? Cannot men Fast and Pray, if not as *Cornelius*, yet as *Ahab*, without faith? Is there not a common Grace of the Spirit, drawing men *towards Christ* that were farre from him, which goes before the special Grace (at least sometimes) whereby they are drawn to *Christ*? This that you maintain is not the doctrine of Mr. *Tho. Hooker*, Mr. *Joh. Rogers*, Mr. *Bolton*, *Perkins*, or any of our experimental practical Divines; no nor of any Protestants that I know; I am sure not of the Synod of *Dort*; but of the Libertines and Antinomists. To what end do you preach to any unbelievers? Do you perswade to any means or duty towards the getting of faith? or do you not? If not, its like you Preach as you Dispute; and then I doubt whether you live at *Blisland*: If you do, sure that duty tends to faith, and may be performed before faith.

3. I think you do more boldly assert, then you can solidly prove that [without faith a man can no more receive Christ, then a dead man walk] if you mean it of the Habit of faith, as, no doubt, you do. If you should mean it of the Act, it were a merry arguing: *q.d.* [We cannot Receive Christ without Receiving him: therefore Receiving him is a Power, and so an Instrument] Actual faith, is actual moral Receiving Christ. But I suppose you mean it of the Habit, in conformity to your former Dispute; And then you suppose that God cannot cause the Act of faith by his Spirit, before the Habit, and by the first act cause a habit (as *Camero* taught, and his followers do still teach.) I suppose if the question were put but *de facto*, Whether God do ordinarily thus cause faith? it is past Mr. K's power to prove the Negative: Much more if the question be *de potentia divina*, whether God *can* do it.

4. Where you say [It gives life to the soul in regard of all spiritual operations.] I Reply, 1. How industriously doth Mr. *Pemble* prove that faith is not the Mother grace? not properly the root of all other graces, nor the first degree of our sanctification and spiritual life, either in the Habit or the Act: *Vindic. Grat. pag.* 12, 13, 14. Yet Mr. K. that is so zealous in defending him, sticks not to gainsay it.

2. Knowledge and Love may be said to give life to the soul, if the exciting and assisting other graces, be giving life.

3. It is in effecting or receiving a relation (*Jus ad Christum, impunitatem, salutem*) that we are enquiring after faiths Instrumentality. And you do turn the business to [giving Life to the soul in regard of spiritual operations;] whereby you seem to mean that faith is no otherwise an Instrument of receiving Christ, then as it is an Instrument of every other operation which it performeth; and as every other habit of grace (Love, Fear, *&c.*) are instruments of their acts.

4. You play with the ambiguity of the term [Life.] You take it for the Union of Causes. You know how commonly it is used for the *Forma Effectis*.

5. And

3. And ſo faith is, as *Pemble* ſaith, part of the ſouls new life, that is, new ſpiritual Rectitude; or as others, the whole *ſemen vel principium*. But this is only a formall, and not an efficient quickening, or giving life. And if you ſpeak of faith exciting other graces: 1. That it doth by the Act, which you yet affirm not to be an Inſtrument. 2. So do all graces in their places help the reſt.

Laſtly, If you did prove that Habits are fitly called the ſouls inſtruments in producing the Acts, yet it is all nothing to our buſineſs. For we are enquiring how farre it is the Inſtrument of the effect, or of reception. And I ſtill ſay, that where the Act is no efficient cauſe, there the Habit by cauſing the act, is no inſtrument of the effect. But in our Juſtification, the act of faith is no efficient cauſe (Juſtification is the immediate effect of God by the Act of grace now, and by his Sentence hereafter.) Therefore, *&c.* And for reception, I ſay it hath no inſtrument, but as the inſtrument of the effect, may be called its inſtrument; except you will ſpeak as a Mechanick, a Rhetorician, or *Vulgariter*, and not Logically. And when Mr. K. gives me cogent Reaſons againſt this, I hope I ſhall regard them.

§. 65.

Mr. K. WHereas *you adde laſtly,* [*The ſharpneſs of the knife cannot be called the knives Inſtrument.*] *I muſt without diſparagement to your confeſt acumen in other things, tell you, that this is but a dull inſtance: for faith is not as the ſharpneſs, but as the knife; and faith admits ſometime a greater ſharpneſs, ſometimes a leſs, which qualifies it in its acting better or worſe, more or leſs. And* 2. *The ſharpneſs of the knife, may be called an inſtrument in a larger ſenſe, as firſt qualities in the elements. The fire is ſaid to act by its heat: the water by its cold; by the heat inſtrumentaliter, by its form* principaliter. *And thus* 3. *may the ſoul be ſaid to act by its faith in receiving Chriſt, without which it were as impoſſible to receive benefit by Chriſt, as to return ſervice to him.*

§. 65.

R. B. 1. I Acknowledge the inſtance of little uſe to the main Queſtion, becauſe it pertains but to the Act of faith, and not the following paſſion or effect.

2. The ſharpneſs of your Anſwer, ſerves but to cut your own fingers. That faith is as the knife, is feigned, and not proved. The knife is the ſubſtance, and the keenneſs is the accident or *modus*. Faith is not a ſubſtance, but a *modus* or accident of the ſoul.

3. In your large ſenſe, you may ſay *quid vis ferè de quovis*, and ſo I told you I did not contradict you.

4. I am ſo cenſorious as to imagine that you ſpeak more by rote, then on true knowledge in your Phyſicks, about fire; but thats no matter.

5. Who doubts but the ſoul may, in the ſenſe you mention, be ſaid [to act by faith in receiving?] But once more diſtinguiſh of receiving: which is 1. The act of conſenting to, or accepting of the offer of Chriſt and Life; which is *Receptio Ethica*, metaphorically called Reception. 2. The true paſſive reception of Right to Chriſt and Life, which follows on the former. The firſt is but the

Condition, and not the Cauſe of the later, and it is in Morality not the later, as in Naturals the *Diſpoſitio materiæ* is to the Reception of the form; but the efficient Cauſe of the later Reception is Gods Will, ſignified by his Law; and this Law ſignifying his Will, and Conſtituting the Duties. Now if you will ſay, that Faith in the Habit is the inſtrumental efficient Cauſe of the firſt Receiving Chriſt, that is no more then to ſay, the Habit is the inſtrumental Cauſe of the Act, *viz.* its own Aſſent and Conſent; as Love may be ſaid of its Act. And whether this Speech be proper or improper, I leave it to your ſelf, I will not meddle with it. But for all Faith might be called the inſtrument of Believing, (ſuppoſing it may) and that Believing is tropically called Receiving, yet I deny that it can therefore be properly called the Inſtrument of conſequent, proper, Paſſive Reception of Right to Chriſt. (The Paſſion is ſuch as Relations in their Reception are capable of.) Yet improperly, vulgarly, as an Inſtrument is not taken for an Efficient Cauſe, I did profeſs and ſtill do, that I will contend with none that will call Faith the Inſtrument of Receiving (or any Conſent of the Will, call it Love, or what you will, as well as Belief in Chriſt, may ſo be call'd an Inſtrument.) But that Faith is no true Inſtrumental Cauſe of forgiving our ſins, or Juſtifying us, I ſhall yet maintain till I ſee ſtronger Reaſons then M. K. hath here produced; and to that I am moved upon Reaſons of great weight, which I have elſwhere manifeſted.

Laſtly, M. K. ſpeaks too unlimitedly [of the Impoſſibility of Receiving Benefits by Chriſt without Faith.] I dare ſay, that many a thouſand (if not all men) have received Benefit by Chriſt before faith. What ſay you by the Goſpel? What ſay you by Faith it ſelf? I hope it is not the Inſtrument of our Receiving it ſelf? Yea, and it is more then Mr. K. can prove, That God could not if he would, have given pardon it ſelf to ſome without faith, upon Chriſts meer Satisfaction. But what need I talk of this, to a man that thinks we have ſo much of, or towards Remiſſion, Juſtification, Acceptation before faith, as he before diſputed for, *i.e.* to be tantamount Juſtified? Though he takes them to be from Eternity, and ſo no fruits of Chriſts Death, yet he cannot deny, but as to us, we are as capable of Receiving ſuch Benefits, without faith, from Chriſt, as without Chriſt.

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§. 66.

Mr. K. *AND I acknowledge I have done very little by this Diſpute; only I had not the patience to ſee ſo worthy Divines ſo unmarthily handled, as if they had need to be taught a Logick leſſon by Mr.* Baxter, *who (as I have heard to the diſparagement of both Univerſities) was ſcarce bred in either, but as much as I eſteem his excellent parts, and I doubt not ſingular piety, yet may I be bold to ſay, ſomewhat more of the Univerſity would have done him no harm; And I conclude all with this Item to my ſelf, though Mr.* Baxter *need not take notice of it,*

——Nec Divinam Iliada tentes,
Sed longe ſequere, & Veſtigia ſemper adora.

§. 66.

R.B. 1. I Think your firſt Concluſion (that you have done little by this Diſpute) hath as cogent Evidence, as moſt that you have maintained in theſe ſix leaves. But it had been more wiſdom to have foreſeen your loſs of time, and to have prevented it, rather then to confeſs it to your diſgrace.

2. Where you ſay, you [had not patience] I ſay, If you cannot forbear, there's no remedy: who can hold that which will away? The tongue is an unruly member. Perhaps your caſe is as his *Diſcolimin.* p. 54.

3. I dare not excuſe, much leſſe juſtifie my tongue or Pen, from too ſharp and unmannerly ſpeeches of my betters: Even where I diſcern no fault, I do ſuſpect ſome, as knowing ſo much evil in that heart which is the fountain: And I hope all thoſe pious Brethren whom I ſhall injure by my raſhneſs, will heartily forgive it; which I earneſtly requeſt, and by Gods aſſiſtance, ſhall do the like by others. But yet I muſt needs ſay, that my Conſcience doth not accuſe me of [handling unworthily] Dr *Twiſs* or Mr *P.* of any men. For as I have exceſſively honoured them, ſo do I very highly honour them ſtill; and their miſtakes I had not mentioned, but 1. That I had been by them enſnared in ſome of them, and thought my ſelf bound to warn others of the danger. 2. The name of ſuch worthy men may do more in propagating an errour, then a thouſand unlearned Antinomians can do, and therefore ſhould their miſtakes be more diligently diſcloſed. 3. It is pity Gods gifts and Saints ſhould be a Defenſative to errour, and a ſnare to the Church. 4. I am confident the ſouls of theſe two Saints of God, if they know theſe things below, will give Mr. K. no thanks for his Vindication, nor be offended with me for diſcloſing their miſtakes, which they now do farre more deteſt then I. 5. It was no ſuch Crime in the late Reverend Aſſembly to queſtion one of them for theſe miſtakes, or in Learned Biſhop *Downame* to write a hundred times more then I againſt the other: And why then is it a Crime in me? 6. Reverend Mr. *Owen*, who approves your book, doth ſay farre more againſt Dr. *Twiſs* then ever I did, in his late excellent, learned *Diatrib. de Juſt. Vindicat.* and yet I heat none accuſe him for unworthy handling him: Yea he ingeniouſly confeſſeth his own former errour, and writes againſt it; and why then may not a man for Truths ſake be allowed to do by another, what he doth by himſelf? Had I been my ſelf the Authour of Dr. *Twiſſes* Works (pardon the preſumption of the ſuppoſition) I ſhould ſay ten times more againſt ſeveral things in them, then I ever yet did. 7. Mr. K. himſelf here confeſſeth the opinions that I mention of theirs to be erroneous: And is not that as unworthy handling them as mine? 8. I intreat the impartial Reader to peruſe my words themſelves, and then let him judge as he ſeeth Cauſe. They are but theſe [A great Queſtion it is, Whether Remiſſion and Juſtification be Immanent or Tranſient acts of God: The miſtake of this one point was it that led thoſe two moſt excellent famous Divines Dr. *Twiſs* and Mr. *Pemble* to that errour and Pillar of Antinomianiſm, *viz.* Juſtification from Eternity. For ſaith Dr. *Twiſs* often, All Acts immanent in God are from Eternity: But Juſtification and Remiſſion of ſins are immanent Acts: Therefore.] Is this ſuch unworthy handling? Mr. K. durſt not once ſay that I falſly accuſed them; or that it was not their errour. And could I give them a higher Elogy, then to call them [moſt Excellent, Famous Divines.] I am confident the greateſt Archbiſhops or Cardinals, yea the Pope himſelf would think ſuch Titles no way

way injurious to them. The Lord General will be content with lower Titles then [moſt Excellent and Famous] Do not ſuch as Mr.K. go about to confirm the vile reproaches of the times, as if Miniſters were the moſt intollerably proud men on earth, when this is taken for unworthy handling! And when they that expect that their hearers ſhould bear their ſharpeſt and frequent reproofs, cannot bear ſuch an honourable mention of their miſtakes?

4. Whether there be one true word in Mr.K's particular accuſation [as if they had need to be taught a Logick leſſon of Mr. *Baxter*] I am content my very enemies ſhould Judge. Did I ever contend about any point of Logick with them? It was not, what an immanent Act is? But onely, Whether Juſtification be an Immanent Act, and ſo Eternal, that I enquired, and in which I oppoſed them? I do therefore take it as my duty to Admoniſh my learned Brother of his great ſin, who hath not once, twice, or thrice, but ſo oft in ſix leaves ſpoken ſuch palpable untruths in matter of fact, and made ſo little Conſcience of the ninth Commandment.

5. If in this Paragraph Mr.K. do diſcover the very end of his undertaking, not to be ſo much the Vindicating of any truth of God, but of Worthy Divines, and Academicall Honour (of which I leave the Reader to Judge) then may we hence conjecture at the Reaſon of ſeverall Paſſages through the whole: for the Means may not be better then the End; and no wonder if they be ſuited to it.

6. As for all that follows concerning my [being ſcarce bred in either Univerſity, *&c.*] I have nothing to ſay. Did Mr.K. ever hear me contend for the Reputation of being Learned? He eaſily carries the Cauſe here, having no contradiction.

7. And where he ſaith, that [ſomewhat more of the Univerſity would have done me no harm] I do not believe him: For though I have been as ſenſible of my want of ſuch happy opportunities, and my defects thereupon, as ever Mr.K. was, at leaſt; yet I believe that all things work together for Good to them that love God; and that by that three-fold Cord (on my Friends, Body, and ſcrupulous Conſcience) by which God reſtrained me from ſuch advantages, and confined me to a more private courſe of ſtudies, he did alſo reſtrain me from ſome evil that I might elſe have run upon, or prevent ſome that he ſaw would befall me: (and indeed he hath ſatisfied me now of the particulars.)

8. What men or other creatures thoſe were that Mr.K. did [hear boaſt of me to the diſparagement of both Univerſities] I cannot conjecture. But this I will promiſe Mr.K. that how little ſoever I have received from the Univerſities, they ſhall have my frequent and earneſt prayers to God, and my beſt endeavours with men, for their Proſperity. The Lord purge them from Pride, Senſuality, Manpleaſing and Self-ſeeking, and cauſe them humbly to ſtudy Chriſt above all, and zealouſly to lay out themſelves for his Glory, and with conſiderate, reſolved Self-denial and Unreſervedneſs, wholly to reſign themſelves to his ſervice, and make it their main buſineſs to win ſouls to that true felicity which they have firſt taſted of themſelves; and then I ſhould not ſo much fear any policy or power of their Enemies.

9. And for Mr.K's concluding Poetical injunction; I heartily confeſs my utter unworthineſs to be annumerated to the Ambaſſadours of the Lord Jeſus, or ever to have been permitted to ſpeak in his Name; much more with any ſuch ſucceſs and encouragement as he hath vouchſafed me: And the Lord forbid that ever

I ſhould

I should be so arrogant, as to equal my self with the Worthies of the Church, much lesse to envy the honour of their preheminence. Yet in regard of the Churches present necessities, I dare not give over, for all my imperfections. Though I have ever been of a spirit too easily discouraged, and have many a time been under *Jonas* s temptation, and ready to say as *Jeremy*, *I will speak no more in his Name*; yet God hath so suited his providences to my infirmities and necessities, as not only to cure my backwardnesse and despondency, but also to convince me of the pleasantnesse of his work. I am assured that it was the Lord that sent me into his Vineyard, and without him none shall force me out. He that gave me fewer Talents then others, will expect but an answerable improvement at my hands: but be they never so small, I dare not hide them. He that calleth for two mites will accept them: He despiseth not the day of small things. He sometime revealeth that to babes which he hideth from the wise and prudent: For the wisdome of the world is foolishnesse with God, and the foolishnesse of God is wiser then men: and no flesh shall Glory in his sight. How many learned men have lost the main end of their Learning, and engaged God so farre against them, as to lay both them and their honour in the dust, because they would not devote it more faithfully to his service! The Lord grant that I may so use the small abilities that I have, that I be not condemned as an unprofitable and unfaithfull servant; and then I do not fear being condemned for their smalnes. There are many learneder men then Mr. K. in hell, and many more unlearned then I in heaven.

But should I deny my self to be Vile against the Accusations of Mr. K. when I daily confess my self Vile to God, I should but prove the hypocrisie of my prayers. And therefore Dispute for Reputation that will for me. When I am tempted to such a work by Accusers, or by my own heart, I desire God to save me from the Temptation. He that works principally for himself, must be his own Paymaster.

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§. 67.

Mr. K. *The summe of all that hath been hitherto said in this Paragraph, is this, That to Justification there is required a transient act of Gods, or the working of Faith in our hearts: which shews, That albeit Gods Decree to Justifie us have much in it that looks so well like Justification, that it may be called so without Blasphemy, yet that indeed Justification is in time, not from Eternity: And it appears further thus: That Justification being the Absolving us from our sins, and the Accepting us as righteous, albeit God the Father Decreed it, the Son Purchased it, a Grant of it were made, and under Seal; yet till it be pleaded there is no Pardoning; as appears by comparing Gods pardon with that of Princes, which is not of Value till Pleaded, and not pleaded till after the Jury hath found the Offendor Guilty: so this Justification which begins at our Eclieving in foro Conscientiæ, a more private Session is again made more Publick in Heaven at our death, and this at Gods Bar before Angels and Saints deceased; and yet more publick before all the world at the General Judgement. This pardon was Purchased, Resolved, or Issued out, Sealed, Received, Pleaded at first: but as new sins are committed we plead it again, and so may be said to be particularly Justified from particular sins,* toties quoties, *but always by virtue of our General Pardon.*

§. 67.

R. B. WE are now paſt the End, and yet new to begin. If in this Recollection he had not ſtumbled on a word or two, that come from the Core of his Errour, I ſhould ſcarce have underſtood any of his minde about the Controverſie in hand, ſave only Negatively, and that he is againſt Me. And yet it is not much that I can diſcern of it. Among all the Diſſenters of all Sects that ever I had to do with, that pretended to Learning, I have ſeldome met with the like ſlippery dealing, as in Mr. K. who pretending to make ſome notable diſcovery of the Truth, did ſo loſe himſelf in the eager purſute of a contemptible Adverſary, that he ſeems to have quite forgot his undertaking, and leave his errand behinde him. But to deal truly, it is my opinion, that though the man were drawn to engage himſelf, yet when he had emptied his bilious ſtomack, he found his work done, and therefore was willing to drop aſleep when he ſhould have performed his Promiſe. He doth over and over again promiſe us to open to us *what is the Tranſient Juſtifying Act*, yea, *pag.* 139. to *ſpeak Punctually to it*; and when all's done, the buſineſs is ſo farre undone, that for my part, I cannot certainly tell yet whether he once name it, or what his opinion about it is. *Pag.* 141. He ſaith [by Giving us faith, he Juſtifies us, as ſhall be ſhewed anon, he giving us that which is our Inſtrument, whereby we receive the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt.] That [anon] is not yet come; for I finde no fuller diſcovery of his minde, but only a little glance in this Recollection, wherewith he doth conclude. In thoſe former words he ſeems to make the Immediate Juſtifying act to be the Giving of Faith; and yet contradicts it in the next words; for that Faith he makes to be Given, that it may be our Inſtrument of Receiving. Now

1. We are enquiring after Gods act, and not mans Inſtrument.

2. We are enquiring after the Immediate effecting Act, and not a Receiving, which is no effecting.

Let us ſee whether theſe words under conſideration will any better diſcover his ſenſe.

1. He ſaith [that to Juſtification there is required a Tranſient Act of Gods; or the working of faith in our heart.] This is all the tranſient Act I can learn he intends from firſt to laſt. But though before he ſaid [by Giving us faith, he Juſtifies us] yet here he thought it ſafer to ſpeak more ambiguouſly, and onely ſaith, that [this is required to Juſtification.] But there are many things required to it, beſides that Act which doth immediately Effect it: Antecedents, Conditions, the Cauſes of thoſe Conditions, are all Required to it; when yet none of them is *the* juſtifying Act. But if indeed he do mean that *Fidem dare*, is *Juſtificare*, I will ſpeak to that anon. Next he ſaith, that [Gods Decree to juſtifie, looks well like Juſtification] but that is not it. Next he ſaith, that [Juſtification is the Abſolving us from our ſins, and Accepting us as Righteous] that he may come to ſhew us what is not, and what is, the Abſolving and Accepting Act. And firſt again he excludes *Decreeing* from being the Act enquired after: then he excludes Chriſts Purchaſe; then he excludes the Grant made and ſealed: then he ſaith [Till it be pleaded there is no pardoning, as appears by comparing Gods pardon with that of Princes.] Perhaps then he means that [Pleading] is Pardoning, or the juſtifying Act. No, not ſo neither: For he only ſaith, that till it be Pleaded, there is no Pardoning] which plainly expreſſeth, That Pleading

ing is but a prerequisite Condition, the want whereof suspendeth the act of Pardon, but is not the Pardoning act it self. In the Conclusion he gives us a little more light to see part of his meaning, where he saith [so this Justification which begins at our Believing *in foro Conscientiæ*, a more private Sessions, is again made more publick in Heaven at our death, and this at Gods Bar before Angels, &c.] Here he tels us more then yet I could gather from him, *in quo foro justificamur fide*, that it is but *in foro Conscientiæ*, a more private Sessions, so that we are left to search for the justifying Act; which though he vouchsafe not expresly to mention, yet we may possibly conjecture at by this last passage. If the Reader would see the whole mystery which is thus darkly lapt up, as being somewhat afraid of the light, as far as I can gather, it is this.

Mr. K. being of the Antinomian faith, That Remission and Justification are Immanent Acts, and from Eternity (and consequently not purchased by Christs bloud) and that Justification by faith, which the Scripture speaks of, is only Justification *in foro Conscientiæ*, or the apprehension of the former; he thought, in these times, when Antinomianism hath an ill savour with the best, that it is the wisest way to appropriate the name of Remission and Justification by faith (in this life) to this Justification *in foro Conscientiæ*, and to give to the Immanent Eternal Act, the description without the name. And therefore he thought it fittest to say, that [Gods decreeing to Remit our sins, carries in it a Remission of them tantamount; for who shall charge them on us, where God decrees to Remit them?] *Pag.* 138. That [Gods Decree to passe the transient Act of justifying, carries in it as much as concerns Gods Remission of sins, and Acceptance of us as Righteous.] But the change that is made in time by the transient Act, is in our Feeling or Knowledge, and therefore he saith, that when we say [Now a man is justified in Gods sight] it [signifies only a testimony given by God, whereby he makes *us* know that we are justified before God, or in his sight] and that [in God it signifies, A making us to see: and we are said to be justified in his sight, when he makes it, as it were evident to our sight, that we are justified] *p.* 138. (Here before he was aware, he gives it the name of justification before we see it.) Now being Resolved to appropriate the name of Remission and Iustification (in this life) to that which is *in foro Conscientiæ*, he is hard put to it, to deliver his meaning of the transient justifying Act, without opening the shame of his opinion. And therefore sometimes he saith, It is the Giving of faith to be our Instrument: Sometime that this faith is necessary to it: but concludes, that it is *in foro Conscientiæ*, a private Sessions, that we are justified before death: So that the Summe is this: That Iustification, and Remission, and Acceptation do consist in our Conscience's apprehension or feeling of that which God did from Eternity (which must not be called Remission, but Tantamount Remission:) and because Conscience cannot know or feel this, but by Believing, and because we cannot Believe till God give us the Grace of faith, therefore God justifies or pardons us by Giving us that Grace: that is, We by Believing or being Conscious of our Eternal Acceptance, do immediately justifie and forgive our selves; but mediately God forgiveth and Justifieth us by Causing us to Believe, and Causing our Consciences to justifie us immediately.

I will not say, that I am certain I have hit of Mr. K's minde in this explication: for who can be certain in such a mist? And therefore I leave every Reader that thinks I mistake it, to gather it better, if he can.

What ever it is, I am sure he oft contradicts himself. He that here tels us it is *in*

foro Conſcientiæ, and talkt before of evidencing it to our ſelves, doth ſay *Pag.* 139. *l. ult.* [Where ever there is a Moral, *i. e.* a Legal change, there is a tranſient act, and this being in juſtification, a tranſient act is neceſſarily required to this change] Now a meer Legal change is *de jure*, and not in the feeling of Conſcience: and it is *in foro nullo actualiter, ſed virtualiter in foro divino*, it being *actus illius Legis quæ eſt Norma Judicii*: and therefore not *in foro Conſcientiæ, vel aliquo privato*. And if it be confeſt to be a Moral, *i. e.* a Legal change, what man ſees not that it muſt be a change *per Legem*? i. e. *novam, remediantem*, or *per actum moralem*? Nay, mark how in the very words of this Concluſion, he yields the Cauſe and doth not ſee it, He confeſſeth that we are pardoned as Offendors are by a Prince's pardon, which is not of Value till pleaded. Now let any man of underſtanding judge, whether the Princes Pardon Granted and Sealed, be not the immediate, efficient Cauſe of this Delinquents abſolution or paſſive pardon, when he doth plead it: And whether it be not firſt a *Jus impunitatis* that is hereby Given him, which (whatever is here ſaid) is of Value upon the Accepting, before the pleading, though the pleading is alſo neceſſary to ſtop judgement, or prevent Execution, and ſo to have the full benefit. And what though the Pardon Granted and Sealed be not Effectual till Accepted or Pleaded? Doth it follow, that it is not the immediate Cauſe afterwards? Let it not ſeem unmannerly if I ſpeak my thoughts; that all this proceeds from this Learned mans great miſtake or inconſiderateneſs of the Nature of Laws and their Actions, and of the nature and uſe of Conditions, whoſe *non*-performance doth ſuſpend the action of the Law or Grant, (becauſe the Will of the Legiſlator or Donor was, that it ſhould ſo be) but the performance doth not cauſe its action, much leſs immediatly cauſe the Effect; unleſs there be ſomething in it that may work as a procatarcktick efficient Cauſe, by way of Merit, or the like, over and above its meer Office of a Condition. If a man by his Teſtament leave his Son a thouſand pound *per annum* on Condition that he do voluntaily Regiſter his Thankful Acceptance of it: It is not the performance of this Condition that doth at all cauſally conſtitute the *Jus ad rem legatam*, or *conferre Debitum*, or *Donare*, though the *non*-performance may ſuſpend the Collation of Right: but it is the Teſtament that doth immediately conſtitute this Right, when the ſuſpenſion is removed, which before it did not, becauſe the Teſtator would not have it ſo. *Grotius in Caſſand. art. 4. p. 280. Promiſſi enim ea vis ut Conditionem implenti Jus conferas. Vid. de Jur. Belli. l. 1. c. 1. §. 4. & l. 2. c. 11. §. 1, &c.* If then it were true, as M. K. here affirmeth, that it is at this private Seſſions *in foro Conſcientiæ*, that we are firſt juſtified on our Believing, then the immediate juſtifying Act (which Mr. K. hath talked ſo oft of) can be no other then either our own Apprehenſion, or belief that we are Pardoned and Righteous, or ſome ſuch like Apprehenſion or Concluſion of our own hearts. For if it be *in foro Conſcientiæ*, it muſt be By Conſcience as the Agent, that is, By the underſtandings Concluding us to be what we are. But this both ſuppoſeth us to be Pardoned and Righteous before (for the Being of a thing goeth before the true Knowledge that it is in Being: None can be truly Conſcious of a Righteouſneſs or Pardon which he hath not:) and alſo it makes us to pardon and juſtifie our ſelves; and the tranſient juſtifying Act of God, ſo long enquired after, ſhould be only Gods cooperating with us in our Believing, or Cauſing us to Believe. Yea rather, the Act of juſtifying faith (which is the Acceptance of an offered Chriſt and Life, 1 *Joh.* 5. 11, 12.) goes before this Act now mentioned, and this is but Aſſurance or a Conſciouſneſs of the State that by Believing we are in. Let any man that is willing to know the truth, but examine every Text

of

of Scripture that ſpeak of Juſtification by faith, and he may eaſily ſee that they do not (no not one of them) ſpeak of Juſtification in *foro Conſciencia*, or of any conſciouſneſs of our Righteouſneſs, but of Juſtification before God.

And that Gods giving faith is not the immediate juſtifying act, appears 1. From the very name. [To give faith] is one thing, and [to juſtifie] is another. 2. From the real difference. Faith is given by a Phyſical act immediatly: Righteouſneſs, immediatly by a Legal or Moral act. Faith is a real Quality (in the habit) or Act: Righteouſneſs is a Relation, and is immediatly by a meer Reſultancy. Nay the very matter or meritorious cauſe of the Righteouſneſs now in queſtion, is not faith, but Chriſts ſatisfaction and merits. The *terminus* therefore of the juſtifying act (I ſpeak now of our conſtitutive Juſtification) is Righteouſneſs, a Relation: but the *terminus* of Gods act in giving Faith, is the Faith ſo given. The Object alſo of the juſtifying act, and the Subject of Juſtification, is *credens*, a man already Believing: but the object of that act which giveth faith, is an Unbeliever. 3. Is not this flat Popery? to make Juſtification to lye in a real change, and not a relative? and ſo to make it the ſame with Vocation, Converſion, Regeneration, or Sanctification? Whereas the holy Ghoſt ſaith, [*Whom he called them he juſtified*, Rom. 8. 30.] For to give faith is Vocation (as thoſe Divines ſay, that make faith to go before other graces in habit and act:) or it is Vocation, Regeneration and Sanctification, as Mr. *Pemble* thinks, who ſuppoſeth all infuſed *in uno ſemine*. So that if *Fidem dare*, and *Juſtificare* be all one, then to Juſtifie and to Call or Sanctifie is all one.

I had once thought to have heaped up divers Arguments here in the concluſion on theſe two laſt points. 1. To prove that our firſt Juſtification by faith, which Scripture ſpeaks of, is not *in foro conſciencia*. 2. To prove that [to give faith] is not the proper or immediate juſtifying act of God. But I ſhall forbear. 1. Becauſe Mr. K. gives me ſo little invitation to it, ſeeing he gives but a few dark hints of his own minde. 2. In that I finde upon review that almoſt all this paper is unavoidably taken up with a meer defence of my words againſt his injury, and he hath not given me occaſion for many further profitable explications or diſputes: and therefore I will reſerve theſe for a fitter place. 3. Becauſe I have largliet already Argued againſt both theſe in private anſwers to the Animadverſions of learned Friends: and though thoſe are not for publique view, yet I have a backwardneſs to the doing of one thing ſo oft. 4. Becauſe this little that I have here ſaid, ſeems enough, and proportionable to his brevity which doth occaſion it.

This one thing ſeems neceſſary, in the Concluſion, that I adde a few Reaſons to prove that it is in Law-ſenſe that we are firſt juſtified by faith, and ſo that the Moral Act of the Law is the immediate juſtifying act (and conſequently the enacting of that Law of grace, or granting that Deed of gift, is the next foregoing efficient act.) There are Reaſons enough in my Aphoriſmes, but Mr. K. thought it eaſieſt to take no notice of them.

Arg. 1. *A termino.*

The thing that is given by Remiſſion is *Jus ad Impunitatem*: But it is only by Laws, Contracts, Deeds of gift, or the like Moral acts, that Right is immediatly conveyed: Therefore it is by theſe immediatly that we are forgiven: (and ſo juſtified *Conſtitutive*.)

I ſuppoſe it will not be denied that Remiſſion is a Giving? *Qui condonat, Donat.* So Lawyers generally ſay of Remitting a wrong, and it will hold in caſe of crimes, eſpecially in our caſe, againſt God. *Fragoſus de Regimine Reipub. Chriſt. part.* 7. *li.* 6.

l.6. Disp. 17. n.95. p. 844. saith, *Remittere injuriam est Donare, & Donare est jactare jus suum.*

Arg.2. *A malo remoto, contrario, & Termino a quo.*

The Dissolution of a Legal obligation, must be by a Moral act of the Rector, of the same kinde with the obliging act. But Remission of sin is a Dissolution of such an Obligation. Therefore, *&c.*

The *major* is proved by that common maxime, *Eodem modo dissolvitur obligatio, quo contrahitur.* The *minor* is proved by the true definition of Pardon: Which is in criminals, The Act of a Rector dissolving an Obligation to punishment. *Remissio est proximè Reatus Remissio; remotius Pœnæ: Reatus est Obligatio ad Pœnam.*

Arg.3. *Ab officio Legis.*

If it be the use of the Law to be *Norma Judicii*, then he that is justified *per sententiam Judicis*, must be first justified in Law: But the Antecedent is true: Therefore, *&c.*

When I say [Justified in Law] I do not mean [by the Law] strictly taken as most do, for one only *Species* of Law: But I mean [by Law] in general, as it is truly defined to be *Constitutiva Determinatio Rectoris de Debito. Vel signum Voluntatis Rectoris Debitum Constituens.* For many Lawyers do call only written and standing Laws, by the name of Laws, and do exclude verball precepes of a Rector: In this limited sense, as it is taken for [Law by an Excellency] I do not now use it.

Arg.4. *A natura Sententiæ.*

Declarative sentential Justification or Pardon, presupposeth Justification Constitutive. Therefore Justification Constitutive goes before sentential Justification.

Here I suppose 1. That Constitutive is *per Legem*, and not *per Sententiam*, which is past dispute. 2. That it is by faith (as the condition) that we are justified *Constitutivè*, it being only Believers that are Morally qualified to be fit subjects for this Justification, and whom alone the new Law pronounceth Righteous, and to whom alone it effectually giveth Christ and Life. The Antecedent is plain, in that the Judge must sentence a man to be as he is, and according to his Cause. A man must be just, before he justly be pronounced Just. He that condemneth the Righteous, and he that justifieth the wicked, they both are abomination to the Lord, Prov.17.15. *He that saith to the wicked, Thou art Righteous, him shall Nations curse, people shall abhorre him,* Prov. 24.24. So that whether the sentence be in conscience or Heaven, it must presuppose Justification Constitutive.

Arg.5. *A natura fidei Justificantis.*

If the nature of that act of faith which justifieth, be only such as may be the condition of the Laws constitutive Justification, and not such as may be the Instrument of sentencing us Just, then Justification by faith (which Scripture mentioneth so oft) is Justification in Law sense, and not Sentential: But the Antecedent is true; as is proved from the Act, which I have elsewhere proved to be [the Accepting of an offered Christ and Life] (including Assent) and not the Antinomian, special Belief that we are pardoned, or a perswasion of Gods special Love to us, or a consciousness of our Righteousness, or Assurance of it, which are said to justifie sententially *in foro Conscientiæ.*

Arg.6. *A communi consensu, & usu loquendi.*

It is the common judgement of men to think, and common custom to say, that

that [A King pardoneth by his written, or verbal Pardon, as his Instrument] and to distinguish [*Justificationem Legis*] *a Justificatione Judicis*, the former being presupposed: therefore we must do so here, unless any special reason can be brought against it: For Gods Law hath the common nature of a Law, and his Judgement the common nature of judgement.

To prove the Antecedent I need but to appeal to the common use of men acquainted with Legal and Judicial affairs. Yea even Mr. K. himself cannot forbear acknowledging it: Yea besides the forementioned acknowledgements, he is strangely guided to conclude with it, as the very last word of his Digression, against me [We may be said to be particularly justified from particular sins *toties quoties*, but alwaies by vertue of our general pardon.] This general pardon is that which God issued out and sealed as he saith, which becoming effectual when received and pleaded, doth by its virtue justifie us from particular sins: that is, by its moral or civil action.

*Arg.*7. When the Scripture so oft denieth Justification by the Law, it plainly implieth that there is such a thing *in rerum natura*, as Justification by a Law, and that it is no improper unfit speech: For else God would not use it, *Gal.* 5. 4. & 3.11. Yea it opposeth Justification by grace in Christ, to Justification by the Law, *Act.* 13.39. *By him all that believe are justified from all things from which they could not be justified by the Law of Moses*: Where note the opposition that [by Christ and Grace] is opposed to [by works] and so [by the Law of Christ and Grace] is opposed to [by the Law of *Moses* and Works.] That therefore is affirmed of the Law of Grace, which is denied of the Law of Works: *viz.* to justifie. And the reason why the Law of Works could not justifie, was for that it was weak through the flesh, and not that it was an action or effect disagreeable to the nature of a Law.

Many other actions of Law to the same purpose, I recited out of several Scriptures, in my Aphorismes, *pag.* 178, 179. which I will not trouble the Reader to repeat.

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§. 68.

AND thus I have done that ungratefull work which Mr. K. was pleased by Digressing to put me upon: which I confess appears not lovely to me on the review. For I finde though I have easily born the charges of this Learned man, yet it is no very usefull work to the Reader that he hath here called me to; and I thought it not fit to go beyond my call. In the first part I have little to do, but to obtrude his confidence, and to shew that he meerly feigned me his adversary, forgetting that of *Seneca*, *Victoriæ sine adversario brevis est laus*: In the rest I have not much to do, but to open the vanity and fallacy of many words, and to shew what a windy Triumph it is which followeth such a windy Opposition, and what his Reader oweth him, who doth *importare verba & somnum pro mercibus*: And what can the Reader gain also by such a discovery. I finde also, that though I resolved to forbear all harsh language when I began, that I have not satisfied my self in the performance. For when I came to his most injurious words, I could not tell how to answer them but by shewing plainly what they are, and calling a Spade, a Spade; which cannot be done in smooth and pleasing words; and I finde that I have used more Ironies then I dare approve of. My resolution therefore is, to stifle this work till I have a call to publish it, and then to commit it to some

ſome moderate hand, to correct all that ſhall ſeem too unmannerly. For though I think I have ſpoken nothing but what Mr. K. ought to hear, yet I doubt whether it be not more then was fit for me to ſpeak. It is my purpoſe therefore to deal with him no more, leſt I be drawn again to the ſame inconvenience. For I finde I cannot Reply to ſuch a man in ſuch termes as I do to the Moderate and Candide. Till his breath be ſweeter or ſounder I think it ſafeſt to ſtand further from him. When he diſgorgeth his ſtomack on me, I have not the skill of ſhaking it off ſo mannerly, and cleanſing my ſelf without his diſgrace, as I could wiſh I had. And if a man ſtirre them not very tenderly, *Plus fœtent ſtercora mota.* I finde alſo that it is a very hard thing againſt the guilty to ſpeak both truly and pleaſingly: For *nemini blanditur Veritas:* and I have a natural inclination to ſpeak nakedly and plainly; which being ſeconded with ſome degree of opinion, that *qui loquitur planè, loquitur ſanè,* may quickly occaſion me to ſtep too farre. But the principal cauſe is, that I am truly aweary of the Warres of Divines: Many an opportunity and importunity have I put by, as finding here alſo, that *Impendia belli ſunt præmiis majora:* and eſpecially in this civil uncivil Warre of Brethren, the gainer uſually loſeth: unleſs men could be brought to deal more with the *Matter*, and leſs with *Words* and *Men*. Contentions are both the Daughter and the Mother of Pride. They are (as ſoot) the fuel of that flame that cauſed them. If the contender be overcome, he glorieth not as a Chriſtian in the Victory of Truth, but repineth as a man at his own overthrow; and *pro plumeis noxis plumbas trahit:* If he ſeem to conquer *ſupercilia erigit*, and it doth puff him up, and ſo increaſe his vice, and haſten his ruine: for

Vindicat elatos juſta ruina gradus.

However it ſets men uſually on two eager a ſtudying for their own Reputation; which is the way that god reſolveth ſhall ruine it: For he that will be great muſt be the ſervant of all, and he that will be wiſe muſt become a fool, and he that will ſave his honour muſt loſe it: *qui propagat nomen, perdit nomen.* My ſoul reſteth an admirable ſweetneſs in Peace: The Churches Peace, the Concord of Brethren is my daily ſtudy, prayer and endeavour; which O that I were able any right way to promote! What I do that way, I do with pleaſure: my greateſt zeal doth carry me to it. But what I do in way of Controverſie, yea even when neceſſitated, ſo that I dare not forbear, leaſt I ſhould betray or wrong the Truth, yet is it grievous and ungratefull to me: I have little pleaſure in it. I am reſolved therefore to draw back from this work, as much as I finde conſiſtent with my Fidelity to the Truth of Chriſt; and to do nothing in it till I am ſatisfied of a Call that muſt not be reſiſted. And when I follow God, I may ſafely commit to him my Way and Labours: for I have found that he draweth forth nothing, which he knows not how to uſe for good. And the more any Brother is perſwaded that I tranſgreſs my bounds in writing too ſharply, I intreat him the more to pray for the pardon of my fault, and the more watchfully to ſhun the like himſelf; and to joyn with me, and all the Churches friends, in daily and importunate requeſts to God, that he would guide our feet into the way of Truth and Peace; even of that Truth, which lying between extreams, is the only way to ſtedfaſt Peace; and of that Peace, which is the Means and End of Truth. *Amen.*

Kederminſter, Auguſt 1° 1653°.

Christian Reader, I Have been willing to hope that my work of this kinde, and with this kinde of men, was almoſt at an end, and that God would in mercy grant me ſome little vacancy for more profitable labors (of practicall Theology) which I have long affected, and earneſtly deſired an opportunity to perform: But the unceſſant aſſaults of contentious men do make me begin to lay aſide ſuch hopes; The enemy of truth is too ſubtle for me; It's like he doth conjecture at the ſhortneſs of my time, and therefore contriveth to force me upon other works till my glaſſe is run. I have long foreſeen his plot, and yet I am not able to diſappoint him: To quiet the ſpirits of the contentious is beyond my power; To bear in ſilence their Reproaches of my ſelf, and to ſpend but little time or none in vindicating of any Intereſt of mine own, this I have purpoſed and promiſed to my Brethren. But when I ſee apparently that it is an intereſt higher then mine that is aſſaulted, and that Gods Truth and the ſouls of men do command my endeavours for their defence, I have no power to forbear. Since the Printing of this Book, there is come to my hands a ſecond Volume of Mr *G. Kendals* againſt Mr *John Goodwin* on the point of perſeverance; wherein he hath aſſaulted my *Directions for Peace of Conſcience* in a large Preface; and my Book of *Reſt*, in a Digreſſion: Had he fallen on my *Aphoriſmes* again, I think I ſhould have ſilently yeelded them up as a ſacrifice to his ſcorn; But thoſe other Practicall Writings, I ſuppoſe it my duty juſtly to defend. 1. Becauſe I know it is the Serpents malicious deſign to make my Labours unprofitable to the Church. And ſeeing God in great mercy hath ſatisfied me by experience, that how weak ſoever, they have been hitherto ſucceſsfull, I take it for no proud over-valuing them, but for a judgement upon experience, to conclude that it will be ſome wrong to the Church of God and ſouls of men if I ſilently give way to this ſerpentine deſign. 2. I have heard ſuch Jealouſies and terrible accuſations ſpread abroad by this ſort of Divines againſt my Writings, and eſpecially my *Directions for Peace*, as cauſed me much to admire what the cauſe of the offence ſhould be. Never could I hear but one particular accuſation of it, which is the ſhameleſſe falſhood, that I was againſt the doctrine of the *Saints Perſeverance*; to which I annexed an Apology to the ſecond Edition. But I found it was further buz'd into the heads of the people, that there were many other dangerous errors in it; But all was in generals, and I could never learn any of the particulars till now: Nay the people that were deterred from reading it, knew none of the particulars themſelves, but took on truſt from jealous fame that ſuch there were. And I learned, that there is among ſome Brethren of this ſtrain, a Combina-

tion, by raiſing ſuch reports to deterre the people from the reading of my writings. I confeſs, upon all this I was not much ſorry for the event, that Mr *K.* had in this book brought forth his accuſations, that at laſt I might know my errors that I could never hear of before, & that I was at laſt put into a capacity of making my defence; when if it had not been for this man I might have ſtill been judged erroneous, & neither I nor thoſe that believed and reported it, could with all our diligence have learned *wherein*; I underſtand that the ſame ſpirit doth ſometime carry this learned man into the Pulpit, and there inſtigate him to the like emploiment, wherewith he once tickled or netled the ears of the Auditory at *Aldermanbury*. Truly I never thought my name, or deſcription, worthy to be brought into a Pulpit, though in a way of oppoſition. I thought none had thus over-honoured me but Mr *Tombs*, nor durſt I think my name capable of being the matter of ſo honorable a triumph to Mr *K.* as by the diligence he uſeth for a victory he ſeemeth to expect. But ſeeing he hath ſo much advantage of the ground (and ſomtime the winde, though not the Sun) when he manfully preacheth againſt me at a hundred miles diſtance; I muſt give him the better there, and take him when he comes within my reach.: And though I ſhall be as be as brief as I can, yet ſo much I intend, if God vouchſafe me time and ability, as ſhall ſhew you reaſon to pity this Learned man, that ever his corruptions ſhould lay him open to the prevalency of thoſe temptations which have ingaged him in ſo unhappy a deſign as to ſerve the enemy of truth in employing his excellent parts in falſe accuſing and unjuſt defaming his brother that would fain live in peace, endeavouring to deprive mens ſouls of the benefit of his labors, and that in his mercenary ſerving the luſts of another, for a little vain-glory of applauſe he ſhould ſo wound his Reputation with the ſober and godly, and make ſuch work for an accuſing conſcience, as he hath once and again done; yea, that he ſhould ſtill ſo much neglect the 9th Command. as to become Mr *Eyres* ſecond, and Mr *Crandons* third. And for thoſe Reverend Brethren, who have (from ſeveral parts) ſolicited me to forbear further Controverſal debates, leſt I be deprived of opportunity for more profitable works (whereto they importune me) I profeſs to them that I take it for the greateſt affliction of my life, that I am neceſſitated to this defenſive controverſal way of writing, & moſt gladly would I be at peace, if men would give me leave; and if they will but convince me, that I may lawfully be ſilent where the Truth of God, the ſucceſs of all my former labors, and the good of men is ſo nearly concerned, I ſhall reſolve on ſilence; (For my own intereſt I hope I can ſubject it to Chriſts;) But till then I muſt crave their pardon, yea, and their compaſſion of me, who am to my great trouble detained from a more pleaſing kinde of work.

May 23. 1654.

READER, To prevent the miſtake of my ſenſe, I deſire thee to correct theſe faults before thou readeſt; many ſmaller there are which may be eaſily diſcerned.

Errata in the Epiſtle to C. G. *Whaly.*

PAge 4. line 23. reade *To which end.* l. *penult.* r. *your ſelf.* p. 5. l. 19. for *their* r. *your* p. 6. l. 7. for *undeſervedly* r. *unreſervedly.*

Againſt *Blake.*

Pag. 1. l. 32. for 1. r. *i.e.* l. 5. for *Cor.* r. *Sen.* p. 6. l. 45. for *our faith* r. *one faith.* p. 7. l. 30. for *former* r. *formall.* p. 25. l. 33. for *recipiatur* r. *recipitur.* l. 38. r. *ſo receiveth.* p. 38. l. 22. r. *non contingat.* p. 46. l. 11. for *ſu.* r. *ſo.* p. 62. l. 15. for *man* r. *an unregenerate man.* p. 85. l. 5. for *Juſtification* r. *Impoſition* or *Inſtitution.* p. 89. l. 15. r, *expect order.* p. 91. l. 33. r. *inceptive.* p. 92. l. 14. for *dura* r. *pura.* and for *ſubconditions* r. *ſub conditione.* p. 97. l. 22. r. *though it was.* p. 99. l. 25. r. *The Apoſtle ſpeaking.* p. 100. l. 32. for *particular* r. *peculiar.* p. 104. l. 22. r. *but ſo come.* p. 117. r. *your ſelf.* p. 118. l. 36. r. *to many.* p. 120. l. 41. blot out *to.* p. 133. l. 30. for *diſtinguiſh* r. *diminiſh.* p. 134. l. 41. blot out *that.* p. 136. l. 5. for 4. r. *quatuor.* l. 6. for *this* r. *his.* p. 138. l. 2. for *ſeal* r. *ſtate.* p. 145. l. 11. r. *by Moſes* Gen. 2.

Againſt Mr *K.*

Pag. 4. l. 25. r. *ſpiritui.* p. 5. l. 31. r. *nemini.* p. 29. l. antepenult. r. *be ſo called.* p. 28. l. 30. for *vivos* r. *vetos.* p 31. l. 42. for *the* r. *them.* p. 51. l. 34. for *now* r. *enough.* p. 97. l. 45. r. *on beleeving.* p. 109. l. 17. for *graceſull* r. *grateſull.* p. 110. l. 31. r. *in diem.* p. 111. l. 9. r. *whither.* p. 121. l. 25. r. *efficientes.* p. 123. l. 6. for *only* r. *wholly.* l. 24. r, *he that proves.* p. 143. l. 37. for *obtrude* r. *obtunde.*

In the Epiſtle before that againſt *L. Colvin.*

Pag. 3. l. 24. for *fear.* r. *bear.* ibid Præf. Apol. p. 3. l. 18. for *meer* r. *neer.* p. 4. l. 13. r. *reverſus.* In the Contents p. 3. l. 6. for *Decree* r. *Degree.*

Againſt *L. C.*

P. 194. l. 3. r. *before both* p. 224 l. 2. r. *work?* and *Diſpoſitio.* p. 229. l. 28. r. *neerly.* p. 237. l. 21. for *after you* r. *ofter than.* p. 250. l. 14. for *becauſe* r. *beſides.* p. 255. l. 38. for *ſins* r. *ſons.* p. 257. l. 35. for *formerly* r. *formally.* p. 282. l. 23. for *Cavell* r. *Ravell.* p. 294. l. 23. for *Relative* r. *declarative.* p. 301. l. 16. r. *intantum.* p. 309. l. antepen. for *Now* r. *Note.* p. 310. l ult. for *ſive de merito* r. *ſine demerito.* p. 324. l. 14. r. *an inſtrument.* p. 326. l. ult. r. *ſalvo.*

Againſt *Crandon.*

Pag. 12. l. 36. for *parties* r. *partes.* p. 15. l. 28. for *endleſſe* r. *ended.* p. 28. l. 2. for *Now* r. *Nor.* p. 35. l. 6. for *wherein* r. *without.* p. 37. l. 14 for *ſolid* r. *ſol'd.* p. 55. l. 8. for *that* r. *the.* l. 14. r. *obtrude.*

WHatſoever hath eſcaped me in theſe Writings that is againſt Meekneſſe, Peace, and Brotherly Love, let it be all unſaid, and hereby revoked, and I deſire the pardon of it from God and Man.

RICHARD BAXTER.

FINIS.